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ABSTRA{;T 
This thesis reprosents the first detailed investigation 
into the career of a neglected British statesman of the 18th 
century. Much new material, including hitherto undiscovered 
letters, has been used to complement official sources. The aim 
of the thesis has been to reconstruct, as fully as the surviving 
evidence permits, ti:lFC full range of Rochford's work as a diplomat, 
with a view to assessing ~is capacity and suitability to direct 
British foreign policy as Secretary of State after 1768. It is 
held that a study e~brac routine work and lesser negotiations 
presents a fairer picture than one which examines only crises or 
major negotiation$'; w"here vital circumstances o:ten lie outside 
1be individual's control. As a career biography, this study is 
not intended to be 'diplomatic history' in th2 uEuallyaccepted 
sense, but only a narrowly prescribed aspect thereof. 
Rochford is revealed to have been an exceptionally diligent 
and well-motivated diplomat, his main strengths bei!lg ; careful 
attention to detail ; thorough preparation even for minor cases 
an ability t(1 "win friends and influence people" ; a realistic 
judgment of how far he could press a forf'J..gn Court without harm 
to his own position ; a talent fo::- finding and rp.tai!:ing able 
subordinates and useful iutelligence contacts ; and a firm grasp 
of the mainspringF; of inte:::'national rela.tions. 
His chief weakness as a l'~gotiator, a tendency to loquacity 
and verbal in.discretion, shown to beat times an effective 
smokesc~een device for a diplomat, out is conceded to be a 
serious fault in a Secretary of stat€'" 
A major theme to emerge f:-om Rochford's routine "It/ork is 
his vigilance in protection of British trading interests, as 
revealed by his clcse de~lings with British Consuls from Turin 
and Hadrid. New light is here cast upon relations between the 
consular and ~iplomatic services in the 18th century. 
Rochford is to be credited with the successful resolution 
of almost all the minor negotiations entrusted to him, by which 
he gained a reputation for tact and firmness. Zven in those 
incapable of success, he is sho~~ to have gained more than most 
would be content with. His enthusiasm and initiative frequently 
led him to anticipate instructions, but usually with accuracy 
and subsequent comme~dation. 
In ten years' service, he was only twice rebuked, the first 
at 'I'urin being w}:olly undeserved. The second, during the Falkland 
Crisis of 1766, stemmed from unclear instructions, for which 
Shelburne apologised, and a major misunderstanding, in which 
Rochford's aSsumptic~, being based on his Madrid c~perience, was 
probably the more realistic. The account of this negotiation 
makes use for the first time of an important secret correspondence 
missing from the State Pauers. Rochford 1 s failure in the crisis 
over Corsica in 1768 is show~ to bej~esponsibility of a weak and 
divided Hinistry which failed to support his O\in spirited tone. 
In the final assessment, it concluded that while he was 
not brilliant, and probably lacked the essential qualities for 
greatness, Rochford may now be regarded as an exceptionally able 
diplomat, diligent and painstaking yet not without breadth of 
vision, ... "'hich made him, if not the ideal candidate to be .. Secretary 
of state, then at least (in Newcastle's words) lithe fittest for 
it of any man in Englandll of his time. 
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PREFACE 
Despite the general title \'lith which it was first 
registered~ this thesis in not strictly a piece of diplomatic 
history. As such, it would be a bad example of that unfashionable 
though necessary branch of inquiry, since its sources are almost 
entirely British and .its frame of reference arbitrarily narrow. 
It is, as the second and more specific titl~ suggests, an essay 
in quite another unfashionable historical ~ode, namely, that of 
career biography. Yet even if one leaves aside for a moment the 
many weighty objections tv the biographical approach, there still 
remains the curious fact that this present contribution is really 
a biography manque 1 since it covers only the first par·;; of its 
subject's life and stops shvrt of that which may be thought, in 
terms of public of rice , the more important part. How tbis came 
a.bout deserves some preliminary explanation. 
The pages which follow together constitute the tangible 
product of a Mixed-Tenure Postgraduate Scholarship awarded by the 
New Zealand University Grants Committee in 1970. The terms of this 
award provide for a year'~ preliminary work within New Zealand, 
a period of no more than twelve months overseas, a:nd a final year 
in New Zealand preparing a thesis for the Ph.D. degree. This new 
form of postgraduate award is intended to foster the growth of 
Ph.D. schools within New Zealand, and in the case of History, to 
encourage research in fields other than local history which are 
currently taught in Ne\'1 Zealand universities. 
I was advised at an early stage to seek if possible 
a topic in Early Modern European History, since this field not 
only figured prominently in almost every History degree course 
in this country, but also seemed perennially difficult to staff. 
There was, of course, the problem of reconciling a year's initial 
research with the very limited resources available witilin New 
Zealand for such a field. Nevertheless, I proceeded in the 
i 
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knowledge that the University of Canterbury pOHsesses a very full 
collection of printed and microfilmed source material for British 
history in the early part of the reign of George III, amassed by a 
former Head of the History Department, Professor N.C. Phillips. 
Initially, I thought in terms of a Namierite topic in political 
history, but again I was strongly advised to seek a European 
rather than a purely British topic t or a-t least a 'British topic 
with a European twist. This advice led me obviously enough to 
diplomatic hist~ry, as an area in which the primary sources were 
not only well defined but more easily available in microfilm form 
this seemed an important consideration in view of my limited time 
overseas and my remoteness from the archives \Y'hilst writing the 
thesis. 
Whilst reading in search of a suitf'.ble topic, I \1aS struck 
by the dearth of scholarly studies on British foreign policy in the 
period 1763 to 1775, between the Seven Years' v/ar and t:ne \~ar of 
American Independence. And of all the diplomate:: a:ad statesmen then 
charged with tl.e conduct of British forei~n ~olicy, none seeme~ 
quite so central yet so enigmatic and obscure as the fourth Earl of 
Rochford. 
Even at a superficial glance, Rochford's career seem~d to 
embrace at once a unity and a breadth of experience exceptional in 
the British diplom~tic service at this time. As Britain's Ambassador 
at Nadrid after thE:- Peaee of Paris (1763), hv had charge of several 
important negotiations arising from the peace treaty, and after his 
transfer to Paris, he performed vital roles in the first Falkland 
Islands Crisis of 1766 and the crisis over the French acquisition 
of Corsica in 1768. As Secretary of State after 1768, he first 
served two years in the unfamiliar Northern Department, before being 
transferred to the more congenial Southern Depar-t:nent at the height 
of the second and w.('re critical Falklands Crisis of 1770. His term 
of office in the Scuthern Department until 1775 \1aS the longest of 
any incumbent since Hewc~:stle's 1724-1746 tenure. In theory at least, 
Rochford waz exceptionally well-qualified to direct British foreign 
policy towards the rest of Europe. But was he so in practice ? 
Where may one turn for a scholarly study of his career, or indeed 
any part of it ? 
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Apart from the able and fairly accurate article by 
Thomas Seccombein the Dictionary of NatiollLll Biography (XXI, 1344-
1346 ; under Zuylestein), and the usual bare notices ill the peerages 
and biographical di~tionaries, there is to my knowledge only one 
published item specifically concerned ';"lith t.le career of the fourth 
Earl of Rochford. This is a short article by an a~~teu:' genealogist 
(K. Walker, tll;Tilliam Henry, Earl of Rochford ; an Essex 1)iploma t til 
Essex Review, XLVI (1937), 65-72), which adds only ~ few local and 
personal details to the DNB article, yet describes Rochford as 
Ita diplomat who was not diplomatic, and a politician far from politic,' 
without advancing any serious evidence for either opinion. 
Modern historians appear in general to have looked no 
farther than the most readily available cont~mporaryestimate of 
Rochford, in Horace Walpolets Memoirs of the Reign of Geo£ge III 
(in G.F. Barker's i895 editi')n, III, 168) ; "a man of no abilities 
and of as little k.nowledge, except in the routine of office. 1I From 
this and Walpole's other scathing remarks, it way have b~en thought 
there was no p~int in examining the career o~ an acknowledged 
mediocrity. \'lalpol~ cannot, however, be regarded us an impartial 
observer, especi«lly not in this case he had taken an intense 
dislike to Rochford on account of his part in -!;he 1772 Royal MQ.rriages 
Act which directly affected Walpole's niece. 
Even had the task of investigating Rochford's career 
seemed worthvlhile, there st-,ill remained a difficulty over his papers. 
Archdeacon Coxe consulted. ~{ochford's private papers at St Osyth when 
preparing his Memoirs of 1;.1:1e Kings of Spain of the HO'lse of Bourbon 
(see the Introdt:ction to the 2nd edition, 1815), but he cited only 
the official correspondence now available at the Public Record Office, 
London. Even the copies he had made from Rochford1s,private papers 
included only a handful of letters not found in the Record Office 
(see British Huseum, Additional Hanuscripts 9242, Cox€: Papers). Since 
then, Rochford's private papers seemed to have disappeared without 
trace, and as recently as 1961 it was declared that they had not 
been found (see The Fourth Earl of Sandwich, Diploma,tic Correspondence 
1763-1765, edited by F. Spencer (Manchester,1961), p.124). However, 
it may be seen from the Note which follOWS this Preface that many 
letters have survived, though widely scattered, and have been used 
for this thesis .. 
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As a result of the apparent absence of papers, and also 
possibly thanks to Horace \.,ralpole' s slightil~g estimation, Rochford 
has been sadly neglected by most writers on the eighteenth century, 
barely rating a mention in the standard histories of the period. 
In large part, of course, this reflects the 5eneral neglect of 
British foreign policy in the period 1763 to 1775. Fo~tunately, 
in recent years this neglect has begun to be remedied, brInging 
more frequent reference to Rochford both as a diploillat and as 
Secretary of State. (See in particular the work of ,Professor Michael 
Roberts, his article "Great Britain and the Swedi.3h Revolution, 
1772-3," in Historical ,journal, VII (1964), 1-46~ and his 1969 
Stenton Lecture, Splendid Isolation, 1763-1780 (Heading,1970) ; 
in addition to Srencer's wcrk on Sandvlich, m~ntioned above, see also 
Dr M.S. Anderson's various a~ticles on Anglo-Russian relations.) 
The glimpses thus revealed suggest a somewhat different picture of 
Rochford than that given by Horace Walpole, and a detailed study of 
Rochford r s career is now not only long overdue but incree.singly 
necessary to Ol'r understanding of British foreign policy after 
1763. 
My origjnal plen for this thesis, upon which I commenced 
preliminary work in 1970 and began gathering naterial in the Urited 
Kingdom in 1971, was therefore to review Rochford's two major 
embassies at Hadrid and Paris, and to examine in detail his Southern 
Secretaryship, with aL emphasis on Britain's relations with France 
and Spain. Two circ..tlllstr ..... nc'Js intervened, however, tv alter this plan. 
The first was a dawning realization that twelve months were simply 
not enough for the research necessary to do justice to all the 
ramifications of Rochford's Secretaryship. The seconu was my timely 
and exciting discovery of a useful c&che of Rochfor1~6 papers in the 
possession of one branch of his descendants. Th~se papers, however, 
were largely related to Rochford's very first post at Turin (1749-
1755), which had figured nowhere in my original plan. 
I was rescued :!.'rom my dilemma by Professor ~.H. Hatton, 
who advised me to make full use of this find, by devoting the thesis 
to Rochford's diplomatic career, reserving his Secretaryship for 
further research at a later date. Hence the present scope of the 
thesis, and the haste ''lith which it has been \<Tritten. Though it is 
only half the full story, even this half strains the bound~ of a 
thesis. 
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My aim has therefore Dean dbsentially quite simple : 
to assess, on the b~sis of a detailed examination of his diplomatic 
career, Rochforct's abilities as a diplomat and his suitability to 
take charge of British for~ign policy as Secretary of State. 
'The questions which I seek to answer are r?ther elementary 
and closely related to reconstructing Rochford's life and work: 
apart from the obviou3 fclcts about his family background, early life, 
marriage, and political conncxions, why did he enter the diplomatic 
service? was he diligent or lazy? did he always have to be 
prodded by instructions, or did he use his initiative? if so, how 
wis~? did he ever commit any 'serious blunders? \laS he ever 
rebuked, praised, OI' commended? how well did he come to understand 
the Courts to which he was appointed? how accurate was his 
assessment of personaJ.ities? what was his standing at foreign 
Courts? with other foreign ministers? was h<> liked and respected., 
nr distrusted and scorned? how efficient W2~ his collection of 
informatioc? did he attract and retain reliable sources of secret 
intelligence? how useful were his reports? were his dispatches 
clear and judicj~us, or muddled anJ alarmist? was he attentive to 
routine matters a6 we:;"l as the big negotiations? how well did he 
prepare himself by stUdying the background of particular cases ? 
in specific negotiations, how well did he press Britain's case? 
what sort of a negotiator Was he? supple and shrewd, or obtuse and 
easily hoodwinked? what were his main weaknesses ? his worst 
failures? did I.e possess any skill as a diplomat ? did he obtain 
any insight into European affairs? In short, if this thesis has 
any single aim, it is to test Horace Walpole's estimation : was 
Rochford in fact "a man of no abilities" ? 
Though the bulk of the evidence which I present in answer 
to these and similar questions is fresh in the sense that it has not 
been used before, i~ also has the disadvantage of depicting Rochford 
largely as he wished himself to be seen. My most difficult task has 
been to find either corroborative or contrasting testimony from 
other sources, and to mai~t~in a sufficiently critical view of my 
subject. Hy success or failure in this respect may well prove the 
crucial test for the value of this thesis as a career biography, 
and as a contribution to the study of the British diplomatic 
service in the eighteenth century. As mentioned at the start 
of this Preface, I make no claim for this thesis as a piece of 
diplomatic. history, especially in the chapters which treat of 
major negotiatior,s in which Rochford was involved. Here my 
narrowly biographical approach may seem to resemble something 
akin to tightrope-walking rather than good diplomatic history. 
Even so, while not actually intended, it is possible that my 
use of fresh material may shed a few glimmers of new light on 
certain minor aspects of European. diplomacy in this period. 
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NOTE ON I'1ANUSCRIPT SOURCES 
The chief manuscript source for this thesis has been 
Rochford's' officia.l jiplo:natic correspondence contained in the 
relevant volumes of State Papers, Foreign, at the Public Record 
Office, London. Details of these volumes are given in the first 
part of my Bibliography. This Note is merely to indicat6 the 
extent to which I have been able to trace Rochford'3 surviving 
private corresr~ndence. 
The obvious place to look for Rochford's own letters 
is in the collections of those to whom he wrote, where these 
have survived. This has indeed been a fruitfl1,l line of inquiry, 
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but most of the material thus traced is concerned with Rochford's 
Secretaryship, as in the Dartmouth andGrant~am Papers, along with 
many others ; these figure nowhere in this thesis. Of those which 
contain material relating to his diplomatic career, the Newcastle 
and Hardwicke P['.pers in the British Museum are perhaps the richest, 
bu,t the most valuable has probably been J~:ne Shelburne Papers, now 
at the \:lilliam L. Clements L:.brary of the University of I1ichigan. 
Here is found the vital secret correspondence ~egarding the first 
Falkland Islands Crisis of 1766 t \o1hich is missing from tl1e State 
Papers. 
The search for Rochford's own private papers, which would 
comprise his drafts and received correspondence, has been mOre 
frustrating but also not without reward. The Essex RAcord Office, 
my first place of inquiry, has a number of deeds, wills, and estate 
records receive~ from solicitors, but no private pap~rs or Rochford 
correspondence from the eighteenth century. Nor ar€J there any 
Rochford papers remaining at St Osyth, the form~r family seat. 
The estate was sold not long after the death of TIochford's grandson 
in 1857, and though the contents of the house appear to have been 
kept intact until the end of the century, there was a complete 
clearance sale of furniture, paintings, and household effects in 
1920 which may have included old papers aL10ngst the ,contents of the 
library. 
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However, thanks to the Notes on Migrations of HSS in 
the Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, VIII (1930-3'1), 
191-2, I was able to obtain details, of a sale of Rochford's 
diploma.tic papers at Sotheby's in London on 16 December 1930. 
This collection, comprising some 750 items from Rochford's three 
postings (though nothing oarlier or later, and no family papers 
as such), was unfortunately split up and dispersed to several 
dealers, none of whom has any record of subsequent disp06als. 
It is possible ~hatthis was not the only sale of Rochford papers 
at this time, t:i.ough I have been unable to trace any others. 
The dealers with whom I corresponded over this sale 
suggested that a brok<7u collection at that particular time probably 
crossed sooner or later to the U.S.A., there to be further scattered 
as individual aut.ograph specimens. In the course of my inquiries 
1;0 some twenty-nir.e likely repositories acro.3S the U.S.A", I have 
succeeded in tracing only about 80 Rochford letters, some of "lhich 
do not appear to have been part of the 1930 sale at Sotheby's. 
The largest si:r[';le group has been collected by Dr Wilmarth Sheldon 
Lewis, director of the Yale edition of IIura~e ilalpole t s Correspondence, 
and is now preserved in his l;!alpole Library at Farmington. 
The last line of approach, that of <::. ttempting to trat:e 
Rochford's descendants, has been the most interesting and rewarding 
of all. The Nassau family of Palmers Green, and Hr T.L. Braddell of 
Winchmore Hill, have Do few family mementos br.~ no papers at all. 
However, thanks to :,he kin~ness of Hr Kenneth \valkel', I was introduced 
to Hr and Brs \oJ.F. Nassau of Hampstead, London, who ::':'eadily gave me 
access to the only papers still in their possession. These consist 
of some 370 items, mostly foul drafts and minor correBpondence 
from Rochford's Turin ministry, though with a few H::ldrid and Paris 
items. This boxful may represent the leavings after the selection 
made for the 1930 Sotheby's sale. These papers, which I was 
permitted to notify to the National Register of Archives, and to 
calendar according to th~ir advice, I have cited as the Nassau 
Papers. 
HO'lIE ON DATES, ABBREVIATIONS, AND FOREIGN NAMES 
1. The calendar used in Britain before 1752 was the Julian 
or Old Style, which was eleven days behind that used in 
almost all other European countries, namely 1;he Gregorian or 
New Style. In consequenco of Chesterfield I s Act of 175'1 
(24 George II, cap.23), Britain changed to the New Style in 1752 
by omitting eleven days between 2 and 14 September, thus preserving 
the succession 0f days of the week. 
In this thesis, the few documents which a.re identified 
only by the Old Style are cited with the abbr·:viation O.S. 
All other dates before and after 1752 are giveil ir. New Style. 
2. Rather than begin vdth a pretentious list of lit!;le-used 
abbreViations, I hdve adopted the principle of giving 
each reference ill full in the first instance. 'l'hereafter I will 
give, for manun:,:!'ipt sources the most widely D.t1cepted abbreviation 
(for example, SP for State Papers,Foreign, Public Record. Office), 
and for secondary sources an i.dentifiable shortened title. avoiding 
wherever possible the ugly and confusing abbreviation op.cit. 
My spellir.g of- foreign names has been consciously 
inconsistp.nt. Some less well-known names have been 
retained in their 0cigir.al. but most have been rendered either 
in the most convenient anglicized form, or that which Rochford 
adopted in his dispatchBs~ For example, I give Leghorn for Livorno, 
but Squilaci for Esquilache. 
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Family Background and Early Life 
Frederick van Nassau, Lord of Zuyle~t€in ; his English 
marriage 1648 ; Governor to William III of Orange ; 
visit to England 1670 ; killed 1672. 
his son William Henry ; flirtation, scandal, and 
marriage 1680-81 ; Zuylestein's role in the IlGlorious 
Revolution," 1688-89 ; campaigns ~n Ireland and Fla..'1.ders 
created 1st Earl of Rochford 1695. 
Viscount Tunbridge ; soldier under Ormonde ; ADO to 
Marlborough at Blenheim ; becomes 2nd Earl of Rochford 
1708 ; killed in Spain 1710. 
Frederick succeedo as 3rd Earl ; hls marriagu to an 
heiress, Bessy Savage ; the st Osyth estate ; his brother 
Henry at Easton, Suffolk ; Fredericl;;: t s death 1738. 
William Henry Nassau de Zuylestein ; childhood obscure 
brother Richard Savage Nassau ; sohool-friends at Eto!J. 
travels to Switzerland. 
becomes 4th Earl of Rochford 1738 ; Gentleman of the 
B .. dchamber ; inherits Easton ; his lliarriage to Lucy 
Younge 1742. 
their correspondence with David Garrickche a(;tor ; 
Rochford's philosophy; his interest in the t~eatre ; 
Beaumarchais. 
Rochford at st Osyth ; Essex friends ; ~ountry diversions ; 
town house at Berkeley Square ; Richard marries a neighbour, 
the Dowager Duchess of Hamilton. 
Lucy and the Duke of Cumberland ; Cumberland as patron 
Rochford's ambitions for high off~ce ; d~cideG on a 
diplomatic career. 
appointment to Turin 1749 admitted to White's Club 
vJalpole comments to Hann •. 
departure from England ; sojourn in P~ris ; an invitation 
to Geneva declined ; journeys direct to Tarin. 
CHAPTER 1 
Family Background and Ear11~Life 
I. William Hen.ry Nassau de Zuylestein (1717-1781) was the 
fourth and penultimate Earl of Rochford : t:le title became extinct 
in 1830 at the death of his bachelor nephew. 1 The ::-!ochford 
Earldom (1695) was a cre~tion of William III, in favour of a 
Dutch family ciosely related to him which had chonen to settle in 
England after the uGlorious RevolutionU of 1689. While the fourth 
Earl of Rochford was apparently the first Nassau-Zuylestein to be 
born and educated as an Englishman, the marriages of two of his 
forebears had already made the family half-~glish even before 
its naturalization in 1689. 
The Ne.ssau-Zuylestein family was founded by I'recierick 
van Nassau (1 ')c!4-1672). He was an illegitir.lata son of the Prince 
of Orange, FredsI"ick Henry (1584-1647)~ and ther.:fore h&~f-brothe:r 
to Prince William II of Orange (1626-1650), as well as grandson of 
'William I, called William the Silent. 2 Frederick van Nassau was 
greatly favoured by his father, who in May 1640 conferred on him 
the manors of Zuylestein ~nd Leersum in the County of Utrecht. 3 
1. G.E. Cockayne, the ComE!ete Peera~e, XI, edited by G.H. White 
(London,1959), pp.53-55. The family of Queen Anne B~leyn had been 
only Barons and Viscounts Rochford in the sixteenth century ; see 
The Complete Peerage, XI, pp.51-52. The Earls of ~ochford ought 
not to be confused with the Rochfort family of Co. \<iestmeath, Ireland~ 
who became (1756) Earls of Belvedere ; The C~~Elete Peerage, II, 114. 
2. See the Genealogic,l,l Chart, Appendix A. The Com'Plete Peerase, XI, 
p.52, note Cal, follows the Dictionary of National.Biograph! 
(hereafter cited as D.N.L.), XXI, p.1j41 , in giving 1608 as the 
date of birth of Freder~ck van Nassau, but this has been established 
as 27 I'larch 1624 ; see W.M.C. Regt, IINassau-Zuylesteir..ll, in 
Genealogische en Heraldische Bladen (1907), pp.486~501. 
3. Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch vioordenboek, I, .pp.1358-1359. See also 
A.J. van der Aa, Aardrijkskundig ~joordenboek der Nederlande,n (1851), 
pp.528-529. Zuylestein lay between Leersum and Amerongen, some 
25 kilometres south-east of Utrecht.(not Uabout a mile ll as in D.N.B.) 
The Huis Zuylestein WaS destroyed during the Second World War. 
As Lord of Zuylestein and Leersum, Frederick ~an Nassau was 
admitted to the Provincial House of the Knights of Utrecht, and 
in August 1640 be~ame a Captain in the Infantry of the states-
General.- He was later promoted Lieutenant-Colonel of the Utrecht 
Regiment, and from 1646 he was Military Commander of Utrecht. 4 
Now known simply as Zuylestein, Frederick was married 
at the Hague in October 1648. His bride was an E~glishwoman, 
Mary Killigre'-.;" t who had come to Holland as a Naid of Honour to 
the Princess Mary when she married William II of Orange. It was 
a popular match, betWeen a handsome favourite and a leading 
court beauty. Within a ;,ear, Mary bore ZU.1lestein a son, who 
was named WilliaJl Henry; he it was who lacer became th.e first 
Earl of Rochford. 5 
The young Zuylestein family remained close fayourites 
of the Prince and Princess of Orange, r ... i.ld a strong bond existeJ 
between William II and his dashing half-brother, terminated only 
by that Prince's untimp.ly death in 1650,baI'Slly a few days bt.fore 
the birth of his successor, William III (1650-1702). When the 
time came to appoint a Governor for the in~ant Prince of Orange, 
Zuylestein was t~e only nominee Princess Mary would countenance. 
She rightly believed that Zuylestein' s strong-wille'i English wife 
would redeem his easy-going nature, and their son Vv'illiam Henry 
was already the Prince's constant playmate when Zuylestein was 
appointed Governor in 1659. 6 
4. These details lowe to Jonkheer F.G.L.O. van Kretsehm~r, Director 
of the Stichting Iconografisch Bureau at the Hague. 
2. 
5. He was baptised on 7 October 1649 ; The Complete P,eerage, XI, p.52. 
The D.N.B. gives the marriage as 164~, and the birth as May 1645. 
6. Zuylestein's Instructions as Governor are summarized at length in 
Marjorie Bowen, William, Prince of Orange, 1650-167~ (London,1928), 
but for a more recent account of Zuylestein's early career, see 
Nesca A. Robb, William ·of Oran e . Part I The Earl Years 16 0-
1673 (London,1962), pp. 4 , 9 , 95-97, 113. 149. stephen B. Baxter, 
William III (London,1966)~ pp.22-24, thinks Zuylestein's poverty 
and laziness made him tfa most unsuitable choice tl as Governor j yet 
concedes (pp-36-37) that he had a civilizing influence on the boy_ 
3. 
Prince William b.ecame deeply· attached. ~o his chee .... 'ful 
and indulgent "uncle" as Governor, and bitterly resented his 
replacement in 1666 by a de Witt partisan.? Nevertheless, Zuylestein 
accompanied the Prince on a visit to England in the winter of 1670, 
and was the only person to whom William co:ufided the startling 
disclosures made to him by Charles II regarding hid religious views. 
Zuylestein was also one of the select few who received honorary 
degrees with William at Oxford during this visit. 8 
William III became stadholder in July 1672, in the depths 
of the crisis causeo. by the French invasion of that year. His 
assumption of power was yet further overshadowed by the murder of 
the de Witt brothers on 20 August at the hoads of the Hague mob. 
Zuylestein has traditionally been vilified for his share in this 
sordid affray. he was certainly instrumental in the earlier 
arrest of Cor .. 'lelis de Witt, but the evident;'e for his preFencl; in 
the crowd that fatal afternoon remains inconclusive. 9 
Whatever Zuylesteinfs actual compli;ity, he r3tained 
William's favour, which had already been manifest in his steady 
10 
military adVanceMent. He naturally took a leading role in the 
campaign to repulee the French invasion, but it ~ ... as in this service 
that he met an end no less brutal than that of the de Witt brothers. 
After helping "'0 recapture the town of Woerden in C".ltober 1672 t 
Zuylestein was caught in a sudden French counter-e.ttack on the 
7. Robb, William of Ot:"ar:fi' I, pp.113, 149. See also P. Geyl, 
Orange and stuart. 16 ~-1672,(Londont1969 ;transla.ted from the 
1939 Dutch edition.), pp. 131, 147-148, 198, 242-243. 
8. Burnet's History of His Own Time (London,1838), II, p.185. Robb, 
William of Orange,I, pp.178, 187. Zuylestein was in London on 
15 December 1670 when he supped with the diarist Evelyn Diary, 
edited by E.S. de Beer (Oxford,1955), III, p.565. 
9. Baxter, vlilliam lIlt pp.8o-84. 
10. promoted Colonel, 1658 ; Lieutenant-General, January 1668; 
Governor of Breda, April 1670 ; General of Infantry, 1672~ These 
detailS I owe to Kretschmar (see note 4). I have not yet seen 
E.B.F. Witterst van Hoogalnd, De aftstammelingen Van prins·Frederik 
Hendrikvan Oranje I 5 erkende zoon l"rederik van Nassau, 1st Heel' van 
Zu;,(lestein ('rhe Hague, 1909). 
night of ~2 October : he was cornered in a farm-house and 
hacked to death. 11 
His son William Henry, now Lord of Zuylestein at the 
age of twenty three, had entered the army as a Cavalry Captain 
only a. month before. He had inherited his father I se.ffable charm 
and handsome appearance, as well as the favour of William III. 12 
Having been childhood playmates, the two cousins remained close 
companions, and Zuylestein's loyalty was repaid by military 
4. 
promotion. He became a I'iajor in William's own Life Guards in 1674, 
and by 1682 had become the Prince's Adjutant-Gene=al. 13 
The younger Zuylestein followed his father's example- in 
marrying an Englishwoman, who was by an odd coincidence Naid of 
Honour to anothe~ English Princess, but thiscime .the ~ircumstances 
were sadly different. Since 1678, and encouraged by William, 
Zuyle~tein had been busily courting a wealthy and beautiful heiress, 
Elizabeth i'ompe, who exactly fitted William's notion of a suitabl9-
match for his lifelong friend. However, Zuylestein was also 
flirting at the Hague with one Jane Wroth, a plain and penniless 
Maid of Honour to William t s English wife, th·') Princess Mary. 
The result of this dalliance was that in 1680 JanB became pregnant. 
Zuylestein is reported to have been frantic with rage and vexation 
at the thought of losing his heiress, and Nilliam sympathized, 
instructing Zuylestein to ignore Jane's demands of marriage. The 
extent of Princess Mary's intervention is not clear, but her Chaplain 
Ken finally prevailed upon Zuylestein to marr~ Jane while William 
11. Robb, William of Orange, It p.266. Baxter,William III, p.95. 
12. Robb, William of Orange, I, p.114. The portrait reproduced in 
Marjorie Bowen's William, Prince of Orange, opposite p.262, as 
William Frederick (sic) Nassau de Zuylestein, is now thought to 
be of the elder Zuylestein, c.1665, possibly by Pieter Nason, but 
certainly not by Lely. Formerly at Zuylestein, it is now kept 
along with a named portrait of William Henry at nearby Amerongen, 
estate of the late Count van Aldenburg-Bentinck. lowe this point 
to Jonkheer Kretschmar of the stichting Iconografisch Bureau. 
13. W.M.C. Regt, IfNassau-i1uylesteinn, in Genealosischeen Heraldische 
Bladen (1907), pp .. 491-492. 
5. 
was absent at Amst':rdam in Fe'!.,,\ruary ~681. This hasty ceremony 
barely preceded ths birth of the child. Although William was 
greatly angered on his return to discover what had happened, he 
soon accepted the fait accompli, and the Zuylesteins emerged from 
disgrace to reeume a favoured position at Court. 14 
The Zuylestein child was a daughter, Anna, but a son and 
heir was born in the following year who was named after his father 
this younger William Henry (1682-1710) later became the second 
Ea~ of Rochford. ~hese were the earliest of eight ~urviving 
children. 15 Though it was productive, the marriag(:! does not seem 
to have been happy: Zuylestein's libidinous privat~ life caused 
Jane to seek solace in drink, and she finally became mentally 
unstable after the birth of her last child. 16 
III public J.:i.fe, Zuylestein remained a boon companion to 
William III. One recent writer ~escribes ~uylestein thus : 
t'handsome, witty and polite, but incurably lazy and self-indulgent, 
he was often a d~:sappointment but never lost William t s affection." 17 
In return However, Zu~lestein gave William unswerving personal 
loyalty, and rendered useful service in the preliminaries to the 
tlOlorious RevolutionU of 1688-89, justifying the trust William 
placed in him and further illustrating the close connexion between 
the Nassau-Zuylestein fnmily and the House of Orange. 
14. Robb, \villiam of (,r_ange, II, The Later Years, 1674-1702 (London, 
1966), pp.163-165,J.s the best recent account, based on the 
Zoutelandt Memoires (1710), and Huygens's Correspondance, VIII, 319, 
and Journaal, IV, 74. See also E. Hamilton, v/illiam's Hary i 
A Biography of Nary II (London,1972), pp.109-110. Earlier accounts 
appear in Strickland's IJives of the Queens of England (London,1877), 
V, 437-438 (naming Zuylestein's wife as Mary Worth), and in 
Plumptrets Life of Ken, I, 144. Brief mention occurs in Spence's 
Observations, Anecdotes, etc., edited by J.M. Osborn (Oxford,1966), 
I, 329. 
15. For the remaining members of the family, see Arthur Collins, 
The Peerage of England (5th edition, London,1779), IV, 142. 
16. Robb, \villiam of Oranse, II, p.164 .. 
17. Robb, William of Orange, II, p.226. 
18. 
20. 
Zuylestein twice carried official letters from the 
Rouse of Orange to the English royal family; in August 1687, 
to the Queen, Mary of Hodena, on the death of her mother, and 
again in June 1688 on the birth of a son to James II. On both 
6. 
occasions, Zuylestein held private discussions with 1euding English 
politicians, who entrusted him with secret letters ~xpr~ssing the 
nation's discontent under James and their personal support for 
18 the protestan:; Rouse of Orange. 
The assurances conveyed by these letters were instrumental 
in helping William to decide to take an army across to England, 
so that Zuylestl.'in f 5 preliminary reconnaissallce t:ork is not .wi thout 
significance. Though be attended William throughout, hid role in 
the remainder of the IIRevolution" \tlas not: nearly so vi tal ; his 
most notable task was to carry William's ter~s to Whitehall on 
16 December 1688, shortly before James fled the country. 19 
Willia~ and Mary accepted the offer of the Crown on 
13 February 1689, and were formally proclaimed King and Queen of 
England on 11 April. ~n demonstration of his continued loyalty, 
Zuylestein became naturalized on 11 May, as William Henry Nassau 
. de Zuylestein. On 23 1';ay, he was rewarded with a Court appointment 
as Master of the Robes. Also about this time he was made Secretary 
for foreign dispatches to Holland and Germany, but unlike some of 
William's closer associates such as Bentinck, he was not as yet 
given a.n English peerage. For the next five years, Zuylestein 
served his kingly cousin as a soldier. 20 
H. Ashley, The Glorious Revolution of 1688 (London,1966), 1'1'.87, 
91-92, quoting Dalrymple's Bemoirs (London,1753), II, 200. 
See also Danby's Letters, edited by A .. Browning (Glasgow,1951), II, 
118-119, and Strickland, Lives of the Queens of England, V, 33, 56 .. 
Zuylestein was promoted Najor-General in the Dutch army for his 
work in London ; Robb, William of Orange, II, 261. For Zuylesteints 
movements during the revolution, see Burnet's History of His Own 
Times, II, 479, 506 ; Ash~ey, Glorious Revolution, 118, 12}, 127, 
1(;0-176, 197 ; Baxter, \villiam 11,1, 241-249. 
Collins, Peerage" IV, 141-142 ; Robb, jlilliam of Orang;e, II, 289-290. 
Leaving his wife and family ~n their apartments at 
Hampton Court, Zuylestein accompanied William on his summer 
campaign in Ireland in 1690, where his regiment fought at the 
21 Boyne in ·July. He then served in Flanders, and was given 
command of the Dutch Cavalry in December 1691. 22 Such service 
often kept Zuylestein a~ay from Court, where other favourites had 
appeared now that Willia~ II! was King of England. Early in 1695, 
Zuylestein was asked to relinquish his office of Master of the 
Robes in favour of van Keppel. soon to be created first Earl of 
Albemarle. But Zuylestein yielded his office with good grace, and 
in recompense, on 10 May 1695, he was himself made Baron Enfield, 
Viscount Tunbridge, and first Earl of Rochford. 23 
The new Earl of Rochford took his seat in the House of 
Lords on 20 February 1696~ 24 Since he lacked any substantial 
personal fo~tuAe, the title had been accompanied by a grant of 
part of the lands of the exiled Powis family, including Powis Castle 
in Montgomeryshile, as well as a yearly pension of if,; 1000 and some 
confiscated lands in IrelarLd. 25 These grants enabled the new 
Earl to purcha6~ a small estate at Easton in Suffolk, which was to 
remain in the family far longer than Powis or the Irish lands. 26 
21. Hamilton, William's Mary (1972), p.220 ; Robb, William of Orange, 
II, 316. He carried letters to London in August 1690, where Queen 
Mary received him "so tanned he frights me." D.N.B. XXI, 1342. 
He made a brief visit to Holland with William in January 1691 ; see 
Narcissus Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs, 
1678-1714 (Oxford,1857), II, 165, 230. 
22. He was wounded at Neerwinden in July 1693, but his ~egiment was 
again ordered to Flanders in November ; Luttrell, Brief Relation, 
lIt 318, 369 ; III, 146, 150, 151, 157, 225. 
23. Luttrell, Brief Relation, III, 467 ; Collins, Peerase, IV, 142. 
24. Journal of the House of Lords, XV, 675; Luttrell, IV, 20. 
25. Luttrell, Brief Relation, III, 467, 470, 472 ; D.N.B. XXI, 1343. 
26. Easton was bought from the Wingfield family, who had built the 
white-brick mansion about 1630 ; see Whitets Gazetteer of Suffolk 
(1844), pp.184-185. The White House was demolished about 1924, 
having been the residence of the Dukes of Hamilton. .. 
After the death of William III in 1702, the first Earl 
of Rochford-retired to Zuylestein, where his Lady, the unfortunate 
Jane Wroth, died in the follo\.ving year. 27 Apart from a short 
visit to -England in 1705, possibly to inspect the murals being 
painted by Lanscroon at Powis Castle in that year, 28 Rochford 
continued to live in seclusion at Zuylestein, his health steadily 
deteriorating, until his death on 12 July 1708. 29 
He was succeeded as Earl of Rochiord by his eldest son 
and namesake, William Henry (1682-1710), who had already made a 
name for himself as Viscount Tunbridge, l*lhich he had been styled 
8. 
since 1695. Becaus~ of his father's illne5~, Tunbridge had in 1697 
taken over the post of Secretary for foreign dispatches to Holland 
and Germany, and later that year he was Bent to Paris to prepare 
for the embassy of William Bentinck, first Earl of Portland. 30 
But this early taste of diplomatic business does not seem to have 
attracted Tunbridge, who like his father and grandfather chose 
. a mili"&ary career. 
Thanks to the patronage of his father's friend Ormonde, 
Tunbridge was appointed Aide de Camp to Marlborough in time for the 
Flanders campaign of 1704. Marlborough thou8~t well of Tunbridge, 
describing him as !tun jeune seigneur qui prcmet beaucouptl, and 
gave him the honour of carrying to Queen Anne the report of the 
victory at Blenheim. 31 Ormonde having obtained his commission as 
Lieutenant-Colonel in the Guards in January 1705, Tunbridge repaid 
this favour by keeping Or~onde supplied with choice wines from 
27. He landed in Holland 23 August 1702 i Collins, Peerage, IV, p.142. 
28. See Mark Girouard's article on Powis, Country Life Annual (1967)p.28. 
29. Collins, Peerage, IV, p.142 ; The Complete Peerage gives 2 July. 
30. Luttrell, prief Relation, IV, 305, 320. 
31. He arrived in London on 15 August 1704 ; J.W.E. Doyle, The Official 
Baronage of England (London, 1886) , III, p.163, citing Harlborough's 
Dispatches, I, p.445. See also the D.N.B., XXI, p.1343. 
Holland during that year. Also in 1705, Tunbridge had been elected 
M.P. for Kilkenny in the Irish Parliament, and in Nay 1708 he was 
elected for Steyning in Sussex. 32 
On the death of his fs.ther in July 1708, Tunbridge succeeded 
as the second Earl of Rochford, and took his seat in the House of 
Lords on 16 November 1708. 33 Be did not, however, enjoy his 
earldom long. In 1709 ne led his regiment to Spain, where he was 
soon promoted Brigadier-General. But he was killed on 27 July 1710 
"in the hour of victol."ytt at the battle of Almenara, still unmarried?4 
The Roch£ord title thereupon descended more swiftly than 
expected to the next brother, Frederick (1684-1 738). Though a Knight 
of Utrecht, Frederick was not a professional soldier, and had led 
the life of n country gentleman at Zuy1estein. He now came over to 
settle in England, at Powis Castle. It is thought that the formal 
terraced ga~dens in the Dutch style which are so notable a feature 
atPowis were completed by the third Earl of Rochford. 35 
Frederick was married at Somerset House on 3 August 1714 to 
Elizabeth (Bessy) Savage, a natural daughter of Richard Savage, 
fourth Earl of ~ivers. 36 It seems to have been a calculating 
match, for Bessy was aged only fifteen and was then the principal 
beneficiary of her father's Will. Rivers had died in 1712, leaving 
32. Historical Nanuscripts Commission Reports, series 36, Ormonde l-!SS, 
new series VIII, pp.58-193 passim, calendars the correspondence 
between Tunbridge and Ormonde across 1704 and 1705. 
33. Journal of the House of J ... ords, XVIII, p~576. Barely three weeks 
after his father died, Tunbridge enlisted Ormonde's help towards 
renewing the pension \iilliam III had granted for the support of 
the title; H.M.C. 36 Ormonde }1.SS, new series VIII, p.315. 
34. D.N.B., XXI, p.1343, corrects earlier references which say that he 
was killed at Almanza. 
35. Collins, Peerag;e, IV, p.143. On the gardens at Powis, see Alicia 
Amherst, ~ History of Gardenin~ in England (1896), p.266. 
On Rivers, see D.N.B., XVII, pp.831-833, under Savage. Bessy's 
mother, Elizabeth Colleton, gave consent for her marriage to the 
third Earl of Rochford ; see The Complete Peerage, XI, p.5) .• 
10. 
lands and debts equally vast. The W~ll was contested by the Earl 
of Barrymore, on behalf of his infant daughter ; hor mother, who 
had died in childbirth, was Rivers's only legitimate daughter. 
After a costly suit in Chancery, a private Act of 1721 divided the 
inheritance more equitably ; the Cheshire, Lancashire, and 
Yorkshire lands went to Penelope Barry, while the Essex estates 
were vested in Bessy Rochforu and her descendants. 37 
The chief part of these Essex estates, the historic 
ruined priory at st esyth, was already the main Roohford residence, 
in anticipation of the return of Powis Castle to the pardoned Powia 
/ 
family in 1722. At S~: Oayth, the third Earl of Ro.::hfo:;. .. d commenced 
renovations anQ added a new wing which completed the north-west 
corner of the quadrangle. St Osyth now became the principal seat 
of the Nassau-Zuyleatein f~mily in Englan~, and remained so until 
the mid-nineteenth century~ 38 
Little is known of the third Earl of Rochford. He did not 
take his seat in the Lords until 1713, and apart frorn some very 
minor election correspondence in 1734 see~s not to have taken an 
active part i~ politics. 39 One nearly contemporary report claims 
he was "honoured and esteemed among the Peers, and by all who knew 
him, for his affable deportment and friendly character." 40 This 
estimation agrees with his appearance in a portrait of 1735, though 
41 his geniality was apparently attended by nervousness. 
37. The Act is 7 George I, c.11 ; see Pickering, The Statutes at Larg~ 
(Cambridge,1765), XIV (the private acts are merely listed at the 
front). The provisions of the Act are given in J. Watney, liSt Osyth's 
Prioryu, Essex Archaeolog;cal Society Transactions, V (1873), pp. 
43-44. (previously printed privately, London,1871.) 
:;8. The Rochford wing was demolished about 1858 ; Watney, liSt Osythts 
Priory", pp.44-4,5_ 
39. H.M.C. Reports, Series 63, Egmont Diary, pp. 84, 86-87, 93. 
40. Collins, Peerage (5th edition,1779), IV, p.1 43. 
41. Signed by B. Dandridge, at Brodick Castle, Isle of Arran, now in 
care of the National Trust for Scotland. From a misreading'" of the 
date for 1755, this has long been accepted as the fourth Earl ; 
F.G.L.O. van Kretschmar rectified the dating in 1966.(correspondence 
in the files of the National Portrait Gallery, London.) 
11. 
~he third Earl's younger brother Henry had also settled 
in England after graduating at Leyden in 1728, and rose to the 
rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the British army. He acquired several 
properties-from his brother, notably the estate at Easton in Suffolk, 
and the manors of Weeley and Clacton Magna near St Osyth in Essex. 
Henry remained a bachelor at his death in 1740. 42 
The death .of the third Earl of Rochford occurred in 
London on 14 June 1738, at his house in Grc:at Queen street, Lincoln's 
Inn Fields. 43 His widow Bessy, now Dowager Countess of Rochford, 
immediately remarried in that same year, her second husband being 
an old family friend, the Reverend Philip Ca~ter. Bessy continued 
to live at st Osyth until her own death in 1746. 44 
42. E. Peacock, Index to Eno-lish-s eakin Students Graduated from 
Leyden Universitl London,1 3), p.73 ; Henry l~ved at Clacton 
Magna from 1729 to 1740, ~/here he signed the V<:stry Ninutes from 
1735, but his Will (1738) describes him "of Weeley." See K. Walker's 
~ote in Essex Review, LX (1951), pp.45-6. 
43. Collins, Peerage, IV, 143. 
44. Carter is usually described as being of Tunstall, Suffolk, where 
he became Rector in 1722 ; it is near Easton. He wrote a popular 
ballad in honour of Bessy Rochford, fiAt St Osyth by the Hill", noted 
in the Gentlemans Hagazine (1781), p.490 ; it is printed as an 
Appendix in J. \iatney, St Osyth's Priory (1871), p.119. Though the 
D.N.B., XXI, 1344, states that Bessy was his widow at her death, 
a Philip Carter appears in Rochford legal documents after this date ; 
Essex Record Office, DiDC, r .. T.1., and K. \</alker, "The Nassau Family 
of St Osyth," Essex Review, LI (11;142), p.77. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
I:t. 
The fourth Earl of Rochford, who succeeded to the title 
in June 1738, was born at st Osyth on 27 September 1717. 45 His 
younger brother, Richard Savage Nassau, was born in 1723 they 
12 .. 
were the" only surviving children of Bessy Savage and the third 
Earl of Rochford. In the absence of family papers, nothing is yet 
known of the fourth Earl's childhood, save that he was brought up 
at St Osyth and attended Eton College fro~ 1725 to 1732 as Viscount 
46 Tunbridge. While his headmaster ther~ was the famous Dr George, 
Rochford's education may not have been solely aca~emic, for in 1729 
. 47 the College suffered a serious rebellion with some rioting. 
Several of 'Rochfol'd IS contemporaric;.s at Eton later attained 
high office as S~cretaries of State, notably Conway, Halifax, and 
Sandwich, with whom Rochford had close dealings before reaching 
that office himself. Richard Neville Ald¥nrth, who becMue Bedford's 
Under-Secretary, claimed Rochford, Sandwich, and Orford (Horace 
Walpole) amongst his intimates at Eton. Walpole's lifelong dislike 
of Rochford may have had some childish origin he~e. 48 
The six formative years of Rochfordfs life after leaving 
Eton, until he succeeded as the fourth Earl, rerr.ain largely obscure. 
He is not to be found on either the Oxford or Cambridge lists, 49 
D.N.B., XXI, p.1344, gives only the Old Stile date, 17 September, 
and Collins, Peerage, IV, p.143, gives both styles, 16/27 September, 
but from an autograph letter in my possession, dated 18 September 
1758 at liSt Osyth by the Mill!!, it is clear that Rochford celebrated 
his birthday on the 27th. 
Eton College Register, Part I, 1698-1752, edited by R.A. Austen ... 
Leigh (Eton,1927), pp.345-346. The ComElete Peerage, XI, p.54, 
notes that there is no evidence for the claim in the D.N.B. that 
Rochford attended \'iestminster School ; but his un{;J.e Henry, his 
brother Richard, and his nephew William Henry, all did so (see 
Baker and Stanning, The Record of Old Westminsters, II, p.683. 
H.C. Maxwell-Lyte, A History of Eton College (1877), pp. 296-304. 
Eton College Register, Part I, under Sunbury for Halifax and under 
Hinchinbroke for Sandwich ; D.N.B. XL, pp.298-299 under Neville. 
Foster, Alumni Oxonienses (London,1887-88), and Venn, Alumni 
Cantabrigienses ••• to 1900 (Cambridge,1922-54). 
13. 
bu't "thel"c is evidence to suggest that he may have studied in 
Switzerland. in these years, which would account for his excellent 
command of French. 50 
·Upon his succession to the earldom in 1738, Rochford was 
appointed one of His Majesty's Gentlemen of the Bedchamber, with 
e. salary of £ 1,000 a year. 51 He took his seat in the House of 
Lords on Thursday 1 February 1739, and dutifully attended almost 
every day for the next two months. 52 HE returned for a few days 
in April,. but apart fl"om the Dinely divorce case early in May, 
Rochford did not attend for the remainder of that session. His 
subsequent attendance at the Lords was spol'adic to SB.y the least, 
a~d in this he was not unuBual. 53 
After 1740,:&'ochford had good reason for spending much 
of his time in the country, for in April that year his uncle Henry 
d.ied at Easton in Suffolk, leaving Rochfol'd his sole heir. 54 The 
most valuable part of this legacy was of course Easton itself, a~d 
while his mother continued to live at St Osyth, Rochford made 
Easton his favourite retreat. Here, he and his brother Richard 
could indulge their fondness for riding, hunting, and shooting. 
50. In 1749 Rochford received a very cordial invitation to revisit the 
family of M. Maurice, Professor of Divinity at Genev~ ( see below, 
pp. 25-26 ) ; whilst at Turin, he had flSwi'3s friends" to dinner, 
and sought a post for his "friend", a Professor of Divinity at 
Lausanne; Nassau Papers, D/45 and D/57, Rochford to V11lettes, 
6 January and 17 March 1751. I have not yet seen the Album 
Studiosorum Academiae Lausannensis,· 1537-1837, edited by Junod (1837) 
51. Collins, Peerage, IV, p.143 ; D.N.B., XXI, p.~344 ; The ~omplete 
Peerage, XI, p.54. The Jervas portrait at Brodick Castle identified 
as the third Earl may in fact be the encoronation :Fv.rtrait of the 
fourth Earl of Rochford; Kretschmar (see note 4 atove). 
5~.Journal of the House of Lords, XXV, pp.278-327. 
53. Journal of the House of Lords, XXV-XXVI, passim ; see also A.S. 
Turberville, The House of Lords in the Eighteenth Century (London, 
1927), Introduction. 
54. 'l'he Will vJas proven 20 Hay 1740 ; Ref. Spurway 132 ; the D.N.B. 
follows Collins, Peerage, IV, p.142, in giving 1741 for Henry's 
death. 
56. 
Ro~hford's pleasure in horses is most interestingly signified in 
a portrait of 1741, showing him with a racehorse and his groom 
the parish church and the White House at Easton are clearly 
depicted .in the background. 55 
Rochford's inheritance from his uncle was also timely for 
quite another reason, for in Nay 1742 Rochford WB.S filurried to 
14. 
Lucy Younge, one of the Maids of Honour to the Princess of Wales. 56 
They had obviously known each other for s~me time before, and since 
Lucy brought no fortune to the marriage, it may have been a love-
match. 57 Her father was of sUbstantial gentry stock, though not 
wealthy, and seems to !lave evinced some an:r.iety at his daughter's 
marriage to an extl:'avagant young noble. 58 
Lucy evidently thought Rochford "forth the risk. She was 
herself IlRather a remarkable person ; a lady of free manners who 
said an~ did whatever she pleased ; but as her husband took no 
exceptions and she was clever and entertaining, she kept her 
place in general society." 59 Presumably, wedding portraits 
Signed and dated, T. Bardwell, 1741 ; Brodick Castle, Isle of Arran. 
See also J. Pinkerton, nSporting Pictures at J3rcdick,1i Scottish 
Art Review, XII, no.3. 
Essex Record Office, DjDC, 27/729-730, reciting Rcohford's Marriage 
Settlement of 9 - 10 May 1742. The D.N.B., XX!, p.1345, and The 
Complete Peerage, XI, p.54, give 1740, repeating the error on the 
Rochford monument in St Osyth parish chur~~ ; the ins~ription also 
makes Rochford "Ambassador to the Court of France, A.D. 1763" (he 
went to Madrid in 1763 and to Paris in 1766), "Ambassador to the 
Cour.t of Vienna, A.D. 1768tt (which he never was), and "Secretary 
of State •• A.D. 1776n (he was appointed 1768, and retired 17'15). 
Horace 'rJalpole wrote to Mann, 20 May 1742, "Did I tell you that 
Lord Rochford has at last married Miss Young? I say at last, for 
they don't pretend to have been married this twelv~ruonth, but were 
publicly married last week." WalpOle Correspondenc.!:: , edited by 
w.s. Lewis (Yale,1937-) , XVII, p.431. 
Edward Younge, of Durnford, Wiltshire. He was later Bath King of 
Arms; see R.C. Hoare, Modern Historl of Wiltshire (1822-24), II, 
p.125. The Narriage Settlement awarded Lucy an annuity of £ 500 ; 
Essex Record Office, DIDC, 27/729-730. The D.N.B., XXI, p. 1344, 
gives no authority for Rochford's extravagance other than a report 
of his pawning plate at Madrid, but the reference given is either 
a misprint or a confusion. His career leaves little doubt 2f his 
extravagance however. 
59. Lady Louisa stuart, F,otes on Jesse's Sel!!yn, edited by vl.S. Lewis, 
(New York, 1928) , p.10. 
60 wo~ld hav~ been painted, though the originals are apparently lost, 
but pieces still su.rvive of a set of armorial porcelain bearing 
the Nassau-Zuylestein arms impaling those of Younge, which Rochford 
61 ordered from China in celebration of his marriage. 
Rochford and Lucy adopted Easton for their residence, 
as is shown in their surviving correspondence, light.·heartedand 
intimate, with the actor David Garrick in 1744 and 1745. This 
precious handful of letters reveals an established household at 
Easton, including Rochfordts brother Richard and ~ucy's mother 
Mrs Younge. 
Delighted that Garrick will be with them for her Lord's 
birthday in SeptembIJr 1744,: for which reason he has obviously 
visited Easton beiore, Lucy reminds him of her mother':; "Abusive 
Temper", nov., devoted to calling the King o't Prussia names, then 
d adds characteristically; "God knOWB what I'm writing, for my L & 
Mr Nassau 8.re playing at Backgammon & to th;l.t Noise thE:;',~ add a 
most t~rrible one of their voices." However, in relating Rochford's 
return to Easton from London that Sunday, she archly concedes that 
he is , 62 "not an unwelcome Guest.1I 
------------------------------------------------------------------
60. The only known portrait of Lucy Rochford, now at Heeze Castle, 
North Brabant, is thought to be a copy of her wedding portrait. 
Also at Heeze is a painting of the fourth Sar!, marked in dorso 
"Earl of Rochford, aged 2.5, 174311 , which may be the companion copy. 
This painting bears a strong resemblance to a portrait of his mother, 
"Bessy, Countess of Rochford ll , mezzotint by J. Smith after d'Agar, 
172'; (British Museum, Department of Prints and Drawings). 
61. Essex Record Office, T/G, 102/29, Notes and Co~respondence of 
Alfred Hills, Esq., on Armorial Porcelain rela'cing to Essex families. 
There appear to have been at least three sets of Rochford porcelain ; 
the first obtained by the third Earl about 173.5, w5~h the Nassau-
Zuylestein arms and the motto uSpes durat Avorumn ; the second set 
mentioned here, including the Younge arms, with the correct motto ; 
and the famous set of 1754, lacking the Younge arms, with the motto 
as "Spes durat Amorum." (see below, p.37.) 
62. Lucy Rochford to Garrick, Easton, 29 August 1744 ; Garrick Papers, 
Forster Collection, Victoria and Albert Museum, London; XXXV, 
fos.20-22. Her mother was Lucy Chetwynd, daughter of John Chetwynd 
of Ingestre, Staffordshire ; The Complete Peerage, III, pp.188-189, 
and the D.N.B., IV, pp.21';-214. 
16 .. 
Rochford! s own letters t·') G3.rrick are so spirited and 
intimate as to be rather bawdy in places, but their informality 
provides us with one or two unique insights into Rochford's 
youthful attitudes and personality.' In one letter, he carries 
a witticism about birthdays to its logical extreme, then breaks off, 
IIby god, I think I am gal; into a damned absurd stile," but he adds 
reflectively, "tho' ha?J.g it Im sincere too, for I make few 
professions where I dont mean them • • • for theres more got 
I bnieve by plain dealing than all the Hypocrisy in the world.H 63 
Elsewhere he agrees with Garrick that a cheerful outlook 
on lite is esseutial to happiness, and confesses his dislike of 
melancholy people ; "when I flee a man of a Gloomy disl-osition, 
I am apt to suspect he has done something \vrong. If But he quickly 
distinguishes bet .. "epn peor19 who are UNaturally gloomy, ~ 
5cavoir pou~qu~l' & those who have llet with distresses & accidents 
in Life ; they are indeed to be pitied. JI Rochford reserves his 
deepest aversion for those silent melancholy men who are IIObservers 
of ones words & actio~s, & never communicate anything they know 
themselves, not aven to those they call their dearest friends 
such men are born Nat~ral spies, & I believe the Devil had a 
hand in their Creation.t: 64 
Rochford's frie.adship with Garrick presumably commenced 
with the actor's trium~~ at Goodman's Fields, which attracted the 
interest of othe~ fashionable young nobles, including Rochford's 
Eton contemporaries Halifax and Sandwich, 65 but for Rochford, 
63. Garrick Papers, XXXV, fos.23-24, Rochford to Garrick, Easton, 
30 August 1744. 
64. Garrick Papers, XXXV, fos.30-32, Rochford to Garrick, n.d. but 
probably 1744 from the references to f'lrs Cibber and Peg Wotfington, 
on whom see Carola Oman, David Garrick (London,1958). 
65. The Letters of David Garrick, edited by Little and Kahrl (New York, 
}963), It Introduction, p.lviii. 
the attachment was sustained by a ge~uine love of the theatre. 
In October 1745 he is found lamenting to Garrick that Fleetwood's 
tlabsurd" shows were bringing ridicule on Drury Lane, and he entreats 
his nlittle David tt to return and slay this Goliath, and take 
command of the i1undisciplined RabbleH himself. Rochford had even 
remonstrated with the manager, whom he found drunk, and was tempted 
to strike him, but for the thought that it would be said of 
r 66 Garrick, "you sent y Bully.tI 
Rochford and Garrick remained firm frian.ds throughout 
Rochford's lifetime. Whilst at Turin in 1753, Rochford offered 
to obtain for Garrick a troupe of Italian dance~s, and in 1769 
he sent Garrick a copy of a ~ew play by the French dramatist 
Beaumarchais, whom Rochford had befriended at Madrid in the 1760s, 
adding this revealing comme!lt ; til believe his play of Eugenie is 
a very good vn.;)' for this sin.gle reason that I, though a minister 
& of course a hardhearted dog, cried & howled at it most shame-
fully ; if you l~~gh at it, it wi~l turn out a tragy comedy ; 
I hope this will find you in a laughing mood. II 67 
When Gh~rick decided he should enlist during the Jacobite 
Rebellion of 1745, his immediate choice for a patron was Rochford. 
His patron, though flattered, was also embarrassed, for while 
Rochford's sentiments w~~e staunchly Hanoverian, he did not intend 
to raise a regiment himself, explaining "I much doubt vThether 
68 
anything that could be raised here would prevent a mischief." 
66. Garrick Papers, XXXV, fos.25-6, Rochford to Garrick, 31 October 1745-
67. Garrick to George Garrick, 16 July 1753, Harvard College LibrarYi 
printed in the Letters edited by Little and Kahrl (New York,1963), 
I, pp.194-195 ; Rochford to Garrick, 7 April 1769, autograph letter 
in the Osborn Collection, Yale University Library. 
68. Rochford to Garrick, 31 October 1745 (note 66) ; see also 
Carola Oman, David Garrick, pp.82, 91. 
18. 
Rochford 'ltJas disappointed that the Young Pretender 
managed to escape to France, but consoled his patriotism by 
attending the trial of rebel Peers at the House of Lords in 
July 1746. 69 Only the month before, on 23 June, his mother had 
died at St Osyth, leaving the Essex properties to Rochford and a 
large private income to his younger brother Richard, 70 Perhaps 
with some reluctance, having settled so well at Ee..st;on, Rochford 
now took up r~~idence at st Osyth, where he and Lucy presumably 
entertained as prominent members of the polite sooiety of the 
county. 
ForemOct among the Rachfords' county friends were the 
7'1 i-iaynards of Walthanlstow, Sir George Valldeput, later of 
Twickenham, 72 \{illiarn Windham of Wenham, and the not~rious 
Richard Rigby of Mistley on the Stour. 73 Thesa last two bachelors 
were also friends of David Garrick, whc p1anned his summer tour 
74 to take in their est~tes as well as Rochford's. 
Rochford, Rigby, and ~lindham were- tobether joint pat!'ons 
of rural sports in their various localities, and the~e is record 
of a return cricket match on Bentley Green ~n 1748 between Rigby 
69. Journal of the House of Lords, XXVI, pp.614-631. 
70. Gentlemans Hap'd.zine, J'une 1746, ·p.328 ; D.N .B., XXI, p. 1344. 
The Rochford lands occupied much of the Tendring HUlt.dred ; they 
are detailed in J. t'latney, list Osyth' s Priory," ~.e.x.~.Archaeolot}ical 
Society Transactions, V (1873), p.45. Rochford had already sold 
an earlier inheritance, Loughton, near Walthmj. for £ 24,000 ; 
Essex Record Office. D/DC, 27/729-730, Convey~ce of August 1745. 
71. Sir \1illiamMaynard (1721-72), 4th Baronet, M.P. for Essex 1759-72 
Collins, Peerage, IV, pp.275-276 ; The History of ?arliament, The 
House of Commons, 1754-2Q, edited by Namier and Brooke, III, 
pp.123-124. 
72. On Vandeput, see Burke's Extinct and Dormant Baronetcies. (1838) ; 
he appears as a witness on several Rochford legal documents in 
Essex Record Office, D/DC, r.T.1. 
73. On Windham (1717-61), See the D.N.B. XXI, pp.642-643 ; on Rigby 
(1722-88), who \1aS later Paymaster-General, see the D.N.B. XVI, 
pp. 1188-1190, and Horace \ialpole I s Hemoirs of the Last Ten Years 
of the Reign of George II . .tLon.do.n,JS47), passim. 
74. Carol a Oman, David Garrick, p.72. 
and a team from Histley, and Rochford's team from St Osyth. 75 
Rochford and Rigby both owned racing yachts, and on one occasion 
Rigby won a considerable wager from Rochford after Euocessfully 
piloting his yacht: Ifthi"'ough all the sands" between Harwich and 
London bridge. 76 It was very likely his proximity to the sea 
at St Osyth and his possession of an ocean-going yacht which 
brought Rochford his appointment in 1748 as Vice·~Admire.l of the 
77 coasts of ESdex. 
Social custom and Rochford's duties at Court inevitably 
meant that his year was divided between town and country. In 
London, the Rochfords lived at Berkeley Square ; presumably the 
prooeeds of the sale of Loughton in 1745 enabled him to build or 
78 to purchase th~ house at No .. 48 in that yea:: or soon 8.fter. 
Rochford's neighbour at No. 49 was the Dowager Duchess of 
Hamilton, who in 1751 remarried, choosing none other than his own 
younger brothe=, Richard Savage Nassau. 79 Their son t William 
Henry Nassau (1754-1830), later became the rifth and Jast 
80 Earl of Rochford. 
75. See JfThe History of Three Parishes ; Lawford, l1anningtree, Mistley," 
(1953), Manningb'ee Braru-;h, \v.E.A. I owe this reference to Mr 
Kenneth Halker, of Romford, Essex. 
76. This undated snippet I also owe to Mr Walker, who had it from an 
old notebook ~.ent him 'by one Mr Kennell. 
77. Doyle, Baronage (1885), If1, p.164 ; The Complete r~erage, XI, 
p. 54 ; D.N.B., XXI, p.13.4. . 
78. 
79. 
80. 
There is a photograph dated 1893 in the files of the National 
Buildings Record, Great College Street, Westminster, which may be of 
Rochford's originhl house; the site has since been rebuilt upon. 
Hugh Philips, Mid-Georgian London (re64)' pp.254, 304, using the 
evidence of fragmentar:l rate-books, lists the Earl of Powis at 48 
from 1748 to 1750, anI.! the Earl of Rochfort (sic) from 1751 to 1777. 
Since the houses in this part of the square were built in 1745, 
it is possible that Rochford occupied No.48 from that year, but 
let it to Powis when he went to Turin in 1749. 
Eiizabeth Anne Spencer (d.1771) of Rendlesham, Suffolk, was the 
widow of James, Duke of Hamilton and Brandon, who died in 1743 
see Collins, Peera~e, I, p.455. 
Their first child was a daughter, Lucy (b.1752), who died un-
married. On the younger son George (11756-1823), see the D.N.B .. , 
XL, p.119, and the Gentlemans Magazine, XCIII (1823), pp .. 173-175. 
20. 
In London society, the fourtil Earl of Rochford and his 
Lady appear to have identified themselves chiefly ~d th the Duke 
of Cumberland's set. Lucy may have been having an affaire with 
81 
the Duke, but she also had a flirtation with his brother-in-law, 
the Prince of Hesse, who by June 1746 was being called "the drop 
to Lady Rochford's earring." 82 Some thought it was to pique 
Lucy that Cumberland gave a ~all at Vauxhall for one of her rivals 
in August that year. 83 Yet in spite of this brief lapse, Lucy 
apparently recovered the Duke's affections, ~~d cer husband was 
only too willing te' assist her in this. 84 
Cumberland's political importance in these years is 
easily obscure~ by his unpop~larity after Culloden, but his 
influence 8.t Court was ver:; great, and whilst his brother Frederick, 
Prince of Wales, re~ained a focus of opposition to the ministers 
of the Cro .. ·u, \oiumberland's association with Bedford and Sandwich 
represented to some the beginnings of a 'Court party' as a more 
8·' loyal alternativ~ to the Leiceste: House faction. / 
81. Horace Walpole wrote of Lucy: trAIl the Royals have been in love 
with her, but the Duke was so in all the forms, till she was a 
little too much pleased with her conquest of his brother in law, 
the Prince of Hesse." Walpole Correspondence (Yale,1937-), XX, p.58. 
32. Mrs Osborn (Sarah Byng) , Political and Social Letters, edited by 
Emily Osborn (London,1890), p.90, Letter xxxvii, t4 June 1746. 
83. Walpole noted on 5 August 1746 : "The Duke gave his ball last 
night to Peggy Banks C'.t Vauxhall ; it was to pique my Lady Rochford 
in return for the Prince of Hesse." \valpole Correspondence (Yale, 
1937-), IX, p.42. ~hen Boswell visited Hesse-Cassel in 1764, he was 
told that the Prince's separation from his wife had been caused in 
part by "une dame d'honneur Anglaise", presumably Lucy Rochford; 
Boswell on the Grand Tour, Germany and Switzerland, 6dited by F.A. 
Pottle (Yale,1953), p.150 and note. 
84. Walpole wrote to Nontagu, 3 November 1746 : "Don't expect ne\.vs, for 
I know no more than a newspaper •• is it news that my Lord Rochford 
is an oaf? He has got a set of plate buttons for his birthday 
clothes with the Duke's head in everyone - sure my good Lady 
carries her art too far to make him so great a Dupe! II Walpole 
Correspondence (Yale,1937-), IX, pp.48-49. 
85. Coxe, Memoirs of •• Henry Pelham (London,1829), II, p.385 
Walpole, Memoirs of •• George II (London,1822), I, pp.1-2 
Dorothy Marshall, Eighteenth Century England (1962), pp.227-229. 
21 ~ 
Rochford' ... ; choice of ~umber:land as a patron reflects 
both his lifelong habit of personal loyalty to the Crown and his 
deep aversion to the labyrinthine paths of political faction. He 
had not hitherto been conspicuously-active in politics, though it 
is said he inhe.:-i ted strong \-/hig views. 86 Thus it seems more than 
mere coincidence that Rcchford's attendance at the House of Lords 
became markedly more regular from 1746, though he made no mark there 
as an orator, and that in 1747 his brother Richard successfully 
stoe-d.for Colchester as a Government supporter on Rochford's 
tlinterest. n 87 
Rochfo~dts ultimate ambition, nakedly obviou~ in later 
years but proba'lJly formed abou.t this time, was nothing less than 
C b " t ~ f bl S t f State~ 88 ~t t a a 1ne pos , pre era y as ecre.ary 0 ~  was 0 
this end that he d~cided to enter the diplom~tic service, since 
ambassadoriEll ,-;~rvice was a recognised apprenticeship for such 
office in the fi:.:-st half of the eight.e~nth century. 89 Rochford 
later reminded C"mberland of this : "the motives I proposed to 
myself by entering into this way of life were not Lucrative, but 
merely to make myself acquainted with Business.U 90 
Here lay the ~alue of Cumberland's patronage : his influence 
with the King and his ministers could advance Rochford's name as 
86. D.N.B., XXI, p.1344. 
87. Journal of the HOUSA of Lords, XXVII, pp.143-366, passim. On 
Richard Savage Nt'.ssau and the Colchester election, see The History 
of Parliament, The House of Commons, 1715-1754, edited by Homney 
Sedgwick, II, p.289 ; I3nd ibid., rl'he House of Commons, 1754-1790, 
edited by L. Namier and J. Brooke, ~II, p.193. 
88. Whilst Ambassador at Paris, 1766-68, Rochford was visibly impatient 
to be appointed Secretary of State, and made no secret of his 
ambition ; see Lettres de Nme du Deffand a. Horace Walpole, edited 
by P. Toynbee (London,1912), I, pp.285, 287, 295. 
90. 
D.B. Horn, "The Diplomatic Experience of Secretaries of state, 
1660-185211 , His t,orI , new series, XLI (1956), especially pp.94-96. 
Nassau Papers, D/18, Rochford to Cumberland, 2 May 1750. -
a candida;';e for a diplomatic posting. With the end of the \4ar 
of the Austr.ian Succession and the signing of the peace treaties 
at Aix la Chapelle in April 1748, it was to be expected that a 
few openings might appear in the diplomatic se:..~v:i.ce ~ especially 
for a young Earl who actually wanted to go abroad. Accordingly, 
in August 1748, Cumberland urged Newcastle to send Rochford to 
Lisbon in pl.ace of Keene, who was to return to Hadrid ; but with 
eharacteristic parsimony, the ministry de~ided simply to elevate 
the Consul there, Keene's friend Castres, to be Charge. 91 
22. 
Cumbel'land fS second attempt on Rochford's behalf was more 
successful. It was widely known that George II intended to send 
scmebody of rank as his representative at Tu~in, as a compliment 
to his ally the King of Sardinia. Arthur V:i.llettes, wh6 had been 
Secretary there since 1734 and Ninister since 1741, had been 
pleading for a transfer to his native Berne ~ver since his gross 
bungling of negotiationB for the Treaty of worms in 1742-3. 92 
Sir Charles Hanbury Williams, fretting as Envoy at Dresden, greatly 
desired Turin, and had ,asked to be moved there in February 1748 ; 
his request was strongly supported by Fox and Bedford. 93 Bedford 
was regarded as Cumberland's political ally ~~ thiR ~ime1 yet it 
is a measure of Rochfordts favour with the Duke that by January 
1749 it was known that Cumberland had persuaded the King and 
Newcastle to name Rochford for Turin. 94 Two months later, 
91. Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, edited by Lord John 
Russell (London, 1842), I, p.440, Newcastle to Bedtorr!, 11 August 
1748. See also D.B. Horn, The British Diplolnatic Sr->].'vice, 1689-
1789 (Oxford,1961), p.154, and Horn, British Diplomatic 
RePresentatives: 1689-1789, Camden Society, 3rd Series, XLVI (1932), 
pp.99, 134. 
92. Richard Lodge, ?,tudies in Eighteenth Century DiplomacJ!', 1740-1748 
(London,1930), p.50 and Chapter 2, passim. 
93. D.B. Horn, Sir Charles Hanbur;,{ Williams and :suJ;:.9pean Diplomacy, 
1747-1758 (London t 1930), pp.41-2, It6. 
94. Lord Ilchester and Hrs Langford-Brooke, Life of Sir Charles Hanbur;y 
Williams (London,1929), pp.161-3, 166. \'IlilliaUls finally went to 
Berlin ; Horn, ReEresentative~, p.92. 
Beeford w&s informing Villettes of his replacement at Turin by 
the fourth Earl of Rochford. 95 
Lord and Lady Rochford would undoubtedly have made much 
capital in London society from their new statt',s before they 
departed for Turin. Rochford had hitherto been black-balled at 
White's Club, for reasons still obscure, but his new status as 
Envoy-designate may 'have helped his acceptance as a member in 1749.96 
In the same month that Horace Walpole noted Lucy "in vast beauty" 
at a masquerade ball at Rdnelagh, 97 he wrote to his friend Sir 
Horace l-iann, the British Minister at Florence : 
" You are going to see one of our court: beauties in Italy, 
my Lady Rochford : they are setting out on their embassy to 
Turin. She ~.s large, but very handsome, with great delicacy 
and address • • fl 
As for Rochford hImself, Walpole added : 
"You will not find much in the correspondence of her husband 
his ~erson is good, and he will figure well enou~h as an 
ambassador; better as a husband where cicisbes don't expect 
to be molested. u 98 
Despite the charge of complaisance, this was praise indeed from 
Walpole. But Mann was immediately delighted 8t the ne'"s, and 
commented in reply, "Lord and Lady Rochford's gaiety will be 
a great contrast to Villettes' solemnity." 99 
95~ Public Record Office, state Papers, Foreign (hereafter SP) 92/58, 
f.119, Bedford to Villettes, 9 March 1749 0.8. 
96. W.B. Boulton, The History of White's (London,1892), II, p.74 ; 
D.N.B., XXI, p.1344 ; Rochford's appointment ~as noted under 
promotions in th~ Daily Ad1lertiser, 29 Nay '17L:9, and the London 
Magazine, XVIII (1749), p.241. 
97. Walpole to Mann, 3 May 1749 0.8.; Walpole Correspondence (Yale, 
1937-), XX, p.49, correcting the misprint in Cunningham's edition 
of Walpole's Letters (1886), II, p.152. 
98. Walpole to Mann, 17 May 1749 0.8.; \valpole Correspondence (Yale, 
1937-),XX, p.58. 
99. Mann to Walpole, 25 July 1749 ; Walpole Correspondence (Yale,1937-), 
XX, p.76. 
24. 
Cnce his appointment was known, Rochford would have had 
much to do at St Osyth~ supervising the packing of his baggage, 
selecting servants to take with him to Italy, and setting in order 
the administration of the estate during his atsence. 100 His 
attendance at the Lords shows that he was in London throughout 
March 1749, and for a few days in May, but he returiled only for 
. 101 
the last day of that session, on 13 June. Since his Instructions 
for Turin are dated 12 June, this would ~ave been a likely 
opportunity for Bedford's verbal 'briefing', to amplify the bare 
formal Instructions. 102 Villettes was returning to England on 
leave before settling at Berne, so Bedford ordered Ruchford to 
mget Villettes in ~aris ea~ly in July, there to receive a first-
haud account of the Court of Turin. 103 
Rochforu obediently made haste, and left England early in 
July, arriving at Paris on the 10th. 104 Villettes, however, was 
delayed by the toils of packing in the heat of the Pietimontese 
summeI, and doubted if he could be at Paris before 10 August. 
He therefore promised to prepare written Memoranda in order to 
t f th d 1 at P · 105 preven ur ar e ay ar1S. 
100. Rochford's Steward at st Osyth was William Field (d.'1783), whose 
mother, Arabella Savage, was yet another natural daughter of the 
fourth Earl of Rivers. Field also acted £ s RochfOl'd' 5 attorney 
after 1745 ; see Essex Record Office, D/DC, r.T.1. (Indenture of 
6 May 1747), and K. Walker, II 'Tyburn Dick' and some Clacton 
Families", Essex Review, LVIII (1948-9), pp.3-6. 
101. Journal of the House of Lords, LXVII, pp~291-366, passim. 
102. Public Record Office, Foreign Office (hereafter FO), 90/40, f.117. 
The date given in Horn, Representatives, p.124 (23 June) is an 
understandable error ; his researcher has read the regnal year, 
Bin the Twenty Third Year of Our Reign", as the db.t;e, instead of 
"the Twelfth day of June, 174911 , in the line above. For discussion 
of Rochford's Instructions, see below, p.55 and note 6. 
103. SP 92/58, fos.102 and 152, Bedford to Villettes, 8 June, 13 July 1749 
104. He had gone from at Osyth before 6 July when Horace Walpole visited 
the Priory ; lIit is the seat of the Rochfords, but I never chose 
to go while they were there." Walpole to Hontagu, 5 July ,1749 ; 
Walpole Correspondence (Yale,1937-), IX, p.88. 
105. SP 92/58, f.160, Villettes to Aldv:orth, 25 July 1749. 
In addition to enjoying the delights of Europe's p~emier 
capital city, Rochford made his monthts unexpected sojourn in Paris 
as fruitful as possible. He immediately established a close 
friendship with tLP- Secretary of the British Embassy, Joseph 
106 Yorke, who introduced Rochford to the l!'rench 1!'oreign Hinister, 
Puysieulx, then obtained for him an audience at Vercailles on 
18 July, where Rochfol~d found the royal family Itperticularly 
gracious. II Tpp. new Sardinian Ambassador to France, St Germain, 
had just arrived in Paris : Rochford made himself known, and in 
fact anticipated belated instructions from Bedford that he should 
do so. Rochfor-l also enqaired after the new ambassador France was 
to send to Turin; the Marquis de la Chetarcie, and thou8h Puysieulx. 
promised an introduction, Chetardie had not come to town before 
the Rochfords aeparted for Turin. 107 
Among the many visitors who ca.lle.l to pay their respee ts 
to Rochford in !?aris was th(": newly-appointed British Consul for 
the Island of Sardinia, ·James Shaftoe, \-1hpc,\rried a letter of 
recommendation from Bedford : in view of their d€alings over the 
next few years, 1t is a pity that Rochford'~ first impressions of 
Sh ft h t . ~ 108 a oe ave no l';urVl:V'eu. 
Also whilst in Paris, Rochford received a most interesting 
invitation. It ~vas contained in a letter from M .. Ma')rice, son of 
the Professor of Divinity at Geneva, expressing delight at 
Rochford's appointment to Turin: uRien de plu.s agreable pour 
nous que la .Pensee que noua aurons a la Cour de Tu~in un Frotecteur 
tel que Vous. ft He hopel that Rochford might stay a few days with 
them at Geneva on his way to Turin: nJtavois souvent fait des 
106. Yorke was later created Baron Dover (1788) ; see D.N.B. LXIII, 344. 
107. SF 92/58, f.156, Rochford to Bedford, 21 July 1749. 
108. SP 92/58, f.167, Bedford to Rochford, 3 August 1749. On Shaftoe at 
Cagliari, see below, Chapter 3, pp.8o-85. 
Vaux pour que quelque heureux Evenement nous p~ocurat le ~laisir 
109 de vous revoir parmi nous.!! Rochford thought this would be 
a useful opportunity to discover at first-hand what differences 
110 
existed between Tu~in and Geneva, and Bedford was willing to 
26. 
. . . 111 
allow th1s d~vers10n, but as time went uy, Rochford reluctantly 
decided that Villettes t long delay had left him no tim~ for a 
jaunt to Geneva. Instead, he made friends with Hns·~at'd, the Genevan 
Commissary at ~aris, who gave him much useful information. 112 
Villettes at last arrived at Paris on 11 August, and 
though he thought his (~arefully prepared Hemoranda precluded 
further comment, Rochford kept him another tleek, discussing and 
1 Of ° • • t .113 c ar1 y1ng var~ous p01n s. As soon as he was satisfied, Rochford 
was anxious to get to Turin. "directly, as fast as possible 1" and 
he appears to have left Paris on 23 August. 114 Travelling by way 
of Lyons and the Mt Cenis Pass, the new Br·:.cish Envoy arrived at 
Turin late on the night of 9 September 1749. 11.5 
109. SP 92/58, f.158 1 extrac~.; copy, l-iaurice to Rochford, n.d., with 
Rochford's of 21 July 1749. 
110. SP 92/58, f.169, Rochford to Bedford, 20 August 17lt9. 
111. Though he warned Rochford that the King thought lithe sooner you 
get to Turin the betterlf ; SP 92/58, f.165, Bedford to Rochford, 
3 August 1749. 
112. SP 92/58, £.169, Rochford to Bedford, 20 August 1749. 
113. SP 92/58, 1.163, Villettes to Bedford, 16 August 1749. 
114. SP 92/58, f.169, Rochford to Bedford, 20 August 1749. 
115. SP 92/58, f.171, Rochford to Bedford, 17 September 1749. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Rochford as British Envoy at Turin 
There was no particular building recognized as 'The British 
Embassy' in Turin at this time : it was the Envoy's task to find 
himself a suitable hOlise, ~hen to affix his monarch's Coat of Arms 
above the door, thereby securing for himself and all within the 
protection of his rliplomatic status. 1 A suitable town house at 
Turin was not easily found, however, and Rochford had to live 
for over two months in a rented villa several miles distant before 
he could establish himself in the city.2 No ~~tails have yet 
come to light regarding either the locatio~ or the cost of 
Rochford's house, but some indication of the liifficulty and 
expense he may l~ve encountered is availa~le from 1751, when he 
sought a similar establishment for a visiting dignitary. The best 
he could find was a suite cf ten roomn on the firBt floor of a 
house occupied by the Austrian Minister, which would cost 
8000 livres for a five-year lease, and still not contain all the 
visitor's hou6'3!lold. Rochford exclaimed, flmais les maisons sont 
dtune rarete inconcevable, ce qui les vend d'une chert~ 
exorbitante.n3 
Evidence concerning the composition and management of 
4 Rochford's Turin household remains fragmentary and scattered. 
1. D.B. Horn, The Britisf1 Diplomatic Service (Oxford,1961), p.16. 
2. SF 92/58, f.171, Rochford to Bedford, 17 September 1749 ; ibid., 
fos.212 and 218, Rochford to Bedford, 12 and 19 November 1749. 
Nassau Papers, B110, Rochford to Allen, 10 December 1749 ; ibid .. , 
D/10, Rochford to Gray, 13 December 1749. 
3. Nassau Papers, D/89, Rochford to Seckendorff, 20 October 1751 ; 
the visitor was the Prince of Brandenburg-Anspach. 
4. Compare the detailed account in Joan Evans, tiThe Embassy of the 
]?ourth Duke of Bedford to Paris, 1762-3", Archaeolosical Journal, 
eXIII (1957), pp.137-156. 
28. 
While ;;<t le3.st some of the menial servants would have been hired 
locally, it i~ clear that Rochford brought a number of servants 
with him from StOsyth; early in 1750 Lady Rochford had reason to 
send one of her maidservants back to England, aud there is mention 
elsewhere of Rochford I s running footman taking a messa.ge to Genoa.5 
There is another isolated reference to one M. St Ferreol, who is 
described as Hone of my Lord Rochford's Family since his Lordship 
has been at Turin." He was "charged with c:!'tain of my Lord's 
affairs,lt but the nature of bis work, and the man himself, 
remain obscure. 6 
Rochford's household included his vwn private Chaplain, 
for it was one of hi~ privil~ges as a Protesta'1t Envoy in a Catholic 
land that he could maintain a Chapel within his house for the use of 
hie 'Familyi and fellow countrymen. Rochford's Chaplain was Louis 
de Visme, an Oxford graduate of Huguenot descent.7 In 1752 he had 
delivered to him at Turin a "French Common Prayer Book." 8 The 
Chaplain's brother, Gerard de Visme, was also living in Rochford's 
household at Turin,and is known to have carried letters for Rochford 
elsewhere in Italy.9 
Perhaps the most important member of' the Envoy's 'Family' 
was his Secretary. George Charles accompanied Rochford to Turin and 
remained as Charge until the arrival of Roch!'ord's successor. 
Charles wrote the body of virtually all the official correspondence, 
copying from Rochford's untidy much crossed-out drafts in a small 
neathand,admirab1y clear and legible. The Secretary's own 
5. Nassau Papers, A/12, Birtles to Rochford, 7 February 1750 
A/59, Birt1es to Rochford, 26 February 1752. 
6. SP 92/90, f.126, Charles to Payzant, 5 August 1752. 
ibid., 
7. De Visme remained with Rochford throughout his diplomatic career, 
and finally entered the service himself ; he was Envoy at Stockholm 
when he died in 1776. See D.N.B., XIV, pp.448-9. 
8. Nassau Papers, A/67 , Birtles to Rochford, 15 July 1752. 
9. Nassau Papers, A/27 t Birtles to Rochford, 10 October 1750. 
dispatches during Rochford's absence in 1754 suggest that he was 
conscientious and diligent, but his elaborate wordiness contrasts 
with Rochford's own direct and succinct style. Charles may not 
have enjoyed good health : on one occasion Rochford had to decipher 
the London dispatches hitlself t since he had given Charles leave to 
visit a curative spa in the foothills. 10 
For a short time, Rochford also had the s~r1ices of 
another Secre~ary, George longe, who had just attained his majority, 
and was visiting Turin in the course of his Grand Tour of Italy. 11 
longe lived in the Envoy's household for several months early in 
1753, and so mu·,:h impressed Rochford that he was appointed ChargE! 
when Rochfordtock Charles (In his O\<1n brief tour of Italy that 
year. longe's father hoped that his son might remain a3 Rochford's 
Secretary, and begin a career in diplomacy, but RochforJ had no 
desire to replace the dutiful Charles, und longe resumed his travels 
soon after the Rochfc:r:-ds returned to Turin. ';2 
Charles'S occasional private notes to his friend George 
Payzant reveal that the social highlight of the year for Rochford's 
'Family' and the handful of English merchant.d residing at Turin 
was the celebraticn of their monarch's birthday each year, on 30 
October or the nearest suitable day_ Rochford regul~rly celebrated 
this event with a magnificent dinner at his house, attended by 
10. SP 92/62, f.38, Charles to Holdernesse, 30 Harch 1754, Separate; 
SP 92/63, f.11, Charles to Robinson, 12 February 1755 ; Nassau 
Papers, D/126, Rochford to Mann, 16 August 1752. See also Horn, 
British Diplomatic Representatives, p.124. The Journal of the 
House of Commons, XXXII. pp.484, 492, records Charles' 6 allowances 
as Charge. 
11. Yonge was later a Governor of the Cape of Good Hope; see D.N.B., 
XXI, pp.1239-40. His father, Sir v1illiam Yonge (d.1755), was a 
stalwart government supporter in the Commons; D.N.B., XXI, pp. 
1246-9, and Walpole, Hemoirs of George II, Volume I, passim. 
12. British Museum, Additional Hanuscripts (hereafter BH Add MSS) , 
32730, f .256, Rochford to Sir IvilliamYonge, 11 October 1752 ; 
ibid., f.253, Sir \t/illiam Yonge to Newcastle, 17 November 1752 ; 
Nassau Papers, C/17, Rochford to Holdernesse, 18 November 1752. 
30. 
members of the COUlt and diploma<;ic corps, and any English visitors 
who happened to be in the city. The first of these dinners, held 
earl.y in November 1749, was conducted "with great magnificence, 
all. the English appearing there in gala •• n 13 
On such occasions, a vital member of the Envoy's 
household would be his Cook. It was essential for the eighteenth 
century dipl.omat to ma~~ntain an ample table, preferably an open 
table as well, enabling him to return hospitality and entertain 
a wide circle of acqucdntances. Relaxed after-dinner conversation, 
when the wine flcwed freely, offered one of the beat opportunities 
14 to hear others !et slip the secrets of their court. Not:hing is 
known of Rochfol'd's kitchen st-aff at Turin, 15 and nor. much more 
16 
of his regular dinner guests, but there is abundant testimony 
that he maintained an inte!'estingly ample table. 
Tb~Ub;J. the bulk of his suppl.ies woul.d have been obtained 
from the local marke-;;'s, Rochford went to considerable expense to 
import a number o!additional items through the British Consul at 
Genoa, surely adding to the variety and popularity of his dinner 
parties. These ~mported foodstuffs ranged from such staples as 
sugar, tea, and cheeses, to rather more exotic delicacies which 
included smoked hams and salmon from Amsterdam, salted sprats from 
, . 
Yarmouth, cases of oranges and barrells of oll-ves from Cadiz and 
13. SP 92/89, f.270, Charles to Payzant, 12 November 1749 ; SP 92/90, 
fos.65 and 146, Charles to Payzant, 17 November 1751, and 
9 December 1752. 
14. Lord Chesterfield's Letters, edited by J. Bradshaw (London,1892), 
I, 155. 
15. Rochford's Cook at st Osyth was presumably the Mr Tubman whose 
death is noted in the East Essex Gazette for 24 November 1754 
(lowe this reference to HI' Kenneth \1alker o£ Romford, Essex), 
but there is no evidence that he accompanied Rochford to Turin. 
16. Rochford names a group of HS\dss friends" who dined with him in 
1751 ; Nassau Papers~ D/57 , Rochford to Villettes, 17 Narch 1754 ; 
but it may be assumed that other diplomats and friends at Court 
would have been regular guests. 
Lisbon. 17 If dela.yed, some of the mere perishable items, 
notably the salmon, might arrive at Turin "warm & very strong", 
but this happened only rarely. 18 
As for the wine with which these expensive delicacies 
were washed down, Rochford found that the local burgundy was 
ffquite to1erablen , 19 but he also brought in regular shipments 
of Rhenish wine and Dor"h~ster beer, together with arrack from 
31. 
Lisbon and Amsterdam. If the wine arrived at Genoa in casks, it had 
to b~bottled to facilitate its cartage by mUle-train to Turin, 
which added greatly to the overall cost .. 20 
This investment, for such it was in effGct, paid a good 
dividend in helping Rochford ~ecure his place in Turin society. 
The British .Envoy and his Lady were inevitably prohlinent in that 
society, from thei:- etanding in the diplomatic corps and their 
acceptance a~ C:Jurt. But Rochford we~t further than most, and took 
-as his model the typical Frenoh minister, almost naturalized and 
welcome ill all th(. best houses in -,;own, rather than the typically 
:insular English minist.Jr of Chesterfield's famous contrast, who 
might live seven years at the same court and not make one personal 
connexion there. 21 
17. Nassau Papers, AJ19, A/271 A/62 , A/63 , A/83, Birtles to Rochford, 
8 June 1750, 10 October 1750, 29 April 1752, 20 May 1750, 
12 January 1754 ; ibid., B/54 , Rochford to Birt1es, 22 January 1752. 
18. Nassau Papers, A/58, Birtles to Rochford, 19 February 1752. 
19. Nassau Papers, D/~O, Rochford to Gray, 13 December 1749. 
20. Rochford and Birtles frequently cursed the dilatoriness of Travi, 
the muleteer; Nassau Papers, A/4, A/10, A/G1, A/75, Birt1es to 
Rochford, 25 October 1749, 10 January 1750, 8 April 1752, 
3 February 1753 ; ibid., B/4, B/12, B/33 , B/45 , Rochford to Birtles, 
22 October 1749, 21 January 1750, 13 January 1751, 2 June 1751. 
One early consignment of beer cost 410 livres, while two later 
accounts for various foodstuffs totalled 350 and 394 livres ; 
Nassau Papers, A/11, A/30, A/64 , Birtles to Rochford, 31 January 
1750, 5 December 1750, 27 Hay 1752. 
21. Chesterfield's Letters, edited by Jv Bradshaw (London,1892), I, 
422-3. 
~'he international language of polite society as of 
diplomacy in, the eighteenth century was of course French, and it 
is worth noting that Rochfordts Secretary once wrote of that 
language ',lit is as familiar to my Lord as Engljsh." 22 Rochford's 
family background truly made of him a tEuropean Englishman.' But 
32. 
at Turin, many visitors were dismayed to find that Piedmontese was 
spoken much more than French at the crowded conversaziones and 
card evenings which were the staple divereions almost every night 
of the week. 23 To judge from his occasional use of Italian 
phrases even in official dispatches, it seems not anlikely that 
Rochford may have acqui£ed a smattering of ~he local clialect as 
24 a necessary entree, especially in feminine company. 
January ,"as the busiest time of year in the social life of 
Turin, for this WRS the height of the Carnival season, with its 
ceaseless round of masquerade balls, concerts, opera, firework 
d ' I . d . / 25 1SP ays, an S01rees. With his love of music and dQncing, 
Rochford must have found this a most enjoyable time. He was greatly 
pleased to discover that his favourite English country dances were 
very much in vogue in Italy, as he reported in 1752 : "the Mesdames 
of Savoye are so fond of English Country DancAs, t~at there was 
none other danced the whole night.u 26 The festiviti.es ended with 
22. SP 92/89, f.269, Charles to Payzant, 5 November 1749. 
23. See Edward Gibbon's complaint of 16 May 1764 ; Gibbon's Letters, 
edited by J.E. Norton (London,1956), I, 174. On the conversazione, 
see Charles de Brosses, Lettres familieres sur l'Italie •• 1740. 
(Paris,1931), II, 199-200 i I"iaurice Vaussard, Daily Life in 
Eighteenth Century Italy: (Lolldon, 1962), Chapter 4 ; e~d D. Carutti, 
Storia del Regno di Carlo Emanuele III (Turin,1859). II, 200-204. 
24. BM Add MSS32835, f.337, Rochford to Newcastle, 13 May 1752 ; 
SP 92/61, f.156, Rochford to Holdernesse, 24 october 1753, Separate. 
25. Nassau Papers, D/44 , Rochford to Gray, 2 January 1751 ; 
SP 92/59, f.17, Rochford to Bedford, 30 January 1751. 
26. SP 92/60, f.56, Rochford to Amyand, 19 January 1752. Horace \.,ralpole 
had noted this in 1740 ; vlalpole to West, 27 February 1740, \<Jalpole 
Correspondence (Yale, '1937-), XIII, 201. . 
Lent, perhaps not before time, to judge from one of Rochford's 
comments : HOur Carnival here is now at an End, & Lent with all 
its meagre Horrors has made its appearance ; indeed, after a 
Carnival in this Country, Sackcloth & Ashes are extremely 
'27 
necessary." 
The Court of Turin in the 1750s was still ~egarded as 
one of the more congenial in Europe,however less ~ttractive it 
28 had grown a de~ade later. Benjamin Keene at Madrid wrote to 
congratulate Rochford on his appointment and to uwish you & Lady 
Rochford all the hea:i..th imaginable to amuse yourselves at so 
agreeable a Cour-c. U 29 Roohford certainly found the Court of 
Turin agreeable, though his first impression found i tle.c!dng 
certain advantages ; "without saying more of this Court than it 
really deserves, it is not quite so numerous as ~urs, 30r so 
brilliant (there is no Queen) for want cf Ladies ; but then the 
32.a 
excessive polite behaviour 01 all the royal family makes all other 
deficiencies less apparent.t! 30 
The King of Sardinia, Charles Emmanuel III, had remained 
a widower since the death ot his third Queer, Elizabeth of Lorraine, 
in 1741, so that (;',;?art from his son and heir, Victor Amadeus, Duke 
of Savoy, the royal family now consisted of three daughters and a 
younger son, the infant Duke of Chablais. 31 The thl'ee princesses 
27. Nassau Papers, D/56, Rochford to Selwyn, 27 February 1751. 
28. Gibbon observed in 1764, "Everything follows the example of the 
Court, which from one of the most polite in Europe, is become 
bigotted, gloomy, and covetous." Letters, edited Norton (1956), I, 172 
29. BM Add MSS 43424, f.56, copy, Keene to Rochford, 2 February 1750. 
30. Rochford to Parry, 21 January 1751, printed in rotes and Queries, 
2nd series, No.4 (1856), p.71. 
31. Charles Emmanuel III (1701-73) was succeeded by his son the Duke of 
Savoy, as Victor Amadeus III (1726-96) ; see D. Car~tti, .Storia del 
Re no di Carlo Emanuele III (Turin,1859), II, 174-180 ; F. Valsecchi, 
L'Italia nel Settecento Hilan,1959) , pp.307-315 ; L. Dimier, 
Histoire de Savoie (Paris,1913), p.266. 
were then in their ~arly twenties, at~ractive and still eminently 
marriageable. 32 Rochford found the whole royal family to be 
enthusiastically anglophile, and he early reported ; "their 
graciousness to me makes me pass my time very agreeably-.1t 33 He 
was particularlj delighted at one court ball when the princesses 
each in turn partnered him in English country dances. 34 
33 .. 
Lord and Lady Rochford were also on very good terms with 
the Prince and Princess de Carignano, a lesser branch of the House 
of SB:voy. 35 In 1751 they asked Rochford if he could secure the 
protection of the British minister at Vienna for a friend recently 
.,ridowedthere., whioh task he performed promptly fOl~ them, and the 
Rochfords plainly shared the anxiety of the royal family over the 
Princess's nearly fatal confinement in 1753. 36 
The foremost social event witnessed by Rochford at Turin 
was undoubtedly the marriage in 1'(50 of the Duke of Savoy to a 
Spanish princess, the Infanta Haria Antonia Fernanda. No expense 
was spared over t~le celebrations ac Turin on this oc~asion ; 
Rochford guessed that the looms of Paris and Lyons had been busy 
for months to make I: a most glittering Court.1t The actual marriage 
ceremony took place at Oulx, near the French border, on 31 Nay 1750, 
but upon the grand entry of the young couple at Turin, the city 
32. Eleanora Teresa (1728-8',), Maria Lodovica Gabriella (1729-67), and 
Maria Felicita (1730-1801). Gibbon found their company just as 
pleasant in 1764, thcugh by then they were sadly "trois princesses 
qui ont bien l'air de ne jamais changerdtetat. 1I Gibbon's Journal 
from Geneva to Rome, edited G.A. Bonnard (London,1961), p.37. 
33. SP 92/58, £.171, Rochford to Bedford, 17 September 1749 ; see also 
Nassau Papers, D/11, Rochfordto Yorke, 21 January 1750, for a 
similar comment. 
34. SP 92/60, 1'.56. Rochford to Amyand,19 January 1752. 
35. The King's half-brother, Louis Victor Joseph (d.1778) had married 
Christina of Hesse-Rheinfeldt ; see Hoefer, Nouvelle Biof}raphie 
Generale (Paris,1853), VIII, 723. 
36. Nassau Papers, D/88 , Rochford to Keith, 9 October 1751 ; 
SP 92/61, r.154, Rochford to Holdernesse, 24 October 1753. 
34 .. 
was give!l over to all the diversions of the Carnival. 37 
The, new Duchesl'l was not exactly beautiful : her dark 
olive skin rather startled tne society ladies of Turin : and though 
the King and the Duke of Savoy declared themselves well pleased 
with the match, the courtiers complained of her haughtiness. 
Rochford himself thought the Duchess might have been a little more 
gracious, but concluded; "I own as far as I have yet observed, 
I dont think she carries her pride to tha~ height people in general 
seem to say she does,,1t 38 
The Duchess's numerous ladies were at least a welcome 
addition to the court, rem~dying the lack R)chford had noted earlier, 
yet when the court ~emoved itself to the Kingts favourite country 
palace at Venaria, sometimes for weeks on end, Rochford complained 
that Turin became as dull as any other cap:'tal city. At one time 
the Fren~h ambassador had to postpone the celebrations he had 
planned at the birth of a new Duke of Burgu..."ldy, because there were 
so few ladies of quality in town. 39 
At such times, Rochford did not lack company, though of 
a rather different quality. This is revealed by an anecdote which, 
as it embodies what may have been a contempor~.ry estimate of his 
ministry at Turin, is worth quoting in full : 
[Lord Rochford] "acquitted himst:lf entirely to the 
satisfaction of his royal master, and gained the 
confidence and esteem of his Sardinian majesty. His 
lordship made no inconsiderable figure among the amorous 
37. See S. Cordero di Pampara.to, "11 Matrimonio del Duo;" Vittorio 
Amadeo 111", Atti della R. Aocademia della Scienze di Torino, 
XXXIII (1897-8), 98-120. The more useful of Rochford's numerous 
accounts are: BM Add MSS 32821, f.365, and SP 92/58, £.345, 
Rochford to Newcastle, 20 June 1750 ; BM Add MSS 32822, f.72, and 
SP 92/58, f.349, Rochford to Newcastle, 4 July 1750 ; Nassau Papers, 
B/21b, Rochford to Allen, 15 July 1750. 
38. Nassau Papers, D/26, Rochford to Villettes, 1 July 1750. 
39. Nassau Papers, D/86 , Rochford to Coloredo, 2 October 1751 L ibid., 
D/87, Rochford to Yorke, 9 October 1751. 
35. 
beauties of Italy. The elegance of his person, the ease 
and politeness of his behaviour, the propriety of his 
conduct, made his fame re-echo from the charming lips of 
the toasts of Turin ; and his amours in that city will 
long remain enrolled in the annals of gallantry. As he 
always supported his public character with the greatest 
dignity, so he never let the intrigues of the man be any 
way blended with the business of the minister. To this 
cause we may ascribe the whimsical accident that befell 
him in that city, when repairing one night, without either 
servant or light, a circumstance uncommon in that capital, 
to one of his dulcineas, he was seized by the officers of 
the police, and confined till he could make known who he 
was, to which he Wcl.S obliged to submi·t to obtp.in his liberty. 
His Sardiniaa majesty, hearing of the affair, rallied him 
upon it, f'lrdering at; the same time that the officers who 
had been guilty of the insult should make his lordship 
40 
every possible submission in their power. It 
. No mention is made, in what little is known of RochforJf& 
social life at Turin, of Mme de st Gilles t "/hose house was the 
chief rendezvous of Turin .society at this time, and a centre for 
t . t . 41 cour 1.n r1.gue. Yet since she had a decided partiality for all 
things English and a great liking for gay company, it would have 
been remarkable if the Rochfords had not cult:'vated h~r close 
. t 42 acqua1.n ance. In the absence of names, Hme de st Gilles's age 
and social eminence make her a likely recipient for a small gift 
obtained by Rochford from London in 1751 ; a pair of silver-framed 
spectacles. 43 
40. 'rhe Town and Country Hagazine, London, II (1770) ,p.457. 
41. Caterina Haria TereSa (d.1800), ,.,.ife of Vittorio Francesco, Count 
of San Gillio, called st Gilles ; he was a natural son of Victor 
Ama.deus II. 
42. Lewis Dutens, Hemoires of a Traveller (London,1806), It 248-9. 
43. SP 92/90,£os.64 and 87, Charles to Payzant, 17 November 1751, and 
26 January 1752. 
Such gifts and favours were the accepted means of gaining 
and maintaining social connexions, and they w~r.e not confined to 
the ladies of the court : in 1751 Rochford procured from England 
an expensive set of mathematical instruments as a favour to the 
4~" King's confessor, the Cardinal de Lances. . 
36. 
Even from the scanty evidence available, Lord and Lady 
Rochford obviously did not deny themselves persona:i. rlxtravagances. 
For Lucy, theY~ is record of several sUbstantial purchases of silks 
and vel vet, as well as shoes, and even eagles' down from Swi t'zerland 
to pad petticoats and quilts. 45 Apart from an expensive gold cane-
head, RochfordtL( known extravagances tend to reflect his sporting 
interests : he had two thoroughbred Spanish pointers sect home to 
England, giving detailed instructions for their feeding and exercise 
en route ; he obtained a riding horse from Sa~'dinia thrlJugh the 
British Consul there ; and he even had ~ s~heme to ship some 
roe-bucks home, for his deer-park at st Osyth, though the final 
46 
outcome of this last plan is not known. 
Rochford also had his portrait painted at Tu=in, by the 
King of Sardinia's court painter, Domenico rupra. 47 The Envoy 
is depicted weari~g a richly embroidered frock-coat and waistcoat, 
but the most memorable feature of the portrait is Ro~hfordts own 
44. Nassau Papers, B/33 , Rochford to Birtles, 13 Janua~y 1751 
A/40, Birtles to Rochford, 10 April 1751. 
ibid .. , 
45. Nassau Papers, A/6, Birtles to Rochford, 22 November 1749 ; ibid., 
B/4, and B/51, Roclford to Birtles, 22 October 1749, and 15 
September 1751 ; ibid., D/43 , Rochford to Villettes 1 30 December 
1750. 
46. Nassau Papers, B/22, Rochford to Birtles, 19 July 1750 ; ibid., 
A/59 and A/6o, Birtles to Rochford, 26 February 1752, and 1 April 
1752 ; ibid., B/11, Rochford to Shaftoe, 24 December 1749 ; ibid., 
B/21, Rochford to Birtles, 15 July 1750. 
47. E. Btm~zit, Dictionnaire des Peintres (Paris,1955), III, 421, lists 
this among Duprats best signed portraits. I have not succeeded in 
tracing the present location of the painting, though it was probably 
brought back to England by Rochford. Sr. Giovanni Romano, of the 
Galleria Sabauda, informs Ille it is nowhere at Turin. 
37 .. 
1.• r f thf 1 f' d 1 . k' dl' 48 a 0 you u con 1. enee, Ca m assurance, ana. ·~n l.ness. 
Perhaps the most interesting (and expensive) of Rochford's 
extravagances at Turin was his second set of armorial porcelain, 
ordered in 1750 and delivered to Turin late in 1754. 49 Unlike 
the earlier set ordered for his wedding in 'i742 , this second set 
omitted the Younge arms, and the motto read very differently 
"Spes durat amorum." This seems more than just a simple error, 
since the desi3ns sent to China were usually copied meticulously, 
and it has been suggested that the alteration was Rochford's own 
comment on some obscar~ quarrel with LUcy's family, and her failure 
to give him an r.eir. 50 
These a'.1d doubtless other unrecor,led extravagar;ces would 
normally be excused as necessary palliat,ives of prolonged residence 
in a foreign land, yet the Rochford household at Turin ~njoyed a 
constant stream ot' English visitors entf"r-i::..g Italy to commence 
the Grand Tour. 51 The Duke. of Savoy t s 'wedding drew crowds of such 
travellers to Turin in the ~iddle of 1750. 52 
One of Rochford's earliest visitors was apereonal friend, 
John Clavering, an officer of the ColdstrealJl Guards, who waS then 
------------------------------------------------------------------
48. There is a mezzotint by R. Houston after Dupra, in the British 
Huseum, Department of Prints and Drawings. 
49. Cartage costs a:::"oneamounted to 365 livres ; the chir..a had to be 
repacked at Genoa for cartage by mUle-train to Turin. Nassau 
• Papers, B/58 , Rochford to Birtles, 13 November 175!~. 
50. Essex Record Office, T/G, 102/29, Hills Correspo!1dence on armorial 
porcelain relating to Essex families ; Essex Archaeological Society 
Transactions, V (1873), p.48 ; F.W. Steer, tiThe Nass&-a Service," 
Essex Countryside, VIII (1960), pp.354-355. 
51. D.B. Horn, Great Britai:::. .. and Europe in the Eighteenth Century 
(Oxford,1967), pp.330-332 ; C. Hibbert, !he Grand Tour (London, 
1969), and the essay by R.J. \\'hite in SilVer Renaissance, edited 
by A. Natan (London,1961), pp.122-141. ' 
52. SP 92/89, f.293, Charles to Payzant, 11 July 1750, names among 
others the Duke of Hamilton, Lords Pulteney, Middleton, Charlemont, 
and Fingal, MrWatson, and Nr Cadogan. 
38. 
on ;liB way to Rome. 53 Rochford also had as his guests for 
several mont~s two unaccompanied ladies, a rarity on the Grand 
Tour, but Mrs Peters and her daughter seemed a very capable pair, 
as Rochford noted : "Miss ~s more accomplished than one generally 
sees young Women ot her age, & talks Italian and French very well." 54 
Another young visitor who had reason to be grateful for Rochford's 
hospitality was Viscount Stormont, later the second Earl of 
Mansfield, who spent some time at Turin ir. 1751 before commencing 
his own diplomatic career as Secretary to the Paris embassy, where 
he replaced Rochford t s friend Yorke. In September '1751 stormont 
wrote ; If I live constantly almost with Lord and Lady Rochford, who 
are more obliging th.an anything you can conceive." 55 
A visitor of ffiuch greater importance was Prince Karl-
Alexander of Brandenburg-Anspach (1736-1816), for whom Rochford 
securea accommodation, furniture, and domestics near the end of 
1751. The Prince spent almost a year at Tu:-in, making a close 
friend of the British En\'oy, who later declared him "one of the 
Jtlost accomplished and affable Princes of this age. tI "lhile Rochford 
earned the thanks of the r1argrave for ensuring the Prince's 
application to his studies, he did not neglect the you.ng man's 
social education, and made sure the Prince attended court balls in 
order to polish his dancing and his manners. 56 
53. Nassau Papers, D/7, Rochford to Mann, 3 December 1749. Clavering 
was later the hero of Guadeloupe; see D.N.B .. , IV, 460. For his 
fracas with a Swiss guard at Rome, see L. Lewio t Connoisseurs and 
Secret Agents in Eighteenth Century Rome (London,1961), p.26. 
54. Nassau Papers, D/58 , Rochford to Nann, 24 March 175". 
55. 
56. 
Historical Manuscripts Commission Reports, Hast~ng6 MSS, III, 75-6, 
stormont to the Earl of Huntingdon, 15 September 1751. Stormont 
was Ambassador at Vienna, 1763-72 ; Horn, Representatives,p.38• 
Nassau Papers, D/96 , and D/101, Rochford to Seckendorff, 24 November 
1751, and 19 January 1752 ; BH Add NSS 32838, f.58, and SP 92/60, 
f.206, Rochford to Newcastle, 8 July 1752 ; SP 105/310, f.1, 
Rochford to Hann, 3 January 1753. 
Tiresome though Rochford found the task of presenting 
37 at Court the sons of nobility on Grand Tour, the only one who 
involved him in a scandal happened to be one of his wifets 
relations" the son of Lucy's cousin Lord William Chetwynd .. 58 
Though some of the vital details are lacking, it seems that young 
39. 
Chetwynd rashly promised marriage to a local girl, but wI"J.s arrested 
when seeking a marr1age licence from the Archbisho~. Roc~ford 
obtained Chetwynd's release, and swiftly sent him on to Venice, 
paying his expenses for the journey. Rochford then successfully 
applied for the girl's release (it is not clear why she was put in 
prison), and ga',\,"e her £ 50 out of his own p;)cket. At this there 
was an outcry, the town believing he ought ';;0 have givel;' c.er£ 300 
as a dowry, otherwise no ma.n would marr;v her. Rochford wanted to 
give more, but doubted if Lord Chetwynd would reimburse him for any 
larger sum. Writing to George Selwyn,RC'ch:':'vrd summed up his role 
in this affair 2.s~ !lye Instru~ent of putting a Stop to a little Fun 
that was going on. 1I 59 
English visitors would have been welcomed by Rochford's 
household for their up-to-date gossip from r?rne, and in between 
visi tors, family ~vrre£.poi.dence would supply news of affairs in 
England. But for public news, Rochford relied on two main sources. 
He had scarcel;y arrived at Turin when he received a .tetter from 
one Beaufort in London, offering to supply a regulu~ digest of 
European events, in French, garnered from the £,olltinental gazettes 
and newspapers. He had performed this service for Arthur Vi11ettes 
over many years, and wa:: anxious not to lose his reg!llar fee. 
57. BM Add HSS 32822, f.72, and SP 92/58, f.349, Rochford to Newcastle, 
4 July 1750 ; Nassau Papers, D/128, Rochford to Albemarle, 
30 October 1754 ; ibid., D/129, Rochford to Gray, 6 November 1754. 
58. For the Chetwynd relationship, see above, p.15, note 62. 
59. Nassau Papers, D/55, Rochford to Lord Chetwynd, 27 February 1751 
ibid., D/56 , ~ochford to Selwyn, 27 February 1751. 
Rochford was not greatly impressed with Beaufo:r-t's specimen 
digest, declaring him industrious but uncritical. Even so, this 
offered a convenient and usefuJ. source of information, which 
Rochford decided to continue, paying a small fee for the regular 
instalments of what Charles called ttour French Novelist.t1 60 
Rochford's other main source of public news lay in the 
40. 
papers he asked to be sent to him from the office ~f the Secretary 
of State in LO'1don, which included all the less bulky imprimees 
relating to diplomatic affairs, and two of the London papers, 
the Whitehall Eveniu?i Post, a res;pectable pro-government daily, 
and the Remembr~~, an independent weekly essay paper. 61 
However, in 1753 a copy of the Lon((on Evening PO!'3t was 
sent by mistake, and Rochford so liked it that he asked for it to 
be sent in future instead of the Whitehall. Bul; after reading 
subsequent issues. and the warnings of the ilnder-Secreta.ry about 
this prominent cpposition pa~er, Rochford thought it wiser to 
return to the Whitehall. leot his visitors at Turin susnected him 
.;.;.;;;.;;...;;;...;....;...;;.;;=._. .•. -
of opposition leanings. As Charles observed, "Vie have been so long 
from home that we know very little of the pr~ & con of these 
Productions." 62 When th~ Remembrancer ceased p~blication, Rochford 
63 left it to the Under-Secretary to choose a suitable j'cplacement. 
His choice is nvt known, but Rochford's caution ove~ such an 
apparently minor issue as the newspapers he was seen to receive 
suggests care and good sense in the novice Env0Y. 
60. SP 92/89, fos. 269, 270, 274, Charles to Payzant, 5 November 1749, 
12 November 1749, and 17 December 1749. 
61. SP 92/90, f.148, Charles to Payzant, 20 January 175~. See also 
T.W. Perry, Public Opinion Propa~anda and Politics in Ei hteenth 
England (Cambridge, Hass., 19 2), pp .. 127- .. 
62. SP 92/90, fos.155 and 158, Charles to Payzant, 15 September 1753, 
and 20 October 1753. See also G.A. Cranfield, nThe London Evening 
Post, 1727-44 ; A Study in the Development of the. Political Press, II 
'i'iIStorical Journal, VI (1963), pp .. 20-37. " 
63. SP 92/89, f.277, Charles to Payzant t 14cJanuary 1750 ; SP:92j90, 
f.158, Charles to Payzant, 20 October 1753. 
Rochford was fortunate to enjoy generally good health 
at Turin, despite the extremes of climate and the smallpox which 
periodically drove the Court from the city. 64 His letters often 
mention heavy falls of snow and frozen rivers in winter, and once 
he complained of "the sudden coldness of the neighbourhood." 65 
Thanks to constant outdoOl' exercise, riding and hunting, Rochford 
was only occasionally laid low by colds or rheumatis~, and then 
from catching":'. chill when hot from exercise. His only serious 
disability at Turin was a painful "boil" on his leg, which kept 
him indoors for a fox·trdght in 1751. 66 
41. 
The S'Cdlmers at Tu.rin were very ho';' indeed, and in company 
with those who cO'lld afford it, Rochford to\.)k care to re:t~ve himself 
from the city during the dog-days. He explained his sol'!!tion to 
... Tames Gray : liAs the Canals of Venice have drove you t::> Padua, 
the heat of this town will shortly send ilie 'to a little vigne I have. 
67 taken about two :niles from this place. fI Rochford was pleased to 
find this rented villa, "si"i.;uated so high upo .. :. the hill t that no 
coach can come to the door, which besides the agr~eable prospect 
also preserves me from many visitors.U 68 
In addit~on to this hill-side retreat, Rochford made 
trips to other places outside Turin which demonstrat~ his interest 
in the countryside around him. His earliest excursion was mainly 
for business rather than pleasure, though he must have enjoyed the 
64. SP 92/58, f05.212 and 218, Rochford to Bedford, 12 November 1749, 
and 19 November 1749. 
65. Nassau Papers, D/21 , ROChford to Villettes, 16 May 1~)50 ; ibid., 
D/42, Rochford to Yorke, 23 December 1750 ; ibid., D/84, Rochford 
to Mann, 28 September 1751 • 
66. SP 92/58, f.210, Rochford to Bedford, 5 November 1749 ; SP 92/58, 
1'.269, Rochford to Bedford, 21 January 1750 ; Nassau Papers, D/86 , 
Rochford to Coloredo, 2 October 1751 ; SP 92/59, 1'.175, Rochford 
to Holdernesse, 6 October 1751. 
67. Nassau Papers, D/27 , Rochford to Gray, 18 July 1750. 
68. Nassau Papers, D/29 , Rochford to Yorke, 1 August 1750. 
sight-seeing when he toured the foothills of the Piedmontese Alpc 
west of Turin in 1750, to investigate the situation of the 
Savoyard Protestants settled in the valleys of Fenestrelle and 
Torre Pellice. 69 
His second excursion, with no business distractions, 
reflects most interestingly upon Rochfordts tastes in sc~nery and 
42. 
his attitude to nature. In August 1751 he spent a to~tnight in the 
Alps of Savoy, travelling up the Val dtAosta to visit the Grand 
St Bernard and to clamber about on the glaciers.. Here he collected 
rock crystal and vuL'1e!'ary medicinal herbs, 1at'3r claiming like 
Othello to have !lad "hairE..-breadth scapes i I th' imminent deadly 
breach. U 70 
Hany years later Rochford still confessed himself to be 
"'1 Ifexcessively curious for plants,f1 ( and even b'~fore his expedition 
to the glaciers he had sent be.ck to EngJ.:-.nt: two boxes of plants 
and seedlings which he had gathered in the count~yside near Turin, 
perhaps at his hill-side vi!la. 72 
It was characteristic of Rochfordfs diligence that his 
own Grand Tour of Italy in 1753 coupled bus:;~ess with pleasure ; 
when he applied ffll' le<::..ve to make the tour, it was partly in order 
to observe tithe disposition of the several Italian courts." 73 
Accompanied by ~ecretary, Chaplain, and selected sel~ants, Lord 
and Lady Rochford left Turin on 20 March after being delayed twice 
by heavy falls of snow. The little party trave~led straight to 
69. Nassau Papers, D/33t Rochford to Villettes, 25 Septelllbcr 1750. 
See below, Chapter 4, p.92. 
70. Nassau Papers, D/79 , Charles to Yorke, 15 August 1751 ; ibid., 
D/81, Rochford to Yorke, 11 September 1751. 
71. SP 105/285, f.83, Rochford to Mann, 2 June 1775, quoted in 
Lewis, Connoisseurs and Secret A ents in Ei hteenth Centur Rome 
(London,19 1), p.150. 
72.. Nassau Papers, B/29, Rochford to Birtles, 28 November 1750. 
73. Nassau Papers, C/17, Rochford to Holdernesse, 18 November 1752 
SP 92/61, f.194, Holdernesse to Rochford, 25 January 1753 j 
Collins, Peerage of England (1779), IV, 144. 
74. 
Rome : according to Rochford, "vlithout stopping:' : arriving t;he~€' 
on 31 March. Over the next few weeks, while viewing the Eternal 
City, Rochford also made discreet enquiries concerning the 'court' 
of the Stuart Pretender, and obtained some useful information about 
supporters of that cause. From Rome, the R~chfords made a brief 
visit to Naples, then l'etu.rned northwards to Flol'enc0, where they 
stayed a week l,d th Sir Horace Nann before setting out for Bologna 
and Venice. They returned through Florence on 8 June, and finally 
arrived back at their house in Turin on 17 June. It was indeed a 
brief Tour, and Rochfold complained to Holdernesse, Hthe very short 
time I staid in ~ost of the Towns would not allow me to make any 
observations worth troubling your Lordship \iith.fI 74 
The reasons for such haste are not known, though they 
L1ay have been f:~nancial. Neverthelef::>s, MS.nn obvl\iusly fcur.d the 
Rochfords a refreshing change from the uFua: crowd of English 
visitors ; Lucy'~ wit and ch?rm especially made ~ impression 
n 
. . Lady Rochford is extremely kild, and at the s€me 
time that my Lord and she showed me so great an instance 
of it by condescending to dwell under my roof, from a 
peculiar good and obliging dispoEition of mind expresses 
herself as if they had received and no"1; conferred the 
favour. Did but the greatest part of our countrymen in 
some degree only resemble them, one should have the 
greatest satisfaction in employing one's whole time, nay, 
one's whole fortune, in showing attentions to them. But 
alas, how few one meets with like ht)r~ u 75 
SP 92/61, £ .. 43, Rochford to Holdernesse, 10 Narch 1'153 ; SP 92/61, 
f.46, Rochford to Holder:lesse, 17 Harch 1753 ; SP 92/61, f.63, 
Rochford to Holdernesse, Rome, 21 April 1753 ; SP 98/59, f.37, 
(newsletter), and f. 48, Hann to Holdernesse, 25 May 1'153, cited 
in \'lalpole Correspondence (Yale,1937-), XX, 376 ; SP 92/61, f.93, 
Rochford to Holdernesse, 23 June 1753. 
Historical Hanuscripts Commission Reports, Various Series, VI, 
Eyre-Hatcham r,lSS, p .. 25 ; Eann to BUbh Dodington, 7 June 1753. 
Mann's guarded comments to Horace Walpole suggest that Lucy's 
beauty had suffered from the extremes of the Turin climate', and 
adds that she was "beyond.measure dejected that she can't even 
confine the affections of her Lord. I! Nann to l1alpole, 8 June 1753, 
WalEole Correspondence (Yale,1937-), XX, 378. 
44. 
~rhe only other extended leave which Rochford took from 
Turin was in the following year, 1754, when he asked to return 
home for three months ; "some family affairs that cannot otherwise 
be settled requiring my presence in England." 76 Again his 
departure was delayed by heavy snowfalls, but he finally left the 
city on 26 March, and reached Dover exactly a month ~ater, on 26 
April. The family affairs which drew Rochford home in 1754 are not 
directly known, but it is likely that they concerned the sale of 
the Easton estate to his younger brother, Richard Savage Nassau. 
Richard t s second child, his first son, WB.S in fa,ct born while 
Rochford was in England, on 28 June 1754. R~chard may have felt 
ce needed his own country seat now, but it i~ equally possible 
that Rochford simply needed the money. 77 
This leave gave Rochford the opportunity to bring home to 
st Osy~h an unusual but wholly characteristic souvenir, strapped 
to the cent~e-pole of his carriage ; a Lomb~rdy poplar tapling. 
He lat~r gave several cuttings from this tree to his old school 
friend, H.S. Conway. Since there is no earlier recorded instance, 
the fourth Earl of Rochford has generally been credited with the 
"'8 introduction of the Lombardy poplar into Engl~.nd. I 
Rochford did not return to Turin until 18 October 1754 ; 79 
the extension of a three months' leave to t..lmost seven naturally 
raises the question of his willingness to return and his own 
estimation of his usefulness or otherwise there as Envoy. 
76. BH Add MSS 32847, f.245,Rochford to Newcastle, 22 :!)ec:ember 1753. 
77. 
78. 
SP 92/62, f .27, Rochford to Holdernesse, 23 Harch '1754 ; SP 105/310, 
f .277, Charles to L"lann, 3 April 1754. I \<Jas unable to see or to 
obtain information about the unsorted Rochford deeds in the Ipswich 
and East Suffolk Record Office, which might yield a precise date 
for the transfer of Easton; however, White's Suffolk Gazetteer 
(1844) suggests that the sale took place "about 1760. 1t pp.184-5. 
L.M. Hawkins, lvlemoirs, Anecdotes, etc .. (London,1824), II, 7-11 ; 
D.N.B., XXI, 1346 ; D.B. Horn, Great Britain and Euroye in the 
Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1967), p.332 ; Horace ~/alpole IS Letters, 
edited by P .. Cunningham (London, 1886). , V, 272 note; J.Y. Watson, 
The Tendrin5 Hundred (Col.chester,1877), p.234. 
Almost upon his arrlv'll i~ 1749, Rochford heard that 
inactivity was the chief complaint of the other foreign ministers 
at Turin. He dutifully echoed this common cry in his first few 
months ; though, it must be added, only once thereafter. 80 
Early in 17.50 he observed to r.lann, lias yet I see very little use 
the King has for a Hinister here," and shortly after he wrote to 
Albemarle, the British Ambassador at Paris ; Hif your Excellency 
complains of ,..,ant of employment at Paris, you will easily believe 
81 that-Turin must be the Idlest Court a minister can be employ'd at.'1 
These early impressions seem merely to reflect quiet spells, 
for Rochford found useful work to occupy himself, and it will be 
evident in succ(~eding chapters that he was often extre,nely busy.· 
when dealing with several separate matters simultaneously. At such 
times he was to complain rather, as he had e":'en before the end of 
1749, of ntb.z: £::.:'eat Hurry of businec:s.1f 82 
Rochford was not idle at Turi~. However minor the task, 
he would devote all his energy to its execution, and he often 
displayed quite exceptional zeal and initiative. He once wrote to 
his patron, the nuke of Cumberland, flit has been my constant 
83 
endeavour to make up in application what I want in ability." 
Even so, it is necessary to appreciate that Rochford had 
very special motives fo!" zeal and diligence in his first three 
years at Turin, and thE:."De are of sufficient importance to any 
estimate of his diplomatic apprenticeship that they warrant 
explanation at some length. 
80. SP 92/58, f.177, Rochford to Bedford, 1 October 1749 ; Nassau Papers, 
D/3.5, Rochford to Hanbury Williams, 24 october 1750 ; ibid., D/36 , 
Rochford to Gray, 24 October 17.50 ; ibid., D/37t Rochford to Keene, 
28 October 1750. The only later instance isin Nassau Papers, D/123, 
Rochford to Dayrolles, 29 July ~52. 
81. Nassau Papers, D/16, Rochford to Hann, 18 P-1arch 1750 ; ibid., D/28 , 
Rochford to Albemarle, 18 July 1750. 
82. Nassau Pap~rs, B/10, Rochford to Allen, 10 December 1749. 
83. Nassau Papers, D/18, Rochford to Cumberland, 2 May 1750. 
46. 
1Ifovice though he was, it cannot be held that Rochford 
began his d~plomatic career quite at the bottom rung of the 
service; Cumberland's patronage had served him well in respect of 
rank. Wh.en appointed to Turin ,Rochford was alone in the British 
diplomatic service in holding the full rank of Envoy Extraordinary 
and NinisterPlenipotentiary. This was the highest rank possible 
short of Ambassador, and. since at this time Brj.tain maintained in 
reality only two embassies in Europe, at ~::!ris and Madrid, Rochford 
stood very high in the service. In addition/his social rank as an 
Earl enhanced bis standing even further ; apart from Rochford, 
there were only two other lleers in the aery ice. 84 
However, Rochfor~ had accepted the additional rank of 
Minister Plenipotentia~y on a secret understanding thut he would 
be paid merely as an Envoy, and that he would rely on his own 
private income to make up the deficiency. 
The difference in his salary was not inconsidtlrable. 
As an Lnvoy his salary was fixed at £5 a day, or £ 1825 yearly, 
whereas the title of Hinister Plenipotentiary should have added 
a further allowance of £ 3 a day, giving an annual salary of 
£ 2920. 85 In addition to this basic salary, a diplomat could 
eb.·. Albemarle at Paris and Holdernesse at the hague were the other two 
Earls (Holdernesse was made Secretary of State on 18 June 1751) ; 
Ambassador Keene at Hadrid was of humble birth and did not receive 
his K.B. until 1754 ; see Lodge's article on Keene in Transactions 
of the nOlal Historical Society-, 4th series, XV (1932), pp.1-43. 
Castres at Lisbon was merely Envoy in 1749 ; Holdernesse, his 
successor Yorke, Keith at Vienna, and Hanbury Williams, were all 
only Hinisters, though the last two \orere later raised. to Rochford· s 
rank. See D.B. Horn, The British Diplomatic Servic~. 1689-1789 
(Oxford,1961), pp.46-~S, and Horn, British Diplomatic Representatives. 
Camden Society, 3rd series, XLVI (1932), pp.20, 37, 92, 99, 107, 
134, 153, 166. 
85. Horn, British Diplomatic Service, pp.47-8, embodying his earlier 
article, "Rank and Emolument in the British Diplomatic Service, 
1689-1789," in Transactions of the Royal Historical Societ~, 
5th series, IX (1959), pp.21-22. 
cla!m a ~pgular quarterly allowance for extraordinary expenses 
arising from. postage, stationery, and intelligence. The amount 
varied widely according to rank and place : whilst the two 
ambassadors, at Paris and Nadrid, could and did claim up to £ 1200 
a year, the rate for Turin had long been fixed at £ 100 a quarter. 86 
Since he regularly claimed this allowance in full, Rochford's 
. 87 
commencing salary at Turin was therefore nearer £ 2225 a year. 
Yet this was still less than two-thirds of that to which his rank 
entitled him. 
When oompared with the remainder of tha British diplomatic 
corps, Rochford's official income at Turin \-as unusually small. 
At the top of the sc~ale, th~ ambassadors received salaries and 
allowances amounting tc between £ 6500 and £ 7500 a year in the 
1750s. 88 Yorke ~nd Hanbury Williams, at the same rank as Rochford 
after '1752, each received over £. 5000 a year t and even lesser 
ministers s~ch as Titley, Dickens, Burrish t and Dayrollcs averaged 
well ov~r £ 3000 apiece. 39 
It was of course a truism in the eighteenth century that 
diplomacy was emphatically not the career in wilich to make one's 
fortune ; indeed, some regarded an embassy as a fo:::'m uf indirect 
taxation, for the expenses of any post were likely tv exceed an 
86. Horn, British Diplomatic Service, pp.48-51. 
87. These claims often rested unpaid for long periods ; see SP 92/58, 
f.370, Rochford to Bedford, 19 September 1750e An example of how 
the full amount of the permissible claim was co~trived is available 
from 1751 : "For Pens, Paper, &c. £ 22-17-6 ; 'Postage, £ 54-19-6 ; 
Printed Intelligence, £ 22-3-0. 11 Dated 28 July 1751. Autograph 
Series (for Holdernesse's signature), The Osborn Collection, 
Beinecke Library, Yale University. 
88. Albemarle had an enormous income from other sinecure offices, 
estimated by some at over £ 17,000 a year ; see Horace Walpole to 
Nann, 19 Hay 1750 O.S., vJalpole Correspondence (Ya1e,1937-), 
XX, p.156. 
89. Journal of the House of Commons, XXXIII, pp.471, 476 (Civil List 
Payments) ; see also Horn, British Diplomatic Service, p.61. 
90. 
91. 
92. 
48. 
incom~~ per~nnially in arrears. It was left to the individual to 
manage his affairs so as not to overspend beyond his ultimate 
reimbursement from salary and allowances, or, if he could afford it, 
to make up the deficiency from his own private income. This was 
the understanding on which Rochford accepted his higher rank. 
Even allowing for the fragmentary nature of our information, 
Rochford's private income was not large by the standards of his day. 
His pension as a Gentleman of the Bedchamber had risen by the 1750s 
to £ 1250 a year, 90 but the St Osyth estate and a few surrounding 
parcels of land constituted the bulk of his landed resources. Even 
twenty years later, the St Osyth estate brought in leBS than £ 5000 
a year, and to judge from ~he estate accounts, most of this went 
out again in running costs, household bills, and wages for a 
surprisingly large body of servants, trades.:nen, and labourers. 31 
Far fr'-'ln plunderJ.ng it, Rcchford seems rather to have nurtured his 
modest inheritance. But these were indeed very modest resources 
for a paer, especially when contrasted with the vast incomes of a 
Bedford or a Portland. 92 
Though it is likely that Rochford ha1 other sources of 
income which remain obscure for lack of eviden~e1 it ',s surely 
more significant that scarcely a decade of his earldom passed 
without either the sale of property or f~her mortgages on at Osyth. 93 
Journal of the House of Commons, XXXII, p.471. 
Essex Record Office, D/DU, 268/1, st Osyth Estate General Accounts 
Book, 1770-83 ; D/nU, 268/2, Tenants' Ledger, 1772-95. These are 
the earliest surviving est~te records for at Osyth. I have no 
information regarding income from Rochford's Dutch estates, which 
were yet smaller than st Osyth, and probably in the Care of the 
Van Reede family at Amerongen, his cousins by marriage. 
See H.J. Habakkuk's chapter in The Europe~~ Nobility in the 
;Eighteenth Century, edited A. Goodwin (London, 2nd ed.1967), pp.4-7 .. 
See above, p.18, note 70, and p.44, for the sales of Loughton and 
Easton ; for two mortgages of Z 12,000 each in 1767 and 1770, see 
Essex Record Office, D/DC, r.T.1.; several smaller Essex manors 
were sold to Rigby in 1775 ; see F.G. Emmison, Guide to the Essex 
Record Of£ice (Chelmsford,1946-8), II, pp.137,1 43. 
Rocnfvrd apparently inherited from his Zuylestein forebears a 
taste for extravagant living; he loved horse-racing and cards, 
undoubtedly gambling on both, and at his death his debts necessitated 
yet another mortgage on the St Osyth estate. 94 Whatever his actual 
income, great or small, and for whatever personal weaknesses, it is 
beyond doubt that Rochford had difficulty maintaining his position 
at Turin. 
The first suggestion of financial problems was perhaps 
his claim for travel expenses to Turin. Such a cJ.aim vIas most 
unusual, especially since this was a first appointment, for which 
the new Envoy would ha.ve received an equipage and outfitting grant ; 
unle~s, of course, this waf.: waived under the secret understanding. 9.5 
Rochford probabl~ thought an additional claim justifiable in view 
of his protracted sojourn at Paris, under o~ders to wait for 
Villettes. His claim was finally granted, 96 but its exceptional 
nature was ~emonstrated when the Treasury accompanied it with a 
ruling ~hat such claims would not be allowed in future, except by 
special direction of the King himself. 97 
A second indication of Rochford's fi~ancial difficulties 
at Turin was his private approach to Bedford even before the end 
of 1749, that the secret agreement had proved to be quite unrealistic, 
and asking that he be paid the extra allowance as Minister 
Plenipotentiary. Bedford returned a frosty refusal, and warned that 
to persist in this would greatly displease the King. 98 
94. K. Walker, HThe Nassau Family of St Osyth, It Essex Revie\v (1942), 77. 
95. The usual Equipage Allowance for an Envoy was £ .500 ; see Horn, 
British DiElomatic Service, p. • 
96. SP 92/.58, f.208, Rochford to Bedford, 29 October 1749 the 
authorisation for the claim is in SP 92/89, f.271. 
97. Treasury Minutes, 29/31,- f.236, dated 7 November 1749 ; see Horn, 
British Diplomatic Service, p • .51, and "Rank and Emolument in the 
British Diplomatic Service," Transactions of the ROilal Historical 
Society, 5th series, IX (19.59), p.29, note 2. 
98. SF 92/.58, f. ,-Rochford to Bedford" 2 May 1750, summarizes 
Bedford's reply of 18 March 1750. 
50. 
Fochford's situation was in fact doubly awkward. Turin 
was widely r~garded as one of the most expensive cities of Europe 
at this time, yet Rochford found himself, as the representative of 
the Sardinian King's most faithful ally, expected to maintain an 
establishment and 'make a figure' at least not notio~ably inferior 
to those of the French and Spanish ambassadors. 99 
His financial distress must have been acute for him to 
risk the King's displeasure : in May 1750, Rochford renewed his 
appeal for the additional salary of Minister Plenipotentiary, 
addressing hims~lf simult~eously to Bedford, to P~lham at the 
Treasury, and to his pa'cron, the Duke of Cur',berland. f:e explained 
that he would not hr..ve dared renew this request "had not the 
circumstanoes of my situation here, from the excessive dearness of 
this place, made it impossible for me to subsist on what his 
100 Hajesty is pleased to allow me." 
TLase letters met with no response at all. Hvwever, a 
further approach to Newcastle in July elicited a significant reply : 
though the King was flvery well pleasedfl with Rochford's zeal and 
diligence at Turin, that post was not thought to be worth any extra 
101 
expense for the moment. 
Even in the face of these warnings and reflA.,sals, Rochford 
persisted. He waited almost another year, u.l.4til April '1751, when 
102 he gathered his courage and wrote direct to the King himself. 
99. SP 92/58, f.322, Rochford to Bedford, 2 May 175J. 
100. Newcastle Papers, Nottingham University Library, 900/a, Rochford to 
Pelham, 2 May 1750 ; Nassau Papers, n/18, Rochford to Cumberland, 
2 May 1750 ; SP 92/58, f.322, Rochford to Bedford, 2 May 1750. 
101. EM Add }ms 32824, £.228, Newcastle to Rochford, copy, 25 October 1750. 
102. SP 92/59, f.48, Rochford tb George II, 10 April 1751, Private. 
51. 
This masterly supplication, dignified, restrailied, and calmly 
reasoned, is one of the best letters Rochford ever wrote, and it 
had the desired effect : in 1752, Rochford began to receive his 
full salal;'y as EnvvY Extraordinary and Hinister Plenipotentiary. 103 
Yet so long as he hoped for his full salary as the 
solution to his financial difficulties, Rochford had a very 
powerful inducement for zeal and diligence beyond th~ call of duty. 
It is perhaps Rignificant that his most intensive work at Turin 
falls into the earlier period, 1749 to 1752 : thereafter he felt 
free to take leave in ~753 and again in 1754 amounting to over 
nine months' abeance. By 1754, Rochford was visibly impatient for 
either promotion ~t Turin or a new post. 
The only other post he coveted was the ultimate pinnacle 
of the service, the Paris embassy. Rochfcrdfc e4pectations at the 
time of his home leave in 175l~ are revec>.::!..ec: in a letter from Malm 
to Horace vlalpol~ : 
If I will mention what, if it be tl;'ue, y~u will know already, 
that some private informations were sent to Lord Rochford 
before he left Turin that Lord Albemarle was to go to 
Ireland, acd';hat he might succeed cs ambassador at Paris. 
Lord Rochft;rd did not make any mention of j.t, however, in 
the very kind and friendly letters he wrote to me on his 
setting out, at "lhieh time it appeared that the height of 
his ambition was to return to Turin with the character of 
an ambassador. tl 104 
Rochford returned from his leave without any increase 
in rank, and Albemarle did not go to Ireland. Neve::.'theless, 
103. BM Add HSS 32737, f.550, A List of the Diplomatic Establishment, 
with Salaries and Allowances, 1752 ; the actual payments, which 
seem to include arrears, are in the Journal of the House of Commons, 
XXXII, 468, 475. See also, Horn, !1The Cost of the Diplomatic 
Service, 1747-52,11 English Histori,cal Review, XLIII (1928), 606-611. 
104. f'lann to \1alpole, ii!9 Narch 1754, Walpole Correspondence (Yale t 
1937-), xX,420. 
Mann was certain that Rochford had been given borne sort of v~rba: 
promise for Paris, which had reconciled him to remaining at Turin 
for a year or two more. 105 
.Therefor~, when Albemarle died unexpectedly on 
22 December 1754, a mere two months after Rochford's return from 
leave, it WaS to be expected that Rochford might be recalled to 
replace him at Paris. Rochford was indeed recalled from Turin, 
52. 
quite promptly. by an order which reached Turin on 18 January 1755, 
d h d th " t L d· d t' 106 t h dOd an e rna e e Journey 0 on on ~n recor ~mc. Bu e ~ 
not replace Albemarle Gi.t Paris, nor did anyone Glse : the post 
remained vacant at the rupture of diplomatic rel~tions in 1756 
which ushered in the Seven Years' War. 107 Rochford filled 
another of the vacancies caused by Albemarle's death, and nine 
years were to elapse before his diplomatic appreuticeship was 
put to use elsewhp.re. 
It nov: remains to consider that apprent,iceship at Turin 
in more detail. 
105. Hann to VJalpole, '17 January 1755, Halpole Correspondence (Yale, 
1937-), XX, 420. 
106. SP 92/63, f.l, Robinson to Rochford, 3 January 1755. 
107. Horn, British Diplomatic Representatives, p.21. 
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estimate of Rochford as observer. 
CHAPTER 3 
The Court of Turin Rochford as Observer 
In ·the first half of the eighteenth century, down to the 
mid-1750s, Savoy-Sardinia was politically by far the most important 
1 of the Italian states in British foreign policy_ The House of 
Savoy was widely regarded as the "natural ally" in Italy for the 
British govern.nent, and after their accord in thf) Treaty of Worms 
(1743) with the Court of Vienna, the Sardinian King \'Ias thought of 
as the protege of that which successive BritL,>h ministers persisted 
in calling 'the Common Cause'. Yet the reasons fc~ Britain's 
remarkably consistent partiality towards the Court of Tur~n are not 
immediately ap:pal'ent as 'nat'J.ral' ties .. 2 
ThoU6~! strong pro-British sentiment undoubteo.lyexiRted 
at Turin, strategic considerations counted much more heavily. 
So long as Britain remained at enmity with France and allied to 
_. .-
Austria, she regarded Savoy··Sardinia in the useful dual role of an 
obstacle to French intervention in northern Italy, and a restraint 
on Austrian ambitions for complete dominatio4 there. In addition 
to this buffer-state role, Savoy-Sardinia's friendship offered 
Britain her sol~ ex~use for a voice in the ~ffairs of Italy. 3 
Furthermore., the King of Sardinia I s desire for a wider 
corridor to the Mediterranean, partially recogniz,ed in the Treaty 
1. D.B. Horn, Great Britai~ and Europe in the Eighteenth Century 
(Oxford,1967), p.335. 
2. L. Dutens, Memoirs (London,1806), I, 170-171 ; R. Lodge, Studies 
in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy, 1740-1748 (London,1930), pp.34-
36, 61. '.' 
3. Horn, Great Britain and Europe, 1'1'.335-6 ; F. Cognasso, I Savoia 
nella politica Europa (Hilan,1941 ), :Pl'. 235-9 ; F. Valsecchi, 
L'Italianel Settecento (Milan,1959), 1'1'.177-180. 
of Worms at the expense of Genoa's claims to Finale, held out to 
Britain the prospect of naval bases for a British Mediterranean 
fleet, conveniently close to the great French base at Toulon. 
British warships al~"e8.dy regularly used the King of Sardinia 1 S 
main outlet to the sea, his 'new' port at Villafranca near Nice. 4 
Rochford's appointment to Turin might well be described 
as the last in which this post held real importance for British 
foreign policy ; by his share in the negotiation':! leading to the 
Treaty of Aranjuez (1752), Rochford himself helped to curtail the 
strategic value of Britain's alliance with th~ Court of Turin. 
The mutual guarautees of Aranjuez, between the Courts of Madrid, 
Vienna, and Turin, removed much of the potential for conflict in 
northern Italy, and while designed to exclude French interference 
in Italian affr,irs, also effectively removed &ny need for. British 
involvement. This reduction in the strategic 'Value of Savoy-Sardinia 
as a buffer-state was overwhelmingly con:irmed in 1756 with the 
reversal of alliances callen the Diplomatic Revolution by which 
France and Austria became allies. Thus caught as if in pincers, 
the King of Sardinia rJight have been forgiveli for throwing his lot 
in with such po\·terful neighbours, yet at the outbreai: of the Seven 
Years' War he opted for neutrality and a precarious independence. 
This was hailed in Britain as a direct consequence of the careful 
preserVation of friendship between the English :md Sardinian cro ... ms 
over preceding decac,es. For this preservation, Rochfo!"d deserves 
at least some of the credit. 5 
4. Horn, Great Britain and Europe, p.336 ; The Cambridge Modern Hi~tor~, 
Volume VI, The Eighteenth Century (Cambridge,1909), p.608, on Flnale. 
Villafranca had been a 'new' port in 1670 ; V Barbour, IIConsular 
Service in the Reign of Charles II,1t American Historical Review, 33 
(1927-8),. p.562. 
5. F. Cognasso,I Savoia nella politica Europa, pp.238-240 ; Horn, 
Great Britain and Europe, p.336. On the Aranjuez negotiati~~t 
see below, Chapter 6. 
While Rochford's primary diplomatic role at Turin was 
that of an observer of the King of Sardinia's disposition and 
policies, his central task at all times was the preservation of 
a close and cordial friendship between his co~~t and that of Turin. 
In the words of his Instructions, Rochford was to declare to the 
K;~ng of Sardinia on behalf of George II, lithe great Value and 
Esteem We have for His Person, and how desirous We are to maintain 
a good Correspondence with Him, and upon all Occasions to improve 
it." This first clause, and the seventh, which enjoined on Rochford 
the duty of ' close observation of the Court of Turin and the influence 
of the various ministers on the King, togeth3r constituted the 
heart of Rochford's brief f0rmal Instructions. 6 
At no time ';/as Rochford in any serious fear that the Court 
of Turin would cease to pay at least lip-&€'~vice to its connexion 
with Britain. From the very outset of his residence at Turin, 
Rochford was assured tha~ the King of Sardi~ia regarded the close 
friendship of England as being so essential to his interests that 
no important step would ,ever be taken at Turin without prior 
consultation with the British government. 7 At O~'le audience, the 
King suggested to Rochford that Britain I s friendship '''as his only 
reliable connexion. 8 Throughout Rochford's residence, there was 
no lapse in the steady flow of platitudes expressing the King's firm 
6. Public Record Offrce, FO 90/40, f08.118-121, dated 12 June 1749. 
The second clause concerned Rochford's visits o~ the royal family, 
and warns him to take care that he is shown all the honours due to 
his rank ; clauses 6 and ,8 vlere routine, reminding Kochford to 
correspond with other British diplomats and to obey all further 
instructions from the Secretary of State. The only specific matters 
were those contained in clauses 3 and 4, concerning protection for 
Savoyard Protestants and the avoidance of conflicts between Turin 
and Geneva; on these matters, see below, Chapter 4. 
7. SP 92/58, f.247, Rochford to Bedford, 17 December 1749. 
8. SP 92/61, f.158, Rochford to Holdernesse, 31 October 1753.-
resolve to maintain IIgood correspondence and understanding.!: 
Scarcely a single audience passed without the repetition of this 
assurance. 9 
·Yet on thl.} other hand, while Rochford spoke of "so steady 
an Ally as the King of Sardinia,n the Envoy was under no illusions 
10 
regarding that ally's motivation. Charles Emmanup.l III was 
notoriously the most cynical opportunist of his agE; in Italy, 
exceeded perha~o only by his father and exemplar. Victor Amadeus II. 
The King of Sardinia was chiefly and understandably concerned for 
his own preservation, ~Ld this made him a wary and unpredictable 
ally. Rochford .'loon perceived that his great2st (tread was the 
outbreak of another war in Italy while he was still exhaucted from 
the campaigns and expenses of the Austr:i.an Succession War. This 
weakness, and his fear of antagonizing either France or Austria, 
largely acceunt fer his avowed pelicy ef cauti~us n~utrality. 11 
T~e King of Sardinia was also. anxieus to. prevent fereign 
influences from gaining a footheld in his own domestic counsels ; 
Rechferd noticed that the King was "extremely jealous" of his power, 
avoiding any hint of fa.vouritism towards his ministers and courtiers, 
and forbidding the royal family to have any part of the intrigues of 
the court. 12 In fact, there were few opportunities fer intrigue at 
Turin, and none of the traditional avenues by which diplomats sought 
9. For examples, see : SP 92/58, f.247, Rochford to Bedford, 17 December 
1749 ; SP 92/59, fJ, Rochford to Bedford, 9 January 1750; ibid, 
f.158, Rochford to holdernesse, 26 September 1751 ; BH Add :f.rss 32838, 
f.60, and SP 92/60, f.208. Rochford to Newcastle, 8 July 1752 ; 
SP 92/62, f.150, Rochfor~ to Robinson, 26 October 1754 ; Nassau 
Papers, D/136 , Rochford to Yorke, 8 January 1755. 
10. Nassau Papers, D/47 , Rochford to Albemarle, 16 Januqry 1751 ; some 
years later, at Hadrid, Rochferd commented en the King of Sardinia 
as one !Iw~o is more prying into the Affairs ef Italy than any other. 1t 
SP 94/171, f.18, Rochford to Halifax, 8 July 1765, Separate. 
11. SP 92/59, f.56, Rochford to Bedford, 8 May 1751. See also L. Dimier, 
Histeire de Savoie (Paris,1913), p.266 ; Valsecchi, L'ltalia nel 
settecento, pp.307-315. 
12. BH Add HSS 32821, f.325, and SP 92/58, f.340, Rechford to Ne\>/castle, 
13 June 1750. 
57. 
to learn a few secrets ; the King of Sardinia had no favourites, 
no mistresses, and indeed no Queen, having re~ained a widower since 
1741. Charles Emmanuel III led as solitary and secluded a life as 
his duties at court allowed. Foreign observers commented upon his 
natural traits of gravity and reticence having been inten.sified by 
religious devotion after the death of Elizabeth of Lorrai.ne. 13 
The King was daily to be seen at Mass, and regularly received the 
members of the ~iplomatic corps, but he preferred to leave business 
with foreign representatives as far as possible in the hands of his 
ministers. The King's reticence made for a very secretive atmosphere 
at Turin Rochfllrd complained of "the Custom of this Court which 
seems to like making a Secret of the merest Trifles.1I 14 
Fortunately, Rochford discovered a way to pen£trate this 
almost oriental seclusion. The King was passjon&tely f0nd of 
hunting, and spent as much of his time ad possible at his country 
retreat Venaria, a few miles north-west of Turin. In the summer, the 
court removed itself to Venaria for weeks on end, provoking the 
obvious comment that hunting appeared to take precedence over 
business. 15 But this proved very agreeabl': for Rochford 
It 
• • as I am \'lilling to embrace every Opportunity of 
paying my Court; I never fail attending him a-hunting, 
at whj~h times I have the honour of Breakfasting with Him, 
16 & of being received in a particular gracious Manner." 
13. SP 92/58, f.175, Rochford to Bedford, 24 September 1749 ; Nassau 
Papers, D/92, Rochford to Albemarle, 10 November 1751 ; D. Carutti, 
Storia del Regno di Carlo ~manuele III (Turin,1859), II. 174-180. 
See also Edward Gibbon's Journal from Geneva to Rome, edited by 
G. Bonnard (London,1961), p.17, note 3, quoting Keysler's Travels 
(1756), I, 225. I have not yet seen E. Pontieri, Carlo Emanuele III 
(Nilan,1935). 
14. SF 92/58, f.269, Rochford to Bedford, 21 January 1750. 
15. Nassau Papers, D/34 , Rochford to Yorke, 24 October 1750. 
16. SF 92/58, f.210, Rochford to Bedford, 5 November 1749. 
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Doubtless thanks to these early morning rides, Rochford 
managed to achieve a good personal relationship with the King of 
Sardinia, and at no time during his residence at TuriL was he ever 
persona non grata to the King, as his predecessor Arthur Villettes 
1...-d b . 17 
.I..I.d. een on occasJ.on. Even during the delicate negotiations 
for Aranjuez, Rochford was favoured with several infvrma2. private 
conversations by the King at Venaria, and while Ch~rles Emmanuel 
later maintaindd a cautious silence on the negot~_ation itself 
during its most difficult phase, he continued to treat Rochford 
18 
very affably 'lfhanever they met. 
Although Rochford's reports are, perhap~ properly, bare 
of personal anecdotes regarding the King of Sardinia, he dutifully 
reported the progress of any royal illnesses, and always noted the 
King's visits to the spa at Vaudier, in the v<:..lley of t'he Stura. 
More than once these supposedly curative ':Taterl'! sent the King back 
to Turin more feverish and ill than when he set out. 19 
Rochford's observ!:>. tion and reports, in accordcl.llce \-Ii th 
his Instructions, conce~trat~d upon the King's policies and public 
character, and upon his ministers. Next to ~elf-preservation and 
aggrandizement, Charles Emmanuel Ill's most obvious policy was to 
secure recognition 8.S an equal from the other crowne<i heads of 
Europe. The Dukes of Savoy had held the Kingdom of Sardinia only 
since 1718, for which they had exchanged Sicily under the mediation 
of the Emperor Charles VI. The Court of Vienna had thereafter always 
20 
regarded the King of Sardinia as an inferior parven'!. 
17. Lodge, Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy, p.50. 
18. BH Add MSS 32835, f.46, and SP 92/60, f.121, Rochford to Newcastle, 
15 April 1752. 
19. Nassau Papers, B/21, Rochford to Birtles, 15 July 1750 ;BU AddMSS 
32822, £.181, and SP 92/58, f.357, Rochford to Ne"''lcastle, 25 July 
1750 ; SP 92/59, f.112, Rochford to Holdernesse, 21 July 1751. 
20. On the King of Sardinia'S foreign policy, see below, Chapter 5. 
Valsecchi, L'Italia nel Settecento, pp.23-7, 69-79. 
Rochford heard it said that other Italian courts sneered 
at the King of Sardinia for "grasping at honours" when he could 
not grasp at territory. 21 Yet this policy initially met with some 
success. Spain conceded the alternat, the customary mark of equality 
between powers, when signing the treaty for the marriage of the Duke 
of Savoy to a Spanish Infante. in 1750, 22 and the Court of Turin 
again obtained the ill.£~ in the Treaty of Aranjuez in 1752, from 
Vienna as well as Maorid. 23 At the birth of a so~ to the Duke and 
Duchess of Savoy in Hay 1751, the King of Sardinia obtained the 
Papal blessing on the child's linen, which was counted amongst 
24 Catholic courts as an important favour. 
However, such a policy can also court. failure, and Rochford 
was on hand to witness its most embarrassing reverse. Ordinarily, 
the Papal Nuncio at a majo:t' Catholic court was also a member of the 
College of Cardinals, as a mark of respect for the soveraign to 
whom he wan sent. When the Nuncio Merlini arrived at Turin in June 
1752 with the linges b6nits for the infant Prince, Cha.rles Emmanuel 
set about lobbying for *erlini to be made a Cardinal. This would 
have added great~'y to the King t s prestige, but the bid caused much 
surprise in Italy, since Turin did not even have an ambassador at 
Rome. For over a year, intensive efforts were exerted at Rome, yet 
when the list of new Cardinals was published in November 1753, 
Merlini
'
s name was not included. 25 
21. SF 92/60, f.267, Rochford to Holdernesse, 16 December 1752. 
22.' S. Cordero di Pamparato, "11 matrimonio del duce Vittorio Amedeo 
III di Savoia,!! Atti dellaR. Accademia di Scienza di Torino, 
XXXIII (1897-8), 98-120. 
23. But notice the secret reservation between Madrid and Vienna ; see 
below,Chapter 6, p.178. 
24. BM Add NSS 32837, f.248, Rochford to Newcastle, 1 July 1752. 
25. SP 92/60, f.267, Rochford to Holdernesse, 16 December 1752 ; 
SP 92/61, fos.38, 50, 182, Rochford to Holdernesse, 3 Harch, 
. 10 October, 1 December 1753. See also, Carutti, Storia della 
diplomazia della corte di Savoia (Turin,1875-80), II, 330-331. 
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Charles Emmanuel III regarded this reverse as a bitter 
personal defeat, and such demonstration of the limits to the 
recognition he could reasonably expect from other powers also 
helps to explain his adherence to the connexion with Britain. The 
friendship of so great a power, even though distant, Protestant, 
a~d largely maritime, gave the King of Sardinia much useful prestige 
in Italy. It is doubtful, however, whethe!" the King was quite as 
personally devoted to the British alliance. as his son C'.nd heir. 
The Duke of Savoy, later Victor Amadeus III, was more 
openly anglophile than h1.s father. Early in 1'?50, Rochford vlrote 
effusively to fri6ndtj in England that the Duke was "by far the 
most accomplishen Prince I ever saw He is excessively fond of 
26 Englishmen, a~d everything that has connexicn with England." 
As a result, Rochford seems to have achieved a closer personal 
friendship with the Duke than with the King himself. In all their 
private conversations, Rochford found the Duke "always remarkably 
gracious" tOvJards him. 27 As befitted the heir-appareI1,t, the Duke 
of Savoy faithfully echoed his father's sentiments on most matters, 
yet despite his apparent timidity, it was not uncommo~ for the Duke 
to chat informally with Rochford on matters of policy and European 
affairs. Rochford's impression that the Duke was intelligent and 
well-informed was an accurate observation. d8 
26. Rochford to Mr & }1rs Parry, 21 January 1750 ; printed in Notes and 
Queries, 2nd series, No.4 (1856), p.714 
27. BM Add r·ISS 32837, f.250, and SP 92/60, f.203, Rochford to Nevlcastle, 
1 July 1752, separate. 
28. SP 92/58, f.171, Rochford to Bedford, 17 September 1749 ; BH Add MSS 
32840, f.86, and SF 92/60, f.231, Rochford to Newcastle, 9 September 
1752. Gibbon also testifies to the Duke's nervousness and timidity 
Journal from GeneVa to Rome, edited by G.A. Bonnard (1961), p.27. 
Carutti, Storia del Regno di Carlo Emanuele III (Turin,1859), II, 
180-182, describes the Duke as having received "un'accurata ed 
ampia istruzione, II vlhich he improved with constant study. 
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Secret information given to Rochford late in 1754 
demonstrated-the Duke's support. for the British connexion : at a 
Council meeting to discuss the offer of a French alliance, the 
Duke of Savoy had staunchly defended Britain's friendship, against 
several doubting ministers, and had shown rather more spirit in its 
d~fence than the King himself. 29 It seems likely that Rochford's 
personal friendship had helped to strength~n this predilection. 
Rochford's considerable gifts fOI' making friends were 
put to good use in other directions as well at Turin, notably 
amongst the leading families who served the King of Sardinia as 
courtiers. Here Roch:f".)rd made a number of very useful friendships. 
Foremost ~mong the~e useful friends at court was the 
Marquis de Breglio, or as Rochford called him, de Breille. This 
noble had been the Duke of Savoy's Governor until 1747, and when 
de Breille was promoted Grand Ecuyer in May 1750, Rochford noted 
that this just reward for his governorship ffieant that the King had 
now given de Breille all that he could in preferment. 30 De Breille 
was a particularly useful contact for the British Envoy. Not only 
wa.s there IIno one more versed in the intrigues ofCon.rt" than he, 
but his background made him ardently pro-British, and his advice 
carried weight with the King. 31 Though no longer his Governor, 
29. SP 92/62, f.179, Rochford to Robinson, 21 December 1754. However, 
by 1764, Gibbon found the Duke, "a qui l'on accorde beaucoup de 
talens, n'est que Ie premier Esclave de la Cour, qutil u'a jamais 
quitte un moment qutavec son pere. 1I Journal fro>n Geneva to Rome, 
edited by G.A. Bonnard (19G1), p.18. 
30. BM Add MSS 32821, f.77, a~d SP 92/58, f.326, RochfOi.d to Newcastle, 
9 Nay 1750. 
31. BM Add NSS 32822, f.1, and SP 92/58, f.347, Rochford to Newcastle, 
27 June 1750. De Breille had spent his childhood in England ; 
Dutens, Hemoirs (1806), I, 17ll-. Vlri ting to Villettes in 1751, 
Rochford described de Breille as limy good friend. 1I Nassau Papers, 
D/64 , Rochford to Villettes, 17 April 1751. 
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de Breille was still on the best of terms with the Duke of Savoy, 
who went out'of his way to show his continued regard. 32 Rochford 
appears to have consulted de Breille on most matters, especially 
in the early years of his residence, and not Duly in relation to 
the Duke of Savoy ; de Breille was presumably Rochford's main 
source of information regarding the King's relationship with his 
chief ministers. 33 
Another of P.ochford's close perBonal friends at Court was 
Count Bricherasio, or Eriquerasque, who 'ViaS appointed Governor to 
the infant Dul<:e of Chablais in 1750. This friendship proved useful 
for Rochford in 1752. when Bricherasio was pl'omoted to he Governor 
OA the Island of B~rdinia. Rochford wrote to the British Consul at 
Cagliari, recommendingi:;he net'/ Governor as his personal friend, who 
had promised Rochford to assist the Consul i.n every possible way 
to further British trading interests in Sardinia. 34 
Count San Vittorio, the First President of the Senate, 
was the third of Rochford's highly-placed connexicns at Court, 
whom he described in 17.50 as "my particular friend. 1I San Vittorio 
came of an old-established anglophile family in Piedmont, and his 
office gave him an influential voice at Turin. His ~dvice was 
thought to have great weight with the King, especially in religious 
matters, and his support was of considerable value in one of 
Rochford's earliest negotiations at Turin.- 35 Although no names 
32. BM Add MSS 32821, f.325, and SF 92/58, f.340, Rochford to Newcastle, 
13 June 1750. 
33. BM Add MSS 32822, f.1, and SF 92/58, f.347, Rochford to Newcastle, 
27 June 1750. 
34. BM Add MSS 32821, f.77, and SF 92/58, f.326, Rochford to Newcastle, 
9 Hay 1750; Nassau Papers, B/53 , Rochford to Shaftoe, 14 January 
1752. 
35. SF 92/58, fos.293 and 300, Rochford to Bedford, 28 February and 
21 March 1750 ; BH Add MSS 32838, f.378, and SF 92/60, f.223, 
Rochford to Newcastle, 5 August 1752.. On the r.liners r negotiation, 
see below, Chapter 4. 
are mentioned, San Vittorio seems the likeliest source of 
Rochford's secret information regarding the Council meeting late 
in 1754, at which the Duke of Savoy defended the Bri~ish connexion 
the information calte from one who was present, someone "greatly 
consulted" and trustworthy, who was above all Itbigo'cted to the 
Common Cause" of Britain and her allies. 36 
Other courtiers are named in Rochford IS :letters who may 
at least be ccmted amongst his acquaintance at rJ!urin, though there 
is no evidence of close friendship ; such would include the Marquis 
de 10. Chiusa, Grand Naitre of the King's Household; the Marquis 
d'Ormea, Lord of the Bedchamber and first Ecuyer!;o the King; 
the Harquis de Fleury ; Count J.lonastreul ; and others. One close 
friend who did not occupy a position. of importance at T'C.rin but 
nevertheless proved his worth later in Rochford's career was the 
youthful Count Roubion. Roubion was given his first diplomatic 
posting to Naples just before the close of Rochford's Turin ministry, 
and Rochford recommendod hir.1 to the British Envoy there $ "as he is 
a particular friend of mine." 37 When Rochford arrived at Madrid 
in 1763, he found Rouhion there as Sardinian ambassador. 38 
Rochford's genius for friendship was apparently of the sort 
lr/hich survives absence ; on his return from leave in 1754, he was 
pleased to find himself greeted with warmth and kindness by the 
courtiers and ministers of the King of Sardinia, lias well as some 
other Persons of Credit here, with whom I was in Connexion before 
I left." 39 
36. SP 92/62, f.1791 Rochford to Robinson, 21 December 1754, Very Secret. 
37. Nassau Papers, D/134, Rochford to Gray, 8 January 1755. 
38. 
39. 
Rochford vias overjoyed to have as his colleague at Madrid one with 
whom he had been "former1y very intimate" at Turin ; SP 94/166, 
f.25, Rochford to Halifax, 13 J~nuary 1764. 
SP 92/62, f.151, Rochford to Robinson t 26 October 1754. 
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While Rochford made useful friends amongst the courtiers, 
his closest and m'.:.st important dealings were of course ''lith the' 
King of Sardinia'S ministers. His primary duty of observation in 
this respect was clearly set out in the seventh clanse of his 
Instructions : he was to report on 
11 •• the Abilities & Affections of the Ministers, 
their Interests, mutual Correspondence & Differences 
one with another, their Dispositions to War or Peace, 
their In~lination fO.r Foreign PrinceG or States, 
together with all such Observations as you shall have 
been able to make, which may contribute GO inform Us 
of the St::l.te of that Government. It 40 
Naturally Rochfo~dls earliest dealings were \'Iith the ,secretary of 
state for Foreign Affairs, the Ninistro degli Esteri. Since the 
death of the elder d'Ormea in 1745, this post had been held by 
the Marquis de GOl'zegno. 
Rochfol'd at first thought Go:!'zegno an honest and hard-
working minister, well-disposed to the allied cause. 41 Gorzegno 
'earned Rochford's respect at one of their earliest interviews by 
surprising him with a reproach that Britain had just missed an 
opportunity to conclude a subsidy treaty with Denmark, letting 
France steal a march on the allies. Rochford knew nothing of the 
new French treaty with Denmark, but he offered as his private 
opinion that a subsidy had probably been deemed a needless expense 
so soon after a general peace treaty. This guess was in fact 
perfectly accurate, and it satisfied Gorzegno. 42 
40. FO 90/40, fos.120-121, Rochford's Instructions, dated 12 June 1749. 
41. BM Add MSS 32822, f.1? Rochford to Nevlcastle, 27 June 1750. Carutti, 
Storia del Regno di Carlo E~anuele III (1859), II, 49, describes 
Gorzegno as I!ministro attentoe laborioso. 1I 
42. SP 92/58, f.177, Rochford to Bedford, 1 October 1749. On the 
Danish treaty, see Horn, Great Britain and EuroEe, p.256. 
44. 
llowever, Gorzegno's advanced age, his chronic illness, 
and the King.ls undisguised lack of confidence in his judgment, 
soon caused Rochford to look beyond Gorzegno to. discern the patterns 
of power and royal favour amongst the other principnl ministers. 
He quickly realized that the man to watch was the Secretary for War, 
Count Giovanni Battista Bogino. 43 
Even before the end of 1749 Rochford had noted Bogino's 
favour with the King and his apparently unbridled ambition. 44 
Continued observation convinced Rochford that Bogino aimed at 
complete ascendancy in the ministry ; he was doing his utmost to 
add Domestic and Ecclesiastical affairs to tis War portfolio. He 
wa03 also the closese anyone had come to being the King's favourite. 
Rochford noted, "that some Persons • • who had been endeavouring to 
&tand on their own Bottom," now paid court to Bogino. 45 It was 
common kno\,lledge that virtually all of the promotions 0:::1 the occasion 
46 
of the Duke of Savoy's w'3dding in 1750 were Bogino's nominees. 
Bogino's arrogance made him almost as ma~y enemies as 
sycophants, and Gorzegno was not the least of his oppon~ntst but 
Rochford took care to remain on friendly terms with both of them, 
and hoped nothing would alienate him from Bogino's tr.lst for then, 
he explained, "it would not be in my power to watch him SO narrowly 
as I can now, being at present on very good Terms with him." 47 
On Bogino (1701-84), see the article by G. Quazza in Dizionario 
Bio&rafico degli Italiani (Rome,1960-), XI, 185. 
SP 92/58, f.247, Rochford to Bedford, 17 December 1749. 
45. SP 92/58, f.271, Rochford to Bedford, 28 January 1750. 
46. Nassau Papers, D/21, Rochford to Villettes, 16 May 1750 ; BH Add MSS 
32821, f.175, Rochford to Ne\-1castle, 23 Hay 1750. 
47. SP 92/58, f.305, Rochford to Bedford, 4 April 1750. Rochford later 
decided that Gorzegno had been a rather less than suitable friend 
to the allied cause, from his lack of credit with the King and his 
constant squabbles with other ministers ; SP 92/58, f.380, Rochford 
to Bedford, 21 November 1750. 
66. 
Rochford was therefore ideally placed to witness the 
most significant minist0rial change during his residence at Turin, 
the appointment in 1.750 of a new Ministro degli Esteri. Gorzegno' s 
age and infirmity had rendered him by Harch that ye3r Ira meer Cypher 
in his Office," and the King decided that he should be retired 
gracefully with the office of Grand Chamberlain, and replaced as 
F . S t b G' o· 48 ore1.gn ecre ary y l.useppe ssor1.o. 
Ossorio 'VIas a Sicilian who had :{on much favour under 
Victor Amadeus II. A career diplomat, Ossorio had served with 
distinction as Sardinian minister in London in the 1730s, had 
signed the Treaty of Worms in 1743, and ass~sted at the peace 
settlement of Aix-la-ChapeD.e in 1748. Latterly, as ambassador at 
Madrid, he had negotiated the treaty for the marriage of the Duke 
Qf Savoy, and had accompanied the new Duchess from Spain. 49 
Rochford seems to have known Ossorio from earlier days 
in London, for he sent compliments to him at. Hadrid which Ossorio 
returned promptly and cordially. 50 It is obviouf';l;hat Rochford 
regarded Ossorio's appo~ntment as Forei~n Secretary to be the best 
possible choice from Britain's point of view, p.x~ecting that from 
his long residence in England, Ossorio would have "i::abibed a \'lay of 
thinking not very different from ours." 51 This expectation seemed 
to be fulfilled on Ossorio's arrival at Turin, as Rochford noted 
48. SP 92/58, f.300, Rochford to Bedford, 21 March 1750. 
49. Carutti, Storia del Resno di Carlo Emanuele III (1859), II, 49-50, 
describes Ossorio as "uomo per pratica delle grandi t~attazioni 
ed eccellenza dtingegnodegnissimo dell'alto e delic~to ufficio." 
See also, Valsecchi, L'Italia nel Settecento, pp.174-5, 309, and 
Lodge, Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy, pp.30-79 passim .. 
50. Keene remarked that he was having to teach Ossorio hm'l to play 
whist again, he had been so long without practice ; BH Add HSS 
43424-, f.56, copy, Keene to Rochford, 2 February 1750. 
51. SP 92/58, f.300, Rochford to Bedford, 21 Harch 1750 ; ibid., f.334, 
Rochford to Bedford, dated 6 .Hay 1750 but corrected to June on the 1'18. 
Nassau Papers, D/27, Rochford to Gray, 18 June 1750. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
that the new minister's protesta~ion6 of amity for Britain were 
every bit as warm as could be desired. 52 
Rochford observpd that Ossorio took considerable pains 
in his first few weeks at Turin to establish his position at court 
and in the ministry. He was especially attentive to Rochford's 
friend de Breille, as a first step to gaining the favour of the 
Duke of Savoy. In the adntinistration of his new office, Ossorio 
displayed exceptional industry, which "mightily pleased" the King.53 · 
With the sudden death of Gorzegno only three weeks after the arrival 
of his successor, Ossorio now became the chief exponent of Turin's 
British connexion. 54 
An able and energeti~ new Foreign Secretary such as Ossorio 
also repreaented a serious obstacle to the ambitious plans of 
Count Bogino, and Rouhford watched with interest the str~ggle for 
ascendancy wIlich. no\1' developed between the two.. The outcome was of 
considerable significance for the future policies 0:: the Court of 
Turin, for while both were thought to be anti-French, Bogino's 
sympathies lay with Austria rather than Britain. 55 
The King of Sardinia, delighted by his new minister's 
zeal, gave Ossorio his full confidence, and by the end of 1750 
Rochford was sure that Bvginots credit had begun to slip markedly. 
As early as October, Rochford reported the ministry deeply divided, 
with Ossorio guarding his ground jealously, refusing to allow any 
56 interference in his department. Throughout 1751, Bogino 
struggled to recover the King's favour and to undermir.e Ossorio's 
BM Add MSS 32821, f.255, Rochford to Ne ... rcastle, 6 June 1750. 
Nassau Papers, D/29, Rochford to Yorke, 1 August 1750. 
Gorzegno died on 24 June ; Rochford had spoken to him only the 
night before at the opera. Nassau Papers, D/27, Rochford to Gray, 
18 July 1750. 
BH Add }ISS 32829, f .149, and SP 92/59, f .124, Rochford to ' 
Holdernesse, 25 August 1751. 
SP 92/58 t f.378, Rochford to Ne\<[castle, 17 october 1750 (not in BN). 
68. 
position. He did so by means of an agent within Ossorio's own 
office, namely the permanent Under-Secretary, Raiberti. This sly 
man had been the means by which Bogino had known all that passed 
Gorzegno's hands. Ossorio's arrival had silenced him for a time, 
but he then revived his correspondence with Bogino. 57 
Raiberti was an able Under-Secretary, nonetheless, and 
Bogino used this fact to suggest to.the King that he deal with 
Raiberti rather than Ossorio on all mundane affa:.!'s. This remarkable 
proposal someho"l reached Ossorio r sears t but his st),rere treatment 
of Raiberti in fa~t only alienated his staff and other ministers .. 
One serious consequence for the diplomatic c(~rp/;; was that Ossorio 
forbade the discussion of foreign affairs ont,side the Council. 58 
The crucial test of pO'ltler between Ossorio and Bogino 
arose from a minor negotiation with the Duc1:J.y of ~1ilan over the 
transport of salt ~n the River Po. Ossorio initially had charge of 
these talks, but Bogino managed to engineer their disruption, then 
took charge of them himself, on the groun~s that the dispute Was as 
much a domestic as a foreign matter, and that Nilan's chief 
negotiator, Coun~ Christiani, was an old personal friend. In August 
1751, Bogino was sent to Milan to conclude the agreement, and on 
his return was rewarded by the King with a very ample pension. 59 
By the end of 1751 it was evident that Bogino had 
regained his former favour with the King, and once again held the 
• 
primacy amongst his ministers. Rochford wished that Ossorio might 
have held such an ascenuancy, thereby ensuring continued friendship 
57. SP 92/59, f.45, Rochford to Bedford, 10 April 1751. 
58. SP 92/59, f.199, Rochford to Holdernesse, 9 November 1751, Secret. 
59. SP 92/59, f.56, Rochford to Bedford, 8 May 1751 ; Nassau Papers, 
D/76, Rochford to Villettes, 24 July 1751 ; SP 92/59, f.124, and 
BM Add MSS 32829, f.149, Rochford to Holdernesse, 25 August 1751 
Nassau Papers, D/81, Rochford to Yorke, 11 September 1751.' 
with Britain as well as preventilLg anJ increase in Austrian 
influence at the Court of Turin. But the King's personal inclination 
leaned towards guarded co-operation with Vienna, as his most 
formidable rival in northern Italy and his closest neighbour in 
the Duchy of Milan. Bogino's Austrian sympathies were therefore 
approved by the King. On the other hand, Ossorio's suspicions of 
Vienna, and his close eor-nexions with de Breille and San Vittorio, 
both friends to Rochford and outspokenly pro-British, may have 
enhanced Bogino' s merit in the eyes of the King .. 11. divided ministry 
enabled Charles Emmanuel to retain a firm personal control over 
60 policy and decision-m~,king. 
It would have been understandable had the British Envoy 
taken sides 1!li th his friends at Turin, but it is to Rochford's 
credit that he formee a realistic appreciation of the limits to 
Ossorio's pm'ler and also contrived to remain friendly with Bogino .. 
After 1751, Ossorio had to work hard to retain any influence on the 
Council and with the King. Though his diplomatic exparience meant 
.that his advice on foreign affairs was always valued, Ossorio had 
no claim to a de';iding voice ; Bogino I s opinions ultimately carried 
more weight with the King. 61 This uneasy balance of power within 
the ministry remained much the same when Rochford left 'rurin, 
causing him to remark upon the strange lack of harmony amongst the 
ministers, and between them and the King. 62 
60. SP 92/59, £.199, Rochford to Holdernesse, 9 November 1751 j SP 92/62, 
f.155, Rochford to Robiuson, 2 November 1754 ; Valsecchi, LlItalia 
nel Settecento, p.309. 
61. BM Add MSS 32838, f.327, and SP 92/60, f.217, Rochford to Newcastle, 
29 July 1752 ; EM Add NBS 32840, f.86, and SP 92/60, f.231, Rochford 
to Newcastle, 9 September 1752. Rochford l s observation accords with 
the judgment of a modern authority on Bogino : "Alla morte del 
Gorzegno, il 24 giugno 1750, subentra quale ministro degli Esteri 
l'abile Ossorio, rna il Bogino rimase il consigliere di maggior 
credito in tutte le questioni principali.!I G. Quazza, Dizionario 
Biografico degli Italiani (Rome,1960-), XI, 185. 
62. BP92/62, f.155, Rochford to Robinson, 2 November 1754. 
70. 
~Ji th the King of Sardinia I s other ministers, Rochford not 
surprisingly' had far fewer dealings, although his co-operation with 
the Intendant de Commerce, Count Chavannes, to foster reciprocal 
trade with England, is noteworthy. 63 Rochford seems to have had 
no direct dealings with the Minister for Internal Affairs, Count 
~9.n Laurent, but he observed that both Bogino and San Vittorio 
coveted this office because of its enormOU!3 value for patronage. 64 
Nevertheless, Rochford gave close attentilm to the domestic policies 
of the King of Sardinia, and reported whatever seemed likely to 
shed light on the state of the kingdom. 
Next to h~~ting, Charles Emmanuel's chief delight was 
his army. Quite ~part from its vital importance for defence and 
us an instrument of foreign policy, the Piedmontese army provided 
a large paI't of the Duke of Savoy's train:i.flg for future kingship_ 
Fortunately, the Duke shared his father's love of the martial arts, 
and troop exercises afforded a frequent SOUl'ce of diversion for 
,the Court and diplomatic corps at Turin. 65 The E::arlif;:r part of 
Rochford's Turin ministry witnessed two importa.nt developments in 
the Piedmontese army, which he reported in det.ail ; the introduction 
of a new Regulation for dress and training on the Austrian model, 
and the reduction of certain regiments to a peo.ce-timc footing. 
Rochford's comments on the King's attempts to introduce 
some degree of uniformity in his soldiers' dress are often amusing 
if somewhat patronizing in tone, and were obviously designed to 
please his own royal maste~, and possibly the Duke of Cumberland also. 
63. See below, pp.73-4. 
64. SP 92/59, f.199, Rochford to Holdernesse, 9 November 1751 ; see also 
Oarutti, Storia del Regno di Carlo Emanuele III (1859), II, 92. 
65. Usually in the Valentino Gardens; SP 92/59, f.120, Rochford to 
Holdernesse, 11 August 1751 ; Nassau Papers, D/77, Rochford to 
Mann, 4 August 1751. 
Whilst enclosing a copy of the Order restricting the expensive 
extravagance of the officers' dress in 1751, "as I thought His 
Majesty might be curious of seeing it," Rochford commented that 
the restriction might cripple the trade of Lyons in laces and 
silks.. 66 He also rem8.rked that the military parades would look 
71. 
much more impressive once the infantry all wore the same uniform, 
and though in the courae of 1752 large purchases were made of 
muskets and Holstein horses, the uniforms took a little longer, 
and were not available until early in 1754. 67 Even so, Rochford 
saw little real improvement from the new RegUlations for dress 
and training ; with regiments incomplete and fo~tress garrisons· 
seriously undermanned, he thought the Piedm0LAtese army was in a 
deplorable co~dition. 68 
Reforms in dress and training were also accompanied by 
troop reductions 1 which Rochford interpreted as a healthy augury 
fer peace in Italy. He suggested to Mann that from now on they 
might expect "more words than blows" to be exchanged, 69 and to 
Villettes he made this observation : 
III need not tell you that they have good Noses in this 
country, & that they would not be the last informed if 
any thing was likely to happen, nor the first to reduce 
their Troops at .such a Crisis.1I 70 
The reason for the troop reductions was simple and obvious ; 
exhausted by the last war, the finances of the kingdom were in a 
66. SP 92/58, fos.282 and 285, Rochford to Bedford, 14 and 21 February 
1750. 
67. SP 92/60, f.94, Rochford to Holdernesse, 15 Barch 1752 ; BM Add 11SS 
32836, f.47, and SP 92/60, f.167, Rochford to Newcastle, 20 May 
1752 ; SP 92/60, f.78, Rochford to Holdernesse, 23 February 1752 
SP 92/62,fos.19 and 23, Rochford to Holdernesse, 2 and 13 March 
1754. 
68. SP 92/61, f.164, Rochford to Holdernesse, 6 November 1753, Sepanate. 
69. Nassau Papers, D/64 , Rochford to Villettes, 17 April 1751; See also 
SP 92/59, fos,20 and 38, Rochford to Bedford, 6 February ami 20 
March 1751 ; ibid., f.67, is a table showing the reductions in 
each regiment. 
72. 
very low condition. The King and his ministers made no secret of 
this fact, and it \.,ras a common topic of conversation amongst the 
diplomatic corps. Indeed, Rochford claims that the King mentioned 
his financial difficulties in almost every conversation they had 
together. Since this was a oatter of some importance, Rochford set 
himself to make a special st~dy of the King of Sardinia's 
financial situation. 71 
His findin~s, impressionistic rather than statistical, 
were that although the Kingts expenses were being held in check, 
even his passion :or b~ilding, his income was consumed almost 
entirely by repayment~ and interest on his many Nar loans. Rochford 
found that the salaries of bo~h the army and t.he royal nousehold 
,,:ere perennially in arrears, and that the extracrdinary war taxes, 
long overdue for reduction or removal, had been retained at their 
wartime level. However, this additional revenue was being devoted 
entirely to a sinking fund which was designed to payoff the loans 
over a period of years. The King of Sardinia could not have 
managed without this cOntinued high taxation ; the income from the 
few scraps of la.1.d he had gained at Aix-la-Chapelle did not even 
cover the interest payments on his war loans. 72 
Not surprisingly, schemes to bolster the Piedmontese 
economy were much in the air during Rochford's Turin residence, 
and in view of the kingdom's trade links with England, Rochford 
very properly took a close interest in commercial affairs. Quite 
apart from his observation of economic policy, his de~lings with 
71. SP 92/61, f.148, Rochford to Holdernesse, 29 September 1753. 
Dutens points out that information regarding revenue and financial 
resources was the hardest secret to obtain from any state in the 
eighteenth century; Memoirs (1806), I, 221. 
72. BM Add MSS 32823, f.1, and SP 92/58, f.363, Rochford to Newcastle, 
22 August 1750 ; SP 92/59, f.56, Rochford to Bedford, 8 Hay 1751 ; 
SP 92/61, f.148, Rochford to Holdernesse, 29 September 1753. 
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British Consuls in the ports of the King of Sardinia and 
elsewhere in Italy gave Rochford much additional correspondence. 
In fact, Rochford's protection of British trading interests 
constitutes a major theme of his Turin ministry. 
Observation of economic policies at Turin chiefly involved 
One of Chavanr.es' earliest and most logical steps was to improve 
the facilities at the port of Villafranca (Nice), \<lhich at this time 
\-las Piedmont's sole outlet to the Nediterrane'3.n~ 7it In 1753, he also 
unveiled a grand scheme to establish a Chamber of Commerce at Nice, 
with its own special fund, to encourage trade. But Rochford's 
comment on this :project is significant ~ Itin the End, i dare say, 
this Project will fall to the ground, as well as most of their 
Schemes for trade. which is very little understood here." 75 
There were many more examples to justify this comment. 
In that same month of 1753, Rochford reported the expensive failure 
of another scheme promoted by Chavannes, a large salt works in Savoy, 
which had been let out to such tlignorant un(ie:rtakers1f that the 
enterprise had collapseu with a loss to the King of over one and a 
half million livres. 76 Plans for a new coinage, urgently needed 
after wartime inflation, were sabotaged by a divided ministry, 77 
but attempts to stim~late the silk industry in Piedmont suffered 
from sheer ignorance and prejudice. In 1752 Chavannes launched a 
73. Nassau Papers t D/83 , Ro(,~lford to Mann, 28 September 1751. 
74. SP 92/58, f.318, Rochford to Bedford, 2 Hay 1750. Chavannes told 
Rochford privately that 300,000 livres had been set.aside for 
Villafranca for 1752 ; SP 92/60, f.14, Rochford to Holdernesse, 
5 January 1752. 
15. SP 92/61, f.140, Rochford to Holdernesse, 12 September 1753. See 
below, Chapter 4, for Rochford's work on the Villafranca duty. 
76. SP 92/61, f.148, Rochford to Holdernesse, 29 September 1753. 
77. SP 92/61, f.167, Rochford to Holdernesse, 14 November 1753. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
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a new public company devoted to the silk trade ; all the leading 
people of Turin, including the Prince de Carignano, bought shares, 
and great hopes were held for early profits. But Rochford saw this 
as the fatal flaw in the plan unless some skilled managers and 
manufacturers were also brought in, a company consisting entirely 
of "men of Fashion" would b6 doomed from the start. 78 
Far from encouraging skilled artisans in silk, the Court 
of Turin actually ex?elled a number. of Protestan~ settlers from 
the districts of St Victor and Chapitre near Geneva~ This forcible 
expUlsion of skilled silk weavers, ostensibly on religious grounds, 
was also designed to let the silk industry fall into native hands. 
But no such thing happened, for the local Sra~oyards lacked both 
skill and incentives. Roch::ord was amazed that th.e COUl't of Turin 
could be so blind to the economic consequences of an act of 
religious intolercmce : he gloomily concluded, "Bigotry is at the 
bottom of it.,,79 
Chavannes also had a scheme to bolster trade with Britain, 
by exporting Piedmontese wines to balance the importation of 
English \voollen~~ Rochford thought their red wines tolerably good 
when allowed to stand long enough ; "in taste & Quality •• not very 
different from the Claret we drink." 80 If it could be established, 
such a trade with Piedmont would be preferable to that with France 
as one of the Consnls remarked to Rochford, "what moneys we spend 
in France in whatever shape is certainly furnishing arms against 
81 
ourselves." 
BM Add MSS 32835, f.100, Rochford to Newcastle, 22 April 1752 ; 
Carutti, Storia del Regno di Carlo Emanuele III (1859), II, 82. 
SP 92/61, f.108, Rochford to Holdernesse, 14 July 1753. 
SP 92/60, f.14, Rochford to Holdernesse, 5 January 1752 Nassau 
Papers, D/83 , Rochford to Mann, 28 September 1751. 
Nassau Papers, A/55, Allen to Rochford, 9 November 1751. 
However, the first shipment of Piedmontese wines to 
England, which Rochford helped to organize in 1753 through the 
British Consul at Genoa, suffered from ignorance and inexperience. 
Rochford had earlier remi:aded the Consul that lI;hile this trade was 
in its infancy it had to be handled carefully ; but the same advice 
ol~ght to have been given to the shippers. Out of 133 casks, the 
Consul found only 29 sound ones. The rest .... ere old and rotten, some 
even lacking hoops, arid they all leaked copiously, even the sound 
casks, for the Piedmontece had carefully nailed tin plates over the 
fermentation vents. 82 Since no further mention of this trade 
appears in Rochfordf~ surviving correspondence, it is to be hoped 
that Chavannes fou!l.d more experienced wine shippers for the second 
consignment, if ther~ was one. 
It is ;?ortunate that fresh evidctLce has recently been 
uncovered for Rochfordts dealings with the British Consuls nearest 
to him in Ita.ly, for the 13ritishConsular Service in the eighteen"!;h 
century and relations between diplomats and consuls rerr.ain largely 
unexplored. 83 The correspondence between Rochford and certain of 
the Consuls adds considerably to our knowledge of his work at 
Turin, as is noted elsewhere. 84 
Rochford t s most voluminous corres!londence ",-Jas with the 
British Consul at Genoa, John Birtles, who has already found mention 
above as Rochford's principal agent for imported luxuries and 
delicacies throughout his residence at Turin : Birtles also took 
82, Nassau Papers, A/80, Birtles to Rochford, 18 August 1753. 
83. I refer, of course, to the Nassau Papers. The most recent work on 
the Consular Service,D.C.H. Platt, The Cinderella Service :·British 
Consuls since 1825 (London,1971), does not touch the eighteenth 
century, for which the best account remains the chapter in D.B.Horn's 
British Diplomatic Ser~ice, pp.237-258. 
84. On the Villafranca duty, see below, Chapter 4, and on the Young 
Pretender, Chapter 5. 
care of Rochford's heavy baggage on its arrival at Genoa, and 
saved him from having to pay any duty on it;. 85 Birtles was an 
16. 
English merchant settled at Genoa, a trader and shipo~mer dealing 
in such diverse articles as salt from Sardinia, corn for Cadiz, 
herring from Yarmouth, and tobacco from America, as well as that 
staple English export, woollen cloth. 86 
Birt!.es gave Rochford remarkably little trouble over 
strictly const:..lar affairs. Their only serious r,roblem concerned 
a scare early in 1750 'II!hen Genoa threatened to revive an ancient 
ten per cent duty on all vessels arriving frem Villafranca. The 
Turin government was thoroughly alarmed and asked Rochford to 
furnish Birtles with arguments to combat sucb a step_ Though two 
small English vessels had been induced to pay a token i!.pty, th~ 
threatened Ed5ct was never published, and no more was heard on the 
matter while Rochford was at Turin. 87 The 01:1y other consular 
matter from Biri.les was his suggestiO!l i~hat Rochford shm.lld enquire 
about the possibility of consular salaries on the French model, but 
th O b ~ "h' 88 no J.ng ecame oj. t J.S •. 
While Bd.tc:in Iv.cked a diplomatic representati":re at Genoa, 
the British Consul there ,;las a vi tal source of infc1'!11ation about 
French influence over the Republic and the activities of French 
troops on the Island of Corsica. Birtles's role in this respect is 
discussed elsewhere. 89 
85. Nassau Papers, B/1, Rochford to Birtles, 17 September 1749 
A/84 , Birtles to Rochford, 9 March 1754. 
ibid. t 
86. Nassau Papers, A/73, A/~8, A/83 , A/58, Birtles to Rochford, 
16 December 1752, 31 October 1752, 12 January 1754, 9 February 1752. 
87. SP 92/58, fos.314 and 318, Rochford to Bedford, 18 ~pril and 2 May 
1750 ; Nassau Papers, B/14 and B/15, Rochford to Birtles, 17 April 
and 22 April 1750 ; Nassau Papers, A/16, Birtles to Rochford, 
25 April 1750 ;BH Add HSS 32821, f .. 325, and SP 92/58, f.340, 
Rochford to Newcastle, 13 June 1750 ; Nassau Papers, A/19, Birtles 
to Rochford, 8 June 1750. 
88. Nassau Papers, A/84, Birtl~s to Rochford, 9 March 1754. 
89. See below, Chapter 5, pp.133-7. 
77. 
Genoa was however considerably overshadowed by its 
southern rival Leghorn, which in this period held far greater 
importance as an entrep6t for British trade in the Mediterranean. 90 
Since Leghorn was the principal port of Tuscany, the British Consul 
there naturally dealt with the British Minister at Florence on any 
commercial problems affectine British ships. 91 The only known 
dealings Rochford had ~ith Consul Goldsworthy at Leghorn occurred 
by accident, ~ihen so!":e cases for Rochford were landed at Leghorn 
instead of Genoa. 92 
Rochford had surprisingly much more corre~pondence with 
a Consul even f'Lu;"ch>3r south than Goldsworthy, narlely,· William Allen 
at Naples. Their main topic of correspondence. next to ne\'{s about 
the Jacobite icourtt at Ro~p" 93 was the diplomatic corps at Napleso 
Allen kept Rochford well-informed on this sl~bject, giving him early 
advice of Castr&mo:n.te's posting to Turin in 1750, and Dews of 
Rochford's Dutch friend Verolst on his visit to Naples in 1751. 
Allen's news of the constant throng of English tourists at Naples 
was on one occasion not.quite so welcome, when it was Allen's sad 
task to relate t~e sudden death at Naples of Rochford's tlesteem'd 
freind" [SiC] William Powlett, who had stayed with Rochford at 
Turin early in 1750 and had carried a letter from Rochford to 
( 
Allen only a few months before. 94 
90. A.C. Wood, b History of the Levant Company (London,1935), pp.139-140. 
91. Golds\'{orthy's visit to Hann in 1749 is described in H?race Halpole's 
Correspondence, edited by 1:/.S. Le,vis (Yale,1937-), XX, 70, 94. 
Nassau Papers, B/35 , Roc~ford to Goldsworthy, 13 February 1751. 
See below, Chapter 5, pp.140-148. 
Nassau Papers, A/14 and A/15, Allen to Rochford, 28 February and 
14 Harch 1750 ; ibid., B/15a, Rochford to Allen, 11 April 1750 ; 
ibid., A/17, Allen to Rochford, 2 May 1750 ; ibid., A/56, Allen to 
Rochford, 28 December 1751. 
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Rochford's most important dealings with British Consuls 
whilst at Turin were with those in the two main ports of the King 
of Sardinia, at Nice (for Villafranca), and at Cagliarj. on the 
island of Sardinia. Rochfordts negotiation for the removal of a 
troublesome duty on British shipping at Villafranca is of sufficient 
interest in showing the novice diplomat at work that it is discussed 
separately else~here. 95 
The British Consul at Nice in 1749 was an aged Frenchman 
named Bonijol, but his duties were performed by his able Vice-Consul, 
Louis Cabanis, with whom Rochford corresponded, in French. during 
his stay at Turiu. 96 Bonijol died early in 1750, and almost at once 
Rochford received an application from a Genevan merchant at Nice, 
}1. Delon, who sou.ght theConl3ulatefor his SOIl. Delon was a friend 
of Rochford's :r':""edecessor at Turin, Arthur Villettes, who had offered 
to recommend Delon's son to the Secretary of St.ate in London. But 
Rochford was highly impressed in his early dealings with Cabanis by 
the Vice-Consults "gr<:at r€.adiness & attention to business. 1I 
Rochford therefore strongly recommended Cabanis as Consul. 97 
Rochford. t S !'ecoffi'llendation was succ ~ssful, and Cabanis 
received his appointment l:efore the end of 1750. 98 When offering 
his congratulations~ Rochford reminded Cabanis to send him his 
Patents, to have them endorsed by the King of Sardinia .• 99 
95. On the Villafranca duty, see below, Chapter 4~ 
96. No letter from Bonijol to Rochford has yet come to light. SP 92/58, 
f.182, Rochford to Bedford, 15 October 1749 ; Nassa~ Papers, B/24 
and B/46, Rochford to Cs.hanis, 2 October 1750, and 18 J"J.ne 1751. 
97. SP 92/58, fos.314 and 316, Rochford to Bedford, 18 and 25 April 1750 
Nassau Papers, B/16, Rochford to Cabanis, 24 April ~750. 
98. SP 92/58, f.391, Bedford to Rochford, 29 November 1750. 
99. The Patents reached Rochford early in April 1751 ; Nassau Papers, 
B/34 and B/38, Rochford to Cabanis, 15 January and 2 April 1751. 
79. 
The new Consul's commis or assistant was his private Secretary, 
one M. Martin, and when Cabanis went on leave to settle some family 
affairs in 1751, he left directions with Martin to report any out-of-
the-ordina'ry occurrences direct to Rochford at 'J:lurin ; a rare 
example of the device of the Charge d' Affaires at wOl'k in the 
C0nsular Service at this time. 100 
Outside their correspondence over the Villafranca duty, 
Rochford's most interesting transaction wi~h Cabanis concerned the 
Consul's desire to establish his own Chapel at Nice. In response 
to his first enquiry on the matter, Rochford confessed that he had 
never before heard of an English Chapel at Idce, and declined to 
sanction Cabanist~ plan on his own authority, promising to make 
further enquiries at Turin. It is noteworthy that Rochford did not 
think a Chapel usual for a mere Consul, in a place which did not 
have an English 'factory' and a large resident community of English 
'101 
merchants. 
After two months, Rochford reported to Cabanis that he 
could find no precedent for an English Chapel at Nice, which meant 
that he would have to make a formal applicati0~ to the King of 
Sardinia. In the meantime, however, he saw no reason bo prevent 
Cabanis from holding services in the privacy of his o.m house, 
"pour prier dans votre famille," so long as he was prudent, "ayant 
; 102 l'attention de tenir vos portes fermees. n Official permission 
was finally granted, and after a formal application to the Senate 
at Nice, Cabanis set up hi;::; Chapel. 103 The episode is an indication 
of Rochford's concern to fulfil his Instructions tc protect the 
King of Sardinia's Protestant subjects, as well as his attention to 
the needs of British Consuls in Italy. 
100. Nassau Papers, B/32 and B/46, Rochford to Cabanis, 8 January and 
18 June 1751. 
101. Nassau Papers, B/24 , Rochford to Cabanis, 2 October 1750 ;_.see also 
Horn, British Diplomatic Service, pp.247-8. 
102. Nassau Papers, B/34 , Rochford to Cabanis, 15 January 1751. 
103. Nassau Papers, B/38 , Rochford to Cabanis, 2 April 1751. 
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The only other major port controlled by the Court of 
Turin was that of Cagliari on the islruld of Sardinia. The British 
Consul here, James Shaftoe, had met Rochford at Paris in 1749 on 
h ' t S d" 104 H Sh ft t· l.sway 0 ar l.nl.a. owever, a oe was 0 gl.ve Rochford 
more trouble than all his other consular correspondents put 
together, and moreover to test the Envoy's capacity to cope with 
delicate private scandal as 111011 as commercial problems. 
Their correRpondence commenced on a friendly and co-operativ8 
footing. Rochford was impressed by Shaftoe's detailed reports on the 
disabilities under which British trade through Cagl:i.s.ri had suffered 
for lack of a Consul during the war, and he dt'e'~' the attention of 
the ministers at Turin to the more glaring a h1]ses, ind~cing them to 
send an order to the Viceroy to give Shaftoe every assistance. 105 
This use~ul servica Rochford foll~wed up with sage advice 
on the conduct Shaftoe ought to observe as Consul ; he should display 
his monarc:!l:.s Coat of Arms above his door, ~but take care not to 
offend the natives by flying the Union Jack on certain of their 
holy days, and at all t~m6s he should avoia making disputes. out of 
t ·, . 1 tt 106 rl.Vl.a ma ers. On a more personal level, Shaftoe obligingly 
procured a Sardinian pony at Rochford's request, but mistakenly 
assumed it was meant for Lady Rochford ; though it was a handsome 
beast, it was too small for Rochford to ride. Mrs Shaftoe's offer 
of some decorative shellwork at this time was, hO\vever, politely 
declined, Lucy being tlnot curious that way .. " 107 
104. See above, Chapter 1, p.25. 
105. SP 92/58, f.252, Rochford to Bedford, 24 December 1749 ; Nassau 
Papers, B/11, Rochford to Shaftoe, 24 December 1749. 
106. Nassau Papers, Bj19, Rochford to Shaftoe, 12 June 1750. 
107. Nassau Papers, B/23 , Rochford to Shaftoe, 31 July 1750. 
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Unhappily, these promising beginnings did not last for long. 
Complaints about Shaftoeis conduct began to reach Rochford in the 
latter part of 1750, and were confirmed by the statements of several 
108 English captains to Consul Birtles at Genoa. By January 1751, 
the British Consulate at Cagliari was the focus of a public scandal. 
At the time of his appointment, Shaftoe had concealed the 
fact that he was a Catholic. He later prot~sted to Rochford that 
this made no difference to his loyalty, as he \'/as "not a Papist • " 
nor a Roman Catholick, or a French Catholick." 109 But HI's Shaftoe 
was a Protestant, and stl"'enuously resisted all her husband's efforts 
to convert her to hJ.i': faith. Doubtless as a !'esul t of his fondness 
for the bottle, a..."l1 his self-confessed fiery-l;emper, Shaftoe resorted 
to violence, and was more than once disc6ver~d thrashing his wife. 
Mrs Shaftoe turn~d for solace and support t~ her husband's younger 
partner and secretary, Christopher Searle, to such a degree that 
Shaftoe publicly accused her of adultery. There was, in audition, 
an awkward complication ; Shaftoe owed Searle a SUbstantial sum of 
money, from loans made before they left England, which Shaftoe now 
refused to repay. One witness even stated to Rochford that had it 
not been for Searle's assistance, Shaftoe would by nO'1/ have been 
in an English debtors' prison instead of His Majesty's Consul-
General on the island of Sardinia. 110 
108. Nassau Papers, A/35 , Birtles to Rochford, 27 February 1751. 
109. Nassau Papers, A/37, Shaftoe to Rochford, 21 March 1751. It is 
noteworthy that the Secretary of State's office knew ~othing of 
the man, and simply appointed him on the recommenda,i,ion of a group 
of London merchants ; SP 92/58, f.410, Aldworth to Rochford, 
27 December 1750. 
110. SP 92/58, f.406, Sarah Shaftoe to Rochford, 26 September 1750 ; 
ibid. t f.408, Testimonies of Captains \Hlliams and Woodruffe ; 
Nassau Papers, A/29, Birtles to Rochford, 7 November 1750 ; SP 92/59, 
f .. 63, Hiln to Rochford, 6 December 1750 ; SP 92/58, f.404, and 
Nassau Papers, D/41, Rochford to Aldworth, 19 December 1750 ; 
SP 92/59, f.61, Searle to Rochford, 29 Harch 175.1. 
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Each of the parties involved addressed lengthy accounts 
to Rochford at ~urin, beseeching his intervention on their behalf. 
But he quickly perceived that this vias a very delicate affair, 
which could easiJ.y prejudice his position at Turin, ~ecause Shaftoe 
had the full support and personal frfendship of the Sardinian Viceroy, 
a renegade Irishman who called himself Lord Roche. It was as well, 
therefore, that Rochford avoided taking sides, and wisely refrained 
from becoming deeply involved in.this domestic sc~udal. He limited 
his role to that of private advice. He repeatedly ad~onished 
Shaftoe for his beh:lviour towards his wife, and solemnly warned him 
of the damage this would do to his standing as Cvnsul, not to mention 
the honour of his country. To Searle, Rochfol· .. l could offer little 
more than sympathy and counsels of caution, recommending that he 
seek the normal processes of English law to recover his debt from 
Shaftoe. Rochford's advice to Mrs Shaftoe has not yet come to light, 
but it pro1::lably offerzd sympai.;hy and advised patient forbearance. 
It seems most unlikely that Rochford would have recommended the 
course of action she finally took; that of running off with Searle, 
and sailing back to England, where he began legal proceedings to 
recover his debt, and she began a campaign to blacken Shaftoe's 
name and procure his recall in disgrace. 111 
Shaftoe was not at once recalled, however; his ,,,,ife's 
desertion now left little doubt of her relationship with Searle. 
Good consuls were not easily replaced at short notice, and 5haftoe, 
as·if to make up for his domestic scandal, now set out to be an 
exemplary Consul. His main task was of course to assist British 
111. Nassau Papers, B/27 , Rochford to Searle, 28 October 1750 ; ibid., 
B/28, Rochford to Shaftoe, 28 October 1750 ; ibid., B/30, Rochford 
to Birtles, 16 December 1750 ; ibid., B/31, Rochford to Shaftoe, 
19 December 1750 ; ibid., B/35 , Rochford to Searle, 13 February 
1751 ; ibid., B/39 , Rochford to Searle, 15 April 1751. 
112. 
113. 
114. 
vessels through quarantine and 'pratick', or customs formalities, 
and to smooth their stay by eliminating delays in loading or 
unloading, and by helping to arrange provisioning at reasonable 
112 prices. These were the duties for which he could claim his 
conSUlage fees, but while he was the butt of ridicule and gossip, 
Shaftoe did not find it easy to obtain the co-operation of the 
local port officials. His ccnnexion with the Viceroy was more of 
, 
a hindrance than a hr.lp, for Roche was unpopular at Cagliari. 113 
In striving to show his zeal for the encouragement of 
British trade at Cagliari, and in the removal of ger.~ine obstacles 
to that trade, Shafto€: met with "many rubs, If .-;:'0 that his stream 
of detailed reports, Petitions, complaints a~~ suggestions, addressed 
first to Rochford and later to the Secretary of stat~ in London, 
almost buried his worthwhile work under a w~lter of petty gripes. 
Shaftoe's efforts to establish a trade in English woollens, his 
attempt to eetablish a British Vice-Consul on the island of st Pierre, 
and his tireless work to combat discrimination against English 
vessels lOading salt at.Cagliari, are but the three foremost of his 
labours, in all :)~ which Rochford supported him to the utmost at 
Turin. 114 
However, Rochford's patience was worn thin many times, 
and he finally had to order Shaftoe to stop sending him papers of 
a personal nature, and to confine his reports to consular affairs. 115 
For details of a Consul's duties, see V. Barbour, "Consular Service 
in the Reign of Charles 11,11 American Historical Revi€:w, XXXIII 
(1927-8), especially p.567. 
SP 92/58, f.404, Rochford to Aldworth, 19 December 1750. 
Nassau Papers, B/19, Rochford to Shaftoe, 12 June 1750 ; ibid., 
A/38 , Shaftoe to Rochford, 31 Harch 1751 ; SP 92/59, f.67 t Rochford 
to Bedford, 22 Hay .1751 ; SP 92/59, f.83, Shaftoe's Petition of 
Grievances, n.d.(about June 1751) ; Nassau Papers, B/52 , Rochford 
to Shaftoe, 8 October,1751 ; SP 92/60, f.71, Shaftoe to Rochford, 
16 February 1752. 
115. Nassau Papers, B/43 , Rochford to Shuftoe, 28 Hay 1751. 
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Rochford himself reported that he thought Shaftoe wholly unsuitable 
as British Cons~l at Cagliari, 116 not simply in view of the scandal, 
b t b f h ' l' 1 ' d' t 117 u ecause 0 ~s pecu ~ar y pugnac~ous an ~mpe uous manner. 
Shaftoe's zeal had led him to have imprisoned an English captain, 
one Blacklock, on suspicion of smuggling, but when it became obvious 
that no case could be proven against him, Shaftoe either would not 
or could not obtain the wretched man's release. Rochford censured 
the Consul sharply 07er this affair, and only wit~ difficulty finall~' 
118 procured orders from Turin for Blacklock's release. In this, 
Rochford was larg31y assisted by the replacement of Roche as Viceroy 
in 1752 by his own friend at Court, Count Brich~rasioe 119 
Shaftoe was himself replaced earl;T in 1754 by one Taverner, 
who was dismayed on arrival to find that Shaftoe had left behind 
him such enormous debts at Cagliari that th~ authorities were 
appropriating tne ~onsulage in order to discharge them~ Rochford's 
loud protestR at Turin soon rectified this abuse, hvwever ; it was 
1 t th f ' 1 t f h' T' ,. t 120 amos e ~na ac 0 ~s ur~n m~n~s rYe Of Shaftoe, nothing 
further is known. 
The Sr..3.ftoe episode did nothing to enhance Rochford's 
standing as Envoy at Turjn ; quite the reverse, in fact, for more 
than once Shaftoe's complaints disturbed otherwise calm periods. 
Nevertheless, the whole affair was a valuable experience for the 
novice diplomat. There was much scope for well-intentioned meddling 
where a domestic scandal was so inextricably entangled with 
116. BM Add MSS 32840, f.186, and SP 92/60, f.237, Rochford to Newcastle, 
23 September 1752. 
117. SP 92/59, f.63, 11i1n to Rochford, 6 December 1750. 
118. Nassau Papers, B/36 , Rochford to Shaftoe, 1 March 1751 ; SP 92/59, 
f.229, Shaftoe to Rochford, 5 November 1751 ; Nassau Papers, B/53, 
Rochford to Shaftoe, 14 January 1752 ; BM Add 1'-1SS, 32840 f.186, 
and SP 92/60, f.237, Rochford to Newcastle, 23 September 1752. 
119~ On Bricherasio, see above, p.62. 
120. SP 92/63, f.5, Rochford to Robinson, 18 January 1755. 
considerations of public office, the honour of the Cro\<m, and the 
interests of British trade. In his public capacity as Envoy, 
Rochford conducted himself with commendable prudence and caution, 
carefully avoiding the temptation to become involved at a personal 
level, or to take sides in the matter. Yet in his private advice 
to the individual partie&, Rcohford displayed much practical common 
sense, and revealed th&t he was by no means lacking in human 
th 121 sympa y. 
Altogether, in his relations with the King, Court, and 
Ministers at TuriL, and in his role as observer on bchalf of British 
interests, it may be said that Rochford did his ".uty well. He exerted 
himself to make enduring and useful friendshi/s at Court, and he 
avoided making enemies needlessly. His relatio:':ls ,,>lith the King and 
the royal family Here at all times extremely affable, and the King 
is known to have p?id tribute to Rochford's probity and discretion. 
As an obse~ver of ministerial power struggles, and the domestic 
policies of the King of Sardinia, Rochford kept himself well-informed, 
and his reports suggest .that he was perceptive yet cautious in his 
jUdgments. Thoug~ Rochford lamented his inability to gain the entire 
confidence of a monarch ~o wary and reticent, he had at least the 
consolation of knowing that no other foreign minister at Turin 
enjoyed greater favour or confidence at Court than he. 
Raving surveyed Rochford1s supposedly passive role as an 
observer, the following three chapters examine in closer detail his 
active diplomacy at Turin. 
121. It is my intention to prepare a more detailed study of Shaftoe's 
career as Consul at Cagliari 1749-54 for publication as an article. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Early Negotiations at Turin Rochford as Advocate 
I English Miners in Savoy-
The case of the English Mining Company in Savoy was 
Rochford's earliest piece of advocacy at Turin, whicr. he ~laimed 
gave him "some employment & much trouble" in seeing it through to 
a satisfactory conclusion. 1 Although Rochfordts formal 
Instructions make no me-ntion of the Hiners' casE.', there is clear 
evidence that Bedford incl~ded them in his ~erbal briefing, and 
that Arthur Ville~tes discussed the matter ",ith Rochford in Paris 
in August 1749 ; it was the only piece of business left undecided 
when Villettes left Turin. 2 
The state of the case when Roc!d"c.rd took it up lias 
that a Company of English miners had become entangled in a law-suit 
with local rivals in Savoy, the outcomeof_wh:':'ch gravely affec;;ed 
their continued cperations if not their very existence. 
This Company had been set up in 17::.8, importing equipment 
and skilled min ere from England to develop lead ane silver mines 
for the King of Sardinia, who granted the Company hie Letters Patent 
in 1740 and 174'1. These letters gave the English miners exclusive 
rights on all royal lands for forty years, together with various 
other privileges including safeguards designee! to prevent local 
rivals on private lands from seducing away their skilled workmen. 
Unfortunately, very soon after this agreement, the War of the 
1. Nassau Papers, D/28 , Rochford to Albemarle, 18 July 1750. 
2. SP 92/58, f.175, Rochford to Bedford, 24 September 1749 ; ibid., 
f. 30, Villettesto Bedford, 9 April 1749. 
Austrian Succession spread into Savoy, and fron. 1742 the Cvmpany·s 
work was disrupted by the depredations of Spal1ish troops who 
plundered the mines for timber amongst other things. Even more 
seriously, however, many smaller mines were taken over by private 
local interests in defiance of the Royal Pa~ent, and the war 
3 ended with the English Company enmeshed in a weltel' of law-suits. 
Many of these were petty actions, readily settled, but 
one proved to he rather more complicated and potentially much 
more serious. This Case concerned a group of rich silver mines 
at Peyrey, on land b~l()nging to the Narquis de St Maurice .. 
The mines had be3n discov~red in 1735 and developed by local 
contractors, the cousins Deriva, but the di~ruptions of the war 
after 1742 caused them to nbandon the workings. In 1745, the 
Marquis signed over the rights to the English Company, \;,thich 
persevered unaer difficult circumstances ar . .! worked the mines with 
marked success for the next three years. Th~ Co~pany even paid 
the Marquis his seigneurial dues several y~ar s in advance t SU('h, 
were their profits. 
Though ~ settlement was made with the Derivas in 1748 
for their equipmen~ ane former development work, it was never 
effected : the cousins wanted the mines for themselves again, and 
had enlisted th~ support of Baron Chabo, a younger c)'other of the 
aged Harquis. In January 1749, Chabo procured a f:::-esh title for 
the Derivas, claiming that the English Company snould confine itself 
to royal lands. The Derivas then sued the English Company for the 
return of the mines, tor-ether with damages for denying them their 
4 
use since the end of the war. 
3. SP 92/58, f.106, Memorial of Grosett and Crosby, enclosed with 
Bedford to Villettes?, 27 February 1749. 
4. SP 92/58, f.185, Relation du fait,qui s'est passe, Entre.la 
Compagnie des Nessieurs les Anglais, at Nessieurs le Harqu~s 
de st Maurice, Baron Chabo' son frere, at les Cousins Deriva, 
Pour les Miniers de Peyrey. n.d. (about September 1749) 
88. 
Dubious as this strap~em must seem to ~odern eyes. 
it was very likely to succeed in a lower court where the Magistrates 
could be induced to sympathise with the Savoyard party. The English 
Company promptly brought an actio~ in the same court for the Marquis 
to appear and testify to his 1745 agreement ~ith the Company, which 
would leave the Derivas without a case. But it was essential that 
the two actions be heard together, and Villettes had toiled to make 
sure of this in the early parto! 1749. He found that the ministry 
at Turin regarded the affair almost as a point 01 national honour, 
but despite much "cavil and chicane", Villettes obtained a joint 
hearing for 4 September. Predictably, as soon as Villettes left 
Turin, Chabo used his influence to bring the Deriva hearing forward 
by itself, to 25 A':.lgust. Before a sympath~tic l1agistrate, the 
Deri vas won their case easily, and the En.glish Company was ordered 
to surrender tile mines and pay damages. 5. 
When Rochford arrived at Turin on 9 Sep~ember, he was 
greeted with a desperate ~lea from the Englisr Company that he 
help them appeal against this unjust decision. It would require 
the intercession of the King's ministers to suspend the adverse 
judgment until the ~ppeal was heard. EVen though his first weeks 
at Turin were extremely hectic, with audiences and formal visits, 
Rochford set hinsel! to master the details of the case. Once he 
was satisfied that their grj.evance was just, Rochfol~d asked the 
miners for a detailed summary of their case, which he translated 
6 into French and tooh. with him to submit to Gorzegno. 
The Company had also addressed a plea to Bedford in London, 
who sent instructions for Rochford to support their case to the 
5. SP 92/58, f.129, Villettes to Bedford, 9 April 1749 ; ibid., f.181, 
Rochford to Bedford, 8 October 1749. 
6. This is the Relation, cited in note 4, a copy of which accompanied 
SP 92/58, f.181, Rochford to Bedford, 8 October 1749. 
utmost of his poweX's. But Roch!'Ol"d could make no impression on 
Gorzegno, and feared he had left the matter too late, for Chabo's 
influential friends at Court were busy trying to blacken the 
English Company's reputation at Turi,n. Rochford therefore went 
beyond Gorzegno, and asked for an audience with the King himself. 
Before the end of November, Rochford had obtained the King's 
suspension of the lower Court decision pending the appointment of 
a Royal Delegation to consider the whole dispute afresh. 7. 
When appoint.ed early in 1750, the Delegation proved to 
be grossly partioan~ consisting almost entirely of Cnabols friends. 
Rochford quickl~ detected and exposed this bias, and his protest 
that flagrant i~justice would only be repeated induced the King to 
appoint a new Delegation under the First President of 'the Senate, 
Count San Vittorio. If an:rthing, the bias hed now swung the other 
way, for San Vi~torio was one of ho~hfordts personal friends at 
Court and was kncwn fOl' his anglophile sympathies. The King even 
offered Rochford cree choice of t~e members of this second 
Delegation, but it says much for Rochford's modesty and shrewdness 
that he gracefully declined this honour, for if his nominees had 
returned a less than ample satisfaction, the miners would have had 
8 
no chance of further redress. 
Rochford was greatly relieved when the new Delegation, 
fairly appointed, finally prevailed on the Derivas to consent to 
a compromise with the English Company., on the basis of a plan 
proposed by San Vittorio. In September 1750, the Derivas yielded 
all claim to the mines in Peyrey for a cash consideration of 
7. SP 92/58, fos. 218 and 220, Rochford to Bedford, 19 November and 
29 November 17~9. 
8. SP 92/58, £.293, Rochford to Bedford, 28 February 1750. 
5000 livres, but in recompense the K~~g granted the English 
Company a higher price for their silver, and several additional 
privileges to prevent further molestation by local rivals. 9 
~here the matter rested, and Rochford could regard it as 
successfully concluded. He told Villettes that he had taken 
ft a great deal of pailla ever this affair because he believed the 
miners cruelly treated, but he regretted that it may have made him 
" a great many enemys, especially among the Savoyards, who will 
I suppose look on me as their declared enemy, whereas I have really 
done no more than every Minister must have done who would have 
obeyed his Maste~(s orders." 10 
90. 
Nothin!:; more is hee.rd of the English ;'!1iners in the official 
correspondence until 1754, when Rochford was on leave. The Company 
lodged a forrr,al CO.TllI)l:9.int that some details of the 1750 agreement 
had not been t'u:t.ly implemented.. Tile Turin ministry still had the 
.' ·-matter under reviuw when Rochford retur:n.ed from leave, and it 
r,emained unanswer~d at his I'ecall ('arly in 1755. 11 -I'he affair thus 
passed out of Rochford's hands, and his successor was instructed 
12 to follow it up. 
The case of the English Mining Company reveals Rochford as 
an energetic advocate, willing to master .. the details of a complex 
matter, wary of traps such as the nomination of the second Delegation, 
and undeterred by the ri~k of making local enemies ; an important 
consideration for a lv)vice diplomat freshly arrived at his firstpost. 
It is doubtful that he could have done more than he did, or done it 
more swiftly, and another might have been content with much less. 
9. BH Add NBS 32823, f.197, Rochford to Ne\".castle, 12 September 1750 
Nassau Papers, D/33 , Rochford to Villettes, 25 September 1750. 
10. Nassau Papers, D/21 , Rochford to Villettes, 16 May 1750. 
11. SP 92/62, fos.118, 123, 128, Charles to Robinson, 17, 24, ~~ August 
1754 ; presumably the same problem over payment of ~~ebts.and arrears 
mentioned in Nassau Papers, D/97 , Rochford to San V1ttor10, 
16 December 1751. 
12. SP 92/63, f.51, Robinson to Bristol, 26 April 1755. 
II Savoyard Protestants and Geneva 
As British Envoy at Turin, Rochford had a. special 
responsibility towards the Protestant subjects of the King of 
Sardinia, who had enjoyed ~ritain's protection earli~r in the 
century. Rochford's Instruetions on this matter were specific, 
and fell into two distinct p~rts. Firstly, he was to give his best 
assistance to the Vaudols and any other Protestants residing in 
Savoy, and prevent as far as possible any discrim;.nat:i.on against 
them~ Secondly, Rochfox'd was to use his "utmost endeavours" to 
prevent disputes betilepn the King of Sarciillia and the Protestant 
city of Geneva on his north-west frontier, since George II had the 
interests of thi3 city very m~~h at heart. 13 
Thore were in fact two main Protestant ar'eas in Savoy. 
It is essential not; to confuse the f1Protestants of the VCl.lleyslf in 
91. 
Savoy, calleu. the Vaudois, with the inhabitants of the S'JJiss canton 
. known as the Vaud. The name has an identical origin, deriving from 
the medieval 'daldellsian heresy which was ultimately absorbed into 
the Swiss Reformation, but the Vaudois of Savoy lived in the 
foothills of the Alps west of Turin. Many had been forced to flee 
the 
to Geneva by persecution in/seventeenth century, but a remnant had 
returned to the valleys iu 1689, and thanks to British intercession 
had won recognition as subjects of Savoy in 1725. This agreement 
gave the Vaudois some liberty of worship, but it also imposed certain 
14 
civil disabilities which had been a sourQ,e of complaint ever since. 
The other main Protestant area in Savoy was on the other 
side of the Alps, far to th~ north-west, in the environs of Geneva. 
13. Rochford's Instructions, 12 June 1749, FO 90/40, f05.118-119. 
14. See F. Venturi, fill Piemonte dei primi decenni del Settecento 
nelle Relazioni del diplomatici Inglesi," Bolletino Storico-
Bibliografico Sub-AI12ino, LIV (1956), pages 227-271, for these 
. earlier negotiations. 
15. 
16. 
92. 
Thic district, known by its two main villages as St Victor and 
Chapitre t wa9 established by treaties as part of Savoy, but Geneva 
had long claimed an ancient right of jurisdiction there, and had 
allowed numbers of French and Swiss Protestant refugees to settle 
there during the \'1ar of the Austrian Succession. Ma~y of these 
settlers were skilled silk weavers, who established & thriving 
industry in St Victor and Chapitre, but the area was not exclusively 
Protestant for many Catholic Savoyards alF~ dwelt there. 15 
The Vaudois of Savoy, tithe Protestants of the Valleys", 
were in touch with Rochford soon after his arrival at Turin, for in 
January 1750 he reported to Bedford that he had recei¥ed two appeals 
from their pastora to obtain permission fo~ them to repair a church 
Bond also to seek redress for insults from their Catholic neighbour.s. 
Despite Rochford';::, fears of a "slow progr&ssff, he managed to settle 
the first matter very readily, but little could be done about the 
d ~. t 16 secon comp~a~n. Rochford therefore de~ided to go and see for 
himself what the situation of the Vaudois really was like. 
He spent almost two weeks in SeptembAr 1750 touring the 
area, speaking to many of the people and their p~.stors, and since 
his itinerary took in Fenestrelle it is clear that he penetrated 
deep into the valleys. Rochford was sorry to find the earlier 
complaints fully justified ; the Catholic neighbours of the Vaudois 
seemed to delight in "teazingH them with an endless succession of 
petty disputes and insults. It was difficult to see how such 
harrassment could be stopped, for Rochford had discovered strong 
prejudice at Turin against the Vaudois. He feared t;(at a formal 
protest might only produce yet stronger resentment, and it seemed 
preferable to keep matters quiet in the meantime. 17 
SP 92/61, f.108, Rochfo~d to Holdernesse, 14 July 1753 ; see also 
F. Valsecchi, L'Italia nel Settecento (Milan,1959), pp.273-275. 
SF 92/58, f.269, Rochford to Bedford, 21 January 1750. 
17. Nassau Papers, D/33 , Rochford to Villettes, 25 September 1750. 
~nfortunately, matters did not remain quiet, and before 
the end of t4at year Rochford was obliged to make a strong protest 
at Turin concerning two Protestant children who had allegedly been 
abducted to a Catholic hospice near Pinerolo so as to change their 
religion. This protest elicited a lengthy reply from the Bishop of 
Pinerolo, who stated that the boys had come of their o~~ accord, 
had twice be'en sent away, but had tv-lice returned, and only then were 
allowed to stay lest they wandered farther afield. 18 
Rochford thereupon simply asked for the restitution of the 
children to their parents t citing an Edict of 1635 \lhich assigned 
religious custody of minors to their own parents. Rocl .. ford felt 
th~t he should insist on this as a test case to give the protective 
Ed " t t" I .. 19 ~ 1C S a 1me y a~r1ng. However, in London, Bedforu. could not 
agree. He pointed out that Rochford's original complaint had no 
oi;her sUI-port than the "bare verbal assertions" of the parents, 
whereas the Bishop's statement was signed by substantia~ witnesses, 
albeit 0atholics. Bedford saw no need to make a fuss OV3r a trifle, 
and while he fully approved Rochford's zeal, he instructed him to 
20 take no steps unless ordered to do so from London. This was 
undoubtedly the wisest course ; some of the d'? cail.::. ill the Bishop I s 
statement suggest that the two boys had simply run away from a 
cruel step-father. 
Nevertheless, Rochford's readiness to defend the rights of 
the Protestants, and his energy, had made an impression. Only a few 
months later, the leading Pastors of the Vaudois were summoned to 
Pinerolo and told in the King's name that as his su~,jects they were 
18. An undated copy of the Bishop's paper is in SP 92/58, f.415. 
19. SP 92/58, f.412, Rochford to Bedford, 26 December 1750. 
20. SP 92/59, f.4, Bedford to Rochford, 7 January 1751. 
not to make complaints, even in matters of religion, to the 
representatives of any foreign power. Rochford immediately 
protested at Turin that this order could be interpreted as an 
insult to.Britain's interest in the welfare of these people, but 
Ossorio hastened toreasBure Rochford that the order was only to 
remind the Vaudois to apply to Turin in the first illl:1tance, and 
that if they felt they were denied justice, then they might apply 
for Britain's intercession. Rochford conveyed this explanation to 
94. 
the pastors, to quiet their alarm, and on this understanding matters 
returned to normal. Rochford had no further probl'~ms relating to 
the Vaudois of Savoy fol" the remainder of h~.s stay at Turin. 21 
The same could not be said, however, of the s~cond part 
of his Instructioll.S concerning the Protesta.nt subjects of the King 
of Sarnir.ia. The jurisdiction of St Victor and Chapitre was an old 
bone of contention between Turin and Geneva. An earlier negotiation 
tor a t~eaty to settle this and other outstandingis5u€s had 
collapsed in 1741, and ,in view of Rochford's intention to visit 
Geneva on his way to Turin, it is reasonable to assume that this 
issue figured prominently in his talks with thd Genev~n Commissary 
in Paris, Mussard, in July and August 1749. 22 
George II and his ministers parti-zularly wanted to see 
this negotiation revived, for quite apart from any benefit for 
Geneva, SUch a treaty would remove much of the potential for French 
interference in switzerland. Therefore, in June 1750, Villettes 
was instructed to begin sounding out the prospects ~or a revival 
21. SP 92/59, f.52, Rochford to Bedford, 24 April 1751. 
22. See above, Chapter 1, p.25. 
of negotiations at ueneva, froll'4 bis new post at Berne, but 
Rochford was to set the work in motion at Turin by endeavouring 
to concert a treaty project with the King of Sardinia. 23 
9.5. 
In fact, this issue was already being considered at Turin. 
Count Bogino had mentioned to Rochford, without any prompting, 
that the King was very willing to renew the negotiation, and on 
24 better terms than before. Rochford was startled to find that 
Bogino took such an interest in a matter which lay outside his own 
department : his suspicions were confirmed when he discovered that 
Bogino wanted to take charge of any Swiss negotiation as a means 
of enhancing his credit with the King before Ossario had settled 
into his new office. Both Villettes and Rochford's friend the 
Marquis de Breille confirmed this suspicion, and warned Rochford 
that Bogino·s coolnens towards Geneva might well wrec~ the talks 
as in 1741. Rc,;hford therefore suggested that the time was perhaps 
cot quite ripe for treaty discussions. 25 
NewcastLe agreed with Ro~hfordfs judgment, probably 
because he would have received the same opinion from Villettes, 
but at the same .f;ime Newcastle emphasised that this was If a Matter 
of Consequence tf which George II had much at heart. Though he 
he could defer the talks until it was certain that Ossorio would 
have control of them, Rochford was to keep interest in the treaty 
. . 26 
alive at Turin l.n the n.cantl.me. 
23. BM Add HSS 32821, f.325t Rochford to lfewcastle, 13 June 1750. 
?4. Nassau Papers, D/21, Rochford to Villettes, 16 May 1750. 
25. BM Add NSS 32821, f.325, aLd SP 92/58, f.340, Rochford to 
Newcastle, 13 June 1750 ; BM Add MSS 32822, f.1, Rochford to 
Newcastle, 27 June 1750 ; Nassau Papers, D/26, Rochford to 
Villettes, 1 July 1750. 
26. BM Add NBS 32822, f.30 (not in SP), Newcastle to Rochford, 
2 July 1750. 
96. 
Even before Newcastle's letter arrived at Turin, hochfcr1 
had broached the possibility of a negotiation with Geneva in an 
audience with the King of Sardinia, and found him as interested 
as Bogino had promiRed ; indeed, Rochford remarked that the King 
seemed to echo Bogino's very words, as if he had "borrow'd his 
Reasoning. 1I 27 But in a later audience, in SeptembeI', the King 
adopted a different tone, complaining that Geneva expected him to 
yield a great (l~al, not only the jurisdiction of St Victor and 
Chapitre, and the district of Carouges, but also his ancient claims 
. on Geneva itself and the Pays de Vaud near Lausanne. As the King 
rather testily p)inted out, the city had virtually nothing to offer 
him in return for these large concessions. Rochford glumly foresaw 
that the negotiation would be complicated by such "unsurmountable 
Difficulties." 28 
But 1n fact, Charles Emmanuel III and his ministers W6re 
thinking in termG of a much .,1ider project, in which Geneva could 
offer something useful to Turin; namely, ~n ,ylliance embracin,3 all 
the Protestant S\-!iss Cantons. The object of this scheme \-las that 
the Cantons should guarantee Savoy ag~inst a French invasion by the 
threatened wi thdrc'·ral cf their regiments from French service if 
such an attack took place. Any scheme to prevent French interference 
in Savoy or Swh"zerland was sure to have British app1"oval. However, 
this wider projet threw the balance of benefit int~ reverse apart 
from additional troops, the only inducement Turin could offer the 
Cantons to enter such an alliance was the settlement of outstanding 
differences between Turid and Geneva. Hence the Kingls reluctance 
to conclude a limited treaty with Geneva alone. 29 
27. BM Add NSS 32822, f.111, and SP 92/58, f.351, Rochford to 
Newcastle, 11 July 1750. 
28. BH Add l1SS 32823, f.197, and SP 92/58, f.367, Rochford to 
Newcastle, 12 September 1750. 
29. BM Add MSS 32824, f.63, and SP 92/58, f.374, Rochford to NeWcastle, 
3 October 1750. 
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Predictabl:v , George II and his ministers were delighted 
at this larger plan, ~~d Newcastle instructed both Rochford and 
Villettes to pUl'sue the possibility of an alliance embracing all 
the cantons. 30 Though the King of Sardinia was determined that 
the first proposlls should come from the cantons, as befitted his 
dignity, an opportuni~y now arose which could lead to preliminary 
talks, namely, the renewal of the Capitulation for the Swiss 
regiment in service with the Fiedmontese army. Early in November 
1750jhe Count de la -rour vIas sent from Turin to negodate the 
new Capitulation at Berne, and he was instructed to ~elcome 
whatever suggestions might be made to him concerning tAlks for 
an alliance. 31 
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Rochford confidently expected that these routine military 
arrangem~nts would $~on give way to preliminary negotiations for 
an alliance, for ho had take:n up t!!e King of Sardinia'S scheme with 
_great enthu.:dasm. He was therefore puzzled and then anxious when 
the talks at Berne over the Capitulation dragged on for many weeks 
longer than expected : the King of Sardinia was not willing to 
increase the regiment's pay, but the Swiss would not renew the 
Capitulation until he did so. 32 
There was however another reason for the delay. Rochford 
found that Villettes was being blamed at Turin for encouraging the 
Swiss in their obstinacy~ Furthermore, Villettes had apparently 
ignored his instruc'd::ms to pursue the wider alliance, and continued 
BH Add MSS 32824, f.226, Newcastle to Rochford, 25 October 1750 
(not in SF) ; SP 92/58, f.391, Bedford to Rochford, 29 November 1750. 
B.f.1 Add NSS 32824, f.255, and SP 92/58, f.385, Rochford to Newcastle, 
31 October 1750 ; SP 92/58, f.376, Rochford to Bedford, 
14 November 1750. 
32. SP 92/58, £ .. 400, Rochford to Bedford, 12 December 1750 ; Nassau 
Papers, D/43 , Rochford to Villettes, 30 December 1750. 
to speak in terms of a limited treaty between 'I'urin and Ge::le-va. 
The Count de la Tour blamed the slowness of his negotiation on 
Villettes, claiming he had "clogg'd it greatlytl by his insistence 
on a separate Gene"";'a settlement. Secure in the knowledge that all 
his steps at Turin, and his support of the ~cheme for a wider 
alliance, tlhave been approved at home", Rochford attempted to 
correct Villettes. 33 
lnstAad, it was Villettes who corrected Rochford. 
His reply convinced Rochford that he had been too ready to see 
the plan for an allia.n()e solely from 'lurin' s point of view. 
There were far wore difficulties involved than the King of 
Sardinia's ministers had led Rochford to be1..ieve, but the central 
obstacle was that the cantons would ne~er agree to a guarantee of 
Savoy against F'.cance, because they l'egarde-d the King of Sardinia 
as incapable of protecting them against.~r~:.'lch attack. As for 
Geneva, far from being willing to enter R wider alliance for the 
sake of settling the jur~sdicticn of st Victcr and Chapitre, ";he 
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city insisted on settling that matter first, befo~e any other talks. 
Now that he could see "on what Extremes Both Parties stand", 
Rochford confessed him~el: at a loss to see how th~y could be 
reconciled ; IIWe must therefore patiently & attentively wait for 
-..;4-
more favorable Times." ., 
In the meantime, de la Tour's talks at Berne had come 
close to disaster. It was his very first missioli, and he was made 
anxious by the unforeseen delays. After at last reaching a 
compromise agreement, hp innocently allowed the inclusion of an 
33. Nassau Papers, D/50, Rochford to Yorke, 23 January,1751; ibid., 
D/51, Rochford to Villettes, 30 January 1751. 
34. Villettes' letters are missing, but Rochford discusses his reply 
in detail i Nassau Papers, D/57 , Rochford to Villettes, 
17 March 1751. 
article he had earlier been instructed to exclude. It was only 
a minor point, but the Kj.ng of Sardinia had wr,nted it to be seen 
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as an act of grace rather than an obligation. Since the Capitulation 
had been signed, Ofi terms arrived at after much hard bargaining, 
the King simply recalled de la Tour and let the matter rest. 35 
The opportunity for any farther talks about an alliance had been 
lost, but as Bedford observed to Rochford, the fact that aeither 
side was willi'"_6 to make the first move suggested that the time '.', ' 
was not yet ripe. 36 
The treaty initiative of 1750 therefore simply eVaporated, 
and for more thaa a year nothing further wau said on the matter, 
until in March 1752 a serious dispute flare~ between Geneva and 
Turin over the jurisdiction ~f st Victor and Chapitre, which made 
the prospect of a settlement Beem more remote th~n ever~ 
In that month, the Senate of fa.ve,! ordered all foreign 
Protestants liviag in St Vic{ ... or and Chapitre to remove themselves 
from the district within thl.'ee months, at the end of which pel iod 
any still remaining would be forcibly expelled. ~t W~6 thought in 
Geneva that the Governor of Savoy had issued this astonishing order 
on his own initiat~ve, ana a representative was se~t to Chambery to 
enquire into his reasons for issuing it. At the same time, Rochford 
was informed of the order by his friend Hussard, who had lately 
returned to Geneva from his post in Paris. 37 
On the basis of his own Instructions to prevent disputes 
between Tu~in and Geneva, Rochford at once hinted to Ossorio that 
it would save ev~rybody needless trouble if this order was quietly 
35. SP 92/59, fos.28 and 38, Rochford to Bedford, 27 February and 
20 March 1751. 
36. SP 92/59, f.34, Bedford to Rochford, 14 March 1751. 
37. BM Add MSS 32835, f.100, and SP 92/60, f.124, Rochford,to Newcastle, 
22 April 1752 ; Nassau Papers, D/111, Rochford to Hussard, ' 
19 April 1752. SP 92/60, £.161, The Sindics of Geneva to Rochford, 
28 April 1752. -
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allowed to drop and be forgotten, but Ossorio i'egretfully 
informed Rochford that this was not possible, as the order had 
come from the King himself'. Rochford immediately submitted an 
inf'ormal note, dra"ling attention to Geneva's ancient claim to a 
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shared jurisdiction over st Victor and Chapitre and appealing f'or 
compassion to be sho~~ towards the refugees settled th~re. 38 
'fhere was some delay before Rochf'ord IS llote was answerea, 
since the matter had to be referred to the Minister for Internal 
Af'fairs, Count San Laurent, and it was not until late in June, 
just one week bef'ore the evacuation order l;<1&S to be enforced, that 
Rochford received their reply. It poured scorn on Geneva's claims, 
and asserted the full sovereignty of the King of Sardinia in the 
district of St Victor and Chapitre, citing earlier refutations of 
1738. With thi3 blunt rebuttal, a serious confrontation seemed 
dangerously c:l.ose, and with further careful raasoning on this theme, 
Rochford succeeded in obtaining a two months" ex'hension to the 
evacuation order. 39 
Newcastle commended Rochford for this initiative, and 
ordered him to co~tinue with verbal representations to secure a 
total suspension o~ th3 order; for the meantime, he was to avoid 
40 
making any formal Demand. After an audience with the King of 
Sardinia on 2 A 'lgust, Rochford had no illusions as to how 
formidable a task he faced. He was distressed to ~illd the King 
SP 92/60, f.165, and Nassau Papers, D/1'13, Rochford to the Sindics 
of Geneva, 13 Hay 1752 j BH Add MSS32835, f.337, and SP 92/60, 
f.156,Rochford to Newc~.stle, 13 Nay '1752 ; Nassau Pupers, D/112, 
Rochford to Villettes, 13 May 1752. 
Nassau Papers, D/117, Rochf'ord to Villettes, 14.June 1752 ; 
BM Add NSS 32837, f.124, and SP 92/60, £.194, Rochford to Newcastle, 
24 June 1752 ; Nassau Papers, D/121, Rochford to Hussard, 
24 June 1752. 
40. BM Add MSS 32828, f.88, N~wcast;te ,to~Ro~hford, 10 July 1752 (draft 
not in SP). 
resolved not to concede an inch, not even out of regard for 
41 Britain's interest in the matter. 
For the next six months, Rochford laboured to obtain the 
desired suspension, exchClnging unsigned notes and meruoires with 
Ossorio, and arguing the facts of the case exhaustively, but all 
he could succeed in obtai~ing were further postpmnements of the 
42 
evacuation order.' It was plain that mere verbal representations 
would not have don.y effect on the Court of Turin. Finally, in 
desperation, Rochford asked leave to submit a formal Demand, in the 
name of George II, which he submitted on 27 February 1753. This at 
last satisfied tl.\e King of Sardinia's sense of. hortour ; he had been 
~eluctant to make any concession by himself which Geneva could 
claim as recognition of their' pretensions.. 1'he evacuation order 
was suspended ilidefinitely, purely as a favour to George II, but 
the question of tha jU,x:s~diction was left lllltouched. 43 
Doubtless with a sigh of relief, Rochford went off on his 
tour of Italy at the end of i'1arch 1753,confit!.ent that bis eff0rts 
had at last secured some peace for the Protestants of s~ Victor and 
Chapitre. He had no sooner departed, than t~e Senate of Savoy 
published a Placar~e in those villages which made the suspension of 
the original order conditional on the Protestants' consigning 
themselves before the Magistrates on a good behaviou: bond, and 
giving oaths of allegiance to the King of Sardinia. :his was 
condemned in Geneva as yet another insult to tb~ir claims of 
41. BM Add HSS 32838, f.378, ~f.lld SP 92/60, f.223, Rochford to 
Newcastle, 5 August 1752,; Nassau Papers, D/125, Roc~ford to 
Villettes, 5 August 1752. 42. 
42. BM Add MSS 32840, f.246, and SP 92/60, f.241, Rochford to Newcastle, 
30 September 1752 ; SP 92/61, f.13, Rochford to Holdernesse, 
6 January 1753. 
43. SP 92/61, f.38, Rochford to Holdernesse, 3 March 1753. 
jurisdiction in that area, and when Rochford returned from leave 
in June he was disturbed to find the Placarde so vaguely worded 
that one article seemed almost to prohibit services in his own 
Chapel at Turin. Ossorio soon reassured him aF. to his Chapel, 
but Roohford encountered a stubborn refusal to withd~aw or even 
44 
amend the offending notioe. 
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The city of Geneva had by this time begun to make its own 
representations at London through Sir Luke Schaub, the renowned 
'British diplomat of Swiss birth, now retired. 45 He submitted 
three papers to the Secr~tary of state, calling for a stern formal 
Demand by Britain that t.he Court of Turin acknowledge Geneva's 
claims over St Victcr and Chapitre. But George II and !lis ministers 
were reluctant to offend an ~lly, and Rochforu was once again 
or-dared to avoid direct demands and play fo: time by continued 
verbal appeals. Just as Rochford returne~ to this wearisome task, 
he was joined at Turin by his friend Mussard, who had been sent from 
Geneva co assist him. 46 
Mussardls arrival barely preceded a fresh complication; 
the Governor of Savoy had arrested a group of Protestauts who had 
failed to consign themselves before the Hagist"!:"ates, /!I.nd they were 
now in prison at st Julien. Notwithstanding his recent instructions 
to avoid any direct demands, Rochford felt obliged to lodge a formal 
Protest at this violent and ill-timed proceeding in a matter which 
was still under disoussion. But his mounting anger and frustration 
almost burst their bounds when Ossorio produceu his rejoinder, for 
44. SP 92/61, f.83, Yonge to Holdernesse, 2 June 1753 ; SP 92/61, fos. 
108 and 122, Rochford to Holdernesse, 14 July and 28 July 1753. 
45. On Schaub, see the D.N.B.XVII, pp.901-902. 
46. SP 92/61, f.209, lioldernesse to Rochford, 11 October 1753 ; 
SP 92/61, f.156, Rochford to Holdernesse, 24 October 1753· 
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a:ftt:r making a detailed exposition o:f the whole issue, with 
precedents s~retching beck to the previous century, Ossorio 
claimed that Rochford had consented to the condition of the 
Protestants· registration with the Magistrates and the good 
behaviour bond. In :fact, as Roch:ford tersely remind~d the minister, 
he had strenuously opposed the i4ea, and thought he had persuaded 
Ossorio to drop it. Roch:ford's disgust is evident :from his 
dispatches ; it is clear that short of making another formal Demand, 
he felt he had done all that he could. 47 
At this critical juncture, the matter pa3sed out of 
Rochford's hands. The lJenevan Commissary Hr,ssard quh.:tly revealed 
tha.t he had been given :full powers to negotiate a definitive 
settlement o:f all the d.ifferences then obtaining between. Geneva 
p.nd Turin, including the dispute over st Victor and Chapitre. 
Now that Geneva had been seen to take the first step, the King o:f 
Sardinia readily agreed to commence talks. The negotia-;;ion was 
alreadJ well advanced before the end of 1753, and progressed 
smoothly into the new year, culminating ina definitive Treaty 
which was signed on 3 June 1754. The most contentious issue was 
settled in a secret clause : the King of Sardjnia yielded his 
sovereignty over st Victor and Chapitre for a cash consideration 
of three million livres. 48 
At the time this treaty was signed, Rochford was on leave 
in England, and so did not witness the final solution to a problem 
which had given him so much anxiety and fru~tration. Nevertheless, 
47. SP 92/61, fos. 160 and 171, Rochford to Holdernesse, 6 November 
and 24 November 1753. 
48. SP 92/62, f.29, Rochford to Holdernesse, 23 March 1754 ; ibid., 
f.93, Charles to Holdernesse, 8 June 1754 ; sP 92/62, f.189, 
Robinson to Charles, 27 June 1754 ; ibid., £.107, Charles to 
Robinson, 13 July 1754. It would appear that DoB. Horn, in his 
Great Britain and ~urope in the Ei5hteenth Century (Oxford, 1967) , 
p.322, is mistaken in attributing this treaty solely to the 
intervention of Sir Luke Schaub. 
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his i~vol¥ement in Turin's relations with Geneva had given him 
valuable exp~rience of Bustaining a mediatory role ~etween two 
parties equally reluctant to give way. In the early stages, he 
committed·the beginner's error of seeing matters solely from the 
point of view of the Court where he resided. But this error was 
excusable, since he was fully approved in the attitude he adopted, 
and when the facts were made plain to him by Villettes, Rochford 
displayed humility and good sense in admi~ting his error. 
I 
His undeniable zeal and energy won him a series of limited tactical 
successes, in repeated l)Cstponements of the evacuation order, 
and though he was not in a position to effe·~t a solution single-
handed, it is arguable that his strenuous chs.mpioning of Geneva's 
~ase contributed to thE:; final settlement by conVincing the Swiss 
that they wouldhclve to maks the first move, and by making Turin 
all the hlore willing to take up that offer when it finally came. 
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III The Villafranca Duty and Monaco 
One of Rochford's most useful positive achievements at 
Turin, for which he deserves a large measure of personal credit, 
was the removal of a small but troublesome duty on English shipping 
at the port of Villafranca. The question of this duty arose within 
a :few weeks of Roch:ford's arrival at Turin, and whil(:: it is tempting 
to wonder whether the Court o:f Turin deliberately provoked the 
dispute as a tt'st of the novice British Envoy, the initial cause of 
complaint may well have stemmed simply :from the excessive enthusiasm 
of the local port officials. 
In Sep~ember 1749, two small English ve~sels called at 
Villafranca for water and provisions, and their masters were 
8.stonished when t.he Receiver of Customs charged them with an ancient 
duty o:f two per cent on the value of each car50, claimiug that all 
vessels under 200 tons putting in merely for provisions and not to 
trade had always been liable for this dutyo The British C')naul at 
Nice, the aged Bonijol, was apparently content to leave the matter 
entirely in the hands of his able Vice-Consul, Louis Gabanis, who 
:finally secured tb~ v~ssels' release only af~er giving his personal 
security for the amount of the duty demanded. Before they sailed, 
the two masters joined Cabanis in addressing indignant; protests to 
lithe British rvIinister at Turin", not knowing whether Villettes' 
successor had yet arrived .. They stressed that while small ships of 
other nations paid this duty, British vessels had always enjoyed 
exemption. Rochford combined his reply to Cabanis ~ith notification 
of his arrival at Turin, promising to apply at once to the Hinistry.49 
Nassau Papers, B/2, Rochford to Cabanis, 10 
B/3, Rochford to Messrs Ferguson and Roche, 
A/3, Birtles to Rochford, 18 October 1749 
Rochford to Bedford, 15 October 1749. 
October 1749 ; ibid., 
10 October 1749 ; ibid., 
SP 92/58, f.182, 
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When Rochford applied at Turi:l for Cabanis to be freed 
from his security for the duty, he found, however, that Gorzegno 
upheld the decision of the port officials at Villafranca, claiming 
that this.duty applied to all nations without exception. Gorzegno 
insisted that i:1:" on occasion the duty had not been aSked of British 
vessels in the past, this was no precedent to claim exemption now. 
He added that he was s~re British ships had paid the duty regularly 
before the war, and promised Rochford a paper setting out the facts 
of the case in detail.. In the mean time 1 since he kne", little of 
the matter himself, Rochford wisely decided not to m3.ke a fuss until 
he had fUrther £dvice from London. 50 
At thiE point, the q'lcstion of the duty at ViJ.lafranca 
1'.'as suddenly overshadowed by an incident invcl ving one of the very 
same vessels which (;p,banis had managed to get clear of Villafranca. 
Thomas Fergu';on in the "Sea Flowerll , continuing his voyage to Genoa, 
-had been int6rcepted on the night of 8 or 9 October by a cruising 
sloop from the pr~ncipality of Mon~co, and forced to stop after 
being repeatedly fired upon and sustaining several casualties. 
Under guise of s<;arching the vessel, the l·ionacans began to plunder, 
and when challenged, threw the goods into the sea. Ferguson asked 
the sloop-commander whether Honaco had declared war on England, that 
they could rob vessels ou the open sea, but Ughet merely retorted 
that he had orders to ifi~pect any sort of vessel in these waters. 
On seeing Ferguson!s Admiralty Pass and British flag, however, Ughet 
beat a rapid retreat. When daylight dawned, Ferguson found that 
much of his rigging had been shot away, and it was only with some 
difficulty that he managed to reach Genoa, where he reported the 
50. SP 92/58, f.182, Rochford to Bedford, 15 October 1749. 
51. 
52. 
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afft'a·i to the British Consul, John Birtles. Protesting in turn to 
Rochford, Birtles urged that he demand a uproper Satisfactiontr 
from Monaco, !ffor if such Proceedings are not put a stop to, it 
51 
will not be possible for small vessels to navigate into these Parts." 
Unlike Villafranca and Nice, which we:r-e part of Savoy 
and ruled by a Senate at Nice directly responsible to Turin, Monaco 
was an independent principality and a centre of strong French 
influence, as indicated by its French garrison. Both Monaco and 
Villafranca claimed the ancient two per cent duty on smaller vessels 
(originally in medieval tImes a Papal measure to help combat Barbary 
pirates), but Honaco W8e ID-ach more active in its enforcement, even 
to maintaining an uff-shor~ patrol. It was this patrolling sloop 
t-'hich had fallen -..:.pon Ferguson. Bri tish vesc.~ls preferred to uae 
52 Villafranca, but were usually allowed to pass Monaco unh1ndered. 
Rochfordts indignant letter of ~rotest to the Governor 
of Honaco swiftly led to th.e imprisonment of the offending sloop-
commane~r, but the Prince of Monaco himself was then in Paris, 
so Rochford also sent a detailed account of the incident to the 
British Ambassador there, Lord Albemarle. Tte Prince declared 
himself horrified at the insult shown to an N}$lish vassel in time 
of peace, and after a series of conversations with Albemarle, issued 
a letter disavowing Ughet t s action. Consu~. Birtles declared this 
satisfaction lias good a Conclusion as could be desired." 53 
Nassau Papers, A/3, Birtles to Rochford, 18 Oc",ober 1749 ; ibid., 
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While the ripples set in motion by the Monaco incide.nt 
were gradually dying away, Rochford found the 00urt of Turin 
determined not to acknowledge any exemption from the Villafranca 
duty for English vessels. He soon discovered the reason for this 
determination. French shipping made far greater use of Villafranca 
than the British, and since 1726 France had paid a regular 
~bonnement of 40,000 livres a year to be free of this duty. 
The agreement w~s due for revision, and the Court of Turin rightly 
feared that any concessions made openly to Britain would give the 
French pretext to drive s harder bargain. 54 
Nevertheless, Rochford was privately confident that Turin 
meant well to Britain on this issue, and that the port officials at 
Villafranca would be told to take no notice of English vessels for 
the future. This surmise seemed confirmed in November 1749, when 
Rochford heard that Gorzegno had rebukedi;h..: Intendant a.t Nice and 
the Governor of Villafranca f::>r not having restrained their underlings' 
misplaced zeal in the first place.- stron~er proof was that al ... other 
English vessel calling at Villafranca on its way t\) Leghorn was not 
called upon to pay th~ duty.55 
In additic~, Gorzegno was taking a long while to prepare 
his promised paper setting out the detailed history of the Villafranca 
duty with evidence of British payment in the past ; ~ochford loftily 
observed, ItI apprehend this Tardiness arises in some Measure from 
the Difficulty of finding Instances." 56 
Nassau Papers, B/4, Rochford to Birtles, 22 October 1749 
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Gorzegno finally produc~d his paper on the Villafranca 
duty on the very same day that Rochford received instructions 
from Bedford to seek a complete exemption from the duty for all 
English vessels. 57 Much of Gorzegnots Memoire was given over to 
establishing a respectable pedigree for the Villafr~~ca duty, 
going beyond its confirmation in major treaties such as those of 
Turin (1696) and Utrecbt (1713) as far back as an agreement by 
Charles of Anjou in 1262. While it was admitted that France was 
theiDhly nation mentioned by those treaties in relation to the duty, 
Gorzegno stressed tr.at the duty had alvrays applied to all natio ns 
"\."'.-
without exceptivn, and cited the Registers of the Port of Villafranca 
for examples of payment by R~glish vessels between 16b3 and 1733. 
The two most recent cases in which English masters successfully 
applied for release from th& duty, in 1729 and 1730, were declared 
to be anoma]~uc and not to be taken as a precedent, because the 
uecisions were made ~y the individual who then held the farm of 
the duty. 58 
Rochford argued in reply, using information supplied by 
Consul Birtles f=om Genoa, that the two examples of 1729 and 1730 
in fact proved the British exemption, and that earlier cases of 
English payment had been allowed by consuls who were foreigners, 
ignorant of this exempticn and fearful of causing any dispute. 59 
Rochford sent a copy 02 Gorzegnots Memoire to Consul Cabanis at 
Nfce for his comments, and redoubled his verbal persuasions that 
57. SP 92/58, f.204, Bedford to Rochford, 26 october 1749. 
59· 
SP 92/58, f.223,"Memoire sar le Droit de Passage de Ville!ranche," 
undated, delivered to Rochford On 29 November 1749. 
Nassau Papers, A/3, Birtles to Rochford, 18 October 1749 
SP 92/58, f.220, Rochford to Bedford, 29 November 1749. 
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tbe . .I.uty be waived altogether. At the same time, Rochford was 
pressing that Consul Cabanis be spared the security he had 
pledged for the two English vessels in September. Gorzegno 
finally assured Rochford that his Court had no wish to offend 
B~itain, and as proof of their goodwill would make no use of 
the Consul's security; but he also made it plain tb,!1t they m.ust 
at least appear to insist, in case France sought to escape the 
duty as well. Presumably for this reason, Gorzegno was reluctant 
. to treat the matter at Tt'irin, though Rochford repeatedly offered 
to do so, and a copy of i:;he Hemoire was sent to the Sardinian 
Envoy in Londen, Count Pel'ron, to submit direct to Bedford. 
Ho\vever, Bedford sJmply SE:mt it on to the Board of Trade for its 
60 
comment, and the~e the matter rested for many months. 
While the question of the Villafranca duty was thus 
safely disposed of for the time being, tLe reverse was true of 
the similar duty claimed by Monaco. Probably as a result of the 
humilh.ting affair in September, 110naco now applied the duty with 
full rigour to any British vessels unfortunate enough to call 
there. The first of many such instances occ:.lrred in January 1750 
when a small sloop from Port Hahon was forced in c.t Monaco by 
bad weather. 'fJhen Rochford protested, Governor Grimaldi replied 
that they had always regarded vessels frore Gibraltar and Port 
Mahon as being on the same footing as Spanish vessels in regard of 
this duty,and enclosed a copy of a letter dated 1717 as evidence. 61 
60. SP 92/58, f.254,Rochford to Bedford, 31 December 1749 ; 
Nassau Papers, B/8, Rochford to Cabanis, 5 December 1749 ; 
SP 92/58, f.256, Bedford to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 
5 January 1750. 
61. SP 92/58, 1'.276, Grimaldi to Rochford, 18 January 1750. 
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Though Grimaldi let the vessel sail the very next day, 
after the master had offered to leave part of his cargo as 
security for the amount of the duty claimed, 62 Rochford did not 
let the matter rest there. After writing a hurried enquiry to 
General Blakeney t the Governor of Hinorca, to find out. whether 
Port Mahon vessels had ever paid this duty at Monaco~ 63 Rochford 
penned a masterly rejoinder to Grimaldi. Politely but firmly, he 
pointed out that the letter of 1717 adduced as evidence of earlier 
liability itself demonstr~ted that the matter was then hotly in 
'dispute and far from settled. So long as a vesse~ carried an 
Admiralty Pass for the Hedlterranean, and a British flag, it ought 
to be treated as ali :English vessel whatever its port of origin., 
~/hile thanking Gr.i.maldi. for the moderation he had shown, Rochford 
left no doubt that he belieV'ed the Prince cf Monaco had as lit~;le 
right ~o impose this duty on English vess~ls as had the King of 
Sardinia at Villafranca. Be would, however, await furth~r instructions 
from Lc.ndon. 64 
In this expectation, Rochford was to be disappointed, 
for Bedford made no specific reply on the duty at Mona~o, assuming 
(wrongly) that it was part of the Villafranca jut:; alX"eady undE~r 
consideration. He merely commended Rochford for his efforts so far, 
adding that he still awaited the report. of the Boartl of Trade. 65 
62. SP 92/58, £.277, Grimaldi to Rochford, 19 January 1750. 
63. Nassau Papers, D/13, Rochford to Blakeney, 24 "anuary 1750. 
64. Nassau Papers, D/14, and Bp 92/58, f.278, Rochford to GrimaldL, 
28 January 1750 ; SP 92/58, f.271, Rochford to Bedford, 
28 January 1750. 
65. SP 92158, f.262, Bedford to Rochford, 11 January 1750, 0.3. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
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As Gorzegno feared, Rochford's activity regardine the 
.duties at Villafranca and at }1onaco had not gone unnoticed by 
another interested party. In March 1750, Chetardie, the French 
Ambassador at Turin, hinted privately to Rochford that France was 
now inclined to dispute this matter, notwithstanding the treaties 
which bound them to pay i";, in the hope of bargainilJ.g for a more 
permanent solution than the old aflnual Abonnement. 66 Rochford 
ached with impatience to answer Gorzegno's Hemoire on the Villafranca 
duty, and had again asked Bedford if he could treat the matter at 
Turin, but this app~~l met with no response. 67 
The BO':lrd of Trade in London, thongh maddeningly slow, 
was not wholly idle, and managed to intervi~w six masters of 
,,.essels which had traded in and out of Villafranca in recent years 
without being aHked to pay any such duty. 68 Yat the Board sti11 
complained tha~ it lacked information, apd ~ppealed to Consul 
Cabanis at Nice through his friend and London pa~tner, Jean Chamie~. 
Caban is replied in Nay 17.50j aud added reassurances for the Lendon 
merchants that it was still safe to consign their cargoes through 
Villafranca : sinae Rochford's energetic representations at Turin, 
there had been sevvral British vessels in port which he had had 
69 no difficulty in getting exempted from this duty. 
Once a~ain, while matters remained quiet at Villafranca, 
difficulties were being encountered at Honaco, where a succession 
of small vessels from Gibraltar and Port Mahon Wt~re being detained 
SP 92/58, f.303, Rochfo!'d to Aldworth (Bedford's Under-Secretary), 
28 March 1750 ; draft in Nassau Papers, D/17. 
SP 92/50, f .. 280, Rochford to Bedford, 4 February 17;50. 
SP 92/58, f.311, Lords of Trade and Plantations to Bedford, 
12 April 1750. 
SP 92/58, f.336, Cabanis to Chamier (copy), 16 May 1750 ; 
SP 92/59, f.14, undated office memo on the Villafranca Duty 
(internal evidence suggests June 1750). 
and compelled to pay the two per cent duty : n(lchfoI'd was 
becoming tired of making the same complaints with no apparent 
effect. 70 His frustration spilled over in a letter to Albemarle 
ft • perhaps it may not be looked upon in England as 
a thing of any consequence, but IJwn I cant see it in 
that Light, for the great trade we have in the 
Mediterranean can but suffer very much & our honour a 
113. 
great deal more from permitting every little Principality 
to oblige us to submit to customs of their own establishing 
& whi~h I am positive we have never allowed to be 
their right." 71 
So long as the Court of Turin insisted on the d"aty at Villafranca, 
Monaco would aho insist on their duty for all English vessels. 
At this point, in the middle of 1750, Gorzegnole.; successor 
Ossorio suggested to Rochford that Britilin should follow France's 
example and compound her liability ror this duty under a lump sum 
or annual Abonnem~nt. While Rochford waG quick to remind Ossorio 
. that Britain's l.iability was as yet far from provcn i in his own 
report to Newcastle, Rochfol'd urged this as. t!le simplest and ruost 
effective way to be rid of the nuisance, saving further needless 
dispute and ill-feeling at Turin.. Knowing ~~de reluctance of the 
Court of Turin to give FrA.nce any pretext to escape the duty, 
Rochford suggested that if Britain offered her settl?ment as a 
favour for an aLly against France, then Turin would ~e glad to 
settle for ua meer Trifle." 72 
70. Nassau Papers, A/20, Birtles to Rochford, 27 June 1750 ; 
BM Add NSS 32822, f.111~ Rochford to Newcastle, 11 July 1750 
Nassau Papers, B/24 , Ro(:nford to Gabanis, 2 October 1750. 
71. Nassau Papers, D/28 , Rochford to Albemarle, 18 July 1750. 
72. BM Add HSS 32822, f.181, Rochford to Newcastle, 25 'July 1750 ; 
SP 92/58, f.357 (copy) ; as early as October 1749 Rochford had 
suggested this solution if it were found that Britain was in fact 
liable for the duty; see SP 92/58, f.206, Rochford to Bedford, 
29 October 1749. 
74. 
75. 
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Again, there was no response from either Bedford 01' 
Newcastle t~ Rochford's suggestion, and the situation remained 
unchanged for no less than a year : still with no answer from 
the Board,of Trade, and with Honaco continuine; to IIharass and 
torment" whatever smaller vessels from Gibraltar or Port Nahon 
unlucky enough to call there. One sueh instance in .June 1751 
prompted Rochford to remind Bedford that the Villafranca affair 
itself remained unresolved, but he met with no response or even 
acknowledgment from Londou, and yet ano~her year wound slowly by.73 
Finally, this period of relative quiet t(as interrupted 
by a revival of the earlier insistence on th.e duty at Villafranca. 
Since the episode in September 1749, Consul Caban is had been able 
to obtain ready clearance for English vessels,with no mention of 
the duty, but i!1 ,3eptember 1752 the port officials once again 
insisted, and Caban is had to pledge his p~rsonal security to enable 
a British ship to proceed to Leghorn. Rochford at once submitted 
a note to Ossorio, reminding him that the matter Has still under 
consideration in London, and demanded that Cabanis be released from 
his obligation immediately. Rochford had also done som~ reading on 
the whole subject of commercial relations bet .... een Britain and Savoy, 
and excitedly informed Newcastle that he had found in Dumont's 
monumental collection 74 a commercial tre~ty of 1669 which exempted 
English vessels from all duties at Nice and Villafranca. 75 
Nassau Papers, A/48, Birtles to Rochford, 26 June 1751 ; SP 92/59, 
f.99, Caban is to Grimaldi, 27 June 1751 (copy) ; ibio., f.102, 
Rochford to Bedford, 7 July 1751 ; Nassau Papers, D/74, Rochford 
to Yorke, 9 July 1751. 
Jean Dumont, Corps universel diplomatigue du droit de gens 
(Amsterdam, 1726-31 ; second edition with supplement, 1739). 
BM Add MSS 32841, f.163, Rochford to Newcastle, 4 November 1752. 
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Ossorio not. only refused to xfdease Consul Cabanis from 
his security, but in passing observed that the 1669 treaty between 
Charles II and the Dukes of Savoy had never been ratified by either 
party, and had long been regarded as' null and void. Avoiding any 
further discusBion~ Ossorio again urged Rochford to seek a more 
permanent settlement, s'Uch as an Abonnement or a lump sum. 76 
It was becoming incre~singly evident to Rochford that 
British merchants and shipowners were much more concerned with 
convenience and minimal delay than with any abstract right of 
exemption at Villafranca. Conclusive proof. of this &ppeared before 
the end of 1752 when a vessel owned by Consul Birtles himself was 
detained at Villafranca; Bi!'tles very promptly paid the duty, 
t.o enable his cargo o£ corn to reach Cadiz on time, and rather 
lamely asked RQch:£o~c to remind the Court of Turin that they should 
not regard this as a precedent. 77 
Oscorio's :;:epeated suggestio:cs that Britain negotiate an 
Abonnement or cas~1. settlement were of course directly inspired by 
the negotiations with France on the same matter, which were in 
progress through~ut 1752 and 1753. France had no wish to renew 
the old Abonnement, anti was bargaining for a permanent cash 
liquidation. 'rhough the main points had been readily agreed upon, 
the negotiation was protracted by a succession of petty wrangles, 
one of which involved the removal of the French coat of arms from 
the door of their Ccnsul at Nice. The mutual Declarations were 
finally sib~ed on 15 December 1753, and France bought her freedom 
from the Villafranca duty for 1,400,000 livres. 78 
76. BM Add NSS 32841, f.190, Rochford to Newcastle, 11 November 1752. 
77. Nassau Papers, A/?3 and A/?4, Birtles to Rochford, 16 December 
1752 and 13 January 1753. 
78. SP 92/60, f.70, Yonge to Holdernesse, 5 May 1753 ; SP 92/61, f.20, 
Rochford to Holdernesse, 20 January 1753 ; ibid., fos.169 'and 188, 
Rochford to Holdernesse, 21 November and 22 December 1753 •.. 
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This was an enormous sum, though much less than Turin had 
originally demanded, and Consul Birtles hastened to remind Rochford 
that Britain should settle for a mere fraction of the French 
payment, in proportion to the far smaller volume of British than 
French shipping at Villafranca. 79 Rochford now lost no time 
in making an exceptionall! strong plea to London that the time 
was ripe for Britain to settle, since the Board of T~ade had failed 
to find suffic~~nt evidence for British exemption~ The matter held 
more urgency now that France had settled her liability for the duty. 
Far from showing indulgence to English vessels, the authorities at 
Nice had become .1lore intransigent, and Roch:tord failed to obtain 
release for a ves.::;el early in 1754 ; despitu an offer by the master 
to leave part of his cargo as security, he was compelled to pay 
the duty in coin. Such warning signals convinced Rochford that it 
had now become "indispensa'bly Necessary ioj.' the sake of our 
. 80 Commerce tf to negot1ate a peroanent settlement. ~ 
In March 1754, Rochford returned xo Zngland on leave, 
to attend to pressing family affairs, but he also sei~ed the 
opportunity to cajole and persuade theSecr~~ary of State to open 
negotiations with ::he Sarc'.inian Envoy on the basis of the still 
unanswered Memoir~ of 1749. Rochford later claimed ~hat he 
IItook some Pains ll whilst in London to get these talk'=l started, 
but they were in Hsuch forwardness" by the time he returned to 
Turin that he confidently expected to hear of a settlement very 
81 
soon, for what he hoped would be a "not very considerable sum~tI 
79. Nassau Papers, A/82, Birtles to Rochford, 22 Decemb~r 1753. 
80.sp 92/62, f.10, Rochford to Holdernesse, 26 January 1754. 
81. SP 92/62, f.28, Rochford to Robinson, 23 Harch 1754 ; Nassau Papers, 
D/129, Rochford to Gray, 6 November 1754 ; ibid., B/58 , Rochford 
to Birtles, 13 November 1754. 
84. 
Predictably, Turin's price began far above the le';el 
Britain was prepared to pay, on the grounds that this was as an 
example to other powers, notably Spain, which had yet to come to 
any agreement over the Villafranca duty. 82 In order to lend 
muscle to their demands, the Court of Turin exerted local pressure 
at Villafranca during Rochford's absence in England. There were 
two incidents in the same month, September 1754, the second of 
which involved the seizure of two xebecs from Port Mahon carrying 
exceptionally valuable cargoes. Mellaredo, the President of the 
Senate at Nice, dispJayed unprecedented obstinacy over each of 
these incidents, and gave Consul Cabanis SOPle very anxious 
moments. 83 
Plunge~ into the midst of these fresh difficulties upon 
his return to Turin, Rochford found. he could make no impression on 
a very determined ministry. KnO\·ling that a st:ttlement was im~tlinellt, 
he did his utmost to calm the situation untiJ ne\'!s arrived from 
London. The expected tidings reached '111rin eaT'ly in November, that 
mutual Declarations had been signed in October which liquidated 
Britain's liabi1i+-,y to the Villafranca duty for a cash payment. 
Yet in the very same letter, Rochford was instructed to demand full 
restitution and reparation for the t,'IO Nahon vesselE:l .. 84 
After careful thought, Rochford wisely decided to ignore 
these outdated instructions. Such a demand would do needless harm 
now that the original cause of the incident hat~ been resolved. 
Furthermore, Rochfo."'d had discovered that the duty asked was very 
small indeed, because the cargoes had been grossly under-valued, 
and in fact the xebecs had escaped lightly with only a token 
SP 92/62, f.114, Charles to Robinson, 27 July 1754. 
SP 92/62, fos.130, 132, 141, and 145, Charles to Robinson, 7, 14, 
and 21 September, 5 and 12 October, 1754. 
SP 92/62, f.195, Robinson to Rochford, 24 October 1754. 
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paYlllent. This reasoning was appreciated in London, and Rochford's 
decision to let the matter drop was fully approved. 85 
The sum agreed upon at London was £ 4,000 rather more 
than Rochford's optimistic forecast of fla meer Trifle ll but it 
was nevertheless a modest price for the removal of so fruitful a 
source of vexation and dispute. Rochford modestly took llO credit 
tor his share of the work when reporting the settlement to fellow 
British diplomats, 86 but COllsul Birtles at Genoa was in no doubt 
about Rochford I s contribu~~ion ; "it is to your Lordship's Good 
Conduct that our Trade i5 now freed from that Burthen. II 87 
Certainly, wifhoul:. Rochford's personal encoul'agement 
whilst on leave in ~ondon in 1754, it remains doubtful whether 
the British minibLry would have sought a settlement at this time, 
and in his careful handling of the disputec on the spot, Rochford 
saved ~"ds government from what might easi2.y have become a complex 
and acrimonious debate. He therefore deserves some creJit at least 
for the removal of the Vl_llafranca duty, though hew~s not in a 
position to effect a similar solution for the Monaco duty, which 
. d t h' . t T . 88 rema1ne 0 vex 1S successor a ur1n. 
85. SF 92/62, £.165, Rochford to Robinson, 23 November 1'754 Nassau 
Papers, D/132, Rochford to Hann, 27 November 1754. 
86. Nassau Papers, D/129, Rochford to Gray, 6 Noveuber 1754 ; ibid., 
D/131, Rochford to Keene, 23 November 1754. 
87. Nassau Papers, A/87 , Birtles to Rochford, 16 Novemb~r 1754. 
88. SF 92/63, f.62, Charles to Robinson, 26 April 1755. 
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CHAPT"B;R 5 
Rochf'.nod and the Diplomatic Corps at T-:,,'rin 
Whil~ the centrepiece of Rochford's formal diplomacy at 
Turin was indou;1tedly his share in the negotiations for the 
Treaty of Aranjuez, to ~hich the following chapter is devoted, 
his relationship with tho diplomatic corps and his observation of 
certain matters in Italy affecting British interests also deserve 
some-attention. His main dealings with the diplomatic corps 
involved the rep~esentatives of the three great pOWD~S, Spain, 
Austria, and France. His watch on matters particularly interesting 
to the British F?;overnment likewise fall under three m&in heads, 
namely, .French influence at Genoa and on the Island of Corsica, 
the Modena r-1arriage Treaty of 1753, and the activities of the 
Young Pretender and the Jaoobite 'court' at Rome. 
The bas~c p~inciple of CharIeR Emmanuel III's foreign 
policy 'ltlaS abunde.ltly obvious to (.11 the diplomatic corps at Turin. 
The only policy consistently pursued by the House of Savoy in the 
first half of the eighteenth century was the ttcautious, piecemeal 
accumulation tf of pol:l:l;.ical and territorial gains. 1 This was the 
practical application of the King of Sardinia's desire for respect 
and recognition from th.;> great powers. As one contemporary observed, 
though he was not stro~g enough to subdue his neighbours at one 
stroke, the King of Sardinia was determined to expand little by 
little, following the famous dictum of Victor Amadeus II, that Italy 
2 
was like an artichoke, to be eaten leaf by leaf. 
1. G. Quazza, IIItaly 1 s r6le in the European Problems of the first half 
of the EighteenthCentury," Studies in Diplomatic His~or~, edited 
by R.H. Hatton and H.S. Anderson (London, 1970) , pp.14'4-1 5. 
2. Charles de Brosses, Lettres familieres ecrites d'Italie en 1739 et 
1740, edited by Bezard (Paris,1931), quoted in H. Acton, 
~Bourbons of Hanles, 173l~-1825 (London, 1956), p.74. 
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Aggrandhcment was the!'efors the key to an understanding 
of the King of Sardinia's policies in northern Italy. His designs 
on nearby territories in the Austrian-Controlled Duchy of Nilan, 
his claims on certain districts in Piacenza, and his desire for a 
wider corridor to the Hediterranean through the Ligurian coastline 
of the Genoese Republic, had all been laid bare in negotiations 
for the successive treet;es of Vienna (1738), Worms (1743), and 
Aix-Ia-Chapelle (1748). His independence of action, and his most 
like-l'y means of realizing these aims, depended on his skill in 
playing off one power against another in the hope of concessions 
from at least OLe of them. France presented the main threat to 
Austrian and Spc.-,nish interest~ in Italy, and it. was only the 'strategic 
J.ocation of Savoy and Piedmont \\Thich induced anyone of them to 
co-operate with the Court of Turin. 3 
Al~r~~d by the prospect of Bourbon encirclement after 
the renewal of the Fa.mily Compact between France and Spain in 1743, 
Charles Emmanuel SII had assiduously courted Spanish friendship, 
and the capstone of this policy was of course the marriage of the 
Duke of Savoy to a Spanish Infanta in 1750. Despite delays in the 
payment of the dowry, this marriage alliance ensured some degree 
of affability between the Courts of Madrid and Turin, even through 
the strains of the negotiations for the Treaty of Aranjuez. 4 
3. F. Valsecchi, L'It~.lia nel Settecento (Milan,1959), pp.156-162, 
187-194 ; D. Carutti,·storia della diplomazia della Corte di 
Savoia (Turin,1875-80), II, 327-328 ; R. Lodge, Studi~s in 
Eighteenth Century DiplomaS[ (London,1930), pp.34-9, 51-2, 73-9, 
399-401. 
4. See C. Baudi de Vesme, "La Spagna alltepoca di FerdinandO VI e il 
matrimonio spanolo di Vittorio Amadeo III," Bolletino Storico 
Bibliografico Subalpino, LI (1953), 123-155, and S. Cordero di 
Pamparato, till matrimonio del duce Vittorio Amadeo III di Savoia," 
Atti della R. Accademia di Scienzadi Torino, XXXIII (1897-8), 
98-120 ; Carutti, Storia della diplomazia, II, 327-8, 331. 
The dowry was still not completely paid when Rochford arrived at 
Madrid in 1763 ; SP 94/166, f .39, Rochford to Halifax, ' 
13 January 176l~, Secret. 
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By contrast, however, relations between the Courtd ~f 
Turin and Vienna were very strained indeed when Rochford arrived 
at Turin. Austro-Sardinian relations had been poisoned soon after 
the Treaty of Worm::> by the discovery of Char1es Emmanuel Ill's 
secret negotiations with France : he had gaLe so far as to 
authorize his signature to an informal agreement of 26 December 1745 
designed to exclude Austria from Italy. For this betrayal, the 
Empress Maria ~heresa swore she would never forgive the King of 
Sardinia. 5 
Yet Britain g)'.'eatly desired harmony amongst her allies, 
and one of Rochford's earliest tasks at Tur~n was to help thaw 
the chill which had descended between Turin and Vienna. Even before 
he received any prompting from London, Rochford had on his own 
initiative recommended tact and moderation to the King of Sardinia's 
ministers in December 1749, t'lhen the dispu t .:: with Hilan over -che 
passage of salt barges on the River Po first arose. 6 
On1y a week after Bedford commended Rochford for th:s 
wise step, Newcastle wrote to Keith at Vienna, rel':lindirlg him to 
maintain at all ti:nes friendly relations amorl.gst Britain's allies. 
He added ; "And th"(l Earl uf Rochford will be dire.cted to make the 
same friendly Representations to the Court of Turin"ft 7 Rochford 
fulfilled Bedfo.::-d's subsequent instructions to this ~ffect in an 
audience with Charles Emmanuel IlIon 21 February 1750, quietly but 
firmly stressing the need for harmony amongst th.(~ allies. 8 
5. Carutti, Storia della d~:plomazia della Corte di Savoia, II, 332-4 
Lodge, Studies ill Eighteenth century Diplomacy, pp .. 101-122. 
6. SP 92/58, f.242, Rochford to Bedford, 10 December 1749. 
7. SP 92/58, £.262, Bedford to Rochford, 11 January 1750 ; BM Add HSS 
35467, f .. 226, Newcastle to Keith, 19 January 1750. 
8. SP 92/58, f.285, Rochford to Bedford, 21 February 1750. 
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Rochford did not simply leave the matter there, within 
the bare letter of his instructions. He also wrote privately to 
Keith himself, explaining his personal view of the matter: 
n • • as a strict Friendship between these two Powers is 
essential to themeelves, as \'1I'ell as to the Common Cause, 
so it merits the greatest Attention. From the observation 
I have made, this Court is so displeased with the Conduct 
of the Court·of Vienna, that nothing could prevent them 
from shewing their Resentment in th0 strongest manner, but 
the Faith they have in our Royal Haster to interpose." 9 
Rochford made good use of Keith's reply, assuring the King of 
Sardinia and his ministers that Keith found the Court of Vienna 
more inclined towards friendship than the C~urt of Turin gave 
th<3m credit for : Rochford promised Bedford that for his part, 
he would flneglect no opportunity of quieting them on that head." 10 
Part of the coolness between Turin and Vienna was 
caused by Vienna's delay in sending a representative long after 
Count Canale had established himself as Sardinian Envoy at Vienna. 
Count Coloredo did not arrive at Turin until 18 April 1750. 11 
Rochford immediately called on him, and was overjoyed to find 
that Coloredo thought well of Britain and was ea€',;6r to assist 
in promoting harmony amongst the allies. Rocnford. reported to 
Newcastle, !las I have frequent conversations l.'iith him on that 
head, I shall make it my study to keep him in.that way of 
th ' k' II 12 lon long. 
9. Nassau Papers, D/15, and B~'I Add HSS 35468, £.58, Rochford to 
Keith, 28 February 1750 •. 
10. SP 92/58, f.307, Rochford to Bedford, 11 April 1750. 
11. SP 92/58, f.314, Rochford to Bedford, 18 April 1750. 
12. BM Add MSS 32821, f.175, and SP 92/58, f.330, Rochford to 
Ne\'icastle, 23 Hay 1750. Coloredo ,,,,as later appointed Austrian 
Hinister in l,ondon, and vJaS thereafter in Vienna an outspokenly 
anglophile government minister ; D.B. Horn, Sir ChaDles Hanbury 
\<Jilliams and European Diplomac:l (London,1930 ), pp.145, 159. 
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Rochford t 1.:', chief cont~ibution to the gradual easing of 
tension and suspicion between Turin and Vienna, apart from his 
repeated assurances to the King of Sardinia, was his mediation 
in an awkward ceremonial dispute which marred the beginning of 
Coloredo's resijence. Rochford's personal friendship with Colorado 
helped him to find a p&rtial solution which prevented a minor 
dispute from developing into a serious rupture between the two 
courts. 
Coloredo held the same 'rank as Rochford, th&t of Envoy, 
so that Rochford had made the first visit, eager to befriend his 
Austrian counterpart, without any fuss or difficulty. However, 
Coloredo was a100 Conseiller ,intime at Vienna, and in recognition 
of this high domestic office, he was instructed to demand that the 
ambassadors·of France, Spain, and Naples shon.ld also pay him the 
first visit ena give him the titl~ Bxcellency in his own house • 
. Rormally an EnvOj \10l!ld pay the first ~!isi t on an Ambassador, 
13 and offer him the upper hand as a mark of respect. 
Not surprisingly, the ambassadors refused to recognize 
this pretension, and would not visit Coloredo ; they were equally 
bound by their own instructions not to yield such delicate points 
of honour. Even worse, Coloredo extended his demand to include 
the government ministers of the King of Sardinia, and refused to 
give them the title of Excellency unless they also conceded it to 
him. It was an a\'ikvmrd and potentially dangerous impasse ; 
Coloredo could do no official business with either the ambassadors 
or the King's ministers until it was settled. 14 
13. See A. van Wicquefort, ~Ambassadeur et ses fonctions (The Hague, 
1680-81, enlarged edition, Amsterdam,1724), Book I, Section XXI, 
especially pp.628-630. 
14. SP 92/58, f.316, Rochford to Bedford, 25 April 1750. 
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In desperation, Coloredo appealed to Rochford to seek 
a solution to the problem, or at least some temporary modus vivendi. 
Rochford visited each of the ambassadors privately, but found them 
resolute and un\,/ill:ing to listen to his suggestions for a compromise 
solution. \vith the King of Sardinia, however, Rochford had some 
success. Stressing the potential danger of such a diaput q , Rochford 
persuaded the King to instruct his ministers to pay Coloredo the 
first visit an,l to give him the title Excellency merely provisionally, 
pending a reply from Vienna on the question of whether or not a 
Sardi~ian Envoy who was also of the Order of the Annunciation at 
Turin would be e.:.'.titled to the same respect at Vi,;nna. On this 
basis, the ministers paid their visits, and Coloredo coulJ at last 
b . h' k ~ T . 1~ eg~n ~s wor a~ ur~n. - In the meantime, to avoid any public 
disputes over precedence, the members of the niplomatic corps were 
16 
simply not invited to the court ball eaI·ly in June. 
Vienna in fact readily backed down. In August 1750, 
Coloredo was ordered to make the first visit on the ambassadors 
and to yield them the upper hand, in the expectation that they 
would out of courtesy give him the title of ~xcellency. Though the 
ambassadors of Spain and !~aples did so, the French a.mbassador held 
strictly to the protocol due to an Envoy, despite as~urances from 
the French minister at Vienna that he would concede at least this 
much. The French court upheld their ambassador's decision, and 
in spite of Coloredo's indignation and the resentment of the Court 
of Vienna, there the matter rested unresolved. 17 
15. SP 92/58, fos.316 and }18, Rochford to Bedford, 25 April and 
2 May 1750 ; Nassau Pap~ers, D/25, and BM Add MSS 35469, f.14, 
Rochford to Keith, 30 Hay 1750. 
16. BM Add NSS 32821, £.325, and SP 92/58, f.340, Rochford to 
Newcastle, 13 June 1750. 
17. BM Add MSS 32822, f.404, and SP 92/58, £.361, Rochford to 
Newcastle, 15 August 1750 ; Bl1 Add MSS 32823, f. 1, and SP 9?/58, 
f.363, Rochford to Ne\'1castle, August 1750 ; SP92/58, f.398, 
Rochford to Bedford, 21 November 1750. 
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~n interesting though minor affair relating to the 
Court of Vie~na and directly involving Rochford at Turin was the 
offer of some secret papers by the head of a leading Piedmontese 
family who had spent some time in the Austrian diplomatic service 
and now hoped for British help in resuming that employment. 
Count Piosasque first approached Rochford in the middle 
of 1751, offering th~ British government a collection of secret 
correspondence relating to treaty negotiations in which he had 
been involved in 1746 bet~een France, Bavaria, Cologne t and the 
Palatinate. He hinted at yet more valuable inform:),tion if and \"hen 
Britain helped him to find re-employment at Vienna. P~osasque's 
ostensible reasons ?or wanting to move were that most of his 
friends and property w~re at Vienna rather than Turin. 18 
Rochfor~ had several discreet talks with Piosasque, and 
relayed to Newcastle various items of information illhich he let drop 
concerning the lesser German states, but Neucastle finally agreed 
with Rcchford's first impression that whatever Piosasq~e had to 
offer was probably of small importance and hopelessly outdated. 
After Rochford's warnings of the Count's loquacity, Newcastle may 
have doubted if his information was worth the risk BrItain would 
run if it became known at Vienna why they supported his bid for 
re-employment. Though Piosasque renewed h:...s offer in 1752, it was 
not taken up, which left him rather disgruntled. While demonstrating 
Newcastle'S care not to offend Vienna, this episode also reveals 
Rochford's readiness to listen to likely sources of intelligence, 
. . t· . d t ", . 19 and suggests that h1S d~scre ~on was recognlze a ~ur~n. 
18. BM Add MSS 32828, f.261, Rochford to Newcastle, 4 August 1751. 
19. BM Add MSS 32830, f.68, Rochford to Newcastle, 26 September 1751 
ibid., 32832, f.84, Rochford to Newcastle, 11 December 1751 ; 
ibid., 32836, f .49, Rochford to Ne\vcastle, 20 May 1752, separate ; 
ibid., 32837, f.253, Rochford to Newcastle, 1 July 1752, Private. 
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Goloredo was recalled from Turin early in 1751, ostensibly 
to command Austrian troops in Lombardy, but in reality as the only 
possible solution to his unresolved ceremonial dispute with the 
French ambassador. Hi~ departure was widely regretted, for he 
had been a rarity among Imperial ministers at Turin ; a sensible 
moderate man who took pains to make himself agreeable. Rochford 
la~ented the loss of a colleague who had become a close personal 
friend, and continued to correspond with C~loredo even after he 
had left Turin. 20 
Coloredo waS not immediately replaced ; for the next 
two years, the Court of Vienna was content ~.,o be represented at 
Turin by his Secretary, du ~eyne, even through the negotiations 
for the Treaty of Aranjuez. Rochford's use of his perscnal 
21 
contacts with du Beyne at this time are noted elsewhere. 
The Spanish ambassador at Turin when Rochford began his 
residence was Don Manuel de Sada. Keene haQ recommended Rochford 
to cultivate the friendship of de Sada, as he knew him to be 
22 lIa very worthy man. u Rochford followed thj.B advice, and was 
pleased to find that de Sada WaS well disposed tm-lards England 
"a True old Spaniard, and hates anything that has ';;he least 
connexion with France.1f 23 
However, de Sada was also elderly and reserved. His 
dislike of all things French meant that he had a poor understanding 
20. SP 92/59, f.31, Rochford to Bedford, 6 March 1751 ; Nassau Papers, 
D/65 and D/86, Rochford to Coloredo, 15 Nay and 2 October 1751. 
21. See below, Chapter 6 
22. BM Add MSS 43423, f.227, Keene to Rochford, 13 October 1749. 
23. SP 92/58, f.196, Rochford 'to Bedford, 9 November 1749. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
of that language, and Rochford at; tirr'es found it exhausting to 
pursue a conversation with him. Nevertheless, with the help of 
de Sada's very capable secretary, who had been a long while at 
Turin, Rochford managed to achieve and maintain a close working 
24 
relationship with the Spanish embassy. This was demonstrated 
early in 1752 by de Sada's comments on the effect of Rochford's 
efforts during the Aral1juez negotiations. 25 But in view of 
de Sada's advanced age and poor health, his recall at the end of 
175~ . t th 'd' 1 t' t ~ . 26 "'" came as no surpr),se 0 e J.p oma J.C corps a .'urJ.n. 
Naturally. Rochford hoped that de Sada's successor as 
Spanish ambassador would prove equally friendly and h.:;lpful. But 
127. 
Rochford had a [.pecial reascn for anxiety on tJ:is poiut. He wrote 
to remind IIoldernesse, "that it is extremely esse:r..tial, the having 
a Spanish Hinister nore who is not blindly devoted to the French 
Interest. tt 27 ~ochford had e,.rident2.y gone to some trouble to 
build up a spirit of friendship amongst uncommitted members of the 
diplomatic corps ,'tt Turin as a buffer against Frencr.!. influence, 
and had directly helped strengthen the 'Common Cause' at Turin 
by setting in mo+ion an exchange of Dutch and Sardinian ministers. 
Finding the Court of Turin "something discontentedll at 
not having had a Dutch m:i.nister since the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle', 
Rochford wrote privately to the British minister at the Hague, 
suggesting that he dro!-l a hint to the Prince of Orange. 'l'he result 
was that in July 1750 the Dutch named Verelst as their minister to 
Turin, and the King of Sardinia responded by naming the Count de 
SP 92/58, f.196, Rochford to Bedford, 9 November 1749 
Papers, D/6, Rochford to Keene, 22 Noveqlber, 1749. 
See below, Chapter 6 , p.160. 
Nassau 
SP 92/62, f.4, Rochford to IIoldernesse, 12 January 1754 ; de Sada. 
did not die until 1764, when Rochford reported his death from 
Hadrid : SP 94/166, f.96, Rochford to Halifax, 13 February 1764. 
SP 92/62, f.4, Rochford to Holdernesse, 12 January 1754. 
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28 Viry for the Hague. The new Dutch minister \Y'as instruc'~e'~ to 
act in close concert with Rochford, and the t'l<TO seem to have 
established an enduring personal friendship in 1752 Rochford 
described .Verelst &s his "particular Friend.u 29 
Rochford need not have worried that his little anti-French 
coterie in the diplomatic corps would be disrupted by the new 
Spanish ambassador. Upon his arrival at Turin in 1754 , ths Conde 
de Fuentes assl1red Rochford that he had been instructed to be 'l;lary 
of the French ambassador, but to live in the clos~st harmony with 
his British and Austria.n colleagues. 30 
Also i'J. 1754, th,'l d:i.plomatic corpE: at Turin was joined by 
a new Austrian minister, Count Herci. He arrived in June I , • .,hen 
Rochford was in England on leave, and had the misfortune to suffer 
a ceremonial dispute with the French ambassador similar. to that 
which had marrt:d Coloredo r s residence. 0r.t :ds return fr(lm leave, 
Rochford found himself being cited by the French ambassador in 
justification of refusing to return Nerci' s f.irst visit. Rochf"rd 
swiftly corrected this false claim, but failed to find an.y solution 
to the impasse. 3~ 
Rochford~ Fueat~a, and Merci together maintained what 
Rochford called the "clOSest Connexion" at Turin unt::Ll. his own 
recall early in 1755. Their friendship ensured that French influence 
was kept to a minimum within the diplomatic corps, to the great 
Itmortificationll of successive French ambassador-e. 32 
28. SP 92/58, f.280, Rochfor'l to Bedford, 4 February 1750 ; BM Add NSS 
32822, f.72, and SP 92/58, f.349, Rochford to Newcastle, 
4 July 1750. 
29. Nassau Papers, D/33 , Rochford to Villettes, 25 September 1750 ; 
BM Add NSS 32823, f.345, and SP 92/58, f.372, Rochford to Ne""castle, 
26 September 1750 ; Nassau Pqpers, B/57, Rochford to Allen, 
24 Hay 1752" 
30. SP 92/62, f.150, Rochford to Robinson, 26 October 1754. 
31. Nassau Papers, D/131, Rochford to Keene, 20 November 1754. 
32. SP 92/62, f .. 175, Rochford to Robinson, 11 December 1754. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
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The French ambassador above any other member of the 
diplomatic corps at Turin was the main object of Rochford's 
watchfulness. Not only was France Britain t s chief adversary in 
Europe, but after the Killg of Sardinia's uno.erhand negotiations 
with d'Argenson in 1745-6, the British government \laS apprehensive 
of any further moves towards a formal accommodation betw~en France 
and Savoy-Sardinia. Fortunately for Rochford's peace of mind at 
Turin, the KinG of Sardinia and his miniGtcrs were profoundly 
suspicious of the French ; Rochford found that they had an "aversion 
to anything that has immediate Connection with tr..e Court of 
France." 33 
The Marquis de la Chetardie was appointed French 
ambassador to Turin about the same time that Rochford ~eceived 
his appointmert, but Chetardie did not arrive there until 
18 November 1749. 34 He did his utmost to begin his embassy on 
a good footing, even to sending baggaee lists in advance to the 
Piedmontese Customs ; an almost unheard-or condescensio:a by a 
French ambassador. Even so, Rochford thought that notwithstanding 
"all his eloquence," Chetv.rdie would have a hard time fulfilling 
his commission at Turin. 35 
Chetardie's main task was to persuade the King of 
Sardinia to join more closely with France in devising fides mesures 
communes ll for Italy, preferably by means of some sort of alliance. 
Chetardie was not to make any overtures himself, but was to court 
them by making himself ag~eeable and gaining the confidence of the 
King and his Illinisters. His other specific tasks were to start 
SP 92/58, f.266, and BH Add HSS 35467, f.230, Rochford to Bedford, 
14 January 1750. 
SP 92/58, f.240, Rochford to Bedford, 3 December 1749. 
SP 92/58, f.182, Rochford to Bedford, 15 October 1749 . ibid. , , 
f. 266, Rochford to Bedfor¢l" 14 January 1750. 
37. 
39. 
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talks for the remo\ral of a small duty at the port of Villafranca, 
and to re-establish a French postal commis at Turin. Chetardie 
was instructed to live "dans la plus parfaite intimite" with the 
Spanish ambassador, and as for the new British Envoy, his 
Instructions added : "Il sera necessaire que le marquis de la 
36 
Chetardie marque aussi baauccup d'attention au comte de Rochefort.fI 
It was Chetardiefs misfortune to fail in all but one of 
these tasks. Though he paid court assiduously, and spent lavishly 
on entertainments, he failed to gain the respect or the confidence 
of the King and his ministers. They were willing eno~gh to start 
talks on the Villafranca duty, but these were conducted elsewhere 
and Chetardie had no part in /.' .nem. However, they would not hear 
of a French postal pommis at Turin, because they w~re convinced 
the last one spent. most of his time smuggli.ng. 37 
Fa~ from making himself liked at Court, Chetardie 
alienated most people by his very strict ir.sistence on ceremonial, 
which he frequent:.;.y carried to exb.'emes. Among those who did not 
approve of his behaviour in this respect was the very man with 
whom he had been instructed to live in closest harmony ; the Spanish 
ambassador. De Sada privately told Rochford that he feared his own 
standing at Turin would eufferif he allowed himself to be associated 
a 
\IIi th Chetardie I s extreme6, and as/result 
from his own instructions to support the 
had asked to be released 
French ambassador. 38 
Even befere the end of 1750, Chetardie himself confessed 
that his business at Turin was at a standstill. 39 Ilis conduct 
had made him personally obnoxious to the King of Sardinia, and 
Recueil des Instructions donnees aux Ambassadeurs et Hinistres <!!l:. 
France •• Volutne x:v, Savoie-Sardaigne, ii, 1748-1789, edited by 
H. de Beaucaire (Paris,1899), pp.1-28. 
SP 92/58, f.240, Rochford to Bedford, 3 December 1749 ; ibid., 
f.303, Rochford to Aldworth, 28 Harch 1750. 
BN: Add Nss 32821, f .. 365, and SP 92/58, f.311-5, Rochford to NEH'lcastle, 
20 June 1750. 
B!1 Add HSS 32824, £.220, and SF 92/58, £.383, Rochford to Newcastle, 
24 October 1750. 
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ShOl·t:,_y e.fter his secretary \vas involved in a duel with. an opera 
actor :L'n Se· pt;ember "17r.:;1, 40 Ch t d' 11 d d'A / e ar :Le was reca e.: rgenson 
tersely noted on 7 November, n M .. de la Chetardie revient de Turin, 
41 etant brouil1e avec Ie Roi de Sardaigne." Chetardie's departure 
at least afforded some amusement, for his enormous debts at Turin 
necessitated the public sale of all his furniture anf!. effects, 
which went on while the French coat of arms remained above his 
42 door. 
Chetardie WaS replaced at Turin by the Harquis des Issarts, 
who was a sick nan on his arrival at Turb.. His b:defstay was 
plagued by illness, which grew steadily woree, and he was recalled 
within six months, in March 1753. 43 Chetardie's true successor 
tiS French ambassador was the redoubtable Francois-Claude Chauvelin, 
later Harquis de Chauve1in, who came to Turin in January 1754" 44 
Chauvelin had e~oyed a distinguished military career 
before being appointed French minister to Genoa in 1749, whence he 
45 was pro~oted to command French forces on Corsica. Ro~hford applied 
to the British Consul at Genoa for information about Chauvelin, 
and Birtles readily confirmed his reputation as an officer of 
exceptional ability, adding that he was II a l-!,:>n of Great Parts 
and a Compleat Courtier • • he will cutt a great figure at your 
Place ... he is a Frenchman, consequently v0ry little sincerity 
, h' It 46 l.n 1m. 
40. Nassau Papers, D/86 , Rochford to Co1oredo, 2 October 1751 ; ibid., 
D/87 , Rochford to Yorke, 9 October 175'1. 
41. Recueil des Instructions .•• XV, ii, p.37. (see note 36). 
42. Nassau Papers, D/110, Rochford to Mann, 22 ~mrch 1752. 
43. BM Add MSS 32840, f.372, and SP 92/60, f.252, Rochford to Newcastle, 
21 October 1752 ; SP 92/61, f .. 43, Rochford to Holdernesse, 
10 March 1753-
44. SP 92/62, f.4,·Rochford to Holdernesse, 12 January 1754. 
45. On Chauvelin at Genoa, see R. Boudard, G&nes et la France dans la 
deuxieme moitie du XVIIle siecle, 1748-1797 (Paris,1962), pp.60-64. 
46. Nassau Papers, 1/83, Birtles to Rochford, 12 January 1754. 
R')chford had already decided that Chauvelin merited his 
"particular $tudy," and noted that the new French ambassador was 
beginning his residence very cautiously indeed~ 47 In his first 
few months at Turin, Chauvelin only rarely saw the King or his 
ministers, and had.little or no connexion with members of the 
diplomatic corps ; he was devoting all his consideratle talents 
to making himself liked in Turin society. Rochford himself found 
Chauvelin friendly and considerate. 48· 
132. 
Unfortunately for Chauvelin, his absence on the day when 
the new Austrian minister~ Merci, called to pay ni~ first visit, 
led to yet another awkwa.rd ~eremonial dispute. There l<iare faults 
on both sides, but the wrangle undid much of ~hauvelints careful 
49 preparatory work. In ad6.ition, he was embarrassed oy the 
attentions of the Genoese minister, Gastaldi t who idolized Chauvelin 
and committed many follies in his misguided attempts to help the 
French ambaBsador. 50 
In spite of these problems, Chauvelin at I8.st made his 
secret offer of an alliance with France towards the end of 1754. 
Rochford's contacts within the Council informed him that the King 
remained as cautious as ever, but that Ossori~ and the Duke of Savoy 
rejected the overture ,'lith "great Warmth." 51 The pl·oposals came 
to nothing, and Chauvelin sadly reported thtit the Cour~ of Turin 
was "tres oppose a toute espece d'engagement" with France .. 52 
1~7. SP 92/61, f.143, Rochford to Holdernesse, 22 September 1753. 
48. SP 92/62, fos.4 and 21, Rochford to Holdernesse, 12 January and 
2 March (Separate) 1754. 
49. Nassau Papers, D/133, Rochford to Guy Dickens, 4 December 1754. 
50. SP 92/62, f .183, Rochford .to .Robinson, 28 December 11754 ; Nassau 
Papers, D/134, Rochford to Gray, 8 January 1755. 
51. SP 92/62, fos.177 and 179, Rochford to Robinson, 21 December 1754. 
52. Recueil des Instructions •• Savoie-Sardaigne, ii, p.52. 
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Rochford therefore came to the end of his ministry 
confident in. the knowledge that his efforts to maintain harmony 
within the diplomatic corps at Turin in order to combat French 
influence.had not been entirely fruitless~ Though there were 
definite limits to the influence a British Envoy could exert 
over the King of Sardinia and his ministers, Rochford could 
console himself with the certainty that the influence of 
successive French ambassadors at Turin war. by comparison 
virtually nil. 
The relations of the King of Sar,'iinia with the 
neighbouring republic of Genoa were deserving of attention by 
the British Envoy at T~rin for two main reasons in the ~750s : 
firstly, relatiunB were distinctly strainea for reasons of economic 
rivalry as well as from fears of territorialaggrandisement, and 
secondly, France wielded considerable influ~nce at Geno~ and 
had leht military aid to the republic to help subdue ihsurgents 
on the Island of Corsica. These were ample reasons for Rochford to 
keep himself well-informed of affairs relating to Genoa and Corsica. 
Having suffered from the rivalry c+ Legilorn as a great 
Mediterranean entrep8t, the Genoese deeply resented the attempts 
of the King of Sardinia to develop his new port at Villafranca, 
which would draw yet more trade away from Genoa, and this resentment 
was expressed in petty disputes over commercial matters at the 
main border crossing points with Piedmont ; Rochford twice reported 
constant friction from such disputes. 53 
53. SP 92/59, f.54 , Rochford to Bedford, 1 May 1751 ; SP 92/61, 
f.138, Rochford to Holdernesse, 5 September 1753. 
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Knowing the King of Sardinia's desire for a wider 
corridor to the Hediterranean, the Genoese also feared his designs 
on the Ligurian coastline between 14onaco and Savona. Little wonder, 
therefore ,. when the tmrm of San Remo rose in ravol t against inept 
Genoese administration in 1753, that Genoa immediately suspected 
the Court of Turin of fomenting it. Turin gave the c1.l.Gtomary 
assurances that it would not aid the rebels in any way, but Genoa 
then found that some rebel leaders had fouud shelter in Piedmont, 
and even in Turin itself. The revolt itself was finally crushed by 
an expensive naval expedition, but the episode dee)ly soured 
an already uneasy situation between the two neighbour~. 54 
Genoa's restive s'lbjects on the Island of Corsica feared 
that this same naval expedition might be sent next to crush them, 
but it was disbanded for lack of funds to pay the men. 55 Rochford 
heard "his from the British Consul at Genua, John Birtles, who 
proved to be his most regular and reliable Bource of in:."ormation 
regarding Genoa and Corsica. Thanks to Birtles's correspondents at 
Bastia, Rochford was able to supply the British government with 
much detailed and surprisingly accurate intelligence of French 
activities on Corsicae 
Rochford's residence at Turin witnessed a phase of 
temporary withdra\'1al by France, which culmi'1ated in th3 complete 
evacuation of French troops during 1753. His reports ga.ve detailed 
inform~tion about the popularity of the French commander, de Cursay, 
with the islanders, which gave rise to rumours that France planned 
to acquire the island for herself; 56 on de Cursa:r's disputes 
54. Nassau Papers, A/76-8,Birtles to Rochford, 16, 23, and 30 June 
1753 ; SP 92/61, f,186, Rochford to Holdernesse, 15 December 1753. 
55. 
56. 
Nassau Papers, A/78, Birtles to Rochford, 30 June 1753. 
SP 92/58, f.210, Rochford to Bedford, 5 November 1749 ; Nassau 
Papers, A/7, Birtles to Rochford, 6 December 1749 ; ibid., D/7, 
Rochford to Mann, 3 December 1749 ; SP 92/58, f.220, Rochford to 
Bedford, 29 November 1749. 
with Crimaldi, the Genoese Commissioner, leading to demands by 
Genoa for de.Cursay's recall; on negotiations by Chauvelin for 
a new agreement between Genoa and the Corsican leaders, issuing 
in the Convention of 1752 ; 57 and finally on de Cursay1s arrest 
late in 1752 on orders from Paris, followed by the evacuation of 
1753. 58 Rochford's sources brought him the news of de Cursayts 
ar:t'est before i twas. known even by the King of Sardinia I sown 
ministers at Turin. 59 
The details of these reports need not concern us here, 
bu'c Rochford's uealings with the ministry at Turin relating to 
Corsica are noteworthy in view of the later crisis over the 
Fronch acquisition of Corsica in 1768-9, which then directly 
concerned Rochford as British ambassador in Paris. 
Soon after his arrival at Turin, when he first heard 
rumours that France intended to conquer Corsica for herself, 
Rochford attempted to sOllnd the King of Sara.inia's ministers for 
their view of a situation .-rhich held grave possibilitie-s regarding 
the balance of power in the Mediterranean. He found that they 
disbelieved such rumours entirely, and were inclined rather 
to think that France was weary of her expensi ~;e cOll:!mi "t .. :tnent on 
Corsica, now that its war-time value had ended, and that France 
57. BM Add NSS 32828, f.241, and SP 92/59, f.115, Rochford to 
Holdernesse, 28 July 1751 ; SP 92/59, f.141, Rochford to Holdernesse, 
15 September 1751 ; BM Add MBS 32838, f.237, and SP 92/60, f.213, 
Rochford to Newcastle, 22 July 1752, are among the more important 
reports. It would be pointless to list all of Birtles's letters in 
the Nassau Papers, since almost everyone of them b!'ollght some 
item of news regarding Corsica. 
58. SP 92/60, f.270, Rochford to Holdernesse, 23 December 1752 ; 
SP 92/61, f.152, Rochford to Holdernesse, 17 October 1753. For a 
useful discussion of the literature on Corsica at this time, see 
Thadd E. Hall, IIFrance and the Eighteenth Century Corsican 
Question," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Minnesota, 1966) especially pp.25-127. 
59. SP 92/60, f.270, Rochford to Holdernesse, 23 December 1753. 
would "dthdraw entirely if she c0uld but find a decent pretext 
60 for doing so. This report corresponded more cJosely to 
136. 
exisiting French policy than was believed in England at this time 
indeed, it was not until the middle of 1751 that Onsorio felt 
sufficiently convinced of it himself to tell Rochford that he 
61 expected soon to see a complete French evacuation. 
Both the British government and the King of Sardinia 
believed the other could play a useful mediatory role over the 
Corsican problem, and supplant French influence at Genoa ; but 
neither was willing to expend the necessary subsidies for this. 
As early as Harch 1750, Rochford saw a letter from the Sardinian 
Envoy in London which reported verbal suggestitjns by Bedford that 
Turin should offer to mediate a settlement between the Genoese and 
their unruly islandcD:'s, but in pursuing this further, Rochford 
found that t'!:e !ang of Sardinia refused to involve himself and 
}',elp solve h!s close.jt rival t S problems. 62 
A year .later, the suggestion moved in the other 
direction Ossorio s~ggested to Rochford that Britain ought to 
intervene, deman A, French withdrawal from Corsica, and offer her 
own services to Genoa as a peace-keeping force on the island. 63 
Consul Birtles at Genoa thought there was at this time a chance 
that Genoa might accept zuch an offer, they were so exasperated 
by de Cursay1s activities. 64 
60. SP 92/58, f.210, Rochford to Bedford, 5 November 1749 ; Nassau 
Papers, D/6, Rochford to Keene, 22 November 1749. 
01. SP 92/59, f.95, Rochford to Bedford, 26 June 1751 ; Nassau Papers, 
B/48 , Rochford to Birtles, 28 July 1751. 
62. SP 92/58, f.300, Rochford to Bedford, 21 March 1750. 
63. SF 92/59, f.95, Rochford to Bedford., 26 June 11751 ; BM Add HSS 
32829, f.151, and SF 92/59, f.122, Holdernesse to Rochford, 
15 August 1751. 
64. Nassau Papers, A/54, Birtles to Rochford, 18 September 1751. 
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Rochfor1 himself, ho,'e'rer~ rightly guessed that 
Britain would not intervene, for the very same reasons that 
France was anxious to be rid of her entanglement in Corsica. 
Rochford.thought that the Court of .Turin ahead of any other 
should be willing to intervene, being far more directly affected 
by the political fate ci Corsica. But the King of Sardinia's 
ministers passed the matter off as being of little interest or 
importance to them. Rochford doubted if this was truly so, and 
he~hought his own government ought to have taken a closer 
interest in the fate of Corsica than yet appeared to be the case 
II Tho' if I may be allowed to differ in my po1iticks 
from some of my correspondents, :c think the french (sic] 
having or not having a port so nef\:::' Italy, of the 
ut!!lost consequence in time of war. tl 65 
Here Rochford put his finger on the strategic significance 
of Corsica t afid the reason for France's involvement there. While 
Savoy-Sardinia rema1ned allied to Britain and Austria, forming 
a barrier to a land invasion of nurthern Italy, France's easiest 
means of access to that ~roa was the port of GenOa itself. Quite 
apart from the ;alue of the Corsican ports for the French navy, 
and the undesirability of having them in the hands of another 
power, France's aid in ;uelling the insurgents on Corsica was the 
price she had to pay to retain Genoa as a mainland doorway to 
66 
northern Italy. Rochford saw that this was why France also 
financed the development of new ports at Massa and Spetia, and 
the construction of a new road linking Spetia to the Val de Taro, 
enabling troops to reaC!l Parma from the coast in three days. 67 
65. Nassau Papers, D/81, Rochford to Yorke, 11 September 1751. 
66. See Hall (note 58), pp.51-62. 
67. Nassau Papers, D/74 , Rochford to Yorke, 9 July 1751. 
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Rochford I S awareness of the ::lctual as "rell as the 
apparent strategic considerations of France's involvement in 
Corsica, which he may have felt were not fully appreciated at 
London, proved valuable later in his career, when the Corsican 
problem assumed much greater urgency for the balance of power in 
the Mediterranean. 
One of Genoa1s neighbours across the Appennines in 
nortttern Italy was the Duchy of Modena. Francis III d'Este, Duke 
of Modena, had married his only son Ercole Rinaldo to a Malaspina. 
Duchess, Maria Te:t'ese of Al berigo , but after produc ing; a daughter 
in 1750, the COt pIe separated and thereafter lilTed apa~;,t. Anxious 
t.o secure his dynasty, Francis III set about findine a suitable 
future husband for h~.s infav.t grand-daughtf;r. He even made secret 
approaches t~ Gd!orge II in 1751, but finding no inte.rest from the 
i~ouse of Hanover, Fruncis had turned to the Court of Vienna. The 
result was a secr,'>t Marriage Conve.:ltion, signed on 1 'I May 1753 and 
ratified the following June 1 which betrothed the young Archduke 
Leopold to the i-:.fant Princess of }todena. As part of the deal, 
which was of course a significant increase in Austrian influence 
in central Italy, Franci~ III became Governor of Milan and 
Commander of Austrian forces in the north. 68 
Rochford was instructed in April 1753 to say nothing at 
Turin a bou t this trc9. ty, even though it \'las by then widely 
rumoured. 69 He held strictly to these instructions, in spite 
68. Valsecchi, L'Italia nel Settecento, pp.244-247 ; Carutti, Storia 
della diplomazia della corte dt Savoia, II, 335-6. 
69. SP 92/61, f.200, Holdernesse to Rochford, 2 April 1753. 
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of Ossorio' satterllp\;S to draw him out on the subject in June. 
The King of Sardinia grumbled at Nodena's neglect of' his own son, 
the Duke of Chablais, but Rochford knew that such an alliance 
would certainly have alarmed everyone else in Italy. 70 
It was not until August 1753, when it was safely signed 
and sealed, that Rochford received instructions to make a formal 
notification of the Mod "m'3, l1arriage Treaty at Turin. His unenviable 
task was to explain to an ally why that ally had been poi~tedly 
ign~ed during a negotiation which was of very considerable interest 
to them. Newcastle :nerely suggested to Rochford to Plake the excuse 
that this was seen in London as a delicate affail',u of a Personal 
& Family Nature,:' in '1hich George II had not wi3hed to interfere. 
Ossorio grud~ingly accepted this thin excuse, but ~omplained to 
Rochford at some l<:n.gth tha,t they "should not have been kept SO 
r1 
long in the 1)ar~~:r by their pl'incipal ally. ( 
In fact, Bl'i tain I s silence had. been simply to prevent 
the Court of Turil: from having any pretext to interft:re in the 
negotiation. Though the King of Sardinia joined the chorus of 
approbation for ~ measure which further stabilized Italian politics, 
Rochford was sure he would have done his utmost to thwart the 
choice of an Austrian candidate if he had knovln in time. 72 
Such an increaB3 in Austrian influence in rvIodena imposed 
yet another restraint on the King of Sardinia's freedom of action, 
and the French amba.ssador's secretary, Boyer, told Rochford that 
70. SP 92/61, f.101, Rochford to Holdernesse, 30 June 1753 
Papers, A/79 , Birtles to Rcchford, 14 July 1753. 
71. SP 92/61, f.205, NevJcastle to Rochford, 19 July 1753 
f.130, Rochford to Holdernesse, 8 August 1753. 
Nassau 
ibid. , 
72. SP 92/61, f.116, Rochford to Holdernesse, 21 July 1753.; ibid., 
f.156, Rochford to Holdernesse, 24 October 1753· 
he knew the King of Sardinia was "ex.t .... emely disgusted at this 
Affair, fI as "las tr.e French government. 73 But in or.e sense, 
Britain's silence served as a reminder to Charles Emmanuel III, 
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after his -obstinacy during the Aranj~ez negotiations, that Britain 
did not simply pander to his narrow ambitions, but could follow 
an Italian policy independent of the Court of Turin when so required 
by considerations of E~rcpean stability. 
Apart from T~rin, which was perhaps the chief focus of 
British interest in Italy in 'ehe early 1750s, the city of Rome was 
frequently the cause on those rare occasions when the ~inisters 
in London turnec:. their thougllts to Italy, because of the existen.ce 
there under Papal protection of that stuart 'court' which had so 
recently challenged the Hancverian dynasty in the Jacobite rebellion 
of 1745. D€opite Culloden and its grim aftermath, Jacobitism was 
.still a source of considerable anxiety for British ministers well 
into the 1750s. 7';, In particular, much effort and expense was 
devoted in these years to kaeping a watch on the movements of the 
Young Pretender, Prince Charles Edward Stuart, and his attempts to 
drum up support for his cause across Europe. Though the Young 
Pretender maintained a h0usehold at Avignon, his father's 'court' 
at Rome remained the spiI'itual home of the Jacobite movement and 
the traditional fountainhead of news. 75 
73. SP 92/61, f.134, Rochford to Holdernesse, 18 August 1 
74. The best recent summary of government attitudes to JaGobitism 
during and after 1745 is found in the Introduction by Romney 
Sedgwick to The History of Parliament; The House of Commons, 
1715-1754 (London,1970), I, 69-77. Also useful is C. Petrie, 
The Jacobite Movement, The Last Phase, 1716-1807 (London,1950), 
especially pp.116-159. Older works include J.H. Jesse, 
of the Pretenders and their Adherents (London,1860) , 
and Andre\'l Lang, Pickle the SPy. (1897), and --'-_________ _ 
Stuart (London,1903). 
75. Britain was still urging that he be banished entirely from France 
in 1749 and 1751 ; Bedford Correspondence (1842-6), II, 3, 68. 
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Since Brltain had no diplomatic representative at 
~ome, nor indeed at Naples until 1753, Rochford had been briefed 
to report whatever he heard at Turin of the Pretender's movements 
the same duty rested with the British ministers at Venice and 
Florence. 76 Rvchford's characteristic zeal took him a step 
further than this, howev~r, and he started up a correspondence 
with the British Consul at Naples, who was well-placed to hear 
the latest rumours. Consul Allen's first letter early in 1750 
repG.Pted that he had heard nothing of the Pretender for several 
months. 77 
In response to his first discreet enquiries at Turin, 
Rochford was told by the King of Sardinia's min.isters that the 
most recent letters from their representatives in Italy assured 
78 them that the Pretender was not in that part of Europe. But 
this assurance ~ecame suspect ",hel. Pllen informed Rochford that 
-his nephew at }leE.sin'-l had heard of the "Young Chevalieru quite 
recently ; at AncJna on the Adriatic coast, with a retinue of 
twenty, getting riotonsly d~unk. This report had an authentic 
ring, and tallied with other rumours Rochford had since heard 
privately at Turin. 79 
Not surprisingly after this, Rochford tended to rely on 
Allents information rather than enquire of the King's ministers at 
Turin. In November 1750 1 thanks to Allen, Rochford was able to 
report that the Old Pretender at Rome and his son Henry, Cardinal 
York, had no idea where Charles Edward was, and that they were 
76. Horn, Great Britain and Eu:c.one in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 
1967), pp.332-334 • 
77. Nassau Papers, A/14,Allen to Rochford, 28 February 1750. 
78. SP 92/58, f.z47, Rochford to Bedford, 17 December 1749. 
79, Nassau Papers, A/15. Allen to Rochford, 14 Harch 1750 ; ibid .. , 
B/15, Rochford to Allen, 11 April 1750. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
83. 
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anxious at having had no reliablE n8wa of him. His letters were 
all unsigned and t'ndated, and simply related that hs had been ill, 
but had recovered, and still had ample funds. This information 
came through the Cardinal's confessor, who also observed that 
while Charles Edvlard ha.d plenty of money, he would not think of 
marriage, which was what his father wanted most for him. 80 
George II was greatly pleased at this fresh information, 
and Bedford praised Rochford for his diligence in obtaining it 
from-Consul Allen. He instructed Rochford to continue to discover 
all he could concerr~ing the Young Pretende:i.~, as this '.vas a matter 
of great intereBt to the King. 81 
Rochfcrd did not co~sider his duty limited to the 
gathering of information ; he also kept an alert eye on travellers 
passing through Turin, and twice reported thuse whom he considered 
important Ja0ot2te adherents. Earl~ in 1750, three Scots named 
~acDonald stopped at Turin on their way to Rome, and though they 
stayed three days they studiOUsly avoided Rochford's attempts to 
talk with them. 82 In September 1752, Rochford noted the arrival 
at Turin of two :rishmen named otSullivan and O'Brien, the latter 
calling himself Lord Lisamore, both of whom boasted of having been 
with Charles Edward in S~otland during 1745. They were now in 
French service, but Rochford could not discover anything else 
about them in their brief sojourn at Turin. 83 
Between these two sets of visitors, Rochford had a most 
interesting visitor of his own in June 1751 ; a government spy, 
SP 92/58, f.389, Rochford to Bedford, 21 November 1'750. 
SP 92/58, f.391, Bedford to Rochford, 29 November 1750 o.s. 
SP 92/58, f.303, Rochford to Aldworth, 28 March 1750 ; SP 92/59, 
f.2, Rochford to Bedford, 2 January 1751. 
BM Add MSS 32840, f.246, and SP 92/60, f.241, Rochford to 
Newcastle, 30 September 1752. 
named John Philips. He told Rochford he had been in the Guards 
before volunteering to s9rve as a spy in the rebel army in 1745 .. 
After the rebellion, Philips had gone to Lisbon to recover a debt, 
and there met a party of Jacobite exiles who greeted him as one of 
their own, assuring him that the cause was still alh'e and nearer 
to success than the British government suspected. Philips had 
therefore accompanied them to Avignon in the hope of discovering 
what schemes were afoot, and he had succeeJed in taking a copy of 
a letter in cipher left unattended on the desk of the Prince's 
secretary, Kelly. Philips had been taken so far in'.;o their confidence 
that Kelly had given him letters of introduction to th~ Cardinal 
and other supporter~ at Rome, and had sent Philips off to Rome in 
the company of a messenger. Philips managed to miss his boat at 
Marseilles, so that he could hand his copy of the letter to the 
British minister at Turin, and still be able to rejoin the Jacobite 
84 
messenger at Rome with a plausible excuse. 
After a second long talk with Philips on 5 June, Rochford 
Vlas convinced he WaS genuine : "He seems avery sensible Nan, & 
capable of making useful Discoveries. t1 Rochford therefore took it 
upon himself to send Philips on to Rome immed!3tely_ he equipped 
the spy with money and a cipher so that he could safely report his 
findings direct to Rochford at Turin. 85 
Before he left for Rome, Philips told Rochford all he 
had heard at Avignon about Jacobite 'managers' in London. One of 
these, a hair merchant named Burck, had lately been arrested for 
a debt, but Kelly was anxious that his papers might have been 
seized as well. This information was of considerable interest to 
84. SP 92/59, f.75, Rochford to Bedford, 2 June 1751. The letter copied 
by Philips at Avignon, in cipher, dated 16 Harch 1750, is f.77. 
85. SP 92/59, f.84, Rochford to Aldworth, 5 June 1751. 
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the Secretaries of state in Londen : :Jurck'rlas one of several 
leading Jacobites taken up at this time, but none of his papers 
had as yet been found. Bedford commended Rochford's initiative in 
sending Philips to Rome, and once again was full of praise for 
86 Rochford's zeal regarding the Jacobite problem. 
Within a month! Rochford had a report from Philips \vhich 
amply justified his estimation of the spy's resourcefulness. 
Philips had gained interviews with both the Old Pretender and 
Carfinal York, and frem their conversation was able to confirm the 
rumours that the Youug Pretender had recently been at: Berlin 
seeking Prussian supPQrt for his cause. He had b~en so well 
disguised there that eVen tht'l French ambassador, an old personal· 
friend, had failed to recog~ize him. Charles Edward claimed to 
have great schemes a!oot for action as soon as George II died, or 
sooner, and '!Jo&oted that he \ms assured of help from France and 
Spain. At Rome) two Scots messengers named Lumsdale and Turrel 
were preparing to carry this news ~o Spain and Ireland. 87 
From Rome, Philips went to Naples, where he approached 
Consul Allen for assistance ; the money Rochford had given him 
was now almost exhausted. Allen was very properly suspicious of 
Philips, and not until Pr.ilips had shown him a letter signed by 
Rochford did Allen advance him his fare to Genoa. Even so, Allen 
warned Consul Birtles to expect orders from Rochford to arrest the 
man on arrival if he proved to be an imposter. Rochford quickly 
assured both Consuls that Philips was indeed all that he said he 
was ; but Rochford was much less prompt in repaying Allen the 
h d t "1" k . h' 't' 88 money he ad a vanced 0 Ph~ 2PS, eep~ng ~m wa~ ~ng over a year. 
86. SP 92/59, f.86, Bedford to Rochford, 10 June 1751. 
87. SP 92/59, f.107, and BM Add MSS 32828, f.151, Rochford to 
Holdernesse, 13 July 1751. 
88. Nassau Papers, A/49, Allen to Rochford, 3 August 1751 ; ibi~., 
A/50, A/52, A/65 , A/72, Allen to Rochford, 7 August 1751" 
7 September 1751, 6 June 1752, 12 December 1752. 
T~is was apparently the last Rochford heard of Philips, 
but Allen co~tinued to be a useful source of news about the 
Young Pretender's reported movements. Not long after the Philips 
episode, Allen informed Rochford that Charles Fdward had been seen 
at Venice and GenOa quite recently, on his way to Paris. 89 There 
may therefore have been some substance to the report which reached 
England in the following year that the Young Pretender had been in 
Savoy. The Sardinian ambassador in Paris 81.so reported this, 
believing Rochford to he the original source of the rumour ; Rochford 
at once denied this at TUt'in, and asked Albemarle -co set the 
90 matter right at Paris. 
The rep-:>r-;; had in fact come from Sj r Horace Nann at 
Florence. Mann's corr~spondence with Cardinal Albani a~ Rome mad~ 
him a much more prolific reporter than Rochford on Jacobite affairs, 
but Mann was reluctant to admit that Alban! fed him with rather 
selective alld at times misleading information. Furtherm~re, Mann 
seemed jealous of Rochfol'd I s interest in the Young Fret ende:;.", and 
in January 1752 Rochford took him to task : 
r 
"You have never in any of y Letters mGntioned the Young 
Pretender to me. I should be glad to know if .:four 
Intelligence tallys with mine, as I should by that means 
be better able to judge of its merit .. " 
Rochford then recited, not his latest news from Allen, but the 
already stale news of the Pretender's travels in Germany and 
Poland. 91 Mann's reply is not known, but in August that year, 
Rochford offered Nann the 3ervices of his own conte.ets at Naples 
and at Rome. 92 
89. Nassau Papers, A/52, Allen to Rochford, 7 September 1751. 
90. Nassau Papers, D/116, Rochford to Albemarle, 10 June 1752. 
91. Nassau Papers, D/100, Rochford to Mann, 12 January 1752. 
92. Nassau Papers, D/re6, Rochford to Hann, 16 August 1752. On Albani, 
see L. Le ... ds, Connoisseurs and Secret AGents in Eighteenth Ccntur;y: 
Rome (London,1961), passim. I have yet to receive microfilm of 
'SP'105/309-31 ° , Archives of British Legations, Tuscany, 1748-5'+, 
which may contain some of Rochford's letters to Mann. 
TIochford I S ovm contact in Rome, as yet unidentifi.ed, 
supplied him with his most important piece of information about 
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the Jacobite 'court' and the Young Pretender in 1752. Rochford's 
informant had seen a letter written by the Polish minister at Rome 
reporting a quarrel between the Old Pretender and his son, Cardinal 
York. The latter had set up his own household elsewhere in the 
city, much to his father's distress. Even as ne was doing so, news 
arrived that the Young Pretender had broken up his household at 
Avignon : his servants ha,l been paid off, and his closest associates 
had dispersed, some to P~ris, some to Bologna. At Turin, Rochfcrd 
later.heard people remark that the Young Prptender had done the 
very same thing just befora the Rebellion of 1745. Other rumours 
claimed that a lauding in I~eland was plannen if not imminent. 
But Rochford personally doubted if Charles Edward was ready to 
run t1 zuch foolish risques" again.. 93 
lJ.'here was in fact a plot by English Jacobitee planned 
for NO~iember 1752, now kno'tm as the Elibank Plot, wr.ich was largely 
uncovered during that winter ; its failure 'tias symbolised by the 
execution of Archibald Cameron in 1753. 94 ~his period was 
therefore One of considerable anxiety for the Britisp government, 
and Rochford was more justified than he realized in taking a small 
personal initiative of his own early in 1753. 
When he took his leave to make the Tour of Italy in 1753, 
~ochford devoted his first few weeks to a sojourn at Rome, during 
which he took IIs ome pains" to make every possi..>le discreet enquiry 
concerning the Jacobite cause. Regrettably, he was unable to 
93. Nassau Papers, D/123, Rochford to Dayrolles, 29 July 1752 ; 
BH Add HSS 32838, f.329,and SP 92/60, f.219, Rochford to NeVlcastle, 
29 July 1752. 
94. Petrie, The Jacobite Hovement, The Last Phase, pp.149-155. Rochford 
gave no credence to a rumour that the Pretender had changed his 
religion in 1752 ; BH Add HSS 32839, f .. 185', and SP 92/60, f. 22'J , 
Rochford to Newcastle, 12 August 1752. 
discover much about the Young Pretender himself, save that h<:! was 
thought to be in France, and that some of the Cardinals had had 
undated letters from him at Paris relating little more than the 
state of his health. On the other hand, the insight which Rochford 
gained into the situation of the Jacobite 'c.ourtt at Rome, and 
the extent of its support there, made his efforts and enquiries 
well worthwhile. 
Rochf;;rd's main conclusion if/as that although those who 
openly espoused the Jacobite cause boasted great hopes from the 
assistance obtained by the Pretender at various European capitals, 
they did so not from any basis in fact but Merely to keep up the 
spirits of their party, "which seem (thank God) in a La!)g~:lishing 
condition. u Very few of the Cardinals, Rochford found, cared to 
support the Jacobites openly, and those who did, notabJy Cardinals 
Lante and Valenti, were regarded as Frer:.ch pensionaries anyway_ 
Rochford heard from someone in Valenti f s househo.Ld that when the 
Young Pretender broke up his establishment-at Avignon, the Papal 
Legate absolutely refused to store his furniture or effects in the 
Palace. 95 
This rel-ort fro!"! Rochfor~ was in fact ona of the earliest 
indications that Papal support for the stuart cause './as on the 
wane after the I"ailure of 1745. The episode at Avigr1.on interestingly 
foreshadows the Pope's refusal to recognize the claims of the 
Young Pretender to the English throne on the doath of his father 
in 1766. 96 
95. SP 92/61, f.63, Rochford to Holdernesse, from Rome, 21 April 1753. 
96. Petrie, The Jacobite Movement, The Last Phase, p.167. 
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iochford's report from Rome in 1753 was apparently his 
last contribution on the subject of the Young Pretender. In that 
year, Sir James Gray was appointed British Envoy to Naples, and 
his Instructions required him to keep a special watch on the 
Pretender's adherents at Rome. 97 
Though his reports by themselves \-Jere perha.ps of only 
limited value, Rochford's attention to the Jacobite problem 
offers yet further instances of his zeal a~d personal initiative 
as Envoy. In this, as in his dealings with the diplomatic corps 
at Turin, Rochford displayed considerable talent for making 
friends and establishing reliable contacts. Olearly his warmth 
and affability made him a g.:)od listener as well as a good talker. 
He undoubtedly possessed some measure of that essential quality 
in a diplomat which Chesterfield described as the ability to 
"get into all the secrets 11 at the court 'V/here he resides. 98 
Hcwever, other equally essential qualities, nc.;tably 
patienc~, firmness, and persuasiveness were required of Rochford 
in the course of his most important piece of formal diplomacy at 
Turin, to which the following chapter isdevot~d. 
Public Record Office, FO 90/40, Secret Instructions for Sir James 
Gray, 2L~ September 1753, Clause 3 Horn, 13ri tish Diplomatic 
Representatives, 1689-1789, p.76. 
98. Chesterfield's Letters, edited by J. Bradshaw (1892), I, 155. 
CHAPT:::;R 6 ~egotiations at Turin for the Treaty of 
Aranjuez, 1751-52 
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149-150 significance of Rochford's role ; the original plan of 
.May 1751 ; Newcastle widens it ; dangerous assumptions .. 
151-154 Rochford's first instructions ; fulfilled promptly despite 
illness ; Ossorio's bedside conversation; Rochford's 
first reports unhopeful ; waits a month for instructions. 
155-158 Rochford presents the treaty project 27 October ; Ossorio 
critical ; he complains of Vienn~rs silence ; dramatic 
arrival of net-IS from Hadrid ; Britain's withdrawal 
Rochford's impulsive message; a..'L enigmatic reply. 
159-162 Turin agrees t':' join 8 November; de Sada praises Rochford's 
efforts ; anxiety over French interferelll::e ; Chetardie 
behaves oddly, Chavigny's visit ; -the mysterious courier. 
162-165 Vienna's sllence a greater danger; British anxiety; 
Rochford )!.as to press hard to fulfill new instructions. 
165-168 the Austrian anS\'lcr arrives 16 February; diff'icl<.lty ove:r 
guarantee of Sardinia; bad news from Keene; C&rvajal's 
omissio~ ; the alternat ; succours from Tuscany. 
168-17i:! Turin now anxiol1.s to reassure Vl.enna ; Rochford's initiat;-"~ 
a~ticipates instructions to approach du Beyne ; their 
second conversation 14 Narch ; Rochford to ad..:-pt a firm 
tone; rebuke from Holdernesse ; Hochford's indignant repJy. 
173-176 Newcastle takes over correspondence ; OS80rio obdurate; 
slight concession from Vienna ; Turin offers troop 
transports ; news of separate treaty ~lready signed at 
Madrid ; Newcastle urges Rochford tc bully Ossorio ; 
Rochford's failure and despair. 
177-178 
179-180 
next day Vienna concedes all ; arrangement over alternat ; 
Ossorio quibbles ; Rochford has to calm du Beyne ; 
conversation with the King ; trea.ty signed '14 June 1752 ; 
the secret reservation. 
Rochford estimates his own contribution ; confirmatory 
praise from Newcastle and Ossorio ; Aranjuez proves an 
empty gesture ; Naples refuses to join ; limitations to 
British influence at Turin ; a worth1:hile apprenticeship 
for Rochford. 
CHAPTER 6 
Negotiations at Turin for the Treaty 
of Aranjuez, 1751-1752 
Rochford's share in the negotiations which led to the 
signing of the Treaty of Aranjuez between the Courts of Hadrid, 
Vicnna, and Turin on 14 June 1752 has no\.;here been examined in 
any detail : most of the standard accountE' of the negotiation 
f 'I t t' h' 1 aJ. even 0 men J.on :>.m. Although Madrid was the scene of the 
negotiation proper, Rochford's role at Turin was unimportant, 
for it was his task to persuade a reluctant court to join the 
tr~aty discussions against its inclination, then when difficulties 
cmd ill-feeling arose between Turin and Vienna, to try to reconcile 
these two partiE:s. An examination of Rochford's efforts at Turin 
is of value not only for the light thus shed on the attitudes of 
the King of Sardinia and his ministers, but also becausE: it 
reveals with painful clarity the limitations to Britain's influence 
over the Court of Turin. 
The negotiation commenced at Madrid in May 1751 with an 
Austrian proposal for the mutual guarantee by Spaia and Austria of 
Habsburg and Bourbon territories in Italy, as they had been fixed 
in the Treaty of Aix-Ia-Chapelle. At LondoLl, however, Newcastle 
1. The best account in English is contained in R. Lodge, "Sir Benjamin 
Keene, K.B. ; A Study of Anglo-Spanish Relatiors in the Earlier 
Part of the Eighteenth Century," Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, 4th series, XV (1932), pp.16-25 .. In Italian, 
see E. Rota, Le Origini del RisorfS.imento, 1700-18°°. O~ilan,1938), 
I, 248-251, using unpublished correspondence between Bogino and 
Christiani, at the Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Milan; D. Carutti, 
Storia della diplomazia della Corte di Savoia (Turin,1875-8), II, 
·332-339 ; F. Cognasso, I Savoia nella politica Europa OHlan,1941) 
pp.236-7. The negotiations are noticed only briefly in VI. Coxa, 
Memoirs of the Kings of Spain of· the House of Bourbon (London,1813) , 
III, 119-121, and in L. Dimier, pistoire de Savoie (Paris,1913), 
pp.262-264. 
seizeJ upon this simple affirmation of the peace settlement 
as an opport~nity to drive a wedge between France and Spain, 
and raise another obstacle to French interference in Italy, by 
widening ~he proposal to include Britain and Savoy-Sardinia. 
There was a good ostensible reason for such an amplification. 
The Austrian project named only Naples, Parma, and Tnscany as 
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acceding powers, yet as Newcastle pointed out, unless it included 
Savoy-Sardinia as the most powerful of the Italian states and 
that most directly threat~ned by French aggression in that area, 
no arrangement for the t~anquility of Italy could hope to last 
2 for long. 
Though holding no territories in Italy, Britain could 
claim an interest in the matter through her long-standing alliance 
wi th the Court of Turin and her naval po\vel" in the Hedi terranean. 
Newcasilo offered to act as mediator for ·i;he inclusion of Turin. 3 
However, this bold scheIha rested ontt>/o rather hopeful ~"_ssumptions. 
Newcastle expected that epain and Austria would easily be convinced 
of the desirability of including Britain and her Sardinian prot~ge. 
Most crucial of all was his assumption that the King ox Sardinia 
would meekly follow Britain's lead. Newcastl~ failec to take 
warning from the fact that Turin had only recently spurned proposals 
made by Spain for a treaty to secure the S,-9.tus quo in Italy, 
during the negotiations at Madrid for the marriage of the Duke of 
Savoy to the Spanish Infanta in 1750. 4 
2. Lodge, "Sir Benjamin Keene • , II pp. 17-18. 
3. Similar British mediation had characterized the negotiations for 
the Treaty of Worms, 1742-3 ; R. Lodge, Studies in Eighteenth 
Century Diplomacy (London,1930), pp.31-79. 
4. c. Baudi di Vesme, liLa Spagna alltepoca di Ferdinando VI e il 
Matrimonio spagnolo di Vittorio Amadeo III," Bolletino Storico 
Bibliografico Subalpino, LI (1953), especially pp.153-4. 
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Rochford ~~ewfrom the gossip of the diplomatic cor~s 
at Turin that there was 8~ negotiation afoot at Hadrid long before 
he received so much as a hint about it from London. Ossorio asked 
him late in August 1751 whether he had any instructions on the 
matter, and Rochford had to admit he was officially uninformed. 5 
Three weeks late~, Rochford received his f1rst official 
notification, in the form of a summary of the discl'~sEdons so far 
at Madrid, fol)owed by instructions to make a formal communication 
of these facts to the Court of Turin. Rochford waf: then to make 
a discreet enquiry as to the 'sentiments of the King of Sardinia 
towards the proj.:::cted treaty between Spain &nd Austria, particularly 
his willingness t('l become a partner in the treaty under B1;itain's 
mediation. Finally, Rochford was to ask that orders be sent to 
the Sardinian ai.lbassador at Madrid to confer and co-op#)rate \iith 
his British counterpart on this issue. 6 
Rochfo:::d had no dL"ficul ty fulJillingi,he first and last 
parts of these instructions quite promptly.. J:e made the formal 
communication to Ossorio on the very same day he received his bulky 
dispatch from Hold6rnesse, 19 September 17511 and although Rochford 
fell lame overnigr. i ; with a painful boil on his leg t Ossorio called 
at the Envoy's house the following evening. There he informed 
Rochford that Charles Emmanuel III was most grateful for Britain's 
notification, and had already sent orders to the Sc.:;:,dinian 
ambassador at l-iadrid, COll..'I1t St Marsan, to co-orcrate fully with 
Sir Benjamin Keene. 7 
5. SP 92/59, f.1 ,and BM Add MSS 32829, f.190, Rochford to 
Holdernesse, 1 September 1751. 
6. SP 92/59, f.126, and BM Add MSS 32829, f.214, Holdernesse to 
Rochford, 29 August 1751 O.S., Very Secret. 
7. SP 92/59, f.143, Rochford to Holdernesse, 22 September 1751. 
Ossorio stayed talking at Rcchford's bedside for more 
than two hours, during vlhich time Rochford did his ttt:.most to 
pursue the middle part of his instructions. He gathered from 
Ossorio'scremarks that the King of Sardinia, far from being 
enthusiastic about the treaty project, was very reluctant to be 
involved at all. Ossorio stated quite bluntly, though only as 
his private opinion, t}l.at. he ~ould see little advantage in the 
scheme, and that the Court of Turin would not join without 
8 goo<t-reason. 
Rochford later wrote to his friend Yorke at Paris that 
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this first exchange made him doubt if Turin would join "without 
being well paid for it." 9 His first reports -<;0 Holdernesse were 
likewise very cautious and restrained. It was obvious that the 
Court of Turin saw nQ tangihle gain for ito elf in a treaty which 
merelyconfj :rmE..i the provisions 0:1:' t..ix-1a-Chapelle. The only 
nffective 'bait' Roc!!ford could envisage which would ensure the 
adherence of the King of Sardinia was a promise for the reversion 
to the whole Duchy of Parma, but this was an unthinkably large 
concession for t~e Courts of Madrid and Vienna. In fact, the 
mutual guarantees of the present project would require Charles 
Emmanuel III to confirm Don Philip in his possession of Parma. 
On the other hand, the attraction of a fresh mutual guarantee was 
the continuation of pe",ce and stability in Italy, if only for a 
few more years, which the Court of Turin desperately needed after 
the destruction and crippling loans of the last war. Rochford 
hoped that Turin would opt for peace and quiet at this juncture, 
8. SP 92/59, fos.143 and 145, Rochford to Holdernesse, 22 and 26 
September 1751. 
9. Nassau Papers, D/87, Rochford to Yorke, 9 October 1751. 
though he feared that in yielding their theoretical freedom of 
movement they would probably display the utmost reluctance. 10 
To his fellow British diplomats at Paris a~d Madrid, 
however, Rochford l"as even less optimistic, indeed, almost gloomy. 
Writing to Albemarle, Rochford claimed that Ossorio's "cold Regard" 
for the treaty proposals Ifmade me open my Eyes very wide upon a 
Court that •• is far from being shortsighted. 1I 11 He was more 
explicit to Keene. Quite simply, Rochford was sure from his 
observation of their system that the Court of Turin dreaded 
having its handa tied -oy unnecessary peacetime treaties. Their 
established polit::y was to remain free of such ti€os in Italy, so 
that when a war broke out they could choose to side with whichever 
power made them the largest offer : "by these means they ha"ITe 
obtained what they no,.., have." This was a not ;!niair re&ding of 
Charles Emmanuel's diplomacy during the War of the Austrian 
Succession. The suggestion that they might be invited to join in 
a general affirmation Q£ th9 status quo in-Italy therefore put 
them in what RochfoX'd termed" a disagreeable Dilemma~' ; they could 
not reject such a mea;3ure without arousing !:uspicions of Utheir 
own ambitious Desi~nstf in Italy .. Though the King of Sardinia had 
responded readily enough in sending orders for Harsan to consult 
with Keene in Madrid, Rochford feared that the Court of Turin 
10. SP 92/59, f~145, Rochford to Holdernesse, 26 Spptember 1751 ; 
ibid., f.175, Rochf~rd to Holdernesse, 6 October 1751 ; ibid., 
f.138, Holdernesse to Rochford, 16 September 1751 o~s. ; ibid., 
f.179, and BM Add MSS 32831, f.18, Rochford to Holdernesse, 
13 October 1751. See ale.,) Lodge, "Sir Benjamin Keene. ,II pp.20-21. 
11. Nassau Papers, D/92 , Rochford to Albemarle, 10 November 1751. 
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would "do all they can to traver",e '~his negotiation, f! and in this 
12 they would nO'1; lack encouragement from France. 
For a month after this first exchange, all remained 
quiet at Turin, for no detailed tal~s could begin until the text 
of the treaty proposals was available for study. Rochford had 
recovered from the boil on his leg by 5 October, but he had to 
wait until 26 October for the arrival of Turner the messenger 
from London "lith a copy of the original Austrian project, the 
amenaments to admit Britain and Savoy-Sardinia, aad a fresh set 
of instructions from Holdernesse. 13 
Rochford wa~ now to present the treaty project, and to 
invite the conc~rrence of the King of Sardinia either 2S a 
contracting or acceding party under British med:i.ation.. He was also 
to press for full pOwers to be sent immedintely to Marsan at Madrid, 
enabling hirr: to sign with Keene the amended treaty including Britain 
and Savoy-Saro.inia, or simply to accede if Spain and Austria had 
already signed alvne. 
The pervading tcne of these fresh instructions was one 
of bouyant optimism: "they ought, if they see their own Advantage, 
most heartily to join His Hajesty's present Measures. 1I There were, 
however, one or two anxicus notes. Rochford's earlier reports of 
Ossorio's cool reception and the reasons for reluctance on the part 
of the King of Sardinia had been echoed by the Sardinian Envoy in 
London, and Holde~nesse feared that further problems might arise 
at Turin : "I own I do !:l.ot like these Refinements ; {;;}>ey look like 
12. Nassau Papers, D/90, Rochford to Keene~ 22 October 1751. See also 
E. Rota, Le Origini del Risorgimento, p.249, note 22, quoting from 
Bogino to Christiani, 19 February 1752, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Milan, 
0/218, Supp_, £.74, confirming Rochford's view of their initial 
dilemma. 
13. SF 92/59, f.175, Rochford to Holdernesse, 6 October 1751 ; ibid., 
f.181, Rochford to Holdernesse, 30 October 1751. 
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a kind of Defaite or at best an Inclination to create Difficulties 
where in reality there are none.1t He also observed that Vienna 
had so far made no sign of welcoming the inclusion of Turin. 14 
"The day on whioh the treaty project arrived Rochford 
devoted to studying this unusually thick package of dispatches, 
t:>.ud he did not see Ossorio until the afternoon of the following 
day, 27 October. He began the interview cautiously, reading out 
passages from Holdernesse's letters which spoke of Geo~ge Ills 
solicitude for the ini;erests of the King of Sardinia, but Ossorio 
interrupted and said wi~h a smile that Rochford need not resort to 
rhetoric to establioh what everyone took fo~ granted. Taking the 
hint, Rochford w~~t straight to the point, revealed the treaty 
project, and made Britain's formal invitation for the King of 
Sardinia to join the treaty under her med~~tion. 15 
He was then startled to discover that Ossorio already 
h1:".d his own copy of the project, sent to hi .. '! from Madrid, and that 
,the minister had thoroughly mastered its contents. Ossorio then 
plunged into a lengthy discourse on the scheme proposed therein, 
\vhich Rochford thought was ura ther to blame than praise. $I 
14. SP 92/59, f.158, Holdernesse to Rochford, ~ October 1751, Separate 
ibid., f.161, Holdernesse to Rochford, 3 October 1751, Most Secret 
ibid., f.169, Rcldernesse to Rochford, 4 October 1751. 
15. The account which follows of Rochford's intensive activity over 
27 - 29 October is derived from these detailed reports : 
SP 92/59 t f .181, Rochford to Holdernesse, 30 Ol:tober 1751 ; 
ibid., f .183, Rochford to lioldernesse, 3 NO'lember 1751 ; BN: Add Mss, 
32831, f.292, and SP 92/59, f.186,Rochford to Hold~~nesse, 
9 November 1751 ; Nassau Papers, D/91, Rochford to ;(eene, 
9 November 1751 ; ibid., D/92 , Rochford to Albemarle, 10 November 
1751 ; BM Add MSS 32832, f.289, and SP 92/59, f.202, Rochford to 
Roldernesse, 10 November 1751 ; BM Add MSS 35472, f.43, and Nassau 
Papers, D/95 , Rochford to Keith, 24 November 1751. 
Ossorio agreed that it was a laudable object to drive 
a wedge between France and Spain, and detach Bpain from French 
influence, but he strongly doubted if the present project 
effectively secured that end. As for securing the tranquility 
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of Italy, he "flatly ridiculed it," chargi.ng that the nUlIlber of 
troops to be furnished as 'succours' by the contracting parties 
would prove wholly inadequate. Rochford had earlier stressed that 
the present pr':'posals committed the parties no farther than their 
existing obligations under Aix-la-Chapelle ; if it: were no more 
than that, Ossorio rutorted, they might as well invite France to 
join too. 
A more experienced negotiator woula have disposed of this 
obvious red-herring with wit or ridicule, but Rochford took it up 
in all seriousness, and laboured to convince Ossorio thRt the 
present treaty was designed to exclude ?r: .. y future possibility 0::' 
French interference in Italy. France was more likely to do all in 
her power to wreck the negotiation, andRochf~rd suggested th~t 
Chetardie had already embarked on this task at Tu~in. Ossorio 
promptly denied that the French ambassador ~~d even mentioned the 
matter to him. Ro~nforQ fuund this impossible to believe, but 
could not contradict the minister to his face without risking insult, 
so he switched ~ttention back to the text of the trecty proposals, 
and the amendments to the mutual guarantee which wu~ld accommodate 
Britain and Savoy-Sardinia. But Rochford could not induce Ossorio 
to discuss them in detail ; the minister merely observed that they 
seemed to be the same ai the papers he had received from Marsan, 
and ended the interview with an assurance that Rochford would soon 
have an answer to his proposition. 
On the following day, 28 October, Charles Emmanuel came 
in from his country re~creat at Venaria to discuss the British 
invitation with his Council. Rochford went to see Ossorio that 
afternoon~ but no ~ecision had been reached and there was no 
answer yet. Rochford found Ossorio a little less peevish than he 
had been the day before, and managed to draw the mir..istAJ:> into 
further discussion of the proposals. At first they ranged over 
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much the Same ground as before, with similar comments from Ossorio. 
But then the minister observed that the Court of -vienna seemed 
likely to raise objections to the inclusion of Turin, and complained 
that Vienna had not so much as informed them of the negotiation at 
Madrid, much less invited them to join it. Rochford end~avoured 
to conceal his alarm at this reminder 0;'- the deep suspicion and 
mistrust v/hich prevailed bet"leen Turin and Vi enna, anc. smoothed 
over Vienna's reserve as best he could, suggeating that the talks 
at Madrid had pu.rposely been kept very secret at first for fear of 
French interference. (i::morio remained disgruntled and unmoved. 
More than a little anxious now at Ossorio's continued 
coolness, Rochford obtained an audience wi t:l the King himself at 
Venaria on 29 Octvber~ ~nd was somewhat reassured by the many 
"obliging Expressions" he made of his appreciation f0r Britain's 
interest in his welfare. But the King showed no entnusiasm for 
the proposed treaty. He repeated all of Ossorio's objections, and 
added one of his ovm, that the preamble seemed a trifle strong, 
more like an offensive alliance than an affirmation of peace. 
This made him apprehensive of alarming his neighbours. Rochford 
had no time to make an effective answer to this obj,ection, as the 
King rose to attend mass in the Royal Chapel. 
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When Rochford emerged from this audience, he found one 
of his o\..rn domestic servants waiting in the ante-chamber with a 
letter from Hadrid. The letter had been delivered tn Rochford's 
Turin house just after his coach had set out for Venaria that 
morning. Lady Rochford, thinking it might contain inportant news, 
immediately ordered the servant to ride out after R~chford. 
Lucy's instinct \1aS correct : the lettel: '/I!as from the 
British ambas~ador at Madrid, Benjamin Keene, and his news was 
of the utmost importance. Spain and Austria had declared their 
objection to incluuing Brita.in in the treaty, en the grounds that 
Britain had no territoriel:; in Italy and therefor·~ if included 
would give France an ample pretext to demahd her inclusivn as well. 
Newcastle had therefore reluctantly directed Keene to withdra\~ 
Britain's bid to join, and her offer of a MeAit~rranean squadron, 
but insisted all the more strongly that Savoy-Sardinia srlould be 
included as a full contract:l.ng party. 
Rochford ap~arent.ly could not bear to keep such vital 
news until another formal audience. He waited impatiently at the 
door of the Royal Ch2.pel, and as soon as thd King of Sardinia 
emerged, pressed :orward and whispered that he had just received 
important news from Madrid. When Rochford had finisr~ed relating 
the gist of Keene's letter, the King merely smiled and replied, 
flJ' entrerai comme I' Angleterre entrera t 11 before continuing on his 
way. It was a suitably enigmatic comment for such an impetuous 
communication, but it was the first sign Rochford had seen that 
the Court of Tux'in was :s;repared to join the treaty at all. 
Two days after this encounter, on Sunday.31 October, 
when Rochford was again at Venaria for a weekend of hunting, he 
was summoned to the King's private apartment. There, in what 
Rochford noticed t'ias Ha gayer hnmour than I had seen him for 
some time, 11 the King informed him that the nel.vs from Madrid had 
so changed the situation that their prepared answer would nO\1 
have to be altered. But he assured 'Rochford that he would find 
their answer perfectly satisfactory. 
Turints posit~on W8.S now in fact considerably easier. 
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Britain1s original off~r had indeed pinned the King and his ministers 
on the horns of a dilemma, for while such an invitation could not 
decently be refused i'fithout arousing suspicion and hostility on all 
sides, to accept as Britain1s partner would have tied the Court of 
Turin in advance: to,whatever terms Britain deemedoest for them. 
But nO\,1 that Britain was no longer a contracting party, and merely 
a friendly mediator, the King of Sardinia sat! some !'ldvantage in 
joining as a full cor.tracting power in hj.s O' .. "U right, since besides 
obtaining a ~ue.~'antee for all his present possessions, this would 
wring valuable recognition of his equality as a crowned head from 
the Courts of Mad:id and Vienna. 
Rochford ag&.in went hunting with the King on 3 November, 
but though their conversation was very affable, no mention was 
made of the treaty. On the other hand, Rochford noticed that the 
Council met almost daily~ at which it was rumoured the discussions 
were very heated. The f2'.ct that an answer had been prepared 
though not at once presented to Rochford, and that this now had 
to be amended, suggests that the King and his ministers had initially 
decided to take the risk of rejecting Britain's offer~ but had been 
naturally reluctant to declare themselves. No", the arguments for 
joining alone had to be debated. 
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At last, on Monday 8 November, after a week of susFense, 
Ossorio gave Rochford the answer of the Court of Turin to Britain's 
mediatory invitation to join the treaty being negotiated at Madrid. 
The King of Sardinia was willing to join as a full contracting 
party, and the necessary powers had been sent to Ha.rsan to sign 
the treaty once the other powers had agreed on the alterations 
which would admit the Court of Turin. The most eas~ntial of these, 
apart from the agreement to supply a similar number of troops as 
'succours' in the event of an invasion of Italy, was to extend the 
general guarantee to i!)clude Savoy, Nice, and the island of 
Sardinia. The :\.llitiative .DOW rested with Spain -9.nd Austria, 
whether they would agree to embrace theCouc-t of Turin, c·r proceed 
with the original project and sign alon~. 16 
After this busy time, during which, ae he bca~ted to 
Albemarle, Hmy InRtructions never slept d. ~Lay, tI Rochford could 
congratulate himself on havi-;lg fulfilled his appointed task to the 
letter. While it is obvioua that the deci§ic~ of the Court o~ 
Turin stemmed largely from their hopes for recognItion as an 
equal to the grea'\; powers, the Spanish ambaf'3ador, de Eada, 
thought this a re~~rkable departure from their traditional policy 
of non-alignment: he was personally convinced that ~ochford's 
energetic repreoentations had greatly contributed tc overcoming 
their initial reluctance. 17 
The remainder of November and most of December passed 
very quietly at Turin. Ossorio was immobilized by a severe cold 
for several weeks, and caly once gave Rochford some alarm by 
16. SP 92/59, f.202, Rochford to Holdernesse, 10 November 1751. 
17 .. Nassau Papers, D/92 , Rochford to Albemarle, 10 November 1751 
SP 92/59, f.224, Rochford to Holdernesse, 22 December 1751. 
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letting drop the e>..tent to whi.:~h th",: Secretary of state in 
London had revealed the contents of Rochford's early reports to 
the Sardinian envoy, Perron. Early in December, however, Rochford 
received praise from two quarters. Keene wrote to thank him for 
his uclear and judicious ll account of Turin's first reaction to 
the treaty proposals, alld Holdernesse informed Rochford that 
18 his work thus far at Turin had George II's Iffull approbation." 
Nevertheless, the closing months of 1751 caused Rochford 
much-anxiety, from his fear of French interference :i.n the matter. 
Rochford had been w~tching the French ambassador's movements 
closely, and was disturbed to find that in addi tiO:"1 tv his normal 
weekly intervie~s with Ossorio, Chetardie had twice visited the 
minister at six in the evening, a time at which Ossorio would 
never receive 9. for.':!ign minister except on very urgent business. 
The Spanish p~h~ssador told Rochforc he was certain Chetardie was 
<'J.sking questi.ons, but Ossorio steadfastly denied this whenever 
Rochford gently s)unded him about it. Rochford was troubled by 
tho ngreat tranquilityll which Chetardie evinced after these evening 
visits, and his hlithe departure to enjoy the fair at Alessandria 
even before the Court of Turin had made its reply to Rochford. 19 
Early in 1752 Pochford had another cause for alarm when 
Chavigny, the French amb-Jssador to Venice, stopped at Turin for 
several days on his way home to Paris on leave, and spent much of 
his time closeted 'With the King of Sardinia's ministers. This time, 
'18. SP 92/59, f.216, Rochford to Holdernesse, 1 December 1751 ; ibid., 
f.207, Holdernesse to Rochford, 14 November 1751 ; ibid., f.219, 
Rochford to Holdernesse, 8 December 1751 ; BM Add MSS 43426, f.111, 
copy, Keene to Rochford, 22 November 1751. 
19. SP 92/59, f.196, Rochford to Holdernesse, 9 November 1751, Separate 
and Very Secret ; Nassau Papers, D/92 , Rochford to Albemarle, 
10 November 1V51. 
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whe~l 1:tochford approached him, Ossorio readily admitted that the 
visiting Fr~nchman had tried very hard to get them to talk about 
the negotiation, but that they had given nothing away, and on the 
contrary, it was he who \vas "sifted.!! Rochford nevertheless wrote 
to Albemarle at Paris asking him to listen for any boasts Chavigny 
might make on his arrival of discoveries at Turin. 'L'his close 
attention to Chavigny's visit in fact anticipated instructions 
from Holdernesse to watch him 
20 
even as Chavigny: left Turin. 
the lette~ was penned in London 
Yet another sCC'.re, the arrival of a sl'ecial courier 
from Paris on 19 January 1752 which was clo~ked in se~recy for 
three anxious weeks, turned out to be a fa.lse alarm : he carried 
routine dispatches from Harsan t sent by way of Paris. O;:;;sorio 
evidently delighted in Rochford's agonized enquiries about this 
21 
mysterious courier. Yet as l~te as 8 February, at a Court Ball, 
the King ascured Rochford that he was sure France remai~"ed ignorant 
of the actual terms and state of the negotiation, all her efforts 
.. 22 
to sound the participants having failed utterly. 
A much greater danger to the negotiation than possible 
French interference, hOi'lever, was the attituc.~ adcpt(:d by the 
Court of Vienna. Charles Emmanuel III had every reas~n to be 
apprehensive of difficulties from this qualter. Spain's friendship 
was assured ; both Ferdinand VI and his first minister Carvajal 
20. SP 92/60, f.14 and £.18, Rochford to Holder~esse, 5 and 12 
January 1752 ; Nassau Papers, D/99 , Rochford to Albe~,arle, 
8 January 1752 ; SP 92/60, f.274, Holdernesse to Ro,:hford, 
9 January 1752. 
21. BN Add HSS 32833, f.304, and SP 92/60, f.51, Rochford to 
Holdernesse, 26 January 1752 ; SP 92/60, f.279, Holdernesse to 
Roch£ord, 13 February 1752 ; ibid., f.90, Rochford to Holdernesse, 
8 Harch 1752. 
22. SP 92/60, f.68, Rochford to Holdernesse, 9 February 1752. 
were warmly pro-SRX'uinian, esp\::c. i.ally since the marriage of the 
Duke of Savoy to the Spanish Infanta in 1750. Partly thanks to 
Keene's promptings, the Court of Hadrid readily welcomed the 
inclusion of Savoy-Sardinia as a full partner in the proposed 
treaty, as the extension of the general guarantee to Savoy would 
help to deter France frolJ fUl"ther Italian adventures. 23 
But at Vienne there was unmistakable reluctance to admit 
the King of Sardinia. Week after week went by, and the old year 
gave:-way to the new, yet at the end of January '!752 there was still 
no communication wha_tever fronl Vienna to the Court of Turin .. 
Rochford was especially anxious that the Austrian charg~ at Turin, 
du Beyne, had mc.~ntained a stony silence on a topic which formed 
the mainstay of gossip within the diplomatic corps. He refused 
even to discuss the n:a t ter with Rochford, pretesting th9. t he was 
totally uninfor~ed on the matter. Ossorio was also convinced that 
Vienna had no wish to include Turin, partly out of resentment 
that the invitati')n had beeil made through Britain's !nediation, and 
hence no formal approach had been made at Vienna. He expected that 
Kaunitz would inl"truct Esterhazy to proceed with the original plan, 
and sign with Spain alone. This prospect did not seem to worry 
Ossorio unduly ; he laughed at Rochford's concern, and remarked 
"the whole of this affaL" is so much a Comedy to me that I long 
2/f to see the denouement.!! 
2,. EM Add MSS 43426, f.111, Keene to Rochford, 22 November 1751 ; 
Lodge, "Sir.Benjamin Ke~ne • ,II pp .. 18, 20-21. 
24. SP 92/59, f.224, Rochford to Holdernesse, 22 December 1751, 
Separate; SP 92/60, f.18, Rochford to Holdernesse, 12 January 
1751 ; SP 92/60, f.48, Rochford to Holdernesse, 19 January 1752, 
Separate. 
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," 
While Ossorio could perhaps afford to be light-hearteQ 
at this possibility, the British government regarded it as a 
serious danger, so much so that Rochford was given fresh instructions 
to prevent the signing of a treaty between Spain and Austria alone, 
excluding Savoy-Sardinia. The danger from a limited agreement 
such as this was the likelihood of Italy's being thus divided into 
two camps, between those states comprehended in the guaraatee, 
notably Milan, Parma, Tuscany and Naples, and those left outside 
it, notably Venice, Nodena, and Savoy-Sardinia. France would 
immediately attempt to exploit such a division, and what might have 
been a salutary .neasure would be Itunfortunately changed into a 
Source of Nischief. u So ran Newcastle's re<;,..soning, relaj'z,d by 
Holdernesse. A similar danger'also arose if Spain offered 
Turin a separatdtreaty between themselves alone, relating only 
to the Bourbonpoosessions in Italy ; this \,.,ould only deepen 
Vienna's fears for Milan and.?iacenza. Rochford~s fresh task was 
therefore to recommend mode:r.-ation and patienc~ to the King of 
Sardinia, in "so very nice & critical a Step." Above all, Rochford 
was to dissuade him f:r.-om signing any separat;;, treaty with Spain 
alone, and encourb"~e him to act only in consultation with the 
British government, as their friend and well-disposer mediator. 25 
Rochford Once again promptly fulfilled his instructions 
to the very letter. He saw Ossorio on 2 February, ~d asked that 
orders be sent to Marsan at Madrid to take no et~p without first 
consulting with the British ambassador. Ossorio's response was, 
Rochford thought, carpillgand evasive, complaining t:hat Britain 
had dragged them into this negotiation against their will, and now 
25. SP 92/60, f.274, Holdernesse to Rochford, 9 January 1752. 
ha~ withdrawn, leaving them too deeply involved to bow out them-
selves. After a lengthy discourse on this theme, OBsorio lapsed 
into silence without having actually answered Rochford's request. 
Rochford had to break the silence to press his request Ifin a very 
strong manner,11 before Ossorio finally agreed, with a show of 
reluctance, to send the necessary orders to Madrid. 26 
Though on this occasion he had been compelled to press 
hard to gain his point, Rochford could st:ill claim, as he did in 
letters to fellow British ministers in Germany, tha,t the negotiation 
at his end was progressing as well as could be expected ; he waS 
at least fulfilling his inGtructions, despiJ"e having "met with 
EomeRubs." 27 The risk of a separate treaty between Turin and 
Madrid seemed overcome for the meantime, but Rochford's main 
source of anxiety was the long delay in he~ring any response from 
Vienna to the King of Sardinia's bid to join the treaty. Du Beyne 
still maint&ined complete and utter silence on the mattEr. 28 
At long last, un 16 February 1752, a courier arrived at 
Turin with the Austrian response to the approach made almost 
three months before. Ossorio had promised to inform Rochford 
immediately he had word from Vienna, but afte!' sevc)ra.l days had 
passed, Rochford was obliged to visit Ossorio himself, and ask 
whether the news was favourable or not. Oss0rio guardedly replied 
that the Court of Vienna seemed pleased that Turin wanted to confer 
on the future tranquility of Italy. Exasperated, Rochford finally 
demanded to know, whether or not Vienna was willing to include 
26. SP 92/60, f.58, and BM Add MSS 32833, f.330, Rochford to 
Holdernesse, 2 February 1752. 
27. Nassau Papers, D/103, Rochford to Guy Dickens, 9 February 1752 ; 
ibid., D/104, Rochford to Hanbury Villiams, 12 February 1752. 
28. SP92/60, r.76, Rochford to Holdernesse, 16 February 1752, Separate. 
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Turin in the treaty project as a contracting p~rty. Ossor~o 
merely said they had. Vastly relieved, Rochford asked what 
possible obstacle now stood in the way of an early signing. 
After som.e demur, Ossorio admitted that a difficulty had been 
raised at Vienna over the inclusion of the island of Sardinia in 
the general guarantee. 
At this moment, they were interrupted by another 
minister who h'3.d an appointment with Ossario at that hour, and 
Rochford could not persuade Ossorio to see him later that day. 
The next morning, howe'ler, Rochford took up their conversation 
where it had bCf'n interrupted, and asked whether or not Vienna 
had given their ambassador at Hadrid the nec.essary pO\'1err: to 
negotiate a final solution on the spot, enabling the treaty to be 
signed without delay. Ossorio hesitated before assurin.g Rochford 
that they had, but quickly went on to SP.y '.l:lat there could be no 
serious difficulty over the g'.larantee for Sal~dil'1ia since Vienna 
had already given the King 0f Sardinia ~ gen(~al guarantee of all 
his dominions in the Treaty of Worms. Rochford t:hought that 
Ossorio seemed unsare of himself in these tl.r~ interviews, and 
wondered if he we~~ hitlinr; something from him. ~ii th. such evident 
mistrust between Turin and Vienna, Rochford gloomily resigned 
himself to seei~g many more couriers trotting to anC fro before 
the business was finally settled. 29 
This foreboding that Ossorio was conc'3.::l1ing bad news 
proved to be. true when on 29 February Rochford received a letter 
from Keene, describing the serious difficulties which had arisen 
at Hadrid.Knm·dng that Vienna might object to the inclusion of 
29 .. SP 92/60, f.80, and BH Add !'iSS 32834, f.100, Rochford to 
Holdernesse, 23 February 1752, Separate. 
the island of Sardinia in the general guarantee, on the very 
reasonable pretext that as she had no navy she could not possibly 
defend it, the Spanish minister Carvajal had omitted Sardinia 
from the revised pt'oject he gave to Esterhazy to send back to 
Vienna. The guarantee hCl.d been thus confined to lIel continento 
de Italia." I'1arsan felt bound by his original instructions, that 
the guarantee must include all possessions of the Y.i~g of Sardinia, 
and said he conld not possibly sign Carvajal's revised project, 
even though Vienna had accepted it. 
Equally serious was the difficulty which had arisen over 
the alternat, tl!~ customary privilege in tr0aties between equals 
that each party should sign first on alternate copies of the final 
treaty. Esterhazy had been ordered from Vienna not to sign with 
11arsan as an eq!lal without at the same time me..ki'lg a for.mal 
Declaration that t.his was not to be takf'i"J. c.s a precedent. The Er.lpress 
Maria Theresa regarded the Sardinian as c:. "mushroom crown," which 
moreover she deeply diatrusted after the King of Sardinia's 
treacherous negotiations with France at the end or 1745. 30 
Marsan's ur~ent appeal for fresh j~structions arrived 
at Turin in the serae pest as Keene's letter to Rochford, and 
provoked a Council of the King and his ministers on 1 March 1752. 31 
Rochford waited outside, and when the Council adjouI'ned for dinner, 
Ossorio stayed to talk, !Ivery ready and desirous to confer." He was 
30. BM Add MSS 43426, f.187~ copy, Keene to Rochford, 17 February 1752 
Lodge, "Sir Benjamin Keene. ,11 p.21. On the alternat, see Horn, 
British Diplomatic Serv~~, pp.204-5. 
31. SP 92/60, f.85, Rochford to Holdernesse, 1 March 1752. 
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vicibly anxious about the omission of Sardinia from the general 
guarantee, despite Rochford's assurances that an attack on the 
island was most unlikely while Britain remained an ally to the 
King of Sardinia and could send a fleet to pr~tect it. Ossorio 
also raised a new problem which Rochford had.not heard of before. 
As the project now stood, Turin had promised troops for the 
defence of the other acceding Italian states. But the Emperor, 
as Grand Duke of Tuscany, while he too han promised 'succours' 
to these states, had not as yet extended any to the Court of Turin. 
Ossorio termed this the ;'greatest piece of injuntice conceivable. 1t 
As for the alternat, O.ssorio exclaimed Uwit!! some warmth" that 
they would not sign without it, nor would they tolerate any sort 
of modifying Declarati0n. Spain had readily granted the alternat 
when signing the treaty for the marriage of the Duke of Savoy in 
1750, and Ossorio therefore could not imagine any good reaSon for 
Vienna to refuse it. 32 
Three major difficulties had arisen the om~.ssicn of 
Sardinia from the guarantee ; the reluctance of Vienna to concede 
Turin the alternat ; and the problem of 'succours' from Tuscany_ 
The insistence of the Court of Turin on these thr&e ;oints was to 
demonstrate that beneath their affected indifference, the King and 
his ministers were now in fact fearful of ~eing left out of the 
treaty altogether. Their honour was now so far committed that their 
exclusion would be a serious loss of face, and not merely a return 
to the status quo. In view of their initial relUctance under 
British mediation, it was now thought needful to c0~vince Vienna 
of their willingness and sincerity for the treaty. 33 
32. SP 92/60, f .. 85, Rochford to Holdernesse, 1 Harch 1752. 
33. SF 92/60, f.90, Rochford to Holdernesse, 8 March 1752. 
0ssorio accordingly sent instructions to the Sardinian 
minister at· Vienna, CO'lint Canale, to pursue this new line without 
delay_ But at Turin, Ossorio was troubled by the resolute silence 
of the Austrian charge, du Beyne, 'iho absolut'2:ly refused to 
discuss the treaty without instructions to do so. 
Rochford here played a very useful part at Turin. 
Early in March 1752,.Ossorio asked him if he could possibly 
speak privately to du Beyne, and convinc(: him of the necessity 
to give his court a m~re favourable view of Turin's attitude to 
the treaty project. It is a striking testimony to Rochford's 
interest in the negotiation and his persom'l initiatJ.ve that he 
ha.d perce! ved this need anCl. had already acted upon it. 
Before 5 March, Rochford had visit~d du Beyne at his 
house, and in ~he course of general conversation had succeeded 
in drawing him out on the treaty negotiations for the very first 
time. Hearing du Beyne remark that Ossorio had kept him well-
informed, and that nobody could have been more Ore::1 al1d honest, 
Rochford urged du Beyne to mention this in the very saoe words 
:j,n his next dispatch to Vienna, as this would greatly help to 
thaw the coolness between the two courts whi~h seemed to be the 
cause of so many delays. Du Beyne had agreed to do this. 34 
In this conversation, du Beyne also made an important 
observation, in confidence, which Rochford passed on to Keene 
privately but was careful not to mention in any official letters 
to London. Du Beyne hint~d that he thought Vienna. would ultimately 
concede all that Turin asked, but because they di8~rusted the King 
of Sardinia's motives, they would first test his sincerity. 35 
34. SP 92/60, f .. 90, Rochford to Holdernesse, 8 March 1752. 
35. Nassau Papers, D/109, Rochford to Keene, 5 Iiarch 1752. 
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In response to Ossorio's plea, Rochford went to see 
du Beyne aga~n about 14 Harch, and discussed more fully the 
major difficulties \vhich had arisen over the guarantee of Sardinia, 
the alternat, and the -'succours' from Tuscany. Du Beyne readily 
agreed that as Turin had offered troops for the defence of Tuscany, 
the Emperor could not refuse to reciprocate, and he F,ssured Rochford 
that it was more likely a simple oversight than a deliberate neglect. 
As for the guarantee of Sardinia, du Beyne told Rochford that 
when Carvajal's ameno.ed pI'oject arrived at Vienna, this omission 
was not only noticed but immediately notified to Canale. Rochford 
noticed that du Beyne made "much merit" of ":his friendly act. 
Throughout their dil::cussioll, Rochford claimecl, he "laboured much" 
to persuade du Beyne tc< give his court a favourable imp:r:'cssion of 
Turin's sincerity, and was confident that he had done so with some 
success ; "what I say has some weight with him, as he knows I am 
not apt to be Credulous. n 36 
Even as Rochford was assisting the Court oj' Turin to 
improve its reputation at Vienna, signs appeared that a similar 
operation might be needed at London. Holdernesse had recently 
informed Rochford that George II saw Turin's desir~ t~ include 
Sardinia in the guarantee as perfectly reasonable and deserving of 
Britain's fullest support. 37 
But his next dispatches evinced uneasiness that if 
Turin insisted on this point too strenu.ously, the \vhole negotiation 
might collapse. The fresh difficulties over the alternat and the 
succours expected from Tuscany had caused George II IIgreat concern,!! 
36. SP 92/60, f.96, and BH Add I>1SS 32834, f.286, Rochford to 
Holdernesse, 15 Harch 1752, Separate. 
37. SP 92/60, £.281, Holdernesse to Rochford, 17 February 1752. 
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and Holdernesse himself employ~d unusually strong language in 
denouncing the "frivolous Pretences and evasive chicaning 
Objections" of the Court of Turin. Holdernesse protested that 
he had never before heard of any problem relating to Tuscany, 
assuming that these succours came under that offered by Vienna. 
As for the alternllt, Ho:!.tlel-nesse observed sourly that the King of 
Sardinia ought to be m('lre grateful that the great pOltlerS were so 
ready to devise any means by which he could still retain his 
pre~nsions to equality_ In short, Rochford \of2.S to adopt a firm 
tone, and warn the Court of Turin that they should 8!~Cept the 
project as it stood and sign without delay. 38 
Rochf(jrd already knew that the omission of Sardinia 
from the guarantee was no longer a serious obstacle. in/hen he 
reminded Ossario in T.1id-Ma,:,C'·h that since the omission 'vas Carvajal's 
error, any ('tat .i.nacy over it \<laS more likely to offend Spain than 
-Austria, Ossorio replied that he would always avoid offending Spain, 
but he had recent.1.y been assured irom both sides tha.t Sardinia 
would be reinstated in the guarantee. The two remaining difficulties, 
over the altern8~, and Tusc~~y, Ossorio declared were much more 
serious. He told Rochford that while they \ofould never II stick at 
trifles, If they \'lould be irery stubborn over essentials. 39 
At this juncture, matters seemed more promising than 
they had been for some time, and Rochford doubtless felt gratified 
that he had thus f~r succeeded in fulfilling each fresh instruction 
sent from London. His perplexity and resentment on the morning of 
5 April may therefore be imagined when he opened a letter from 
38. SP 92/60, f.283, Holdernesse to Rochford, 24 February 1752 O.B. ; 
ibid., f.287, and EM Add MSS 32834, f.171, Holdernesse to Rochford, 
5 Harch 1752 o.s. 
39. SP 92/60, f.96, Rochford to Holdernesse, 15 March 1752, Separate ; 
ibid., f.101, and EM Add Msa 32834, f.281, Rochford to Holdernesse, 
22 t·tarch 1752. 
Holdernesse which contained two distinct rebulH':s, the very first 
of Rochford's diplomatic career. 
Holdernesse first expressed surprise that "it should 
never have occurred ll to Rochford that Carvajal's error in omitting 
Sardinia from the revised project meant thal,; it was Madrid rather 
than Vienna who would be offended by Turin's insiste~ce on this 
point. Secondly, Holdernesse was even more surpril";ed tha.t Rochford 
had apparently made no use of his instructions of 9 January to 
press Ossorio to take no step unless in close consultation with 
the British government# 40 
This l~tter arrived in the same P0st as Holdernesse's 
latest instructions of 5 March, and by the ~ime they had been 
deciphered, Rochford was in the act of signing a routine dispatch 
with nothing neVi to report. There \ ... as no time to draft E'~ :f:'ull 
letter, and ra~her than miss that week's prot, Rochford added a 
hasty postscript to his routine report. 
The first reou1...e \~as understandable, though quite 
undeserved, because Rochfordfs report of 22 March describing his 
reminder to Ossorio about Carvajalts error o~d the risk of offending 
Spain, had left Tll1'in (':al:, a day before Holdernesse' s rebuke left 
London. But the second rabuke raises serious doubts concerning 
the attentivene...::s with which Holdernesse studied Roci".ford's reports. 
As Rochford tersely pointed out, his report of 2 Fe~ruary, which 
had long since arrived in London, related in d~tuil the very full 
use Rochford had made of his 9 January instructions, and the pains 
he had taken to extract :.l. promise from Ossorio not to sign any 
41 
separate treaty with Spain alone. 
40. SP 92/60, f.293, Hol<3.ernesse to Rochford, 12 Harch 1752 o.s. 
41. SP 92/60, f.108, Rochford to Holdernesse, 5 April 1752. 
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tt was perhaps fortunate that at this precise juncture 
Rochford received directions to address his dispatches for the 
time being to Hanover, where Holdernesse's brother-Secretary 
Newcastle, the architect of Turin's inclusion in the treaty project, 
had accompanied George II on a visit. Rochford's first dispatch 
to Newcastle at Hanover was devoted to a long and detailed account 
of his interview with. Ossorio on 6 April, in obedience to his latest 
instructions to adopt a firm tone and pres, Turin to drop their 
pretensions and sign the treaty without delay. 
But it seemed as if Holdernesse
' 
s rebu~:e had soured 
Rochford's good fortune so far; this time, he had to report total 
failure. He had mad.e no impression whatever on Ossorio, , ... ho was 
ready "lith a quick answer to every argument Rochford put forward 
to show the neccs~ity for Turin to yield. The central point of 
discussion was the alternat, and Turin's refusal to countenance 
theconditivnal Declaration which Vienna decired. Ossorio insisted 
that the alternat was essential to the dignity of the King of 
Sardinia, and could not be hedged about with conditions. Rochford 
could not recall having seen Ossorio so confidGnt and resolute, 
and wondered if he had persuaded the King to ~cand fi~m on the 
grounds that whether they had Britain's support or not, they had 
little to lose and possibly much to gain bj attempting to outs tare 
h C t f V · 42 t e our 0 J.enna. 
This new resolute spirit was demonstrated conclusively 
only a few days later, when a courier arrived from Vienna with. 
the very first sign of concession by that court : r: .. ther than a 
£'114, 
42. BM Add MSS 32834, f.313, and SP 92/60,/Rochford to Newcastle, 
8 April 1752. 
formal Declaration, Vienna was willing to concede Turin the 
alternat with a milder form of Reservation which need not be 
made public. This was a slight but definite improvement, but all 
Roohford's labours to persuade Ossorio to sign on these terms 
proved fruitless. Ossorio merely reminded Rochford that Vienna 
had still said nothing of the succours from Tuscany, nor made 
anything more than a vague assurance as to the guarantee of 
Sardinia. They must have the alternat unconditio'lally or not at 
all, and if Vienna did not concede these points, then Harsan 
would abide by his original instructions and stand aside ,,[hile 
Spain and Austri~ signed alone. Rochford could m~{e no impression 
nn Ossorio's narrow logio : usi on doute notre sincerit~, on n'a 
que nous attrapper en nous accordant ce que nous demannons, et on 
\. I, ;:; 
verra alors, si nous sommes sinceres ou non." -
Notwithstanding this brave show of determination, the 
King of Sardinia. knew that the negoti:::..tion might well founder 
unless he made a gesture of concession himself. Since his one 
brief comment at the Ball in February, the King had carefully 
avoided any discusoion of the treaty "lith RClchford, even though 
Rochford attended court r<;gularly ; Itthere seldom passes a Day 
that I miss going thither .. 11 The fact that the King It:!ft all the 
talking to Ossorio, Rochford took as proof that "they look on this 
as one of the most delicate as well as most difficult Affairs 
44 they have ever had to treat of with US.II 
But the King broke his silence to Rochfo:.""i and du Beyne 
on 27 April, to make a vital suggestion regarding the guarantee of 
Sardinia : since Vienna had no navy, she had only t,o provide the 
43. BM Add MSS 32835, f.132, and SP 92/60, f.127, Rochford to 
Newcastle, 26 April 1752. 
44. BN Add NSS 32835, f.46, and SP 92/60, f.121, Rochford to Newcastle, 
15 April 1752. 
troops and the Court of Turin would find the ships to transport 
them to the island. 45 
This important concession had been prompted by the 
quickening of events at Madrid, which Keene later explained in 
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detail in a letter to Rochford. Esterhazyts patience had worn so 
t~in that he had finally drafted two treaties, one b~sed on the 
original project between Madrid and Vienna alone, and the second 
including Turin on Vienna's terms. He had given Marsan an ultimatum, 
that unless he signed che second project by 10 April, he and 
Carvajal would proceed alone and sign the first one. Marsan was 
almost frantic with rtesperation at this ; h~ could not possibly 
sign the existin~ project fvr his instructions bound him to insist 
on Turin's terms, nor could he hope to obtain fresh guidance from 
his court before the deadline. Esterhazy and Carvajal had therefore 
signed their separate treaty alone, much to Keene's despair. But 
Carvajal had left the door open with a proviso that if agreement 
could be reached soon enough between Turin and Vienna, this first 
treaty would be destroyed and forgotten upon the signing of a new 
tripartite one. As a step in this direction, Vhli.na had agreed to 
include Sardinia in the guarantee, and offereo. her slight concession 
over the alternate Now that the King of Sardinia had solved the 
practical problem of conveying Viennats troops to the ioland, there 
remained only the problems of Tuscany and the alternat to be settled. 
Keene fervently "fished an end to "these littlenessas." 46 
45. BM Add MSS 32835, f.178, and SP 92/60, f.149, Rochford to 
Newcastle, 29 April 1752. 
46. British Museum, Stowe MSS, 256, f.125 (Phelps Papers), Keene to 
Rochford, 15 Hay 1752. 
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Newcastle doubted if any further concessions could be 
expected frol'!l Vienna, hO.lever, and believed the only hope for 
success now lay at Turin. In two long letters which Rochford 
received about 19 May, Newcastle urged him to return once more 
to the critical and essential task of persuading the King of 
Sardinia to drop his pretensions to the full alter~at and to 
sign immediately on Vienna's latest terms. It was in fact Britain's 
last desperate attempt to browbeat the Cov::-t of Turin into a 
speedy settlement v:ith Vienna. 47 
In t~,.,o long and exhausting intervie\'1s all 20 and 22 Hay, 
Rochford again laboured to ~onvince Ossoria and the King himself 
th.?t they should bb~eway to Vienna over the alternat and the 
fluccours from Tuscany. He returned to all his previouE ergtlments 
but met with the Game stubborn refusal as tefore. The King was 
extremely affable, even paying tribute to Rochford's discretion 
and fair reporte<.ge throughout the whole tedious negotiation, but 
he refu3ed to concede an inch regarding the alternat. Rochford 
had to admit defeat, and he bitterly observed in his report to 
Newcastle, IIhow jealous little Courts are to pre,c:;erYe their 
Honours, II wagering that if the obstacle were :"'ade :flub.Lic, Hthe 
whole nation would be unanimous, and ready to give ear, to what we 
might think more essential." 48 
The tone of this dispatch reveals Rochford in the depths 
of despair and frustration, miserable and distressed that he had 
again failed utterly to fulfil his instruction. It was small 
comfort to know that he had received from Holdernes:,e, not quite 
47. BM Add MSS 32835, fos.310~321 (not in SP), Newcastle to Rochford, 
8 and 12 Nay 11752. 
48. BM Add MSS 32836, f.182, andSP 92/60, f.173, Rochford to 
Newcastle, 27 May 1752. 
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an apology, but the nearest permissible thing from a Secreta~y 0; 
state, after his unwarranted rebuke of 12 Nar~h : a private 
testimony to lithe Diligence "Thich your Lordship constantly shews 
in the execution of' the King's commands.1t 49 
Rochford's glum mood was not to last for long, however. 
The very next day after v:riting his oonfession of failure to 
Newcastle, on 28 May, the astonishing news arrived t~at Vienna 
had given way ~n all points, conceding Turin's demands regarding 
the guarantee of Sardinia, the succours from Tuscany, and above all 
the unconditional al1;el'l'lat. It was left to Spa1n to devise a 
modality for th~ alternat ~hich would satisfy th~ King of Sardinia. 
Ossorio was at fi:;:-st a little anxious about this last prJ:;'ut, 
in case some sort of condition was aft:ez:- all attached to the 
~ternat, and his small demur on ,,{hat was beyond. doubt a resound:l.n.g 
triumph for Turin so enraged du Beyne t"!:"J./at Hochford had tlno small 
.trouble to quiet him. It But \-las generally understood that the 
negotiation was settled at last, and order..s "'~re sent to Hadrid 
enabling Marsan to sign a treaty embodying the new concessions. 50 
Rochford im~ediately wrote to con~ratulate Keene at 
Madrid on the suc~3ssful ~onclusion of their troublesome negotiation 
and confessed himself at a loss to explain "how thie fond fit" came 
to seize the Courts of Madrid and Vienna. He was relieved to see 
it ended, but rather wished that Britain's role had been more 
effective, !lafter all the zeal we have shewn fo::::' the success of 
this affair." 51 
SP 92/60, f.298, Holdernesse to Rochford, 2 April 1752, Private. 
BM Add MSS 32836, f .237, and SF 92/60, f .182, Rochf'ord to Ne"lcastle, 
2 June 1752 ; Nassau Papers, D/116, Rochford to Albemarle, 
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51. Nassau Papers, D/115, Rochford to Keene, 1 June ~52. 
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In the Valentino Garciens a week later, the King of 
Sardinia held a long conversation with Rochford about what he 
chose to call "this curious Treaty, which had given more trouble 
than a ten times more important one.'ff Rochford was amused to hear 
the King blame Vienna for the delays and uncertainties, but he 
thought it unfair for the King to blame Narsan as well, saying 
that a more consummate d5plom3.t would not have been constantly 
sending back to Turin for fresh instructions on every little point. 
ThiS-had undoubtedly added enormously to the delay, but Rochford 
thought r-iarsan's caution very proper, and doubted if' his orders 
were particular:y clear from the start. Rochford also wondered 
whether the delHYs were inherent in the diplomr:..tic game 
"Negotiators, who are like Jews in that particulal', • • love to 
52 haggle to the last m9ment." 
The- definitive Treaty of Al'anjuez was signed on 14 June 
:1752, and the news or this event caused much jubilation when it 
reached Turin on Sunday 28 June. The young Duke of Savoy told 
Rochford that he was pleased because it was obvious that Turin 
was the only one who really gained by this treaty. Certainly, quite 
apart from the various guarantees, the prestige of being granted 
the alternat by such great powers as Spain and Austria constituted 
a major diplomatic triumph for the King of Sardinia. But the Duke 
would have been dismayed had he known what some of the diplomatic 
corps suspected fact, Vienna had induced Madrid to exchange 
a secret article assuring each other that this alternat would not 
be regarded as a binding precedent. 53 
52. EM Add MSS 32836, f.361, Rochford to Newcastle, 10 June 1752 ; 
Nassau Papers, D/117, Rochford to Villettes, 14 June 11752. 
53. BM Add HSS 32837, f.250, Rochford to NeYlcastle, 1 July 1752 ; 
Lodge, "Sir Benjamin Keene. ," pp.24-25. The text of Aranjuez; is 
printed in the Recueil des trai tE)spublics de la liaison de S.av5?i.~, 
edited by Comte-Solar de ~arguerite (Turin,1836-1861),III, 128-
137. 
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~ochford saw his own small contribution to the success 
of the negot~ation, apart from having retained the confidence of 
the Court of Turin throughout, in his private intervention with 
the Austrian minister, du Beyne. Both Newcastle and Ossorio 
separately endorsed this modest self-appraisal. Newc~stle wrote 
st.ressing that Aranjuez had been an important measure for the 
future stability of Italy, and praised Rochford warmly for his 
efforts at Turin with Ossorio and du Beyne- : "by which you have 
been enabled to be of great service in this Negotiation.IIOn 7 July, 
Ossorio personally thanked Rochford for the troubl.:.! he had taken 
to persuade du Beyne to send Vienna more fa'iourable reports of 
thBir intentions, 1t1'ihich, h~ said, he knew had been of great 
F:ervice." 54 
Contemporaries tended to agree with Newcastle, and hail 
the Treaty of Aranjuez as a significant and reassuring affirmation 
of Aix-Ia-Chapelle, and a harbinger of peaco for Italy. But in 
realit~, it proved to be little more than a gesture, fer the other 
most important Italian state invited to accede never did so. 
The Bourbon King of Naples saw Aranjuez as an unwarranted interference 
in his plans to dispose of the succession at ~apled &8 he pleased 
when he himself succeeded to the Spanish throne, and the guarantees 
stipUlated in the new treaty cut across hib claims on certain 
districts in Tuscany. Underneath these ostensible objections, 
however, lay a deep personal hatred for the upstart Sardinian King 
he would never merely accede to a treaty \'lhich his arch-enemy had 
signed as a full contracting party. 55 
54. BM Add MSS , f.237, and SP 92/60, f.182, Rochford to Newcastle, 
2 June 1752 Nassau Papers, D/115, Rochford to Keene, 1 June 1 
BH Add NSS , f .54 \ NOvlcastle to Rochford, 19 June 1752 ; BH Add 
MSS 32838, f.60, SP 92/60, f.208, Rochford to Newcastle, 8 July 1752. 
55 .. Bl'1 Add HSS , f.250, and SP 92/60, f.203, Rochford to Newcastle, 
1 July 1 ; BN Add ESS 32838, f.182, and SP 92/60, f.210,. Rochford 
to Newcastle, 15 July 1752. See also H. Acton, The Bourbons of 
~les, 1734-1825 (London,1956), pp.73-74. 
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Rochford was able to investigate for himself the 
reluctance of N~ples to accede to the Treaty of Aranjuez when he 
made his tour of Italy in 1753. He found the King of naples so 
strongly influenced by his francophile Secretary of 8tate, Fogliani, 
that despite his "utter aversion to every Body that is french" [sicl 
the King was prepared to con,:;ur with them "in traversing the 
Treaty of' Aranjuez as nuch as possible." 56 
Yet at the ~ime, Newcastle could justifiably regard 
Aranjuez as something very close to that which he hf>.d hoped for 
a further peace settlement for Italy which included the King of 
Sardinia,largely thanks to Britain's initiative in widening the 
original project. But he also must have re~:gnized that the 
negotiation had shown how very limited Britain'F;) influence was at 
Turin when the Kiug of Sardinia was determined to go his own way. 
It must have been ~s galling for Newcastle as it was for Rochford 
on the spot to find that their advice and warnings were politely 
ignored. Once Britain had withdrawn as a contracting power, and 
as soon as Turin had been a~cepted in her own right by Madrid and 
Vienna, Britainls influence en the negotiation, even as a friendly 
mediator, was severely restricted. The real triumphs of British 
mediation lay elsewhere than Turin ; at Madrid, where Keene laboured 
tirelessly to prevent a total breakdown, and in encouraging Vienna 
to yield at last. 
Ironically, Aranjuez actually marked the end of active 
British intervention in Italian affairs for almost the remainder 
of the eighteenth century ; designed as a barrier to French 
interference, it proved equally effective in excluding Britain too. 57 
56. SP 92/61, f.93, Rochford to Holdernesse, 23 June 1753. 
57. D.B. Horn, Great Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth Gentur~ 
(Oxford,1967), p_341. 
181. 
As for Newcastle's fond hope that Aranjuez might help to isolate 
France among the European powers, this doubtful effect of the treaty 
was rendered otiose within a very few years by the Diplomatic 
Revolution'which preceded the outbreak of the Seven Years' War 
the Courts of Vienna and Versailles thereby became allies, and 
destroyed the Old System of Britain's continental policy which 
N tl h d t · t . t· 58 ewcas e a s r1ven 0 wa1n a1n. 
Yet even as war-clouds gathered during 1755, Benjamin Keene 
noted that of all Brit~inls professed allies, the King of Sardinia 
stood "firm as a rock, It and went on to remark ; tf\'io now find the 
benefit of the Treaty made at Aranjuez about three year's ago for the 
tranquility of I"valy between Spain, the Empress, and Sardinia, which 
cost me more pains than all the business I ever did on our O\m 
t::c 
accounts.lI f:l Ro,,;hford might have smiled in sympathy at such a 
remark, havirlg <::arlier marvelled himself at "the difficulties and 
delays I hRve found in an Affair that appeared to most of our 
60 J!"'riends easy and sl1ort.u But it had not been an entirely "Vlasted 
effort for Rochford, for in this respect if in no other his interviews 
with Ossorio ove:- the ten months of the negotiation had been a 
realistic and worthwhile apprenticeship in the arts of diplomacy. 
58. It is noteworthy that Are,njuez was only a minor affair by comparisnn 
with Newcastle's great preoccupation in the 1750s, the plan for the 
Election of a King of the Romans ; on which most recently see 
60. 
Ro Browning, "The Duke of Newcastl.e and the Imp~rial Election Plan, 
1749-1754,11 Journal of British Studies, VII (1967), pp.28-47. 
Keene to Castres, 7 July 1755, in !.he l'ri:rate Co:.r..!E.P0ndence of 
Benjamin Keene, edited by R. Lodge (Cambr1dge,1933), p.415. 
Nassau Papers, D/92 , Rochford to Albemarle, 10 November 1751 • 
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CHAP'l'ER 7 
English Intermezzo, 1755-1763 
Rochford·left Tprin on the night of "11 February 1755, 
having sent his carriage ahead some days before to negotiate the 
SLOWS of the Mont Cenis Pass. 1 With this headstart, he made the 
journey from Turin to London in record time, arriving at his house 
2 in Berkeley Square on 28 February. Rochford! s haste .,.,as quite 
understandable ! his rec311 so soon after the death of Albemarle 
can only have suggested the Paris embassy. But in fact nobody was 
appointed to Paris fel.' several years to come, and Rochford I s recall 
had another reaS04~ Albemarle had occupied a number of sinecure 
~ffices in addition to his embassy, notably the lucrative Court 
appointment of Groom of the Stole, which D'),,; lay vacant. George II 
expressed a decided personal preference for the fourth Earl of 
Rochford to succeed Albemarle in this important office, insisting o~ 
this choice even in the face of opposition from Newcastle and 
Eardwicke, who \'lould have preferred to keep the post vacant as a 
tempting plum of patronage. 3 
The day after his arrival in London, Rochford presented 
himself at Court, and on the next day (2 Hare:,) he was appointed 
Groom of the Stole and given his keys of office. 4 At this, Earl 
Paulett, the first Lord of the Bedchamber, resigned in a huff at 
seeing a junior Lord appointed to this coveted ~ost ahead of him-
1. SP 92/63, f.7, Rochford to Robinson, 29 January 175j ; ibid., 
f.11, Charles to Robinson, 12 February 1755. 
2. Collins, Peerage of En,,;laYld (1779), IV, 144 ; D.N.B., XXI, 1344. 
3. BM Add MSS 32737, f.516, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 29 December 1754 ; 
ibid., 32852, f .2'7, liewcastle to Hardwicke, 2 January 1755 ; see the 
discussion in Riker, F;.enry l!~x, 1st Lord Holland (1911), I, 232-7. 
4. Collins, .!:e.erage, IV, 14Lr ; D.N.B., XXI, 1344. The appointment was 
noted (besides the Gazette) in the London Daily Advertiser, ) March, 
and the London 11agazine, XXIV (1755), 140. 
self. Rochford was thereupon made first Lord of the Bedchamber in 
his place.5 .A week lateX', Rochford was also sworn in as one of 
Ris Hajesty's Privy Council. 6 Altogether, his rewards for zeal 
and diligence at Turin were fairly ample. 
Soon after taking the customary oaths for these new 
offices, in the House of Lords on 8 April, 7 Rochford attempted 
to show his gratitude for these lavish favours by preparing a 
speech in denunciation of Paulett's ridicll:;"ous motion against 
George II's proposed t~ip to Hanover. 8 Though there is no record 
that this speech was ever delivered in the Lords, its good intention 
may have impressed the King, for in the following week Rochford 
wae included among the Lords Justices entrusted with the governance 
of the kingdom during the King's absence. However, Rochford WaS 
not one of the 'inner Cabinet' and it seems unlikely that he would 
have been consulted on matters of any import~!ce. 9 
With these encouraging marks of royal favour, Rochford 
took ca~e to be diligent in his attendance at the House of Lords, 
missing only a few days during March and April 1755. 10 But his 
hopes for a ministerial post, as war with France loomed closer 
5. Horace vlalpole, Memoirs of the Last Ten Years of the Reign of 
George II (London,1822), I, 381. 
6. ~>/ith Barrington, on 11 March; London Hagazine, XXIV (1755), 140 ; 
D.N.B., XXI, 1344. 
7. Journal of the House of Lords, XXVIII, 395. 
8. Rigby wrote to Bedford on 17 April 1755 ; "I he~rd last night that 
my friend Rochford had thought it incumbent upon him to answer him, 
and had got a speech of ridicule ready •• " ~edford Correspondence, 
edited by Lord John Russell (London,1842-6), II, 16(J-162. 
9. Rochford's term as Lord Justice extended only from 28 April to 
16 September 1755 ; Doyle, Official Baronage, III, 164. D.N.B., 
XXI, 1344. For the 'inner Cabinet,' see James 2nd Earl of Waldegrave, 
Memoirs, 1754-1758 (London,1821), pp.45-6. 
10. Journal of the House of Lords, XXVIII, 350-412, passim. 
after JUll€:. 1755, were not to be realized. He vms apparently not 
even mentioned in negotiations for successive changes in the 
ministry between December 1755 and October 1756, 11 and as late 
as June 1757, Rochford appears in one of Newcastle's notional 
lists of promotions only for a pension and not even for a minor 
office let alone a ministerial post. 12 
Yet Rochford was perhaps not the only one \vho thought 
he was about to assume a ministerial post at this time, as may 
be gathered from the flattering Dedication to him written by 
Samuel Johnson for a little book published early in 1756. 13 
As the realization dawned that he vas not immediately 
destined for high oifice in an executive capacity, Rochford's 
attE:ndance at the House of Lords fell off quite markedly. After 
1755, and throuehout his residence in England up to 1763, his 
attendance averaged no more than about ten per cent of sitting 
days. He was usually present for a few days in December, almost 
184. 
never ill January, and very spasmodic.ally between }i\0~ruaI'y and Hay 
14 
ea.ch session. 
This quite casual attendance was not entirely owing to 
absence in the country, except perhaps during January, for "lith 
11. Walpole, Memoirs of •• George II (1822), 1, 482-3, II, 44, and 
II, 98-104. See also Walpole to Mann, 21 December 1755, and 
29 November 1756, Vlalpole Correspondence (Yale,1937-), XX, 516-8, 
and XXI, 22-27. 
12. Rigby to Bedford, 18 June 1757, Bedford Correspondence, II, 251. 
13. Vlilliam Payne, An Introduction to the Game of DraUGhts (London, 
1756) ; British Huseum, Department of Printed Books, 7907cc35(2). 
See also Boswell's Life of Johnson, edited by G.B. ~ill, revised 
by L • .1". PO\vell (Oxford, '1934) , I, 317. 
14. See the Journal of the House of Lords, XXVIII(1753-56), and XXI 
(1756-60), passim. Rochford's attendance at the eight sessions 
from November 1755 to June 1763 ran as folloills j 1755-6, 25 days 
out of 98 ; 1756-7, 14/109 ; 1757-8, 19/96 ; 1758-9, 5/90 ; 
1759-60, 18/90 ; 1760-61, 5/61 ; 1761-2, 4/90 ; 1762-3, 4/60. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
his new rank at Court, Rochford easily assumed a prominent place 
in fashionable society. Only a few days after his appointment as 
Groom of the Stole, he and Lucy were to be seen dancing happily 
at a ball. given by Lord Holdernesse. 15 In the following month, at 
White's Club, Rochford belied his reputation for extravagance with 
a very cautious wager against a raffle result. '16 Roohford' s town 
house became a rendezvous for the renewal of old f~i~ndsl~ips, such 
as those with ~igby and Garrick, and the making of new ones, with 
Barrington, Holdernesse, and Sandwich. Garrick w~s now married 
and living at Twicke21ham, where the Rochfords dined with him in 
August 1755 in the compan~ of Lady Holdernesse, the Duko of Grafton, 
the Spanish ambassador d'Abreu, and Garrick's neighbour Horace 
Walpole. 17 
Indeed, were it not for \valpole, Ii -ttJe would be known 
of the Rochfords· social life in these yda~s, for despite his 
intense personal dislike fOI' Rochford himself, \rialpole seems to 
have CUltivated their ar:.quaintance solely fOl' the sake of Luc;,t'S 
witty and entertaining conversation. As early as i'lar~h 1755 she 
had asked Walpole lor a motto suitable to b~ engraved on a much-
. 18 travelled ruby r1~g, and in May that year the Rochfords dined 
with Walpole at his gothic mansion at Strawberry Hill, in the 
Horace Walpole to Bentley, 6 March 1755, Walpole 1 s Letters, edited 
by Peter Cunningham (London,1886), II, lt26. ('rne Yale edition of 
Walpole's correspondence has not yet reached ths Bentley letters.) 
"April ye 17th 175.7. Ld Rochford wagers Hr Maxvlell O::-le hundred 
guineas, his No. against Mr Maxwell's in Hogarth's Raffle; if 
neither have the prize, the bett is void." W.B. Boulto!1, The History 
of White's (London,1892), II, 34. 
Garrick wrote of this company to Huntingdon, 23 August 1755 ; 
"they were very chearfull & made us happy.n The ~etters of David 
Garrick, edited by Little and Kahrl (New York,19b3), I, 231-233_ 
Compare Walpole1s more cynical report to Bentley, 15 August 1755 
Walpole's Letters, edited by Cunningham, II, 457. 
Walpole to Bentley, 27 March 1755 ; Walpole's Letters, edited by 
Cunningham, II, Lt-29. 
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company of Lady Hervey. 19 ~lt th~ most convincing evidence of 
Walpole's regard for Lucy was given in the course of her visit to 
the printing press at Strawberry Hill in 1757, when Walpole 
revealed his attitude to her marriage in a few lines of type. 20 
Older and closer friends '<lere the Naynards of \·Jal thamstow 
and· Easton Lodge, Ess~x, ':/i th whom the Rochfords maintained a close 
and constant friendship. A description of a ball which they 
attended at Rochford's house in Berkeley Square also incidentally 
reveals one of Rochford's musical accomplishments : l~e entertained 
J.h 1 . . t 21 ~ e company p ay~ng on a gU1 are The company at Rochford's 
house that night was indeed illustrious. Besides the Haynards, 
Lord Huntingdon. Lord Waldegrave, and Horace WRlpole'Q nieces, 
22 His Royal Highness Prince EdvJard Augustus was also present. 
Nor was thi,'3 the first time the Prince had graced the 
Rochford house with his presence. He had been introduced to their 
circle in l"ebrualY 1757 by his uncle, Rochford's patron, the Duke 
of Cumberland, in accordance with George II's wish t2at he should 
"seethe world to learn something, for he can learn nothing at 
Home." Though he and his uncle were charmed by the singing of 
Lucy and Lady Essex 2.t their entry, the Prince's mother doubted 
if he would learn much of value from the Rochfords. 23 
19. Walpole to Nontague, 13 May 1755 ; Halpole Correspondence, (Yale, 
1937-), IX, 168. 
20. Walpole to Montague, 25 August 1757 
liThe Press speaks : 
In vain from your properest name you have flown, 
And exchanged lovely Cupid's for Hymen's dull throne; 
By my art shall your beauties be constantly sung, 
And in spite of yourself you shall ever be Young. 1f 
Halpole Correspondence (Yale,1937-) , IX, 215-6. 
21. Walpole to Montague, 14 January 1760 ; Walpole Correspondence 
(Yale,1937-), IX, 269. 
22. Edward Augustus, Duke of York (1739-1767), younger brother of 
George III. 
23. Rigby to Bedford, 7 February 1757 ; Bedford Correspondence (1842-6), 
II, 236-7- See also Walpole to Hann, 13 February 1757, \"falpole 
Correspondence (Yale,1937-) , XXI, 57. 
With no children of their own, and apparently sure cf 
their own relationship, Rochford and Lucy allowed each other 
considerable freedom to do as they pleased in the licentious society 
of their day. HO\<!ever, the Princess Augusta's comment had a ring 
of prophecy ; the Rochfor1 marriage very nearly foundered in the 
middle of the following yoar, 1758. Lord Chesterfield explained 
the situation to his son in these terms : 
"Your fr5.:.;nd Lady Rochford is gone into the country \<lith 
her Lord to negotiate, coolly and at leisure, their intended 
separation. My Lady insists upon my Lord's dismissing the 
(Banti] as ruinous to his fortune ; my Lord insists, in his 
turn, upoa my Lady's dismissing Lord Thanet ; my Lady replies, 
that that is unreasonable, since Lord Thanet creates no 
expense to the family, but rather the contrary. Ny Lord 
confesses, that there is sorn~ weight in this ar~'Ament ,but 
then pleads sentiment ; my Lady says, a fiddles~ick for 
sentime.:t after having been married ~o long •• If 24 
This intended separation did not, however, bake place. The solution 
was ingenious in the extrome, as Lucy's frien~ Lady Essex noted 
uLord Rochford has left the Banti, and Ld Thanet has taken her 
into keeping, so Ld & L:I R .. now live together quite comfortably.1t 25 
Neverthe}sss, Rochford before long found himself a less 
expensive mistress, one Martha Harrison, of the parish of st George's 
Hanover Square. Sometim8 before 1763 she bore Rochf()rd a daughter, 
24. Chesterfield's Letters, edited by J. Bradshaw (London,1892), III, 
1231. Bradshaw has 'Battotte' instead of Banti< I am indebted to 
w.so, Lewis of Yale :'or sending me a photostat of p.420 of Horace 
Walpole's 1774 copy of these letters, with the names entered in the 
margin. 'l'he Banti was an :i:talian opera dancer \-!ho may have followed 
Rochford from TU1~in. She lived in Dean street, Soho. On her, see 
Town and Country Masazine, London, II (1770), p.457. o~ Backville 
Tufton, eighth Earl of Thanet, see The Complete Pee~ase, XII, i, 697e 
25. Frances Hanbury Williams, Lady Essex, to ? , from Cashiobury, n.d. 
Hanbury Williams Correspondence, LXXXII, 146, in the collection 
of W.B. Lewis, Farmington, Connecticut, to whom I am indebted for 
this quotation. 
26. 
27. 
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who bec~me known as Maria Nassau. In June 1763 Rochford set up 
a trust fund ,to give the mother and daughter each a regular income 
for life. 26 But by 1767, it would appear that Rochford and Lucy 
had adopted Maria as their own daughter, and brought her to live 
with them in Paris and later at st Osyth. 27 
For her part, Lucy Rochford continued to lead a fairly 
free and unconventional life, to judge frow the comment of an 
acknowledged authority on such matters, Ja~ques Casanova de Seingalt, 
in 1763 : "This Lady's gallantries were innumerable, and furnished 
28 a fresh topic of conversation every day." 
In contras'(- ~ Rochford I s brother Ri.:;hard Savage Nassau 
and his wife Eliz~~eth, the dowager Duchess of Hamilton t appear 
to have been blessed with a quiet and uneventful marriage. They 
already had a son and daughter before Rochford returned from Turin, 
and a second son was born to them on 5 September 1756. 29 Rochford 
did not neglect his brother's interests at Court, and at the end 
of 1759 obtained his appointment as one of the Grooms of the 
Bedchamber on £ 500 a year. 30 Richard had been H.P. for Colchester 
since 1747, but he had not offered himself for r~-ele~tion in 1754, 
preferring a quiet country life to the onerous and expensive 
business of politics. 31 
Essex Record Office, D/DC r.T.1, Indenture and Demise, 1 June 1763. 
The trust was vested in Rochford's agent and attorney, William Field, 
and his friend John Hontagu, fourth Earl of Sand\'/ich. 
Hme du Deffand to Horace Walpole, 13 July 1767 ; i1alpole Correspondenc( 
(Yale,1937-) , III, 325. Martha Harrison was still alive in 1778, 
when Rochford's Will of 4 June that year confirmed the 1763 Indenture; 
Public Record Office, London; Probate, 11/1083/481 ; copy in Essex 
Record Office, D/DCr, L.2. 
28. Casanova's Nemoirs, translated by A. Machen (London,1894; reprinted 
New York, 1959-60), v, 206. 
29. George Richard Savage Nassau (1756-1 ), noted Suffolk antiquary; 
D.N.B., XL, 119 ; Gentlemans l'lagazine, XCIII (1823), pp.173-5. 
30. Journal of the House of Commons, XXXII, , 533. DaN.B., XXI, 1346. 
31. L. Namier J. Brooke, The History of Parliament, The HouSe of 
Commons, 1754-1790 (London,1964) , III, 193. 
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Rochford ~id at least share with his brother a love of 
country life, with its ample amenities for riding and hunting, but 
his chief preoccupation at st Osyth in these years was the 
improvement of the Park. 32 The results of his efforts, or rather 
his expenditure, are proudly displayed in a specially commissioned 
map of 1762, v/hich shows among other things a large ornamental 
lake, straight-edged a la Versailles, with a row of fish ponds and 
a pump-house ; a Hermitage (later converted to a Grotto) ; a large 
new~lantation with curving carriage-drives ; a P:tgeon House a 
building marked on p. later map as the Deer House ; and what appears 
to have been a Belvedere, an artificial mound from which to obtain 
a prospect. Surrounding the house itself are vr:.rious f.)rmal gardens· 
a.nd a sinuous maze. Here, as in the Park itself, the artist has 
carefully depicted elle many poplar trees fer 'f.'lhich st Osyth was 
justly reno~ea. j3 
Though within sixty miles of London, St Osyth was in a 
rather remote cor',1.er of Essex, overlooking extensive coastal salt 
marshes ; in winter, with the parlous condition of roads in the 
eighteenth centu""y, access was at times easier by sea. This isolation 
made visits by friends especially welcome, yet even for special 
occasions such as Rochford I s birthday, ,'lhi6h regularly brought 
Garrick up from London, 20me douceurs and attractions were necessary. 
In 1758 we find Rochford inviting a friend with the'promise of 
32. No evidence has yet come to light regarding Rochford's landscape 
designer. Thomas Reynolds was at this time (c.1759) building a 
house and laying out a park for Rochford I s friend and fellow \vhig 
Isaac Hartin Rebow near Colchester ; but Hiss Nancy Briggs of the 
Essex Record Office thinks st Osyth was the work of Richard Woods, 
from the similarity of tlseveral pieces of water ll he laid out for 
Rebow a fe,,, years later. See Essex Record Office, D/DHt.B. 1., 
33. 
RebO\'l Papers .. 
itA Plan of the Park, Gardens, &c., at st Osyth in the County of 
Essex, the seat of the Rt. Hon. the Earl of Rochford, as taken in 
1762 by Edwd. John Eyre, Surveyor." Essex Record Office, D/DU, 
268/15. 
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som~ Count.ry Dancing, for which he begs him to bring the latest 
music books from London ; but Rochford is careful to add the offer 
of a post-chaise to meet him at Colchester. 3l~ In the absence of 
such visitors, and when the weather necessitat€'d recourse to indoor 
pursuits such as cards and backgammon, Rochford may ~lso have 
exercised his apparently not inconsiderable skill at carving in 
ivory. 35 
The coastal isolation of St Osyt~ nevertheless made 
Rochford ideally situated for the discharge of his duties as 
Vice-Admiral of the coasts of Essex. One example of his work in 
this capacity is availo.hle from August 1761, 'It/hen a bl.'ig from 
Scotland went agrou~d at ni~ht on the Gunfleet Sands. Having got 
the crew and passenger~ safely ashore at first light, Rochford.s 
yacht returned with two local sloops to recover the cargo, which 
they brought to Brightlingsea. 36 
Rochford's standing in the county vias greatly tnha..~ced in 
April ~756 by his appointment as Lord Lieutenant a.mi Custos 
Rotulorum of Essex. 37 As Lord Lieutenant, Rochford's chief duty 
was to preside over the Quarter Sessions of the ,Tustices, though in 
practice few Lords Lieutenant did SO in perso:"', pr~fel'ring to 
nominate a deputy for this tedious task. Of greater importance, 
and possibly of more interest to Rochford, was his duty to command 
the forces of the county in the event of an emergency or an invasion. 
34. Rochford to ? (possibly Garrick), liSt Osyth ty the Nill, 19 Septbr, 
17581t ; signed holograph-in my possession" 
35. Horace Vlalpole concedes that Rochford !lexcelled in ~,urning in ivoryll; 
I.>lal ole!s Anecdotes of Paintin in En land, edited by F.H. Rilles 
and P.B.Daghlian Yale,1937 , p.230. 
36. Admiralty Office report, 17 August 1761. I am indebted for this 
information to Hr Kenneth Halker, u:ho eODied the extract from a 1761 
paper. He did not, hm·!ever, note the exact reference. The Vice-
Admiralty records at the Essex Record Office date only from 1795. 
37. The order for Rochford's commission, signed by Holdernesse~ dated 
22 Harch 1756, is in BH Add HSS 35604, f. 305. London j·lagazine, 
XXV (1756), p.196 ; Collins, Peera~e, IV, 144 ; Doyle, Barona~e~ 
III, 164 ; D.N.B., XXI, 1344. 
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Essex was one of the south-east counties most directly exposed 
to an invasion fro~ the Continent, and Rochford's a9pointment 
almost coincided with the formal declaration of war on France in 
Nay 1756. \'lith the passing of Pitt's· 1757 Hilitia Bill~ Rochford's 
\ 
activities as Lord Lieutenant were greatly intensified, and militia 
affairs took up much of his time throughout the Seven Years' War. 
He made the first appoi!lt,nent of officers to the Essex militia at a 
meeting in July 1758 at Chelmsford. Not surprisinely, his friends 
~lilliam Harvey and Isaac Hartin Rebow became the commanders of the 
two battalions, the ~lef)t Essex based at Romford and the East Essex 
based at Colchester. On 1 November 1759, Rochford 'tlas himself 
appointed Colonel of the Essex militia, in addition to his Lord 
l.ieutenancy, and he supervi5ed the manoeuvres of the t1l10 battalions 
until their dis embodiment ir. December 1762. 
As JJord Lieutenant of the county and Colonel of militia, 
it was only to be expected that Rochford should take some part in 
county politics, and he was regarded in these years as the leader 
of the strong Whig 'interest I in Essex. Th:JUgh he tock an active 
interest in loca~ ... election business, his personal patronage and 
influence does not seem to have been very great, except in concert 
with such principal Whigs (some of them his close friends) as Rigby, 
Barrington, Tylney, and Nugent. 39 
Nevertheless, it ,,;as partly thanks to Rochford's long-
standing personal friendship that Sir Hilliam f1aynard, head of one 
J.\V. Burrows, The Essex Nilitia (1929), III, 126-1 • Doyle, 
Baronage., I, 164, alone gives the date for Rochford1s Colonelcy. 
The Essex Nilitia Lists and Returns from 1757 omoJards are in the 
Essex Record Office, but the Lieutenancy Hinutes (LIN, 1-21), date 
only from 1762, and are bare and formal ; see F.G. Emmison, Guide 
to the Essex Record.Office (Chelmsford,1946)~ I, 76-88. 
390 A. Pickers gill , Itparliamentary Elections in Essex •• 1759-1774,11 
(unpublished H.A. thesis, Hanchester University, 1953) pp.109-121. 
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of I;he olCl.est Tory families in Essex, Was persuaded to stand in 
the governm~nt interest in 1759, after a meeting of the principal 
Whigs at Rochford's Berkeley Square house had failed to produce 
a suitable candidate following the death of Si.:..~ John Abdy in April. 
The county seats had been a Tory preserve since 1734, and Newcastle 
vJas delighted that Rochford had managed to split the Tory interest 
at last. The other leading Tory, Sir John Tyrell, declined to 
stand, and Maynard was elected unopposed. But with the prospect of 
a general election in 1760, Tyrell determined to stand again, and 
caused some alarm, until at the Brentwood Races in September that 
year, Rochford persuaded his fellow militia commander Will Harvey 
tQ join Haynard ins·cead. Eochford was also closely involved in 
the Cclchester election of 1760, in which his friend nebow vias 
returned, and Rocllford was appointed Steward in July 1762 for the 
revival of the town's Charter. 40 
County electiol1eering was not, hOvJ~ver, the le'tel of 
politi<..al activity to wh7.ch Rochford aspired. Though his hopes 
for a ministerial post had not materialized on his retu~n from 
Turin, he seems still to have favoured a diplomai;:i.c career as 
his best available avenue to high office. W~~n Sir ~enjamin 
Keene, the British ambassador at Madrid, died in December 1757, 
Rochford made it known that he vmnted that post. However, he 
was not to know that Newcastle had already promised this vacancy, 
years before. It must nevertheless have been galling for Rochford 
40. BM Add MSS 32829, £.23, Rochford to Ne,.,.castle, 11 A-~)l'il 1759 ; 
ibid., f.25, Newcastle to Rochford, 11 April 1759 ~ BM Add MSS 
32890, fos. 118 and 237, Rochford to Newcastle, 17 and 21 April 
1759 ; BM Add MSS 32912, f.183, Rochford to Newcastle, 27 September 
1760 ; BN Add NSS 32913, f.26, Rochford to Newcastle, 10 October 
1760. See also Pickersgill (cited in note 39), pp.134-140 ; 
L. Namier and J. Brooke, 'rhe History of Parliament,'l'he House ot: 
Com:r;ons, 1754-1790 (London,19b1+), I, 274-5,277.; and L. Namier, 
England in the Age of the American Revolution (2nd edition,1963) , 
p .. 195. 
41. 
42. 
to see appointed to Hadrid the very man who had succeeded him 
at Turin ; the Earl of Bristol. 41 
\oJith no further openings or even prospects in the 
diplomatic" service in vie',1 of the war in Europe. Rochford had to 
be content with his' lucrative offices as Groom of the Stole and 
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first Lord of the Bedchamber. He owed these offices to the personal 
favour of George II, and took care that he should give no offence 
to warrant his dismissal from them. But the aging King unexpectedly 
died of a stroke on 24 October 1760, and was succeeded by his 
grandson as George III. 
The Groom of the Stole was by custo"l entitled to the 
contents of the 12.t:e King's bedroom, but Rochford was induced to 
:relinquish t.his claim for a few items of furr.iture and a cash 
oettlement of £ 3,000. 42 The new King brQ1lght new favourites, 
and Rochford was replaced as Groom of the Stole by George Ill's 
friend and mentor, Lord Bute. 43 Yet it has heen said that Rochford 
yielded his office with such good grace that he retained. favour at 
Oourt ; certainly, within a few months, he was given a pension on 
44 the Irish establishment of £ 2,000 a year. 
Daily Advertiser, 4 January 1758 ; \tlalpole to Mann, 11 January and 
1~ April 1758, Walpole Correspondence (Yale.1937-), XXI, 166, 190. 
Bristol sailed for Spain in July ; he was replaced at 'rurin by Lord 
Bute's brother, J"ames Hackenzie ; London Gazette, 17 June 1758. See 
also, Horn, British Diplomatic Representatives, p.125. 
Journal of the House of Commons, XXXII, 531, with a note explaining 
this arrangement. From the items Rochford was allowed to keep, he 
gave a 'Breeches' Bible and. some velvet bed-hangings to the parish 
church of SS Peter and Paul at st Osyth. The Bible is still preserved 
there ; the hangings were made into cushions and al·~8.r-cloths. See 
Essex Herald, 15 December 1896, and Essex Revie"l, IV (1897), p.123. 
Walpole wrote to Hontague, 31 October 1760 : "Poor Lord Rochford is 
undone ; nobody is unreasonable to save him. II \valpole Correspondence 
{Yale, 1937-) , IX, 316. 
44. Walpole t s Hemoirs of the Re.ign of Georze IIJ; , edited by Sir Denis 
Ie Narchant (London,1845), I, 10-11, note. See also Walpole to 
Mann, 5 December 1760, \ialpole Cor!'.espondence (Yale, 1937-), XXI, 
460. 
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Rochford's brother Richard was less fortunate, und did not appear 
on the new list of Grooms of the Bedchamber ; nor did Rochford's 
old friend Sir John Clavering. 45 
A return to diplomacy was nO'l'I all the more needful. 
It was widely known that Bristol disliked Madrid, and had failed to 
gain the confidence of the nevi Spanish King, Charles III, and his 
ministers. But the renewal of the Family Compact between France 
and Spain in Auzust 1761 and Spain's subsequent entry into the war 
against England made Bristol's recall inevitable. His departure 
from Madrid without t3king leave on 17 December 1761 marked the 
4€ 
rupture of relat~.ons between Spain and England. 
The end of the war, after Spain's aumiliations at Manila 
and Havana, reopened the prospect of the Madrid embassy for Rochford, 
but he was not in fact the liJ:.eliest choice. Sil' James G!'ay was the 
more logical choice, in view of the close f:iendship he had established 
47 
with Charles III as King of Haples. By the er;.d of 1762, Gray 
talked openly of his expected appointment to l~drid. 48 
But logic sometimes has little to do with such appointments, 
and both Gray and Rochford were to be disapp 0 inted. Cumberland's 
waning influence h~d be~n ~ransferred from Rochford to the fourth 
Earl of Sandwich, who was nmv named for Madrid and bce;an to draw his 
49 pay as ambassad0~. However, there were still a f0~ other choice 
openings available at the end of the war. The Duke cf Bedford had gone 
45. Walpole to Mann, 5 December 1760 ; Walpole Correspondence (Yale, 
1937-), XXI, 460. 
46. Diplomatic He resentatives, p.135. See also Walpole 
November 17 1 ; Walpole Correspondence (Yale,1937-), 
47. Mann to Walpole, 12 December 1761 
1937-), XXI, 556. 
48. Mann to Walpole, 4 December 1762 
19~7-), XXII, 107. 
Walpole Correspondence (Yale, 
Walpole Correspondence (Yale, 
49. SP 105/314, f.400, Gray to Hann, 14 December 1762; F. Spencer, 
The Fourth Earl of Sandwich, Diplomatic Correspondence, 176;3-1765 
(Manchester,1961), pp.1-2. See also, D.N.B., XXXVIII, 254. 
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to Faris in September 1762 to negotiate the peace treaty, but he 
was not to remain there. In addition, it was intended to appoint 
a full ambassador to Vienna. Rochford's faint hopes of a cabinet 
post failed to materialize in the ministerial ~hanges following 
Bute I S resignation ,in April 1763, so that a diplomat5,c posting 
seemed his only chance of worthwhile employment. But the chance 
elnded him. In May, '. Viscount Stormont, ''lho had stayed with Rochford 
at Turin in 1751, Was appointed to the new embassy at Vienna, and 
soon afterwards Lord Hertford was named for Paris. 50 
Unlike Aix-la-Chapelle, which had herald~~d hi~ appointment 
to Turin, the Peace of Paril3 brought Rochford little ;joy. Indeed, 
he lias gravely ill ihroughout April 1763, fro'll "a violent fever," 
which left him very weak. 51 Yet one small ray of hope remained. 
Sandwich had recently taken over the Admiralty in addition to his 
Madrid embassy, and it remained to be seen which of the t'i'/O he woult! 
retain. At last, in June, Sandwich relinquished the Mad:l:'id embassy 
on the promise of a Secretaryship, and probably thanks to Sandwich's 
recommendation, Madrid was offered not to Gray but to a convalescent 
Rochford. 52 
Naturally, Rochford accepted with a}a.cri~y .. such an 
unexpected tUrn of fortune undoubtedly speeded his r~covery, for 
he was soon making preparations for his jou~ney to Spain. By August, 
50. ltlalpole to Nann, 10 April 1763 ; \<Jalpole Correspondence (Yale t 1937-) , 
XXII, 130. Horn, British DiplomaticRepresentat~, pp.22, 38. 
51. Rochford to Sir Philip Francis, 10 Hay 1763 ; Pierpont Morgan 
Library, New York~ Autograph Series, Folio 229. I am indebted to 
the Curator, Nr H. Cahoon, for a photostat of this :'ctter. 
52. Rochford Was named for Hadrid on 18 June 1763 ; Collins, Peera~, 
IV, 144, and Jenkinson Papers, 1760-1766, edited by N.S. Jucker 
(London,1949), p.176, both give 8 June, but the Annual Register 
for 1763, p.130, gives 18 June from the London Gazette, as does the 
London }1agazin~, XXXII (1763), p.337. Sandwich finally became 
Secretary of State for the Northern Department on 9 September ; 
on his manoeuvres for office, see L. Namier, ~ngland in the Age of 
}he American Revolution (2nd edition,1963), pp.3 2-385. 
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he ~ad arranged to have his wine a~d a spare coach shipped in 
advance, 53 and on 11 September he at last applied to his former 
school friend Richard Aldworth Neville, now Seoretary to the Paris 
embassy, for French passports to be made out covering himself, 
Lady Rochford, two secretaries, eight servants, and all their 
baggage. 54 The two secretaries presumably comprised a private 
secretary and Rochford's chaplain, de Visme, for the newly appointed 
Secretary to the l·ladrid embassy, Colonel Fn.ward Ligonier, was to 
set.out for Madrid ahead of Rochford, to prepare for his formal 
entry. ~5 Also to arrive at Madrid shortly befere Rochford was the 
British Consul-General for Spain, Stanier P0rten, wh00e connexion 
wi th Rochford \V'as tG last for the remainder of Rochford's public 
career. 56 
Even :in the midst of his preparations for Hadrid, 
Rochford was involved in local election business in Essex, for 
Will Harvey had died on 11 June 1763. As late as 25 Se£tember, 
Rochford was still corresponding with Grenville over tke interesting 
contest between Conyers and Luther, but the election did not t~{e 
place until December, by which time Rochford was in Madrid. 57 
53. m·i Add MSS 38191, f.78, Grenville to Jenkinson, 5 August 1763, 
printed in Jenkinson Papers 2 1760-1766, edited by N.S w Jucker t 
pp.175-6 .. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
Historical Manuscripts Commission, 8th Report, Various : Braybrooke 
Papers, Neville Correspondence, p.286. Aldworth had changed his 
surname to Neville in August 1762 ; D.N.B., XL, 298-9. 
Ligonier arrived at Madrid on 19 November; SP 94/165, f.175, 
Ligonier to Halifax, 20 November 1763. He had been A.D.C., to 
George III and was later created Earl Ligonier D.N.B .. , XXXIII, 
242-3. 
SP 94/165, f.159, Porten to Halifax, 10 November 1763, the date of 
his arrival at Madrid. Rochford occasionally wrote his name Porteen, 
presumably from its pronunciation. Porten had been Consul at Hadrid 
since April 1760. youngest sister , Judith, VlaS the mother of 
Edward Gibbon the historian. See D.N.B., XVI, 167. 
L. Namier and J. Brooke, The History of Barliament, fEhe House of 
Commons, 1754-1790, I, 275-6, with references. 
58 Having received his Instructions of 20 September, 
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Rochford set out from London in the following week, and proceeded 
direct to Paris. Here he had several amicable conversations with 
Prince Masserano, the new Spanish ambassador bound for London. 
Secretary Neville also obtained for Rochford an audience with the 
French King, which took placo at Fontainebleau on 18 October. 
Rochford found himself very graciously received, and in a private 
conversation 'ltd th LOll,is x:v talked "a considerable tim~1I on various 
subjects. Two days later, Rochford resumed his juurne:r to Spain.59 
Travell~ng south to Lyons, Rochford followed the same 
path \-/hich had ta!cen i:im to Turin fourteen year:::. before, but this 
time he continued down the Rhone Valley, tur!l:i.ng aside ''It Avignon 
60 for Hontpel11er, vlhere he vioi ted the novelist La\n-ence Sterne. 
Rochford then pl"eEumably followed the coastal road into Spain, and 
arrived at Barcelona "in perfect health," to be greeted by the 
61 Governor of the City and the Captain-Gener~l of Catalonia. 
After an enjoyable fe\'l days t rest, Rochford left Barcelona on 
19 November for the last leg of his journey to Hadrid, and arrived 
in the Spanish c~pital in the afternoon of 6 December 1763. 62 
58. SP 94/165, fos.50-65 ; FO 90/62, fos.58-74. 
59. Nassau Papers, E/1, and SP 94/165, f.125, Rochford to Halifax, 
(Paris) 18 October 1 
60. The Letters of Lawrence sterne, edited by L.P. Curtis (Oxford,1935), 
pp.20tl-209 ; Sterne \'las lying ill at Hontpellier. This may have been 
merely a courtesy visit; there is no other evidence of Rochford's 
friendship with Sterne. 
61 .. SP 94/165, f.173, Ligonier to Halifax, 19 November 1763. 
62. SF 94/165, f.193, LiGonier to Halifax, 7 December 1763. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Madrid Rochford's Instructions and 
Early Reports 
Ferdinand VI of 13pain died on 10 August 1759 and was 
succeeded by his energetic half-brother Charles III, Wb0 since 
1738 had been King of Naples and the Two Sicilies~ 1 This long-
awaited success':'on occurred in the midst of a majol' European war 
which had as i~s overseas counterpart a bitter s~ruggle for 
colonial mastery between Britain and France in ~!0rth America, 
the Caribbean, West Africa, and India. Spain had thus far remained 
neutral, though vitally interested in the outcome, and irritated 
by the interferencl~ of both belligerents with her shipping. Spain's 
relations with Britain had been generally friendly across the 1750s, 
based on stron6 reciprocal trading links whicc had been confi~med 
by a series of corumercial treaties extending back into the 
2 
seventeenth century. 
Yet the year of Charles Ill's accession to the Spanish 
throne was also Britain's aunus mirabilis in th~ Seven Years'War, 
especially in the coloniaJ theatre, with the captllre of Guadeloupe, 
France's richest island in the West Indies, the conquest of Quebec 
by Wolfe, and tvo s-r;rikin.g naval victories off Lagos and in Quiberon 
Bay, following earlier successes in \tlest Africa and I':"ldia. With the. 
1. Sir Charles Petrie, ~ing Charles III of Spain; An Enlightened 
Despot (London,1971), p.6G i this is the only full biography in 
Engii'sh of Charles III ; .j ... he standard lives are A. Ferr'9r del Rio, 
Historia del Reina.?o de -;arlos III en Espana (Madrid, 1856), and 
F. Rousseau, Regno de Charles III d'EsDae;:n_~ (PariS, '19C7). For his 
earlier career, see H. Acton, 'l'he Bourbons of NaEles, 1734-1825 
(London,1956). ' 
2. J.O. McLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667-1750 (Cambridge, 
1940), pp.2-29 ;~ Christelo'll, IIEconomic Background of the Anglo-
Spanish War of 1762,1' Journal of Modern History, XVIII (1946), p.22 
R. Pares, "far and Trade in the \vest Indies, 1739-1763 (Oxford,1936), 
pp.556-579. 
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surrender of r10ntrealin 1760, J! .... ranc~' s colonial empire in North 
America lay exposed to virtual control by British forces. 3 
These remarkable successes greatly alarmed Charles III, 
and even his pro-British foreign minister Richard Wall was perturbed 
that the collapse of French colonies in North America and the West 
Indies exposed the Spanish American empire to what seemed an imminent 
British attack. 4 SpaniDh forces in the Americas were known to be 
weak and ill-equipped, yet even if spared a military conquest, 
there seemed nothing to prevent the redoubling of Britain's already 
considerable illicit trade with the Spanish colonies. Added to this 
was the inevitable friction between neutrals WId belligerents over 
prize-ships; Spuin's was no~ a decidedly uneasj neutrality. 5 
This year of miracles so-called, 1759, was also the first 
year in pO\'ler of a ne''''' French foreign minister, the redoubtable 
Due de Choisc:ul, whose immediate task vias to prevent J!'rance' s 
isolation in Europe and retrieve something 3t least from a disastrous 
colonial war. 6 CllOiseul immediately began to play "lith effect on 
the fears of Charles IiI and his ministers, emphasising the danger 
1;0 Spanish posser,clions of British dominance in North America and 
3. G. Williams, The Expansion of Eurone in the Eighteenth Century 
(London,1966), pp.83-92, is the best short summary of these events 
the standard works are J .. 3. Corbett, England in the Seven Years I vial' 
(London,1907), and L.H. Gi}Json, The Brit-ish Empire before the 
American Revolution, Vo~nnes VI-VII, ~he Great War for the EmEire 
(New York,1946-54). . 
4. Wall replaced CarvajaL in 1754 ; he had been Spanish ambassador in 
London 1748-52. See J.O.NcLachlan, "T'ne Seven Years' Peace and the 
It/est Indian policy of C;'lz'vajal and \'Iall, II English Historical Revic1Jf 
LIII (1938), pp.457-477. 
5. Z.E. Rashed, The Peace of P~ris, 1762 (Liverpool,1951) , pp.34-37 ; 
J.O. HcLachlan, tiThe Uneasy Neutrality ; A Study of Anglo-Spanish 
disputes over Spanish ships prized 1756-1759," Cambridge·Histori,cal 
Journal, VI (1938), pp.55-77. 
6. Etienne-Francois, Duc de Choiseul (1719-85) replaced Bernis as fore 
minister to Louis XV in 1758 ; J.F. Ramsay, AnJ;;lo-FreI!...ch Relations 
1763-1770 j A Stud~ of Choiseul's Foreign Polic~ (University of 
California l"ublications in IIistory, Berkeley, 1939), pp.1 ll-3-5. 
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the West Indies, but he was also motivated by a desire to capture 
for France Britai:n i s extensive trade privileges in Old Spain. 7 
The result of continued British success overseas and rising 
Spanish alarm was the third renewal of the Family Compact between 
the Courts of Hadrid and Versailles on 15 August 1761. This \vas 
much more than a pact of friendship ; it was a full defensive 
alliance which pledged l~ance and Spain to mutual assistance in the 
event of attack by any other maritime power. In e.ddition· to the 
stipulated naval and military succours, the Family Compact gave 
important commercial concessions to France, chiefly 'i;he relaxation 
of' export and import ::'estraints and equal treatment in matters of 
t.axation, navigation and COml!H.;rce. French subjects in Epain were 
no longel' to be treated as foreigrLers in the disposition of their 
property, while Spanish anc Neapolitan subjects were to enjoy the 
Same privilee;e in France. In addition to the main treaty, a secret 
Convention '-las signed at the same time ltlhich committed Spain to 
join the war against England on 1 Nay 1762 if peace had not been 
concluded before then. France promised to make no separate settlement, 
and undertook to champion Spanish grievances against Britain in any 
negotiations for peace. It was also agreed that Portugal should be 
induced to forsake her s~bmissive alliance with Britain and to 
8 
collaborate more closely with the Family powers. 
7. A. Christelow, ".French Interest in the Spanish empire during the 
ministry of the Duc de Choiseul, 1759-1771,1t Hispanic American 
Historical Review, XXI (1941), pp.520-530. 
8 ... The full text is printed in L. Blart, Les Rapports de La France ,et 
de l'Espagne apres le pacte de famille (paris,1915), pp.205-217 ; 
see also F~P. Renaut, "Etudes sur le Pacte de Famille ... 1760-92,11 
Revue de l'histoire des colonies francaises, IX (1921), pp.35-36, 
and Rashed, Peace of Paris, pp.75-9, 96-7. The economic aspects 
are considered in detail by Ramsay,Anglo-French Relat~ons, 1763-1770, 
pp.151-7, and Christelo\-/, !lEconomic Background of theAnglo-Spani~h 
l:Jar of 1762, II Journal of nodern H:i:;story, XVIII (1946), pp. • ln 
Spanish, see Hafael Altamira y Crevea, Historia de Esnana (Barcelona, 
1911), IV, 49-51 ; D. Antonio Ballesteros y Beretta, Historia de 
Espa!L!. y. su in:J;'.luen.cia en 1a Historia universal (2nd edition, Hadrid, 
1964), VIII, 164-166. 
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News of the signing of the Family Compact soon leaked out, 
but coincided with rather than caused the failure of the current 
round of peace talks in September 1761, conducted by Stanley at 
9 Paris and·Bussy in London. In England, Pitt demanded an immediate 
declaration of war on Spain, but his cry met ministerial reluctance 
acd an outright rejection by George III ; Pitt resiglled his office 
10 . 
in October 1761. In Spain, Charles III and his ministers waxed 
in bellicosity, encouraged by Choiseul an~ by the uncritical reports 
of Fuentes, the Spanish ambassador in London, who grossly under-
estimated Britain's capacity to continue the 1.rlar· overseas. It was 
assumed at Madrid that Brit:ain was exhausts,l and would not withstand 
th~ combined power vf Francs and Spain together. Choisaul pressed 
h.ard for an early declaration of war by Spain, stressing Spainls 
~nresolved grievances such as the old problem of Gibraltar, the 
activities of British logwood cutters in the Bay of Honduras, Spainis 
claim to a share in the Newfoundland fisheries, the disputes over 
prize-snips, and of course British contraband tra6.~ with Old and 
New Spain alike," By December 1761, the expected rupture of relations 
had occurred, and in January 1762 Britain declared war on Spain. 11 
9. Rashed, ?~_ace of Paris, pp.87-99 ; A. Bourguet, "Le Duc de Choiseul 
et l' Angleterre ; la mission de H. de Buss~r a Londrp.s, II Revue 
Historique, LXXI (1899), pp.1-32. 
10. J. Steven Watson, The Reign of George III (Oxford,1960), pp.73-4. 
11. Blart, Rapports, pp.6-9 ; Christelow, uEconomic Background of the 
Anglo-Spanish \var of 1762," PI'. 25-26 ; A. Bourguet, "LeDuc de 
Choiseul et l' Alliance Espagnole apres le pactt' de famille, II Revue 
Historique, XCIV (1907), p~.4-27. On Anglo-Spanish disputes, see 
Stetson Conn, Gibraltar in British Diplomacy in the I:ir:htee.nth 
Century (Ne' .... Haven, 19'+2) .; V.L. Brown, tlAngIo-Span~.~h Relations. in 
America, 1763-74," Hispanic American Historical Revie,." V (1922), 
especially pp • .551-385 ; ·V.L. Brown, IlSpanish claims to a share in 
the Newfoundland fisheries in the Eighteenth Century,H Canadian 
Historical Association Report (1925), pp.64-82 ; R. Pares, Colonial 
Blockade and NeutrallUr;hts, 1739-63 (Oxford, 1938), pp.285-292 ; 
V.L. Brown, IlContraband trade; a factor in the decline of SpainTs 
empire in America, II Hi~anic American Historical Revie,,;, VIII (1928), 
pp.178-189 .. 
12. 
13. 
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Brief as it was, the Anglo-Spanish War of 1762 proved to 
be an almost unmitigated dis8.ster for Spain. Charla.:: III devised 
grandiose plans for the c~.pture of Britain r s overseas possessions, 
and hoped'for a continental embargo on British goode; but after 
the failure of his campaign against Portugal, which only exposed 
the weakness of his poorly t"'ained army, he was forced to realize 
that Spain simply lacked the resources ·for global strategy. 12 
Charles also had to admit that his informants had seriously under-
estimated Britain's military resourcefulness. In Aueust 1762, the 
great citadel of the Spanish vlest Indies, Hayana, was captured by 
British forces, togei~er with a vast quantity of shipping and 
merchandise. In October, Hanila and the Philippines su:rendered 
to a British force under Geueral Draper, who spared. the city from 
sack for a negoti~ted ranscm drawn in part on the Spanish Royal 
Treasury by the Archbishop of Nanila. 13 
While Spain suffered these stunning defeats, France wa~ 
steadily losing tue remainder of her valuable West Indian islands, 
notably Hartinique and Grenada ; these losces broke French pm'ler in 
11L the Caribbean. The impossible had become reality ; British 
military prowess had defeated the combined might of France and Spain 
overseas the powers of the Family Compact were reduced to 
exhaustion and humiliating defeat. The resumption of peace talks soon 
resulted in a preliminary settlement signed at Fontainebleau in 
November 1762. 15 
Blart, RapT.)orts, pp.34-36 j Renaut, "Etudes. ," pp.39-40 ; 
Christelo~Economic Background. ," pp.31, 34-5 ; A. Bourguet, 
!lUn ultimatum franco-espag!1ol au Portugal, 11 Rev,Ye d'histoire 
diplomatique (1910), pp.21-25. 
Altamira, Eistoria de Espana, Dl, 51-52 ; Ballesteros y Beretta, 
Historia, VIII, 167-172 ;--0:::;: Hanila, see Documents illustrating; the 
Brit~Conauest of Hanila 176;:>-1763, edited by ;:~.P. Cushner 
(London, Ro;al Historical Society,1971), pp.120-125. 
14. Williams, Expansion of EuropE!., pp.87-88. 
15. Rashed, Peace of Paris, pp.18o-186. 
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The terms of the defin:~tive treaty signed at Paris on 
10 February 1763 did not quite embody the Carthaginian peace Pitt 
had desired, yet they still amounted to a humiliating defeat for 
the new Family Compact. ~vhile France' lost the larger part of her 
former colonial empire, Spain was fortunate to recover most of her 
recent losses. With the exception of two small islands as refuges 
for her fishermen, France cedp-d to Britain all of her possessions 
in Canada (Articles 4, 5, 6.) and transferred her part of Louisiana 
west-of the Mississippi to Spain' (Article 7). Br:i.tain restored 
Belle Isle en Mer off Brittany, and most of Fr~~cets rich sugar 
islands in the West Indies (Articles 8, 9, 11), while Britain 
recovered Minorca (Article 12). 
Spain ceded Florida to Britain, along with her territories 
east of the Hiosissippi (Article 20), \>lhile Britain returned Havana 
and Cuba (Artic~.e 19). Hanila and the Philippines were like\>lise 
-l'sstored to Spain, bt<'(; the treaty made no mention of the Archbishop's 
ransom for the ci ,'y (Article 23). The thorny question of prize-
ships was to be settled by the British Admiralty Courts (Article 16), 
the British logw~od cutters in the Bay of Honduras were to remain 
there unmolested so long as their forts were dismantled (Article 17), 
and Spain relinquished all claim to a share in the Newfoundland 
fisheries (Article 18). 16 
Perhaps most i~portantly for Britain, the Treaty of Paris 
renewed without exce~tion all existing commercial agreements between 
Britain and Spain, especially Keene's advantageous 1750 treaty 
(Article 2), so that while the Louisiana cession preserved a buffer 
16. The text of the Treaty is printed in Rashed, Peace of Paris (1951), 
pp. 212-229. See also, Ballesteros y Beretta, Historia de Espana, 
VIII, 172-173-
between Mexico and British North America, Charles Ill's 
plans to put. an end to Britain's trade privileges with Old Spain 
suffered total defeat. 17 
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'Choiseul saw the Peace of Paris as a humiliating disaster, 
which though it might have been worse needed to be redressed without 
delay. Until his fall from power at the end of 1770, Choiseul's 
prime concern was his projected 'revanche' against England, to 
recover France's lost colonial territorie~i, and he saw as his best 
tool to fashion such a pY'oject the assistance of Spain under the 
18 Family Compact. 
Britain could therefore safely as~ume continued French 
enillity after 1763. but the question facing the French and British 
governments alike was C~arles Ill's readiness to be involved in 
the 'revanche' nfter the disastrous war of 1762. Was Spain equally 
bent on revenge, or did she blame France for dragging her into a 
humiliating failure? H0W soon would Spain possess the military 
capacity to resume war against Britain? How cloe~ly devoted was 
Charles III now to the French connexion under the Family Compact ? 
Finding answers to these and other ~elated questions 
was the main task of the first British ambassador appJinted to 
Hadrid after the Peace of Paris. 
17. In fact, trade between England and Spain revived remarkably swift~y 
after the end of hostilities ; see The Fourth Earl of Sandwich, 
Diplomatic Correspondence, 1763-1762, edIted by I~rank Spencer 
(Hanchester,1961), p.16, note, \'lith table of returns. See also, 
Christelovl, "Economic Background • ," pp.32-34 ; Rasb ed, Peace of 
Paris, pp.19-21 ; Renaut; "Etudes. ," pp.47-52. On the Louisiana 
cession, see A.S. Aiton, liThe diplomacy of the Louisiana Cession," 
American Historical Review, XXXVI (1930-31), pp.701-720. 
18. Ramsay, Anglo-French Relations 1763-1770, pp.146-7 ; see also 
E.T. Daubigny, Choiseul et 1a France d10utre-Mer ; Etude sur la 
politique eoloniale au XVllle siacle (Paris,1892) ; A. Bourguet, 
Etudes sur la politique etrang~re dU Due de Choiseul (Paris,1907), 
and Bourguet, IILe Due de Choiseul et l'Alliance Espagnole apres 
le Paete de Famille," Revue Historique, XCIV (1907), pp.23;"27. 
Rochford's instructions for his Madrid embassy were 
conveyed to him in two separate papers ; the first, his "General 
Orders,1I were rather brief and formal, whilst the second, his 
"Particular & Pri'Va~e Instructions," were much more detailed and 
over twice as long. 19 
The "General Ordersl! contained the usual routilLe 
instructions regarding the ambassador's journey to his post, the 
formal presentation of his credentials at 3. roy~.l audience, and 
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his obligations to corr0spond with other British diplomats and to 
obey all subsequent instructions from the Secretary of State 
( Clauses 1, 2, 3, 10, 11). The ninth clause reminded Rochford 
to pay particular attention to matters ceremonial, and to ensure 
that he was shm",!! all the honours s.ppropriate to his r.:;'.vk • 
. The g'':'''3ater part of the tlGeneral Ordel's!1 related to 
commercial matterR. Rochford was to safeguard the welfare of all 
British subjects trading in Spanish t~rritories ( Clause 3 ), and 
to protect and uphold the work of the British consuls in Spain 
( Clause 4 ). He was to.be alert to prevent any breach or abuse of 
the commercial tr~~ti~s between Britain and Spain, but ill the event 
of any such breach, he waG to act promptly and demand redress on 
the spot ; only if these attempts failed was he to sand home for 
further orders ( Clause 3). As for specific suits C~ cases 
brought against the Spanish by British subjectF.l, Rochford vJaS to 
give his support on1y to well-founded or justifiable cases, taking 
particular care over those !Iwhich must raise Clamuur. t1 ( Clause 5 ). 
19. Public Record Office, FO 90/62, fos.58-74, dated 20, September 1763 
The "GeneralOrders" are fos.58-64, the IIParticular & Private 
Instructions" fos.64-74. Duplicates are in SP 94/165, fos.50-65_ 
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In his observation of the Spanish Court, Rochford was instructed 
to "use your best; Skill to penetrate into their Secret Views and 
Designs," especially with regard to their policies in Europe and 
their commerce with Britain ( Clause 7). The only other specific 
matter concerned an old bone of contention Gibraltar. Rochford 
was to keep himself well-inf3rmed of affairs relating to this 
outpost, and to prevent wherever possible any disputes or 
misunderstandings ovsr it. But whilst assuring Spain of Britain's 
resolve not to countenance lIa collusive Trade to tho Prejudice of 
the King of Spain's Revenue," he was also to be very watchful of 
Spanish designs en Gi~raltar ( Clause 6 ). 
These were all essential and funda!"'sntal objects of 
attention for the British ~t:1bassador at Madrid, but those "several 
Points of great Ii.1portance': following the Peace of Paris t/ere 
reserved for more detailed setting-forth in Rochford's I!Particular 
& Private Instructions." Here are found the. vital questions 
regarding Spanish policies and intentions under the Family Compact, 
20 to which it was Rochford's task to supply answers without delay. 
His first task was to give the strongest assurances to 
the King of Spain that Britain was resolved to abide by the terms 
of the Treaty of 10 February 1763 as the basis of a durable peace 
(Clause 1 ) .. Conversely, the British ministers could not help 
Ifbut be extremely (;ollicitous to have certain Information" of the 
intentions of the King of Spain and his ministers ; whether they 
too were disposed to adhere to the peace settlement and cultivate 
friendship and harmony wit!l Britain, or whether they entertained 
20. Public Record Office, 1"0 90/62, fos.64-74 SP 94/165, fos.56-65. 
thoughts of getting rid of their treaty obligations as soon as 
they were in a condition to avenge lIthe disgrace of their late 
III Successes,!! and embark on the recovery of their losses, either 
alone or in concer.t with France ( Clause 2). If in fact the 
latter represented their IISecret Intentions,tf Rochford WaS to 
watch very carefully for any sign of military preparatious, 
especially anyt~ing that seemed to be in excess of their normal 
establishment In America. r.losely related to thts point was the 
condition of Spain's finances, and the size of her debts, about 
which Rochford was to gather as much useful iufor~ation as he 
could (Clause 3 ). 
In view of their readiness to trade with Britain in the 
past, and the apparent "general Inclination of the Peo~lp. of Spainfl 
in favour of t~is connexion, it was now a matter of considerable 
interest whether the war had changed this atti"tude: and created any' 
general prejudice or resentment against Britain for the humiliating 
defeats inflicted on Spain t)Verseas. It was hoped in Lor..don that 
the Spanish people Hould recognize that France \vas largely to 
blame for dragginG them into a needless war. While attempting to 
sound opinion on this topic, Rochford was to give assurances that 
past disputes and conflicts settled in the peace treaty were now 
buried and forgotten, but \ihare he found that French ',,'iews prevailed, 
he was to drop a gentle ):'eminder of Spain's "Shameful Injustice of 
falling, without an7 real Provocation,11 upon aer neighbour Portugal. 
Such would be "proper Top5.cks of Defence" in the ev"mt of any 
criticism of Britain's proceedings in the war, but they were to be 
used with discretion, and in a spirit of friendliness, if they had 
to be used at all (Clause 4 ). 
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Though the commercial motives of the Family Compact, 
to transfer ~ritish trado privileges with Spain to t~e subjects of 
the French King, were frustrated by the renewal of all previous 
Anglo-Spanish commercial agreements in the Treaty of Paris, this 
area deserved the particular attention of the British ambassador. 
Rochford was to keep himself constantly informed through the British 
co:r..suls in Spanish ports of any step \'1hich may seem to revive the 
commercial motives of the Family Compact, ..;.nd to make immediate 
protests if the French were given privileges detrimental to British 
trade. Spain had offered at the peace talks to make a new Treaty of 
Commerce "dth Britain, presumably to limit the extent of existing 
p~~vileges, but this had be~n refused, and Roohford was likewise 
to pay no heed to any f.lrther proposals for such a revision 
( Clause 6 ). 
Concerning Spain's relations with the rest of Europe, 
Rochford was to pay close attention to whate~er connexioas Spain 
ha.d fOrl.led or was forming vd th other po\ .... ers, especi2.11y France and 
Austria. It was known that a marriage alliance was afoot between 
the Courts of Madrid and Vienna ; Rochford was tc discover all he 
could of the terms of this match, in order to judg~ h~w far it might 
affect the IIgeneral Balance of Power in Europe" and the present 
situation of Italy ( Clause 5). Rochford was equipped with a copy 
of the Convention of June 1762 between France, Spain, and Savoy-
Sardinia, settling at last the King of Sardinia's claims to part of 
Piacenza, which settlement Britain had supported and guaranteed. 
But Rochford illas also to 'find out whether anything iurther was 
intended to be grafted on to this treaty, relating to the affairs 
of Italy ( Clause 7 ). 
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Relations between Spain and Portugal, after their 
acrimonious confrontation in 1762, naturally formed a particular 
focus of attention for Rochford ( Clause 8 ), but in addition, he 
was instructed to sapply anS\tlers to several specific· questions 
regarding Spanish policy cowards north-eastern Europe. Reports had 
been received that a Spanish Secretary had been sent to ':!arsaw \-lith 
credentials to the Primate of Poland ; \tlhat in fact VIas his errand '( 
Further, in vi,,·w of the presence of Russian troo!,s in Lithuania and 
the expected demise of the Polish King, what was Spanish policy 
towards the affairs of Poland '( Was there an:' agr::ed plan between 
the Courts of l1ac:.rid, Versailles, and Vienna, reg.:;..rding the Polish 
~uccession ? ( Clause 9 ). 
Finally, Rochford ,·ras to devote his closest attention to 
the King of Spain himself, to his "Character, Genius, aad Inclinations'~ 
his occupations, and his attitude to'\vards foreign alliances. 
In particular, Rochford was to investigate Ithow far He m:sty continuE' 
to be under the Influer..ce of the French Court, and what Hopes you 
may see of weaning Him f,rom that Partiality.n If the prospect 
seemed fair, Rochford was to promote the ide~ of a closer alliance 
between Spain and lmgland dS being in Spain!s best interests. 
A t the same time, Rochford \19.6 to observe very closely "the 
particular Dispositions and Affections of the Spanish Ninisters, 
their several Capacities, Power, and Credit with their Master ; 
their Sentiments upon the present State of Publick Affairs ; and, 
above all, their Bias towards the English or French Alliance." 
( Clause 10 ). 
As at Turin, the observation of the King, Court, and 
ministers would be Rochford's constant duty. 
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The new British ambassador and his 'Family' arrived 
at Madrid in the afternoon of 6 December 1763, whereupon Rochford 
sent a note to the Marquis de Grimaldi, the Spanish Fcreign Minister, 
notifying ·his arrival and desiring a time to call and present his 
Credentials. 21 Grimaldi replied at once, suggesting noon the 
following day, at which time Rochford duly presented his Credentials. 
On 8 December, Grimaldi sent Rochford a note advis5ng that the King 
would reeei ve ~lim at an audj.ence that Sunda.y, 11 December. The day 
after receiving this note, Rochford had a visit from the Introducteur 
des Ambassadeurs, 1t!ho informed him that his all.dience was fixed for 
ten in the mornil:g, to be foII01,.,.ed by audiences \·I..:.th the heir to 
the throne, the Prince of Asturias, at 11.30, and with the other 
members of the royal family at 12.30. He also suggested that Rochford 
should leave his card with tho mayordomo m~Y2r del rey, the Marquis 
de Montealegre, and with the Queen Mother's mavordomo, the Marquis 
de P I , 22 opu J.. 
On the mornir.g of 11 December, Rochtord accordingly 
proceeded in his coach to the Royal Palace, accompanied by his 
Secretary, Ligonier~ They were met at the foot of the grand entrance 
steps by the Introaucteur and conducted to the ~ayor~~o mayor del 
rey, who immediatf!ly brought Rochford into the audiellce chamber, 
past the crowds of assembled courtiers and nobles ; the reception of 
an ambassador was an important event at the Spanish court. 23 
21. SP 94/165, f.201, Roch;ford to Halifax, 12 December 1763. 
22. Bodleian Library~ Oxford; Lyell MSS, Empt. 37 ; Rochfcrd's Madrid 
Notebook, fos. 1-2. The iront half of this notebook was used as a 
"Minute Book of Ceremonial." The back part contains entries headed 
simply "Intelligence" (fos.177verso-197verso). The notes are 
entirely in Rochford's own handwriting. 
23. Charles Kany, Life and Manners in Jvladrid, 1750-1800 (Berkeley, 
California,1932), p.144. 
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Upon his l'eception by Charles III, Rochford delivered 
himself of a carefully prepared little speech in French, which 
fulfilled the first clause of his Private Instructions, declaring 
Britain1s.desire for friendship with Spain and her resolve to 
abide by the tel:'ms of the peace treaty. After a polite exchange 
of remarks on this them~, Rochford bowed his way out, and was at 
once taken to his audieuce with the Prince of Asturias. Finally, 
after meeting other members of the royal family, Rochford rejoined 
the~rong of courtiers and nobles, and went in to dine with the 
King. At the conclusion of the dinner, Rochford tcok his leave 
and returued to his coach in the forecourt of th\':! Pal&oe, then 
21-drove back to hj s house in the street of St Je;r-ome. ' 
The formal business of the day was not yet euded, however 
later that afterncon~ Rochford returned to tbe Palace for his 
audience wit}1 t,::e Queen Mother. El.ieabeth Farnese, virtual ruler of 
Spain in the 1 ife time of her husband, Philj.p V, was now aged over 
seventy, yet Rooh.ord had been instructed to find out what degree 
of influence, if any, she retained over Spanish policy, and to 
insinuate himself into her good graces. 25 He had no sooner arrived 
back at his house aftar this audiencel when he was visited by the 
Introducteur and informed. that an audience with the King's brother, 
Don Luis, had been arranled for the next morning, Monday 12 December. 
24. Bodleian Library, Oxford; Lyell MSS, Empt.37 ; Notebook, fos.3-4 ; 
SP 94/172, f.185, Rochford to Comlay, 16 December 1765. 
25. Rochford \'/as originally instructed to confine himself to verbal 
assurances of George III 1 s regard in his audience vii th the Queen 
NatheI' ; then he \vas equipped ' .... ith written Credentials, in case 
the other ambassadors were so equipped ; but when Rochford found 
that this was not the case, he returned to his original instruction 
and confined himself to mere verbal assurances. SP 94/165, f.98, 
Halifax to Rochford, 27 September 1763 ; SP 94/165, f~201, 
Rochford to fax, 12 December 1763. On the Queen Nother's 
early life, see E. Armstrong, Elisabeth ]i'arnese, Termagant of Spain 
(London, 1892). 
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Before his audience with Don Luis on 'the 1·10nday, Rochford 
formally notified ~he other ambassadors of his arrival and 
reception by the Spanish King, so that the remainder of that week 
was taken up with the exchange of visits from other ::nembers of the 
diplomatic corps. All this Rochford described as "the Hurry of 
Business inevitable on my fi:v-st coming to my Destination." 26 
Rochford '>'las evidently pleased by his gracious reception 
at Madrid. He \'JaS toJd, but was not sure whether to believe, that 
Grimaldi had IIs hewn more Attention to me, than he has to any other 
Ambassador here." 27 !lis earliest conversations at court accorded 
with the King's OT,1ll a~surances that it was Sp3.ir"s :intention to 
preserve and cultivate the peace ; "indeed, this seems to be the 
Language of -ehe whole Court." 28 
Notwithctanding t~ese encouraging beginnings, Rochford 
kept himself busy over the following few weeks, and was Hvery 
assiduous ll in his attzndance on the Kine;, even when the Court 
removed itself to the Pardo in January, as WCl.S usual a.t this time 
of year. In addition, Rochford frequented the ministers and "those 
who are directly consulted," as well as Itothers who by indirect 
Methods have opportunities of thrm·!ing in their advice." These 
conversations were of cottrse conducted ,..lith the aim of gathering 
tithe best Informations" available on the topics commended to 
Rochford's attention in his instructions. 29 
26. Bodleian Library, Oxforil. ; Lyell NBS, Empt.37 ; Note'o00k, fos.4-5 
SP 94/253, f.12, Hochford to John Hurray, 19 December 1763. 
27. SP 94/165, f.201, Rochford to Halifax, 12 December 1763. 
28. SP 94/253, f.12, Rochford to Murray, 19 December 1763. 
29. SP 94/166, f.25, Rochford to Halifax, 13 January 1764. 
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Besides ministers and courtiers, Rochford also pursued 
his enquiries within the circle of the diplomatic corps. He was 
pleased to find as Sardinian ambassador at Hadrid an earlier 
acquaintance from his Turin ministry ; Count Roubion. On renewing 
their acquaintance, Rochfvrd found however that Roubion was still 
II a great Talker, a little indiscreet, and •• in hiD pr;.vate 
character as well as his publick one, apt to tempo~ize.1l In the 
tone of one \'Ihc) knows, Rochford added ; "His Court ,,/ill not find 
fault with him for that." A more reliable ally wa.s the Dutch 
minister, Doublet, who immediately took Rochford. into his confidence. 
Doublet's commen''':s were useful, for he was then H·:-ery well with the 
Xing of Spain," and though already a sworn enemy to Grimaldi, was 
"closely connectE:d." with SqU:ilaci, the Hinister for War an.d Finance. 
The new Russian Envoy, Count Peter Buturlin, had also exchanged 
sharp words \vith Grimaldi, and though he readily made friends with 
Rochford, he was unlikely to be as useful as Doublet ; Rochford 
observed of Buturlin, jjPleaf>ure seems to be hl.s principal Pursuit." 
Apart from these faw, the remaining members of the diplomatic corps 
at Nadrid It/ere IIchiefJ..y Creatures of the French Ambassador," the 
Marquis d'Ossun. Rochford found that Ossun enjoyed a considerable 
advantage over the other diplomats, from his being regarded at 
Madrid as an ambassadeur en famille. This meant that he and the 
ambassador from Naples were always called in first at the Levee, 
and Ossun was Imown to make good use of this o}Jportuni ty to speak 
to the King before he received the other ministersc Rochford's 
only other prospective ~lly amongst the diplomatic corps, the 
30 Portuguese ambassador, had not yet arrived at Hadrid. 
30. SP 94/166, f06.31-32, Rochford to Ealifax, 13 January 1764. 
31. 
32. 
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Outside tile diploma tl.C corp"', Rochford had a reliable 
informant and adviser in the British Consul-General 1 Stanier Porten, 
both from Porten's correspondence with the other Consuls in 
Spanish ports, and from his own circle of friends at Nadrid. 
Porten had, in addition, resided for some years at Naples before 
his transfer to Madrid, cO that he was not unacquainted with the 
3i government of Charles iII. Equally useful yet even more 
advantageously situated, was Rochford's earliest and best friend 
at Gourt, the Duke de Losada, whose office as first Eoquire of the 
Body made him the single most influential courtier acout the King. 
Rochford's judgment of Losada agreed exactly with that of his 
predecessor; Halthough the Duke's Genius is but moderate, he is 
a thorough honest Nan, is more esteemed by the Kin.?; of Spain than 
any Han here, and h&c had his Haster's Confi6ence for these Number 
of Years past: w:.thout the least Variation." 32 
~~cm these and other unrecorded sources, Rochford busily 
gathered his firs"t" impressions of t;he Spanish governuH:~nt and its 
policies, which he finally assembled into two extended and masterly 
dispatches of 13 January 1764. However, in his haste and anxiety 
to please, he overlooked one small point they arrived in London 
without any date. Though it was Rochford's Ultimate responsibility, 
the omission was Ligonie~!s, it seems, for Rochford had left the 
completed dispatches UuBealed in case he heard anything important 
at Court that day, but on his return with nothing to add, Ligonier 
had swiftly sealed up the packets and sent Potter the messenger off 
on his journey to London. Fortunately, this oversight did not detract 
from the value of Rochford's first major report. 33 
D.N.B., XVI, 167 ; Q.~ntlemans Eagazine (1760), p.203 ; London 
Maga7>ine, XXIX (1760), p.221~ 
SP 94/166, £.29, Rochford to Halifax, 13 January 1764 ; Bristol's 
comments are printed in Petrie, King Charles III of SEain," pp.96-8. 
SP 94/166, f .. 52, Rochford to \'!eston, 16 January 1764. 
This first major report took the form of answers to 
each successive article of Rochford's tlParticular" Instructions 
indeed, Rochford began his "Secret and Separate" dispo.tch of 
13 January by stat.ir.g that he would, flfor the sake of method," 
relate them in the same order. 34 
He had already fulfilled the first of these cla';;;.ses 
in his little s:peech to the King at his first audience, r.oted 
earlier. In a;1.swer to the second clause, which Rsked whether 
Spain seemed likely to adhere to the peace settlement, or on the 
other hand wanted to be rid of her obligations in ~he Treaty of 
Paris, Rochford \.:onfidently claimed ; 
"I can venture to give it as my opinion that they are not 
at all inclined to get rid of their Obligations ; and, if 
they were so inclined, not at all in a Condition to 
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underta~~ it. Their Finances are low their Resoarces few ; 
and the Hinister concerned for the Finances in Years and 
anxious only to suppl: the present Noment"it 35 
This reasoning was sound enough; Spain's exh~ustion after the war 
of 1762 was obvious to all observers, and freely admitted at the 
Spanish Court itself. 36 
With her finances so 10tl1, it was not to be expected 
that Spain's military establishment would be at its ~est. In answer 
to the third clause of his Instructions on this poine, Rochford 
gave a succinct yet detailed analysis of the state of the army_ 
Though there had as yet been no postwar reductions in the infantry 
34. SP 94/166, f .36, Rochfor1 to Halifax, 13 January 176! .. , Secret and 
Separate. Though this dispatch follows his 'Most Secret' in the 
volume of SP, it should logically be treated first. 
35. SP 94/166, f .. 36, Rochford to Halifax, 13 January 1764, Secret and 
Separate. 
36. V.L. Brown, Studies in the History of Spain in the second half of 
the Eight~h Century (Northampton, Nass., 1930), p.30 and note 71 
on his accession, Charles III was reputed to have found forty 
million duros in the Royal Coffers ; by '1763, this was all put 
exhausted. 
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regiments, Rochford's information led him to believe that tlthey are 
at present far frum compleat, and ill-appointed. II Several of the 
cavalry regiments had been incorporated into older Regiments of 
Horse, and while this reduced the actual number of regiments, 
Rochford noted that the remaining squadrons lJ/ere thereby greatly 
strengthened. However, the v0lunteer regiments had all been 
disbanded, with theexceptiol). of that from Catalonia, which was 
3'1 now destined for HavC".na. On paper, the total establishment 
numbered 70,000 ; but of this, Rochford's informant eGtimated the 
effective forces at less than 40,000. 38 
As for naval strength, Rochford confesGed that his 
information was still incomplete, since the l1~\v l3ritish Consul for 
Cartagena had yet to arrive at his post.Neverthel~ss, Rochford had 
procured a list of the Ferrol squadron, 1:1hich he enclosed ; of the 
eleven capital ships based there, only two were armed and ready 
for service. 39 
The fears of the British government that the war of 1762 
might have soured the Spanish nation against Britain and turned 
them rather tovla."'ds France, Rochford firmly refuted in his reply 
to the fourth article of his Instructions : 
" • • as the Inclination of the People of Spain has been 
always favorable to Alliance and Commerce with England, 
the same disposition still remains, and their Aversion to 
the French greater than ever. This I have dayly Instances of, 
37. SP 94/166, 1'.37, Rochfo~d to Halifax, 13 January 1764, Secret and 
Separate ; the details of individual regiments Rochford takes 
almost word for t'lord from his original information, a copy of vlhich 
is preserved in Nassau Papers, E/24 t "Etat des Troupes Espagnoles 
pour Honsr.le Comte de Rochford." 
38. At the outbreak of war, the total Suanish establishment was estimated 
by Rochford's predecessor Bristol a; 109,600 on paper, or 80,000 
effectives ; Petrie, King Charles III of Spain, pp.101-102. 
39. SP 94/166, 1'.42, for the Ferrol list. 
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and I shall scarcely ever find it necessary to rectify the 
Notions of the Old Spaniards on this account, who are apt 
enough openly to blame the Court for their late Proceedings. ,,40 
This was certainly the most optimistic view which could be taken, 
and perhaps reflects rather too closely Rochforu 1 s informants 
amongst the 'Old Spaniards f at Court, for it is dou~tful if he 
spoke for the country at large ; the humiliations of 1762 were 
resented just as much as French perfidy_ 41 
The fifth cla,use of Rochford's Particular Instructions, 
relating to the 1759 ~~arriae;eTreatywith Vienna which vias still 
not implemented, called forth a lengthy explanation of the delay, 
at the end of which Rochford concluded that Gharles III viewed the 
prevarications of the Court of Vienna as so much "Tripotagetl he 
d l · k 1 t . . t th .. 1 t 42 soerne J. e y 0 J.nsJ.s on e orJ.g:>..na s.greemen. 
As l'1r the 1762 Convention between France, Spain., a~~d 
Savoy-Sardinia over the fate of Piacenza, Rochford Was unable to 
discover anything further in agitation which '~light be grafted onto 
this agreement ; the Sardinian ambassador 1r/as merely instructed to 
keep on the best of terms with the Spanish ministers and to avoid 
any disagreeable t~pics. 43 Rochford was also unable to discover 
any ulterior motive for the appointment of a Spanish Secretary to 
Warsaw. He was sure that the Court of Hadrid SUppol":ed the 
candidacy of the Elector of Saxony for the Polish throne, rather 
than any Russian protege, but at present there zoemed no likelihood 
of direct Spanish iuterference in the matter. 44 
40. SP 94/166, f.37, Rochford to Halifax, 13 January 1764, Secret and 
Separate. 
41. See, for example, the Address by the Nobles of Aragon and Catalonia 
(1762) printed in Petrie, King Charles III, pp.109-110. 
42. Jl'or further discussion of this Treaty, see below, pp. 
43. SP 94/166, f.39, Rochford to Halifax, 13 January 1764" 
44. On the Polish Question, see the discussion in Spencer, The Fourth 
Earl of Sandwich? Divlomatic Correspondence, pp.25-42. 
46. 
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For the tenth and fj,nal article of his Partj,cular 
Instructions, concerning the Spanish King, his mini~tcrs, and 
their attitudes, Rochford reserved a second and longer dispatch, 
by far the most interesting and valuable part of his first report 
from Madrid, in which he essayed a "short Sketch of this Court.1t 45 
Rochford stressed that Charles III, sO often represented 
as a weak prince, was in fact I1very far from it." Rochford thought 
the King! s general knowledge of European affairs B.nd the polj, tical 
interest of Spain flguod and just," so that "it wOuld be impossible 
to put any gross Imposition upon him.l! Charles III impressed 
Rochford as being "extremely discerning." He had a habit of seeming 
to acquiesce with his minist,n's, IItill he has learned their way of 
thinking, ana then has been knO\ffi to tell them at once to their 
great Surprize thc.t they do not knO\'I what they are about, and that 
he will conduct the Affair himself.tf Once his mind was made up, 
the King's customary steadiness began to resemble obstinacy, and 
this usually deterred ministers from making any contro.ry moves. 
Unfortunately, Rochford thought, the King's "darling Passion of 
shooting" gave hl.m little time to look more deeply into national 
affairs ; if he did, "he would, I am persuaded, manage them more 
wisely and better than his Hinisters. 1I Instead, in order to be rid 
of business quickly and be free to go shooting every day, "schemes 
laid before him do not undergo that strict Examination it is to be 
wished they did.!1 !t6 
SP 94/166, fos. , Rochford to Halifax, 13 January 1764, 
Most Secret ; this dispatch (but not his Secret and Separate) is 
printed in full (but inaccurately) in vi. Coxe, Hemoirs of the Kin5,s 
£f Spain of the House of Bourb0l:!. (London,1815), III, pp.285-292. 
Kany, Life and Hanners in Hadrid, 1750-1800 (Berkeley,1932), p.143, 
points out tha"t- this devot~ion to sport vIas intended to ward off 
the family tendency towards melancholy and depression. 
Rochford heard it said at Hadrid that the French 
ambassador Os sun openly claimed the revealing of the Family Compact 
as Ita finesse of the Duke of Choiseul, to drive this Gourt into the 
War." As 'a result, Charles III now believed that he had been 
"duped by the French conrt" into joining a war already mostly lost. 
Further, Rochford 'lias convinced that Charles III him3elf ifwas most 
certainly very much inclined not to break with us, and those who 
know him best itave assured me, that it vias a great astonishment to 
them when he did, and the first time they had known him to change 
his mind .. tt 47 
As an t.'xample of the many small observations which led 
,lim to believe that Charles III was "not pel-sonally inclined to 
the French," Rochford related a brief anecdote, for the sa.ke of a 
significant remark made recently by the King. On a tou:.- of inspection 
at a new building in Hadrid, Grimaldi had lound fault with some 
feature of the a::'chitecture, at which the King turned to Losada 
and observed liOn voui!rait me fa.ire faire tout a la mode fran~aise, 
mais moi, je veux fetire a la mienne. 1I Whoever tried to lead the 
King in a course of snbservience to French ",~shes, Rochford thought, 
"must be very cautious." On the contrary, kno1tling that his country 
was "greatly eXhausted," the King's personal intenti,;.;n was now to 
avoid trouble and IIremain quiet" for as long as possible. Even so, 
his private expenses for buildings, ne\o[ roads, and hunting, drove 
the Finance mi.:3.ister to distraction. 48 
47. SP 94/166, f.26 ; Bodlei::tn Library, Oxford; Lyell gSS, Empt.37 ; 
Rochford's Notebook, f.193v. Rochford may have been overly optimistic 
here, forgetting Charles's deep resentment against Britain for the 
insult of her 'gunboat diplomacy' at Naples in 1742'; see Brmm, 
Studies, pp.14-19 ; Petrie, King Charl~s III, pp.49-51. 
48. SP 94/166, f.27 ; BrO\ffi, Studj._~, p.17, points out that the Family 
Compact was a matter of necessity rather than personal preference 
for Charles, citing F. Rousseau, Ragne de Charles III d'Espagne 
(Paris,1907) , I, 35-44. 
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At this point it is of interest to compare Rochford's 
judicious official report on Charles III with a more lively and 
succinct sketch he made in a private letter to his friend Sandwich, 
Secretary-of State for the Northern Department 
U You told me before I left England, you would be glad to 
know \"lhat I thought of His Catholic Hajesty. :Us talents 
are extremely good, his discernment surprising, and his 
memory more so, very obstinate, ana a little suspicious, 
feared by his ministers and both. J . .:.nred and feared by his 
subjects, affable beyond measure, conceives immediately 
anything you say to him, and replies quickly a..'>ld cleverly. 
He is a slave to shooting tvhich is only passion and he 
breeds up the Prince of Asturias in the same taste, to 
whom in my opinion ~e gives a very bad education ; he wishes 
to see h:...l'! own kingdom flourish, and l:.as certainly no 
partiality to France. I wish I could say he believed our 
trade w~.s as advantageous to his nation as it re8.1ly is, 
but he is made to look upon our mbrchants as a p8.rcel of 
smugglers." 49 
Closer to the King than any of his ministars \..ras of 
course his Confessor, yet Rochford candidly arunitted he knew little 
of this man's influence, !tfor he is very shy to everybudy, and 
particularly so to foreign Hinisters. He has c3rtaj.nl:,r a great 
deal of Credit with the King." As an instance of th:i.s, Rochford 
related another anecdote; the King's Conftssor happened to remark 
one day that Havana fell exactly a year to the day after the 
Inquisitor-General had been banished ; the Inquisitor was at once 
recalled. 50 
49. Sandwich NSS ,Rochford to Sand'1ich, 13 January 1764 ; printed in 
F. Spencer, ~ Fourth Earl of Sandwich, Diplomatic Correspondence 
(1961), pp.125-126. 
50. SP94/166, f.30. 
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The Queen Hother, Elisabeth Farnese, seemed at last to 
have accepte~ that her ~nf1uence no longer extended to affairs of 
state ; "Her Hajesty plainly sees, although to her great regret, 
that her Son never asks her Advice.f! Rochford. suspected that she 
would probably "dabb1e" with Grimaldi as the most recent minister, 
but he \-las sure this would be fatal for Grimaldi if he encouraged 
her; "For he must have more Skill than I think he does, if he can 
deceive His Catholic Hajesty.1t 51 
Grimaldi virtually embodied French influence at Hadrid, 
more so than even the :French ambassador himself ; lIwho, conscious 
that Grimaldi has a private correspondence 'dth the Di.:.ke of Choiseu1, 
i.5 now rather shy i!~ his Behaviour to this Frenchified Spanish 
Hinister." Wall's last. act before his retirement in October 1763 
had been to "put all his friends about Grimaldi, and that is the 
only party he (Grimaldi) has here." These friends formed the core 
of the franuophi1e party at Madrid. Two of them were now absent on 
embassies ; Fuentes, whom Rochford had known briefly at Turin, was 
now at Paris, and Hasserano, \-Thom Rochford had met on his way to 
Hadrid, had replaced Fuentes at London. However, there still remained 
Count d'Aranda, and Don Agostino de Llano, wh" eve~l as \vall's first 
Secretary had been Ita most determined frenchman." As a result, 
Rochford observed, Grimaldi's predilection for France Ilgrows 
stronger and stronger." 52 
Grimaldi's behaviour on his arrival at Madrid had been 
"high and insolent beyond measure," especially towards the diplomatic 
corps, IIwho in general paid very servile court to h:~.m. If Yet with 
Rochford he had begun very differently; Hmaking the greatest 
51. SP 94/166, f .30 ; Armstrong, Elisabeth }'arnese (1892), pp. 395-6. 
52. SP 94/166, f.28 •. Rochford's private opinion of Wall, not mentioned 
in SP, vias that !fa Roman Catholick & an Irish Jacobite, as- vIall is, 
could never be a true friend to England, It and that IILordBristol 
,,,as most certainly duped by him." Bodleian! Lyell HSS, Empt.37, 
Rochford's Madrid Notebook, fos.176v-177v. 
proie3si~ns of personal friendship, and there has been no sort 
of attention. he has not shewn me." 53 
Again, Rochford was a good deal more direct in his 
private letter to Sandwich than in his official dis~atches 
It You will see by my dispatches to Lord Halifax what a 
dreadful man Grimaldi is to deal with. lIe does not 
believe I have that opinion of him which, I flatter 
myself, ",Jill be some advantage to ;:rIe, though if he 
contimles to go on as indiscreetl:, as he has done 
I much doubt whett.er he will stand his ground." 54 
Rochford had indeed mentioned in his official report that 
Grimaldi was "far froLl being discreet," ann elsewher~ added 
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that he was "plausible, but entirely unacquainted \'Ii th commercial 
Affairs, or the real irtereBts of Spain with regard to Commerce." 
Be had boasted 1;0 Rochford of his having Ild.uped the French, in 
gainin5 considerable Advantages for the S}anish Trade by the Family 
Compact, II yet Rochford observed that the poJ.icy of encoc'.:r.aging 
foreigr. imports for the sake of the duty to be raiseu from them 
causing the decay of native Spanish industries. 55 
The Minister for War and Finance, Squilaci, was described 
by Rochford as "a Man of 10\'1 Birth, indefatigable tn :susiness, and 
rather likes it ; . . although the Clamours of the NRtion are 
strong against him, he thinks himself quite.. secure in his place. 1I 
Squilaci owed his position entirely to the King's personal favour, 
having been Charles's finance minister at Naples; but as a Sicilian 
and a social nobody who scorned cultivated tastes, he was disliked 
53. SP 94/166, f.28. 
54. 
55. 
Sand\vich HSS, Rochford to Sand ... /ich, 13 January 1764 ; in Spencer, 
The J.i'o_urth Earl of Sand1rlich, Diplomatic Correspondence, p.126. 
SP 94/166, fos.26, 28.. See also, Ballesteros y Beretta, Historia 
de ES.12ana, VIII, 17lj·. 
intensely at Court, while his financial measures ensured that he 
was despised by the nation at large. 56 Rochford observed, however, 
that Squilaci paid court to the Marquis de la Ensenadc, who formerly 
held three ministri~s under Ferdinand VI, and now hoped by his 
friendship with Losada to find re-employment. In view of Losada's 
regard for Ensenada, and his standing with the King, Roc~ford 
thought that Squilaci thereby had a stronger claim or.. the King's 
favour than Gr:~maldi. This was of more than passtng significance 
for Rochford, since Squilaci professed the stronGest possible liking 
to\fTards Britain, \':hich Rochford hoped to cultivate, even if, as he 
suspected, it sp::."ang chiefly from a "motive of ae l;ing directly 
::::ontrary to Grimaldi-" 57 Unfortunately, Rochford also heard it 
"from very good Authority" that the French ambassador had orders to 
help Grimaldi in bringing about Squilaci t s ru:.n, for this very 
58 reason. 
Grimal~i had recently persuaded the King to hold weekly 
meetings \'1i th himself ,SquiJ.aci, and Ariaga, "(;he Hiniste:&:' for Marine 
and the Indies, so that .instead of being informed only of that which 
related to foreign affairs, Grimaldi would now be au fait with all 
internal and comme~cial affairs as well. This development would 
clearly confirm Grimaldi's ascendancy, since the Kin~ already had 
59 
" a great Opinion of his (Grimaldi's) Abilities in Foreign Affairs." 
Don Julian Ariaga, !-1inister for Barine and the Indies, 
Rochford dismissed as "a \frell-meaning Man, but led entirely by 
56. Brown, Studies, p.11 ; P~trie, King Charles III of Spain, p.60. 
57. SP 9'+/166, £,29. See also, Altamira, lIistoria de Espana, IV, 53-54. 
58 .. SP 91~/166, f .28. 
59. SF 94/166, fos.26-27 ; Brown, Studies, pp.11, 20-22. See also, 
Ballesteros y Beretta, Histori~, VIII, 174-175, on Grimaldi and 
Squilaci. 
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the Jesuits, and although he meets th~ other two ministers, is 
never consulted but in what concerns his own Depart~lent." Rochford 
gathered that Grimaldi was trying to make him more active, but 
in remarking "both his indolence and' his bigotry will prevent hiPl," 
Rochford certainly underestimated Ariaga's ability and industry. 60 
Summing up his commonts about the Spanish Kingts ministers, 
Rochford observed, "Gri.naldi :~s the Minister I must do Business 
with, and he shews by his Behaviour to me, that he believes I have 
a Confidence in him, but I frequently see Squilaci, and least 
Grimaldi should not always report faithfully what I zuy,'Iacquaint 
the former with the points of Business I talk to the latter upon, 
and in Commercial affairs it is absolutely necessary to do, as they' 
all pass through his hands. Be is very Frank and open with me, has 
assured me that whenever I :ol.pply • • , if my Demands are but 
1'1oderate, • • I shall not meet with a refusal." 61 
Rochford's conclusions from his two long dispatches of 
13 January 1764 wt-re that "from th~ present Situation of this Court, 
there never was a time, that we could insist more strongly on their 
acting conformab~y to the Treaties • • • as they were never more 
62 disposed to Pacifick Heasures than they at present are,n and 
further, that ltThe King, his Ministers, and the whole nation are 
sensible and conscious of their Weakness from the Experience of 
the last War, as well as from their present Situation ; It is 
therefore very Ob!lious that besides their professions to me, "/hieh 
are very strong, they will be obliged to abide by the Terms and 
Conditions of the last definitive Treaty.lI 63 
60. SP 9LI-/166, f.30 ; see also Bro1rm, Studies, pp.11-12, and A.S.Aiton, 
"Spanish Colonial Reorganization under the Family Compact,1I 
Hispanic Ameri_cau Historical Revie\1, XII (1932), pp.270-80. 
61. SP 94/166, f.32. 
62 .. SP 94/166, f.40. (Secret and Separate) 
63. SP 94/166, f.28o (Host Secret) 
These first reports reached London on 25 January, by 
Potter the messenger, and on 3 February Halifax replied that 
George III had expressed satisfaction at "the very in:eresting 
and instructive accnunts!1 Rochford had given of the Spanish Court, 
adding that he "much approves the Zeal and Diligence ll Rochford had 
displayed in the short time since he arrived at Hadrid. !1alifax ' 
added as his own opinion ; nYour Excellency I s Abil1. ties , Assiduity, 
and Knowledge of the Characters and Connections of the Spanish 
Ministers give the most promising Assurance of the Success of your 
11inistry • .11 64 
It was at least an encouraging start. 
64. SP 94/166, f.48, Halifax to Rochford, 3 February 1764. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Rochford as Ambassador at Hadrid 
The Earlier Phase 1764-65 
Madrid was in some respecfs a much pleasant~r city when 
Rochford arrived there than it had been a decade before, in the 
time of Benjamin Keene. Charles III and his Queen, ~1aria Amalia, 
having made Naples a more beautiful and or1erly city than it had 
been for many years, t'Jere shaken to find Hadrid in 1759 rather more 
resembling a pig-sty than a capital city. Charles1s first task as 
King of Spain '>'faS a r~dical clean-up of Nad;id, initi:;;.tir.g urgent 
i;()provements in p-3.v:;.ng, drainage, and street lighting, accompanied 
by the ereotion of fine new public buildings. The Queen's health, 
already impaire~ ty a fall from her horse, did not recover from the 
initial chock of homesickness in Madrid's rieorous climate, and 
she was dea& within a year of her arrival. As at Turin, Rochford 
had to ieal with a widower King. 1 
Nevertheless, much was left unchanged. The new King could 
not be expected to ameliorate the climate, but at Court, where he 
was master, and where Rochford was condemned +0 s:.o~nd some time, 
Charles did little to remedy the tedium and dullness of excessive 
etiquette and ceremonial, for \'Jhich the Spa"lish CourtNas renowned. 
Maria Amalia had briefly injected some liveliness into the Court, 
but after her death Charles had settled into a fixed and precise 
daily routine, which did not admit of such frivolities as mistresses. 
The exterior gravity of the Court vias typified by s~~ch ceremonies as 
1. C. Petrie, Kin~ Charles III of Snain, p.96 ; Nicholas Henderson, 
"Charles III of":Spain, an Enliii1t'ened ," Histor~ '110 day , XVIII 
(1968), pp.679-680 ; Beaumarchais in 1764 declared "the tm·m is one 
of the cleanest I have seen, well spaced out, ornamented with 
numerous squares and public fountains" ; quoted in Cynthia- Cox, 
The Real FiGaro (London,1962), pp.26-27. 
227. 
the besamanos or official hand-kissilig, held on saints' days and 
royal birthdays, !·,hich involved the ministers, ambasaadors, and 
nobles, all in gala uniform, filing past each individual member 
of the royal family, even babes in ~rms, to pay their respects. 2 
The r10vement of the whole Court from palace to palace 
according to the season::'! was fixed like clockwork. Each year on 
7 January the King and his entourage left Hadrid for the Pardo, 
where they remained until Palm Sunday, returning to Hadrid for 
Easter. After Easter, the Court removed itself to Aranjuez until 
the end of July, when it moved north acro&s the Guauarramas to 
La Granja (San I1dep!:lonso). In October, the Court re':;urned south 
to the Escorial, and thence ";;0 Hadrid in DeGen,ber. 3 
Where the Court repaired, there also the diplomatic corps 
had to follow. A~aujuez &nd the Escorial were at least within 
easy reach J1' dadrid, but the move to La Granja necessitated a 
complete household removal. Rochford complained th(:'.t the journey 
was "long and inconvenient, II invoi. ving the hire of e:dra carriages 
"for the quantity of Baggage it is so necessary to transport to a 
Town where the ~omlllon Necessaries of Life are not to be found." 4 
, Rochford was assiduous in paying his court to the 
Spanish King and royal family, despite these inconveniences, and 
his attentions did not go unnoticed. At La Granja in 1764, Rochford 
noted that the King \'Ias Itremarkably gracious" towards him, and the 
Queen Mother promised to set the fountains playing whenever Rochford 
had a mind to see them. 5 
2. C. Kany, Life and Hanners in Hadrid 1750-1800 (1932), p.144. 
3. SP 94/166, f.229, Rochford to Halifax, 30 April 1764 ; SP 94/167, 
f.170, Rochford to Halifax, 11 June 1764 ; Kany, op.cit. pp.138-9. 
4. SP 94/167, £.21+4, Rochford to 16 July 176L~. 
5. SP 94/167, f.244, Rochford to Halifax, 16 July 1764, No .. 15· 
228. 
Rochford1s earliest impressions of the Court at Madrid, 
however, were not at all promising. He lamenteu in a private letter 
to Sandwich "the dreadful dullness of this place ,vhich exceeds all 
description ; ithaa e7en infected the foreign ministers who live 
more unsociably than the Spaniards • • • nothing in Nature can make 
this place tolerable." }Ie 1tJent on to entreat Sand\vich to "think of 
an absent friend ••• whenever any opportunity offers of getting me 
from here. 1I . His first preference, as at ~r:urin, was of course the 
6 Paris embassy. 
The social highlight of Rochford's first year at the 
Spanish Court, jt.st as it had been at Turin, ';Jas i,'; royal marriage. 
A treaty of 8 October 1759 had settled outstanding territorial 
anomalies in northern Italy betvJeen the Courts of Hadria, Vienna, 
and Naples, and to set the seal on this agree~ent, the ~ustrian 
Archduke Leopclc. was to marry a Spanish infanta, and tai-tB Tuscany 
as his establish~ent, to which he would succeed on the death of the 
Emperor Franc I. Rochford managed to see a copy of this treaty 
early in January 1764, and found that the terms involved the yielding 
of the reversion to Parma by the Court of Vi~nna to Don Philip and 
his heirs, for which Spain yielded her claim to the allodial lands 
of the Medici. Na.ples in turn ceded to Tuscany her half of the 
Presidii. 7 
Though ratified by all parties, these cessions had not 
yet been made, the marriage 1IIaS delayed by the war, and by Vienna's 
quibbling over the terms. The Archduke Joseph had protested that 
6. Sandwich Diplomatic Correspondence 1763~1765, edited by F. Spencer 
(Hanchester,1961), pp.125-126 ; Hochford to Sandwich, 13 January 1764. 
7. SP 94/166, f~37, Rochford to Halifax, 13 January 1764, Secret and 
Separate ; A. B<.!llesteros y Beretta, Historia de Espana y au influencia 
en-la Historia universal (2nd edition··~Hadrid, 1964), VIII, 176. 
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he would be left without a single foot of land if the Empress 
survived her husband, as seemed very likely. Vienna offered to 
marry Joseph to the Spanish infanta instead, but the King of Spain 
disliked what he callerI this ItTripotage." Finally, Haria Theresa 
promised to nominate Josei)h co-regent if she survived Francis ; 
this satisfied Joseph, ana cleared the way for LeopoJ.d's espousal 
8 to proceed. 
After another last-minute delay, caused by the death of 
an Austrian Archduchess, the entry of the Imperial ambassador into 
Hadrid to demand the infanta1s hand was fixed for 11 February 1764, 
and for this occc,sion the Spanish Court returned ~o Madrid from the 
Pardo on 10 February. 9 In giving notice of his ceremoni~l entry, 
Count Rosenburg asked Rochfo~d to send his coach to swell the 
procession into the city. But Rochford declin€'d this i!i~Jitation, 
as he foresaw that difficulties over precedence could ari8e with 
the French and Neapolitan ambassadors, who claimed special favour 
as ambassadeurs en fam:i.l1e. The Sardinian ambassador Roubion 
followed Rochford's lead in this matter, and likewise declined 
to send his coach. Rosenburg later told Roc'aford privately that he 
fully understood tits a"rk;"al~dness of their situation, and had not 
expected them to do otherwise. 10 
Rochford1s formal Instructions had stressed the importance 
of guarding t~e honour due his rank and his monarch ; as a result, 
Rochford VlaS constantly alert not to expose embassy to any 
• SF 94/166, f.37, Rochfor~ to Halifax, 13 January 1764, Secret and 
Separate; H. Coxe, Hemoirs of the Kinr;s of S?ain of the Hs:>use of 
Bourbon (London,1815), III, 292-3. 
• SP 94/1 ,£.211, Rochford to Halifax, 22 December 1763 ; SP 94/166, 
f.54, Rochford to nalifax, 19 January 1764. 
• SP 94/166, f.96, Rochford to , 13 February 1764 ; Bodleian 
Library, Oxford; Lyell NSS, Empt.37 ; Rochford's Hadrid Notebook, 
f.9. 
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public disadvantage. In fact, Rosenburg's invitation was the first 
of three decisions regarding precedence which Rochfvrd had to make 
in connexion with the royal espousals. His response to each of 
these problems was of considerable importance in setting the tone 
of his embassy at Hadrid. 
The second and morp. difficult problem arose over one of 
the entertainments given oy the Spanish King to mark the impending 
espousals, namely, an evening of plays at the Opera House on 
13 l!'ebruary. Normally on such occasions, each foreign ambassador 
\'iould be assigned hiG Olfln box in the theatre t but a few days before, 
Grimaldi paid a call en Lady Rochford and inform~d her that he had 
set aside a box for the use of herself and the Venetian ambassadress. 
Rochford himoe1f '1laS expected to share this box in his \'life I s name. 
Grimaldi explained this as ~n etiquette of the Spanish Gourt that 
ambassadors who had not made a public entry could not be given a 
box of their own. Rochford at once made enquiries aITongst the 
diplomatic corps, and soon discovered that the French and Neapolitan 
ambassadors had been given their own boxes, though they had "not 
made public Entr:-_es any more than me. II The reason given was that 
they were ambassadeurs en fami11e, and Vlere held to have made their 
entries to the King in his private apartments. While admitting that 
the King was maitre chez lui at a private audience, Rochford felt 
that !fat a pub1ick Theatre!! and uupon a solemn occasionu for the 
British ambassador co be seen in any other than his own box would 
be a disgrace to his cO~1ntry' s honour. Rochford confided to his 
notebook ; flHr Keene subr.dtted to this but in my opinion he did 
wrong.!1 Rochford therefore stayed away, despite his love for the 
11 thea tre, and the Sardinian and Venetian ambassadors did 1ike\vise. 
11. SF 94/166, f.121+, Rochford to Halifax, 27 February 1764 
Lyell NSS, Empt. ; Rochford's l·1adrid Notebook, f.9 .. 
Bodleian, 
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Rochford nevertheless attended the entertainments of 
the next two'days associated with the Imperial ambassador's formal 
demand of the infanta (14 February) and the signing of the marriage 
contract C15 February), for these did not involve any ceremonial 
awkwardness, consisting chiefly of fireworks displays at the Buen 
R,::tiro palace followed by "gala with uniform.ll 12 The King and 
his ministers were just as affable as usual to Rochford, but not 
a word was spoken of his absence from the theatre. 13 
Rochford's third important decision regarding precedence 
concerned the espousal ceremony itself, held in private in the 
"Great Glass Rooml! of the Buen Retiro on 16 February, when the 
Prince of Asturia~ acted as Leopold's proxy in his sister's espousal. 
The ambassac.lors were na -cura11y invited as \'ii "';;nesses., Rochford' G 
~otification advised him to stand to the ]pft of the altar, but at 
the palace, he suspected that tlthey intended again to trick us" 
into making a distinction by placing the falT.ily ambassadors on th-d 
right with the royal family, and relegating the rem~inder of the 
ambassadors to the left •. Rochford felt lilt ilTaB a sort of Triumph 
I could not consent to give the ambassadors of the Family Compact." 
He waited until the Imperial ambassador and the Nuncio began 
to move to their places, then, 
!las soon as I sa\" them move, I followed them & took along 
with me the Sardinian & Venetian ambassadors, and put the 
latter above us, which shewed we all stood without any 
Ceremony. When they saw that, the Nuncio told us we 
should be of the uther side of the [SiC] , but we 
paid no regard to what he said. The Guards then gently 
offered to make us go of the other side of the Table, but 
12. Bodleian Library, Oxford; Lyell JISS, Empt.37 ; Rochford's Madrid 
Notebook, f08.8-9. 
13. SP 94/166, f.124, Rochford to Halifax, 27 li'ebruary 1764. 
232. 
WhOil they saw I was determined not to move they let us 
alone, & so \-:e carried our point, & in this \'ihole Ceremony 
the family ambassadors have been mortified & disappointed. 11 
This was the account Rochford reoorded in his private Notebook 
in his dispatch reporting the affair, he merely obBe~ved, 
"I mixed with the others & was immoveable.',' 14 
In taking this bold step, Rochford v!as aWare that he 
ran a grave risk of offending the Spanish King. It might have been 
argued that the espousal ,·Jas a private family ceremony, and Rochford 
had already granted that the King was maitre chez lui at such times. 
Yet the presence of the diplomatic corps definitely made it a public 
event, and Rochford felt that the occasion demanded boli action; 
n It is not my Tl.:.:!'Yl to be over-scrupulous on these Points, but it 
is particularly essential here to support the Dignity of [onela] 
Charac'':er.'' 15 
The francophile party at l1adrid promptly dubbed the 
British ambassador "Turbulent" and Uimpetueux ll ; but Rochford \'ias 
relieved to find that Charles III did not resent his action. 
After the ceremony, the 'King was IIremarkably c.ivil," Rochford 
thought, and at the fireworks display that evening at the Buen 
Retiro, the King called Rochford to join him at thevTindow, "that 
I might see the Fireworks the better," whiJ~ Ossun remained with 
the other ministers. In their conversation at the window, the 
King remarked that he was sorry not to have seen Rochford at the 
Opera House a few nights before, but he I!exprecsed a satisfaction" 
14. Bodleian Library, Oxford; Lyell HSS, Empt.37 ; Rochfordts Hadrid 
Notebook, fos.10-11 ; SP 94/166, f.124, Rochford to Halifax, 
27 February 1764. 
15. SP 94/166, f.124, Rochford to Halifax, 27 l~ebruary 1764. 
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when Rochford assured him that he had been well entertained at 
all the other functions. :From this, and from the comments of his 
friends at Court, Rochford gathered that Charles III "was not 
displeased at my FiX'mness on this Occasion," and the King's 
continued affability in the week of festivities which followed, 
until the Court returned to the Pardo on Saturday 25 February, 
R hf d f d · . t 16 gave oc or no cause or .1squ1e • But he w~s not completely 
free from anxiety until he received a dispatch from Halifax 
conveying George Ill's full approval of Rochford's action, and 
his support for any similar steps thought necessary in the future. 17 
Rochford needed to assert himself as British ambassador 
a little more than most, for the odds he faced at Madrid were very 
considerable. His most important task, in a European context, was 
to neutralize a.o far as possihle the influ6nc~ of French counsels 
at the Spanish CO"-lrt, and to explore any possibility of ~eaning 
Spain away from the Family Compact. Stated as simply as this, the 
task was well-nigh impossible. The foundations of British influence 
at Madrid in Keenp,'s time had been undermined by the death of 
Carvajal in 1754 and the Diplomatic Revolutiun of 1756, but their 
collapse is more precisely marked by the death of Ferdinand VI and 
the succession of Charles III in 1759. 18 Charles had little 
personal affection for England after his humiliation oy an English 
fleet at Naples in 1742, and even less after the war of 1762. 
16. Bodleian Library, Oxford; Lyell MSS, Empt.37 ; Rochford's Madrid 
Notebook, f.11.; SP 94/156, f.100, Rochford to Halifax, 20 February 
1764 ; ibid., f.124, Rochford to Halifax, 27 February 1764. On 
"l'ardent ambassadeur ll see F.P. Renaut, "Etudes sur le pacte de 
Famille," Revue des Etudes des Colonies Fran9aises(1922), 239-242. 
17. SP 94/166, f.139, Halifax to Rochford, 27 March 1764. 
18. D.B. Horn, Great Britain and Europe in the Ei~hteenth.Century, pc294. 
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He ~e~ply ~esented Britain's extensive trading privileges in 
Old Spain, a~d her contraband activities in Spanish America. 
Much as he disliked being represented as the auxiliary or lackey 
of France,. there was for Spain no practical alternative to the 
Family Compact at this time ; Charles sought friendship outside 
the Compact with the Court of Vienna, for the sake of his Italian 
interests he saw Britain in the guise of adversary rather than 
friend. 
Rochford had earlier lamented the strong position enjoyed 
by the French ambassador Ossun at Hadrid as an a,nb3.3sadeur en 
famille. Ossun '-TaS moreover a personal frie;,d to the King, having 
been French ambasBa~or at Naples ; Charles had sought his transfer 
to Hadrid at the time of his own succession to the Span:i.sh throne, 
cince he disliked change in his immediate entourage. 19 Assisting 
Ossun at Hadrid was the able and intriguing French Consul-General, 
the Abbe Beliardi, 20 and for a time early in 1764, they were joine~ 
by Louis-Gabriel de Conflans, who held a roving commlssion to bolster 
~ h' fl t th' t h .. t d 21 rTenc ~n uence a e var~ous cour s e V~S1 e • 
Perhaps even more significant than this strong core of 
French influence was the unmistakably francophile ~ttltude of 
Grimaldi, Charles's ne\.,r Foreign Hinister. Grimaldi' G friendship 
and direct correspondence with Choiseul en&~red a constant pressure 
of French ideas and opinions on the Spanish King. Charles was aware 
of Grimaldi's intense devotion to French interests, and no doubt 
properly cautious of his advice, yet he treasured Grimaldi as his 
most able minister by far, and was to rely on him re~re and more. 
19. Petrie, King Charles III of Spain, pp.95-96. 
20. P.Huret, "LtAbb~ B~liardi et les relations commerciales de la 
France et de l'Espagne (1757-1770)", Revue d'Histoire Hoderne et 
~ontemp'oraine, IV (1902-3), 657-672. 
21. Rochford heard that Conflans had his own cipher and corresp?nded 
direct with Choiseul ; SP 94/166, £.83, Rochford to Halifax, 
6 February 1764. 
Yet at the very start of his embassy, Rochford's prospects 
for neutralizing French influence at Madrid were not entirely dark. 
Grimaldi was ne\'1 in office, and his arrogance on arrival in Spain 
had offended many. Host observers thought his position isolated and 
insecure at first. The leading members of the francophile party Wall 
heel put about him -- Hasserano, Fuentes, Aranda -- had all received 
22 appointments to foreign embassies or to the provinces. Indeed, 
Hme Squilaci vlhispered to Rochford one eveHing that she ¥Jished there 
was another vacancy open in the provinces, "and then, says she, 
adieu to Grimaldi's French friends. 1I 23 In the promotions for the 
royal espousals, Grimaldi fully expected to receive the Golden Fleece, 
but ,,,,as disappointed, even t::.ough the King mad.e the selections 
s~cretly and by himself. 24 
Furthl3rmore, Grimaldi showed a tendency to\vards verbal 
indiscretion, not uncommon in those who are insecure and anxious to 
establish themselves. Roc~ford found it not at all difficult to 
draw Grimaldi out in their earlier interviews. Per~aps the most 
striking example of this.is available from March 1764. Grimaldi 
remarked to Rochford that Spain had no other v5.ew", than to hold 
what she was left with and to improve her trade, adding that they 
had no plans to recover their few remaining losses in the last war. 
Rochford, "in order to pique him and make him talk a little more,1I 
asked in mock innocence \"hether Grimaldi could be sure that France 
held the same attitude. Grimaldi immediately leapt up and fetched 
22. Aranda succeeded RochfordJs old Turin friend de Sada as Governor of 
','alene , and 'Fuentes left for Paris after much reluctance and many 
delays on 28 January '1764 ; SP 94/166, fos.54, 69, Hochford to Halifax, 
19 and 30 January 1764. l'lasserano ¥,ras of course at London ; Hochford 
warned ITalifax of an Irish priest in the embassy acting as a spy, and 
later \'larned that Hasserano vras "very particular"ill his reports of 
conversations \lfith ilalifax ; SP 94/166, f.202, Rochford to Halifax, 
2 April 1764 ; Nassau Papers, E/5, Rochford to Halifax, 7 July 1764 
Private (not in BP). 
23. SP 94/166, f.160, Rochford to Halifax, 20 March 1764. 
24. SP 94/166, f.124, Rochford to Halifax, 27 February 1764. 
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a lett~r which he said he had just received from Choiseul, and 
proceeded to read part of it out aloud. Rochford noted what he 
thought vIas a "very remarkable Expression," in \1hich Choise'J.l 
stated that France was "so bent upon pacifick Heasllres" that she 
vJOuld suffer everything, IIjusquf~ des coups de Baton lnclusivement,1f 
rather than go to war again. 25 
Rochford guessed that this disclosure had been designed 
expressly for his ears, to reassure him in case of any movement of 
troops to America. But Rochford remained convinced that Grimaldi did 
not personally s~are such peaceful asseverations ·:the French 
through him mean to engage this Court by deg:;"ees to strengthen· 
26 thel;'1selves, and prepare for ~"hat may hereafter happen." This was 
as succinct and accurate a summary of Choiseul's policy regarding 
Spain's role in his planned revanche against England as the French 
minister could have made himself; 27 
There is no evi1ence to suggest that Rochford for a moment 
deluded himself with vain hopes of diverting Grimaldi from his 
devotion to France, nor of some grand coup by which Spain would be 
28 
split from French influence and the Family Compact broken asunder. 
Rochford was much too realistic to indulge in huch fantasies. But he 
did at least do 1r/hat little he could tOHards that end, and by far 
his most promising ally in combating Grimaldi's influence over the 
King of Spain was the l{inister for vJar and Finance, Squilaci. 
25. SP 94/166, f .160, Rochford to Halifax, 20 I'larch 1764. 
26. SP 94/166, f.161-2, Rochford to Halifax, 20 Harch 1764. 
27. See Ramsey, Anglo-French Relations, 1763-1770 (Berkeley,1939), pp. 
149-150, quoting Choiseul1s 1765 m~moire justificatif~ 
28 .. As at least one \'lri ter assumes ; r·.p. Renaut, Uitudes sur Ie Pacta de 
Famille,11 B,.evue des colonies fran9aises (1922), p. 239, claims that 
Rochford !!comptait parmi cas hommes qui esperaient rompre l'alliance 
franco-hispanique.1! 
29. 
30. 
31. 
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In addition to the exp~cted jalousie de m~tier between 
the two most powerful ministers in the King's governDent, there Was 
also a personal dislike which Squilaci did not trouble to hide. 
As Minister of Finance, Squilaci had much cause to resent the 
ruinous expense of the war, for which he unreservedly blamed the 
French. Rochford gathered from the other members of the diplomatic 
corps that the French amoassador Ossun had, for this reason, shown 
great friendship towards Squilaci during 1762, but that with 
Grimaldi's arrival, had neglected Squilaci and reported to his court 
that minister's declining favour. 29 It was therefore only natural 
that Squilaci should w~lcome the arrival of the British ambassador. 
Indeed, he treated Rochford in "the most confid~ntial Hc::nner" from 
the outset of his embassy. Rochford ventured, "from the freedom with 
which he talked," to bound Squilaci as to Grimaldi's situation and 
prospects early in February 1764. Squilaci thought Grimaldi's tenure 
was ~hen still fairly precarious ; "that Minister mURt be very 
cautious of what he does." 30 
By the folloi'ling month, an uneasy equilibrium had been 
established in th~ Spanish ministry. Squilaci's credit with the King, 
eclipsed by Grimaldi's arrival, had again "greatly risen, II and as 
Rochford became more frie~dly with Squilaci, Ossun resumed his 
former attentions ; Rochford thought, in fact, that Ossun paid I'the 
most servile court," and when he pointed this out to Squilaci, the 
minister replied "in ilis blunt manner" that he \<rould not be caught 
like that 
SP 94/166, 
SP 94/166, 
SP 94/166, 
31 again. 
f.160, Rochford 
f.88, Rochford 
to Halifax, 
to Halifax, 
20 I-larch 1764. 
13 February 1764. 
fos.161-2, ltochford to Halifax, 20 Harch 1764. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
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Squilaci represented Rochford's sole effective means 
of redressing the preponderance of French influence at the Spanish 
Court, and neutralizing the effect of Grimaldi's direct correspondence 
with Choiseul : 
ttSquilaci, who does not love Grimaldi, is aware of all this, 
and by his means I hope to be able to adminjster a Counter-
poison I must do him the justice to say he still acts in 
the most confidential manner with me, and certainly at 
present the greater credit with the Catholick King, whilst 
Grimaldi on the other hand loses ground. 'I 32 
Grimaldi was himself aware of his vulnerability at this time. On one 
occasion when Rochford was dining at Grimaldi's hc..use in Harch 1764, 
somebody mentioned a matter which the minister would need to attend 
to in the next yea~ or two, and Grimaldi remarked with a smile 
"If I am still i.'1 the same Situation t ".;hich is Coubtfull.1f 33 
It (.'nly remained to be seen hO\;l successfully Grimaldi 
established himself in power~ and whether o~ aot 3auilaci could 
retain a greater share of influence with the Fpanish King. The best 
that Rochford could do was to watch them very closely and give 
Squilaci his full support. 
Rochford had lii:.tle enough support of hi;3 own at 1-1adrid. 
Though he had readily achieved a personal friendship \-tith the Duke 
of Losada, perhaps the mest influential of the leading courtiers, 
Losada carefully avoided political entanglements. He was first and 
foremost the Kingls man, and Hould no more dream of championing 
Rochford1s cause tha~ he would that of Grimaldi or Squilaci. 34 
SP 94/166, fos.161-1 , Rochford to Halifax, 20 Hareh 1764. 
SP 94/166, f.162, Rochford to Halifax, 20 Harch 1764 .• 
Petrie, Kine; Charles III of C' • pp.60, 98. u..2S11!! , , 
239. 
Amongst Rochford's few natural allies tvi thin the 
diplomatic corps at Hadr:i d, the Dutch minister, Doublet, '-Jas 
unquestionably reliable, but he had little or no influence at 
Court. The.Portuguese ambassador was not to arrive in Madrid until 
December 1764, and in the meantime Rochford's princip~l ally and 
supporter ought to have been the Sardinian ambassador ; yet even 
Roubion proved a disappointment, notvlithstanding his earlier 
friendship with Rochford at Turin. 
The reasons for Roubionts desertion Rochford chose not 
to include in his reports to the Secretary of State in London, but 
he did confide them to his Iiotebook. Rochfor~ found th&t Roubion 
had been encouraged ~y his o~n court, from their jealousy of the 
favour shown to the Imperial ambassador during the recent royal 
I'lt"pousals at Madrid., to attach himself to the French ambassador, 
as a gentle hint to the Spanish King not to neglect Turin~ Roubion, 
however, observing that Rochford was "privately well witL Squilaci," 
went a step further and began to court Grimaldi as well~ even though 
that minister had neglected and ill-treated Roubion on his arrival 
at Madrid. Rochford being a shrewd observer of ~lman n&ture did not 
fail to note another motive besides political ~onsiJerations 
"add to all this a woman's reason; Roubion is piqued against Madame 
3 f , Squilace who supplanted him for Doublet." ~ There 1vas obviously 
Ii ttle chance of that friendly unity \'Ihich Rochford might have 
desired between the Dutch and Sardinian representatives. 
By end of April 1764, vlhen the Court removed itself 
to Aranjuez, Rochford must have felt somewhat bereft of supporters, 
and his reliance on Squilaci as his means of administering an 
35. Bodleian Library, Oxford; Lyell MSS~ Empt.37 ; Rochford's Madrid 
Notebook, fos.187v-186v (about March 1764, judging from the items 
on either side of this entry). 
:;6. 
37. 
38. 
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antidote to Grimaldi's French ~l1fluense became all the more crucial. 
Rochford attended Court regularly at Aranjuez, and Il watched, as 
narrowly as I possibly could, both the Spanish ministers.1t The 
sojourn at Aranjuez was usually an opportunity for the ministers 
to discuss financial, economic and colonial matters, and to 
formulate policies for the coming year. Grimaldi and Squilaci vlere 
therefore in almost daily conference, by General Wall. 
Rochford found no change in the behaviour of the two ministers 
towards hims ,but W.::l.S anxious' to note that ~lall and Squilaci, 
formerly enemies, now dined together in great familiRrity. 36 
Rochford also ncticed that Wall spent much of his time with the 
Imperial ambassador Rosenburg! but whenever Rochford attempted to 
sound the ex-minister, Itlall avoided "talking upon _my 'l'hing of 
Consequence," though he remained "extremely civil." 37 
Th~ h:,i; summer months of 1764, during which Rochford 
continued to watch the ministers closely, were in fact dominated 
by quite another t 1atter, equally s~rious for the British ambassador. 
On 10 Hay, Rochfox-d reported hearing \..rhispers from a 
usually reliable source that France and Austria had concluded an 
offensive and defensive alliance, and had invited to join. 
Rochford had suspected from the close rapport among Grimaldi, Wall, 
and Rosenburg, that some ching of this kind might be afoot, especially 
since Os sun was again on good terms with Rosenburg. 38 At the 
reading of the Austrian marriage contract in February, Rochford had 
SP 94/167, f.14, Rochford to Halifax, 10 Hay 176l l- (his first full 
report from Aranjuez). 
SP 94/167, f.14, Rochford to Halifax, 10 Hay 1764. 
SP 94/167, f .14, Rochford to Halifax, 10 Hay 1764 . see also V.L. , 
Brown, Studies in the Histor;z: of SEain, pp.21 , on Ossun. 
been startled to hear mention of a secret Convention made between 
Madrid and Vienna in December 1762, which nObudy had heard of 
before, not even the French ambassador. Rochford gue·ssed at the 
time that 'it related to the royal marriage, and saw it as a product 
of VIall's policy of rapprochement with Vienna, which Grimaldi had 
adopted with enthusiasm. 39 
Rochford was apprehensive that this WaS the sort of policy 
over which Squ~laci and Grimaldi might agree, anQ that Charles III 
would readily follow their united advice in this matter, since 
it accorded with his own peroonal preference for closer friendship 
with Vienna. 30chford therefore dropped a hint to Squilaci that 
such an extension of the Family Compact would only tie Spain's 
hands yet more tightly ; Squilaci promptly replied, "Do not believe 
IlO it, for there is not a Word of Truth in it .. " . 
Even so, by the end of Hay, RClchl'ord we.s sure that his 
original information had been accurate, and that some sort of 
triparti te negotiation ",as afoot somev/here-, probably at Paris, to 
judge from the frequent val and departure of French messengers 
at Aranjuez. The bcha7iour of Ossun and Ros€nburg, and of the 
Spanish ministers, seemed to confirm this notion; they were all 
very close and secretive, even Os sun and Grimaldi ha~ing reconciled 
their earlier differences. 41 Nevertheless, Rochford did his utmost 
to fathom the attitude of the Spanish Court ; as he remarked in a 
private letter to Sandwich, "no ferret took more pains than I have 
42 done.!! 
39. SP 94/166, £.160, Rochford to Halifax, 20 Harch 1764. 
40. SF 9l~/167, f.14, Hochford to Halifax, 10 JvIay 1764. 
41. Rochford later discovered that OSBun and Grimaldi had been init 
on such bad terms that Choiseul had offered to have Ossun replaced, 
but feared that his credit \vith the King vias not secure 
enough for such a step; SP 94/168, f.96, Rochford to 
17 September 1764. 
L1-2. Saud\1ich Dip:l:.?.E':.:~tJ....s:._Co~<:!?..3?_C?l.1.~_~_C~j_ 1763-176:'2., edited by F. Spencer, 
pp.162-163, ffl Rochford to Sandwich, 30 Hay 17b4. 
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Rochford doubted if anything had yet been decided by the 
Spanish King, despite the confidential behaviour of his ministers 
"if I knOvl them at all they appear too uneasy to have carried their 
Point as yet." He was rather inclined to think that Charles III 
would be reluctant to commit himself further "S9 soon after an 
expensi ve and I may add l'uinous \V'ar." Rochford thought that he 
would assure the other two powers that while he did not wish to 
be committed more openly at this time, they coule depend upon him 
!lguand Ie cas arriv~.11 If he was persuaded to join another treaty, 
Rochford was sure it would be for the sake of Vienna rather than 
Versailles ; such a m0ve by Charles III would b~ almost in spite of 
rather than because of French pressures at th~ Spanish Court. 
Even so, Rocnford heard that France intended offering Corsica as 
a bait, to be attuched to Tuscany following the latest agreement 
with Genoa over the control of that turbulent island. If this scheme 
succeeded, Rochford thought1 then "adieu to the Equi.libre of Italy," 
for the King of Sardinia vlo1.~ld be sure to protest. This prospect 
at least had the effect.of bringing Roubion back into Rochford's 
circle. As Rochf'"lrd rather cynically observed ; "Trimming vlould be 
useless now, he honors me therefore at present with his Confidence, 
I h 11 1 f h · 11 43 • •• s a ma(e a proper use 0 ~m. 
Early in June, Secretary of State Halifax \V'rote from 
London to inform Rochford that his informations from Paris and 
Vienna tended to confirm Rochford's suspicions; "some sort of 
treaty is well advanced. if not already concluded." ThE-se reports 
differed greatly in detail, but the general conclusion seemed to be 
that Vienna had made overtures to be included in the Family Compact, 
but had been rejected by the French, whereas the Spanish Court was 
43. SP 94/167, f.48, Rochford to Halifax, 30 May 1764. 
very willing to see Vienna included, as a counter-balance to 
44 French impetuosity. 
Before the end of June, Rochford had found an opportunity 
to question Grimaldi on the rumours of a treaty in progress, 
reminding the minister that hitherto he had not pestered them 
wi th enquiries. Grimaldi ass1tred Rochford that the King had noted 
and approved Rochford' & "Frudent Behaviour" in this respect. 
Grimaldi then proceeded with this remarkable observation : 
IINothing vlould embarrass us so much as the Conrt of Vienna 
desiring to a.ccede to the Family Compact, for on the one 
hand, we wish, on many Accounts, to be well with that Court, 
which alone can support His Catholick Hajesty's Son and 
Brother in Italy, but ~he Family Compact is an Affaire de 
Coeur, and not an Affaire Politique ; the Homent any other 
Power, that is not of the Family, accedes to it~ it becomes 
a politioaJ Affair, and would alarm ~urope, which is the 
farthest from our Thoughts, for I \vould ha-..re the Peace last, 
if possible, tuese Twenty Years 11 
Rochford was not '.teceived by this lJ.ypocritical concealment of 
the French rejection of Vienna'S overtures, but he conceded that 
"the Reasons he r::ives are real ones ; They \'lill not alarm Europe 
mal-A-propos." Rochford was sure that while something was definitely 
afoot, "Their Attempt waz discovered in the very Beginning," and the 
time had been judged not ripe for such a scheme. For if Europe 
had taken alarm, and ailother war ensued, Rochford knew that Spain 
would not be ready ; 
"Their Troops are in a miserable condition ; their Fleet 
worse ; and their Coffers empty They cannot even, without 
the greatest Difficulty get money to pay the Archdutchess's 
Fortune • • II 45 
44. SP 94/167, fos.25, 60, Halifax to Rochford, 8 and 15 June 1764. 
45. SP 94/167, f.199, Rochford to Halifax, 25 June 1764. 
lie was, however, equally convinced "that They propose 
to put Themselves in a Condition [sic] as soon as possible They 
can ; Monsieur Choiseul to my certain Knowledge preaches that 
Doctrine to them.·1f In the meantime, t.;hile not openly admitting 
Vienna to the Compact, the three Courts of Vienna, Hadrid, and 
PJ'tris "mean to unite more closely and only wait for the proper 
Opportuni ty to she\V" themselves. It 46 
244. 
Thus the scare of an enlarged Far.lily Compact had passed 
by the middle of 1764. Th.rly in July, Squilaci again assured 
Rochford that there was no truth in the rumours of a treaty afoot 
he took Rochford by the hand, saying that \-,1:en there \,;as any 
47 likelihood of such measures, HI will be the first to inform you." 
KnoltJing how advanced the talks at Paris had been befo!'e 
the project was called off, Rochford recognized this assurance as 
his first warning that he co~ld not rely on Squilaci as a counter-
weight to Grimaldi. His ~opes to use Squilaci as an advocate for 
British interests now seemed doubtful, at the very time that 
Grimaldi and hiG faction were attempting to e~casperate the King 
against Britain, and encouraging Hasserano to aci. the part of a 
ItFirebrand" in London. 48 
Rochford retained a private hold over Squilaci, however, 
since he knew of a transaction between the minister and Ossun 
46. SF 94/167, f.1 Rochford to Halifax, 25 June 1764 ; see also 
SP 94/167, f. ,Halifax to Rochford, 24 July 1764, SP 94/168, 
f,9, Rochford to fax, 6 August 1764 Separate; also, Coxe, 
Memoirs of the Kings of Spain (1815), III, 293-4. Th~ best and 
most detailed account of,this tentative negotiation appears in 
J.A. Lalaguna Lasala, "England, Spain, and the Family Compact, 
1763-1783,!! (unpublished Ph.D.thesis, University of London, 1968), 
pp.90-107. 
47. SP 94/167, f.2'14, Rochford to Halifax, 8 July 1764. 
Its. SP 94/167, 1' .. 246, Rochford to Halifax, 23 July 1'764. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
in 1762 which, if revealed, would ruin both of them. This el~sUl·eJ. 
if nothing else that Squilaci would continue to confide in Rochford, 
but it "laS no guarantee that he would champion a British point of 
view in council with Grimaldi and the King. 49 Nevertheless, 
Squilaci ivas anxious to :placate Rochford I s doubts e.nd fears. Early 
in August, after a conversation in the minister's office, Squilaci 
assured Rochford in a whisper (for fear that he sho~ld b~ heard 
by his secret1",.::-ies, \vho were in the next room), that he alone knev' 
the King's real intentions, and that he did not i,ntend lito be 
deceived any more by tne French Court," nor to show towards France 
even a fraction of the cO~lmercial favours enjoyed by Britain. 50 
Rochford was prepared to accept this particular assurance, 
since he knevl from other sources that C!1arles III had fldeclared 
various times to those he is in confidence wjth, that nothing but 
his being attacked. should engage him to dX'aw his Sword. fl But he 
doubted if any of the ministers really knew the King's mind, or 
could persuade him against his better judgmel.t. Rochford also 
doubted if secret treaties ~rere much to the taste of Charles III, 
51 
"who is, I believe, as upright a Prince as "vel' sat on this Throne." 
But as f·:r Rochford I s hopes to use Squilb.ci as an antidote 
to Grimaldi I s French 'po:i.son, f by September 1764, these had faded 
completely, and Rochford waB honest enough to admit defeat. In 
matters of foreign policy, Squilaci supported Grimaldi's pro-French 
line ; "the;j' speak as one voice II observed e. disappointed Rochford. 
Squilaci's defection to the opposite camp was not, however, very 
surprising, when one cm!siders that his overriding anxiety at this 
SP 94/167, L214, Rochford to Halifax, 8 July 1764. 
SF 94/168, f.23, Rochford to Halifax, 13 August 1764, Very Secret. 
SP 94/167, f.214, Rochford to Halifax, 8 July 1764. 
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time Was self-preservation. Rochford had learned that Squilaci 
was negotiating to purchase the Duke of Al-ra I S estate in his 
native Sicily, in order to retire there. In Rochford's inimitable 
phrase, IIhe wants only to 'l'lind up his BottO~,l and be gone." But 
because he was hardworking and meticulous, understandi~g better 
than anyone else the labyrinthine Spanish finances, Charles III 
would not let Bquilaci retire just yet. 52 
Rochford Was not blind to Squilaci I S lrlt3.knesses as a 
potential ally \V'ithin the Spanish ministry. Being more anxious to 
keep his place than to pursue what Rochford termed "Spain's true 
Interest,tI Squilaci would never persist in any opinion if it did 
not meet with the King's approval. Furthermore, his ignorance of 
European affairs .<las notorious, so much so that in order :Ito make 
a figure in ccnference with his Haster," he w,;;nt about gathering 
random opinions f:.r:om members of the di 'PlomA.t~.c corps. Rochford was 
perhaps most disappointed to find that, of late, instead of himself, 
"the French ambassador has acted the part of Tutor. 1I 53 
Rochford's gloomy conclusion was that French influence 
now ran unchecked ; lithe Councils held at Versailles .. /ill be 
follo\.,ed here." The only consolation was that Charles III would 
avoid being pusl::ed into another war before he 'VIas ready ; "they are 
in too bad a Situation hereto venture for the present." Here, 
Rochford hoped that Squilaci might at least ex~rt a restraining 
influence, if only tor his OVln preservation; an untimely war would 
wreck his cherished retjrement plans. Rochford could still play 
52. SP 94/168, f.96, Rochford to Halifax, 17 September ~764 ; see also 
on Squilaci, Coxe, l·I~::1oirs of the Kin~_ of Spain(T815), III, 315. 
53. SP 91+/168, f.96, Rochford to Halifax, 17 September 1764. 
on Squilaci's fears in this respect, and Squilaci responded with 
a most accommodat~ng attitude over Britain 1 s trade privileges ; 
Rochford now found, "I seldom apply to him for anything, but I 
carry my Point ; for although Grimaldi and he are agreed in their 
Poli ticks there is still a Jalousie de HE~tier, \<1hich the only 
Ground I have to work upon." 
Over the remainder of 1764, Rochford ruefully observed 
\Ian entire harmony" between Grimaldi and Squilaci? \vith the result 
that Grimaldi "gains more Credit here than I could l·!ish him." It was 
obvious that Grimaldi had emerged as the dom:Lnant ndnister, and 
Rochford could only h~pe that Squilaci did not follow his lead too 
slavishly. 55 Btlt clearly RQcllford's one slim chance of effectively· 
opposing French influence ac Madrid had evapcratec:., not from any 
fault or lack of ~act on his part, but froin circumstances largely 
beyond his cont~ol. He now echoed again the warning with which he 
~ 
had concluded his first masterly report from Madrid ; that a British 
minister in Spain faced considerable odds? so that if he did not 
succeed in fulfilling his instructions as ~eadily or as fully as 
desired, this skould be assigned to the difficulty of his situation 
rather than to any lack of zeal or diligence on his part. 56 
The early part of 1765 gave heartening evidence, hO'/lever, 
that French counsels did not always have their ''lay ,·lith Charles III, 
much less "lith the intensely nationalistic 'Old Spanish' party. 
The officers in command at the loss of Havana in 1762 had been on 
trial for the unforgivvble crime of surrendering to t~e King's 
54. SP 94/168, f.96, Rochford to Halifax, 17 September 1764. 
55. SP 94/168, f08.187, 241, 261, Rochford to Halifax, 12 November, 
10 December, 24 December 1764. 
56. SP 94/168, f.96, Rochford to Halifax, 17 September 1764, repeat 
in almost the same words his closing remarks in SP 94/166, f.32, 
Rochford to , 13 January 1764, Most Secret. 
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enemies, and the French faction at Hadrid, urged on by Choiseul~ 
had been pressing for very severe sentences, even including the 
death penalty, pour encourager lss autres. The principal officers 
on trial included de Prado, the Governor of Havana, and Superunda, 
the former Viceroy of Peru, who had unfortunately happened to be 
at Havana on his way home to Spain at the time of thd British attack. 
Even Aranda, one of the militaristic old grandees, favoured severe 
sentences, by ;rnich he meant. the death penel ty. But de Prado was 
related to Losada, who ~rotected him, and Superunda Was protected 
by Ensenada, 'liho even "vcnt so far as to set O!l.e of his servants to 
spy on Aranda's ~ovements. This serVant was in fa~t arrested, and 
for a time Ensenada was paralysed by the fear that Aranda would use 
this incident to disgrace hill. The servant kept quiet, r.owever, and 
nothing came of it. The fact that only a very small circle of 
people knew of this incident testifies to the Axcellence of Rochford's 
sources of information at the Spanish Court. 57 
The sentences on t~e officers of Havana were at last 
published in Harch 'i765, and \,/hile they were severe enough, extending 
to banishment and confiscation of estates, n0hody suffered the 
death penalty. Rochford discovered that the Council had been evenly 
divided over this ; three (including Aranda) voted for the death 
penalty, three for banishment and confiscation, and o~e for acquittal. 
It was thought that the King had made known he did not favour 
excessively severe sentences. The French pari;y \'1as distj .. nctly 
disappointed in this affair. 58 
Despite Rochford'S own disappointment over Squilaci, 
perhaps the only significant reverse of his Madrid embassy, there 
was no lapse in the British ambassador's customary diligence. 
57. SP 94/169, f.209, Rochford to Halifax, 28 February 1765 .. 
58. SP 94/170, f.14, Rochford to Halifax, 7 March 1765. 
The ldtte~ part of 1764 and the early months of 1765 were 
dominated for Rochford by a temporary crisis over the massing of 
Spanish troops on the border with Portugal, and by the continuing 
negotiation over the British cutters of logwOOQ in Honduras, to 
both of \-Ihich he made significant contributions. All the while, 
Rochford gave constant attention to commercial matters involving 
British subjects and British interests. These major themes of his 
Hadrid embassy are discussed elsel;/here. 59 
In addition t~ these major concerns, Rochford did not 
scorn the mundane tasks of his embassy. His alertness is instanced 
from April 1764, \vhen he observed "as I waL' looking over some of 
tho Gazettes that w~re publj .. shed here during the \oJar, II an article 
of December 1762 \'1hich was couched in surprisingly strong terms. 
Since Britain had no representative in Spain at that time, Rochford 
enclosed a copy of this article, as serving to show the sentiments 
of the Spanish ministry in wartime, in case Halifax had not seen 
60 the item before. 
The unending business of diplomacy then as nOll is the 
gathering, assessing, and transmission of informo.tiol1, some of 
which may not seem important by itself, but c0uld taka on greater 
significance when compared with news from other sources. Not all 
of Rochford's information came from his society frienQs at Madrid 
the eighteenth-century diplomat worth his salt did not scruple to 
61 
use spies and agents to gather secrets. It was presumably, 
however, by more respeccQble means that Rochford uncovered a 
most remarkable plot during the summer of 1764, and reported his 
59. the Portuguese scare is discussed later in this chapter ; for the 
Honduras logwood negotiations, see Chapter 10 ; for his attention 
to commercial matters, see Chapter 11. 
60. SP 94/166, f.229, Rochford to Halifax, 30 April 1764. 
61. One of Rochford's spies at Madrid was apparently known as _ 
Jean Boudct ; the catalogue for the sale of Rochford Papers at 
Sothebys, 16 December 1930, mentions this man's correspondence 
under lot 448 (p.74) ; IIbeing a spy's secret reports to Hochfordo" 
62. 
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discovery in time to prevent its execution. It was a French plot, 
aimed at destroying Britain's vital naval installations at 
Portsmouth and Plymouth, but Grimaldi at least among the Spanish 
ministers·· appears -:::0 have been privy to the scheme, as Rochford 
made clear in his first report of 17 September : 
"I have learnt that about three" weeks since, Grir;;aldi 
received a letter from Choiseul, telling him that every 
thing was ready ; and in his anSvler, which viaS sent by the 
last Spanish messenger \'lho ""ent to Londc..~l, Grimaldi, after 
approving the scheme, added, the sooner it is put 
execution til~ better. 
The scheme in this two french engineers were sent 
to England in June last they went to Portsmouth and 
Plymouth ; staid some time ; and returned to France. They 
are since returned to England ; and are now there. They 
reported to M. de Choiseul, that they had gained, by bribery, 
the necessary people 'to assist them, ;:;ome of "1hom are 
English. In short, that in the dark ghts, bet\V'een the 1st 
and 15th November, t:lf.) shipping and dock yards both at 
Portsmouth and Plymouth would infalli0ly be destroyed. and 
that they had invented a new kind of fire for that purpose. 
I would not willingly give credit to so diabolical 
a design, but I can see no reason tr doubt my friend1s 
intelligen-::e. He heard Grimaldi relate ti.;,e whole to his 
intimate and bosom friend Masones, [62J who was formerly 
embassador [sic} at Paris; and has further told me, that 
it has since been confirmed to him.~ 63 
presumably this 'l'laS Grimaldi I s predecessor irl the Paris embassy, 
Jaime Basones de Li,na y Sotomayor, who 'ltIaS Spanish ambassador to 
France 1752-61 ; Renertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller 
Landen, II. Band ~(1~i16-,iG3), edited by F. Hausmann (Z~rich,1950), 
p.387. 
Rochford to Halifax, 17 September 1764 (not in SP), printed in 
Coxe, Hemoirs of _ the. ,Kings o:t: Sp~~n of. the lIouse of' Bo~bon ('1815), 
III, 298. Coxe describes this as Rochford I s "I'lost Secret H dispatch 
of that date. but Rochford's own subsequent references to this 
letter de,scribe it as his !lEost :2rivat~ by Potter" (the messenger). 
This would account for its not having been preserved in SP 94. 
Archdeacon Coxe gives his source sim21ly as llRochford papers, NSt! 
undoubtedly a draft in the Rochford Papers then at st Osyth1 the 
use of which Coxe acknov/ledc;es in his Preface. 
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Early in October, Rochford noted that the Spanish King 
had received- a letter from Louis XIJ himself, but after bvice 
reading it had burned the paper ; Rochford related this occurrence 
to the intelligence he had sent by Potter on 17 September. But at 
the end of his dispatch reporting this, Rochford added an excited 
p0stscript. He had just received confirmation of the original 
intelligence, with the additional news that the attempt had been 
postponed on account of the moon until thlC' latter end of November. 
The materials ,however, "rere all ready and lodged :in private 
64 houses near the dock-yar-ds. 
Fortunatel;' (to quote Archdeacon c.;oxe) , lithe vigilance 
of Lord Rochford d i.scovered the plot, and the precautio.l':1s of our 
65 government deterred the incendiaries from me,king the attempt. ll 
It \'1as not until December that Rochford himself knew that the 
attempt had been called off. His friend at Court heard that 
ttthe french perceived we had found them out, & H. Grimaldi had bc.:n 
reproached by Choiseul that the affair had been discovered here. u 
The fire-works j,;'emained undiscovered, however, and it was hoped 
66 that another opportunity to use them would soon rresent itself~ 
But nothing happened before Rochford's fina: report on 
this subject in February 1765, in \'lhich he 'tla.S at last able to give 
the name of the original ~rojector of the scheme, an Enelishman 
named Hilton, and the names of the householders at Portsmouth and 
Plymouth \-tho had cO!lcealed the fire-works. 67 
64. SP 94/168, f.136, Rochford to Halifax, 8 October 17(,11-. 
65. Coxe, Hemoirs of the Kings of Spain, III, 299. 
66. Bodleian Library, Oxford; Lyell HSS, .37 ; Rochford's Hadria 
Notebook, fos.180v-179v ; intelligence dated 12 December 1764. 
67. SF 94/169, f.207, Rochford to ,25February 1765, Secret & 
Private. Rochfordts first reports had been given serious attention, 
though it was hoped this vIaS a false alarm ; see SandyJich to Bedford, 
13 November 1764, in Bedford Correspond~, edited by Russell (18'+6), 
III, 270-272. 
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Wi th this information, the plot ''las \'1all and truly 
exposed, and nothing came of it, at least not immediately. But the 
threat was no idle one, for in July 1770 there was a serious fire 
in the Portsmouth dock-yard, which destroyed many important buildings 
and a vast quantity of stores. It was remarked that this fire 
spread with unusual rapidity, and foul play vlas suspected, though 
never proven. This may well have been a revival of the attempt 
which Rochford had nipped in the bud in 1764. 68 
Apart from this exceptional piece of preyentive intelligence-
gathering, Rochfordtf) attention had for its main focus the military 
preparedness of che Spanish forces; her naval strength, the 
condition of her army, and the size of her ~arrisons in the Americas. 
Rochfordts Instructions had made this particular responBibility 
very clear, and his first reports in January 176Jr '>lere reassuring 
in their rather slighting estimation of Zpc.xlisharmed might. 59 
The only serious ga~ which Rochford had noted in his 
informa tion at that time \va£; the absence oj a.'!.y report from 
Cartagena. Consul Bomeester finally arrived at his new post in 
February 1764, and made his own report direc~ to London regarding 
Spaints Hediterra:r:"lan squadron. There was little ~ause for alarm 
in his report, which stressed the poor condition of -the ships and 
the crumbling SHore defences. 70 
68. London r,ra -az ine, XXXIX (1770), pp .. 429-430 ; report of 27 July 
the fire occurred ,hat morning). A second fire of December 1776 
is better kno\,lll, but this \<Tas clearly the work of a lone pyromaniac 
knovlll as John the Painter ; see his Deposition in 'l'he Correspondence 
of George III, edited by J. Fortescue (1927-8), II~23-427 ; see 
a::c;o Horace Halpole, .::ourna1 of the Reign of George II; (London, 1859), 
II, 100, which shows that Rochford for one viewed it seriously. 
69. See above, pp.215-216. 
70. SP 94/166, f.154, Bomeester to Halifax, 18 Harch 1764 , the report 
is in fos.156-159. See also, SP 94/167, £.29, Bomeester to Halifax, 
27 Hay 1764. 
Nevertheless, in June 1764 Rochford sent his Chaplain 
de Visme to Cartagena to make as close an inspection as possible 
of the installations and the shore defences. The result of this 
visit was 'a detailed report which discussed sources of timber and 
supplies for the shipbuilding yards as well as enclosing an up-to-
date list of the warships stationed there. The shipyarc had 
benefited greatly from the services of an English ship"lright, who 
had introduced various chain-pumps and machines, but he \'las still 
handicapped by the scarcity of timber. That of Catalonia was almost 
exhausted, and \'Jhat was of poor quality and tended to 
crack in the sun .. As a result, timber "is go/:' \·!i'i,;h great difficulty 
and at a vast expense." In desperation, Spain had recently 
contracted with some Genoese builders who had access to a largo 
stock of good timber from the Adriatic to build six ships of the 
line at Cartagena over the next few years, for what Rochford thought 
was a very reascnable price. Hemp "<las readily available in good 
quality and great quantity from Valencia, and Cartagena itself 
supported "a considerable manufacture of Sail-cloth"; only masts 
and planks had to be imported. Of the seven ships of the line based 
there, one had jus;; saile!l. for Naples, and tV/o of the remainder 
were in dock in poor condition. By far the larger part of the naval 
forces in readiness at Cartagena were Xebecs and Galliots. 71 
Rochford was not the only foreign ambassador at Madrid 
interested Spain's naval strength ; Ossun, "the :F'rench ambassador, 
71. SF 94/167, f.208, Rochf~rd to Halifax, 8 July 1764 (embodying 
de Visme's report) ; the list of vessels is f.213. The?'e is an 
interesting item in the collection of 'd.8. of Farmington, 
Conn., U.S.A.ethe Le\'lis-\Xalpole Library, ), in Rochford's hand, 
entitled "Verses to be added to our Clerkes of the 
Spanish Court!! (presuoably at"l. untraced e account by de Visme). 
The couplet, IiAlone he strays admires the TOi'lering Bark / & leaves 
his King & Country in the dark,lI seems distinctly undeserved in 
view of this very full report of 8 July. 
also had instructions to report regularly on Spanish military 
readiness, as a guide to Choiseul's plans for the revanche against 
England. However, Ossun tended to be somewhat generous in his 
estimates~ Before the end of 1764 he confidently predicted that 
Spain would shortly have a total naval establishment of at least 
sixty ships of the line ond forty frigates. 72 Choisaul, however, 
had other sources of information from Spain, notably the French 
Consul-General Beliardi, and tartly corrected the ambassador : 
"You are poorly informed II His own most optimistic estimate 
amounted to only thirty-six ships of the line and thirty frigates. 73 
Rochfo:d's estinlates of Spanish naval strength, based on 
information from ~he various British Consuls, accorded ~emarkably 
closely with Choiseul's estimate, namely, about thirty-four ships 
of the line and a corresponding number of fri~ates. Th€ total naval 
establishment in the Americas Rochford uelieved did not aT;:]ount to 
more than sixty_ vessels, large and small, but only half of these 
were capable of being ':.u.tfi ~ted for action~. Hochford stressed that 
numbers alone were no true estimate, and that the Spanish navy was 
in a poor condi tim~ ix'om the scarcity of eXI,erienced sailors. Spain 
had a very small merchant marine, having let her carrying trade slip 
into the hands of the Dutch, French, and British ; tile latter two 
also had the advantage of the Newfoundland fisheries, that great 
'nursery of sailors.' 74 
72. France; Archives Etrang~res ; Correspondance Politique, Espagne 5L+1, 
Ossun to Choiseul, 31 December 1764 j quoted in R.B. Abarca, 
"Bourbon I Revanche I aga::;',lst England ; the Balance of PovJer, 1763-
1770," (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, 
1964), pp.198-9. See also, Ramsey, p.160. 
73. AECP Espagne 542, Choiseul to Ossun, 15 January 1765 ; quoted in 
Abarca, pp.179, 199. 
74. SP 9l+/'167 , f.199, Rochford to Halifax, 13 Nay 176lt ; SP 94/171, 
f.150, Rochford to Halifax, 6 September 1765. See also SP 94/172, 
f.132, Bomeester to Conway, 9 November 1765. 
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The King of Spain was fully aware of the poor condition 
of his navy" and accordi:ng to one report reaching the British 
embassy in Hadrid, had instructed Grimaldi to \1rite to Ithis friend" 
Choiseul for an able ship-builder. \.Jhatever the cat:.se, a French 
engineer, M. Gautier, arrived in Spain early in 1765, and though 
he \-Iore the uniform of an officer in the French Artillery, and 
frequented Count Gazila, the Spanish Master of Ordnance, he also 
professed expertise in naval architecture. Ossun went out of his 
way to inform Rochford that Gautier thought the Spanish navy in a 
very bad condition; but this only aroused Rochford's suspicions, 
since Ossun "laS usually so reserved towards him. Rochford doubted 
if Os sun would have mention~d this fact if it were true, and 
therefore concluded tha~ the French visitor had not found the nav~{ 
~uite as bad as he had expected. Nevertheless, Gautier expressed 
dissatisfaction with the English and Spanish designs in current use, 
and with French finance proceeded to lay the keels of thrae vessels 
a.t Ferrol which would serve as models of the FrenC'll deE'igns. 75 
Improvements in the Spanish navy were essential for the 
defence of Spain's American empire, since any future British threat 
to that area would best be met at sea. It was generally expected 
that any future conflict between Britain and Spain would commence, 
and probably be decided, in the Americas ; an earlier French visitor 
to Hadrid, Conflans, had remarked to Rochford early in 1764 thct 
"the first Gun, that should be fired, should be in America." 76 
On this assumption, Charle~ III had embarked on major reforms to 
strengthen Spain's colonial defences. 77 Naturally~ this gave 
Rochford yet another reason for vigilance. 
75. SP 94/169, f.193, Rochford to Halifax, 18 February 1765, Separate 
SP 94/170, f.134, de to Halifax, 13 Hay 1765. 
76. SP 94/166 ~ f .88, nochford to Halifax, 13 February 176l l-. 
77. " V I Bro~" I Rnlat~ons in America in the closin~, .::> e e .. J.. ~ v •• ~ , .k ;..; ... -
of the colonial era, II Hispanic American Historical Revi_e\'1, 
V, No.3 (1922), pp.329-483. 
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Early in 1764 Rochford had been alarmed to hear of the 
appointment of .'a, new Commander in Chief for Nexico, the Marquis 
de Villa Alba, who was to take with him some 2,000 men and officers. 
This looked like the start of substantial military reinforcements, 
but Squilaci assured Rochfo~d it was merely a piece of reform, 
to bring the ££rreg~~ to heel who were cheating the Spanish 
King out of most of his rev~mue. Rochford I s further enquiries 
tended to confirm Sqtilaci 1 s assurance, and Grimaldi told hi~ early 
in Harch that the present force \vas designed to replace rather than 
augment the existing rorces, which had been decimated by desertion 
and become corrupt and expensive. By June 1764 this force had still 
not left for Nexico, though they were "gettinr~ ready '1ith the 
greatest Expedition. lt Gri~aldi at this time made much of his 
confidential offer to Rochford of a detail cf the regiments that 
v/ere to be sent ; Rochford in return me.de much of his gracious 
refusal, preferring to take this on trust in fact, he had already 
obtained this information and relayed it to london in Narch! 78 
There was no further news of note ~egarding Mexico until 
the middle part of 1765, 79 but in the meantime Rochford reported 
whatever seemed to him sufficiently important to warrant mention 
regarding Spanish overseas interests. In March 1764 he submitted 
a detailed account of the \"orks in progress to improve the 
fortifications at H~vana, which included new forts at the Morro 
and Caranios, and an im~ense rock-cut fosse sixteen feet deep, to 
80 be flooded as a moat. in 1765, he also reported the rare 
78. SP 94/166, foa.88, 144, Rochford to Halifax, 13 February and 
12 March 1764 ; SF 94/167, f.199, Rochford to Halifax, 25 June 1764. 
79. See belOW, Chapter 12. 
80. SP 94/166, f.160, Rochford to Halifax, 20 March 1764. 
occurrence of a Spanish ship sailing for the Philippines from 
Spain itself, with two French pilots on board. The intention was 
to survey a direct sea-route around Cape Horn, to avoid having to 
trans-ship' the spicss at Acapulco. Rochford observed that this 
strategy would make Spain even more jealous of Portugal in South 
America, but he rather doubted the success of the expedi+ion ; 
It I have so very bad an Opinion of Spanish Projects, that I can 
scarcely 
undertake." 81 
e They will ever succeed in any Thing they 
Rochford also kept a vlary eye on Fr,mch activities in 
the Americas. Eal'ly in 1764 he supplied \vhat details he had been 
D.ble to obtain a.bout a French colonizing expedition to Cayenne 
under the Marquis de Raux. 82 But the topic of greatest interest 
to the English government at this time regardi~g Spanish America 
(apart from the Honduras log':Jood cutters) We.S l.oufsiana. 
The Fre-nch cession of western J .. ouisiana to Spain at the 
time of the Peace of P2.:'1s had stimulated much speCUlation as to 
possible ulterior motives, and the likelihood that this remarkably 
generous gesture fo~e8hadowed a reciprocal c~ssion of Spa~ish 
territory sometime in th~ aear futUre. It now seems fairly clear 
that an exchange vias not intended, and that France was glad to be 
8::; 
rid of vThat seemed a useless expanse of wasteland. But the 
British government suspected that Spain had secretly promised Tt~ance 
an island sO~lewhere in the Caribbean, or even suostantial trade 
concessions with Old Spain, in compensation for the loss of Louisiana, 
81. SP 94/170, f.53, Rochford to Halifax, 25 March 1765. 
82. Nassau Papers, E/4, copy of an extract (in Porten's hand) from a 
letter to the Venetian ambassador at Madrid, 14 May 1 ,is the 
source of Rochford's details in SP 94/167, f.34·, Rochford to Halifax, 
28 1764. 
83. V .. L. Br01-m, "Anglo-Spanish Relations in America. , 
American Bistorical Revie~, V (1922), pp.344-5. " 
Hispanic-
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and Rochford initially shared these suspicions. In February 1765 
Halifax directed Rochford to find out all he could about the 
rumours still current in London that some sort of exchange between 
F d' S· .. t 84-ranee an pa~n was ~~~~nen • 
Rochford replied within a month, observing that he for 
o~e had always thought the Louisiana cession concealed something 
more than Ita meer Act of Generosity." His vigilance had in fact 
only recently been stimulated by the arriv,ql at Hadrid of a French 
promoter, Daubaret, who \>-;a8 attempting to form a Fr.~nch trading 
company for Louisiana, to assist the Spanish in their development 
of the area. He had ~een heard to argue in private that Louisiana 
would decay under Spanish gGvernment unless assisted by French 
ingenuity. But he had at last gone away empty-handed. The "Old 
3paniards 'l to '''hom Rochford had spoken on this subject vlere all 
convinced that France had simply unloaded a neglected and v.seless 
territory onto her ally. In addition, he heard that it had been 
proposed in Council to Itmake a Desartllof Louisiana, as a no-manls 
land between Hexico and ,British North America. Therefore, Rochford 
concluded, 
Hafter the most Nature Examination (and I have taken 
great Pains to find out the Truth), I cannot believe 
this Court has or '\lill yield an;/, 'rIling to the French, 
compensation for Louisiana.!1 85 
Rochford obtained most of his information about Daubaret 
from another French visitor, Beaumarchais the playvlrieht, \·rho '\las 
trying to obtain for Franc!::; an asiento in , '~ri th as little 
success. He and Rochford here established a lastinG friendship. 86 
84. SP 94/169, f.110, IIalifaxto Rochford, 12 February 1765. 
85. SP 94/170, f.18, Rochford to Halifax, 11 March 1765. 
86. Bodleian Library, Oxford ; Lyell ~SS. Empt. ; Rochford's Madrid 
Notebook, f.179v. 
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In addition to Spain's naval readiness and her colonial 
defences, Rochford kept a close watch on the Spanish army at home. 
Besides his information from spies and agents, Rochford had frequent 
opportunities to see for himself at least the better side of the 
army, for Charles III regularly invited him to watch military 
reviews and manoeuvres. At f:i x-st, Rochford \-laS not much impressed 
even the Royal Regiment 01 Carabineers, lles teemed the finest 
Regiment in the Spanish service,1l gave Rochford "but an indifferent 
Idea of the present state of the Spanish Cavalryil in thme 1764. 87 
Later that year, however, at a review on the plain between 
Segovia and San Ildephonso, the cavalry regiments were more complete, 
and in Rochford'::; opinion made a "fine Appearance." A week later, 
as part of the same manoeuvr<?s, Rochford \~itness9d in company with 
the King and Royal )Family a mock assault on a fortified camp 
he was great:y ~mpressed, and remarked upon the improvements wrought 
by Count G~zola on the Spanish artillery. Tne Ordnance was in a very 
bad condition 1.-then Rochford first arrived in Spain, but since Gazola 
had been entrusted with it3 reform, it had become better than ever 
b f . - t h - 88 e ore ~n ~ s u;tory. 
Having witnessed these manoeuvres in October, Rochford 
assembled his best inforffiation regarding Spain's military strength. 
His list numbered 102 infantry regiments, a total of 72,590 men, 
and 78 squadrons of cavalry, amounting to 11,192 men. These were 
impressive figures, but Rochford emphasised that many. of these 
regiments 'vere incomple+;8, and that the vlhole regular "lrmy numbered 
87. SP 94/167, f.170, Rochford to Halifax, 11 June 1764 ; see also SP 
94/168, f.64, Rochford to H~lifax, 2 September 1764. 
88. SP 94/168, f.136, Rochford to Halifax, 8 October 1764 
f.139, Rochford to Halifax, 15 Gctober 1764. 
SP 94/168, 
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probably no more than 5~,000 effectives, not counting local militia. 89 
The accuracy of Rochford's estimate way be checked 
aloneside French intelligence reports. Ossun, as remarked earlier, 
tended to inflate his totals and give a healthier impression of 
Spain's readiness than was usually the actual case. In December 1764 
he reported that the regular army now totalled effective:!.y 80,000 
infantry and 14,000 cavalry. Choiseul's other sources of information 
led him to cor:..'ect the ambassador sharply, for t:rey gave the totals 
of effective forces as 45,000 infantry and only 8,000 cavalry ; 90 
remarkably close to Rochford's estimate of about 50,000 effectives. 
In the course of his watch on the Spani8h army, Rochford 
i.loticed with increasing alarm throughout September and Oct.ober 1764 
the movement of {fl. number of regiments towards the Portug'J.ese border. 
Consul Forrester at Barcelona also noticed and reported these 
movements. 91 Besides the march of regiments, Rochford also 
discovered that Gtores of corn were being stockpiled at Burgos in 
Old Castile, and that troops were to be stationed there ; this was 
not so close as to cause. alarm, but still within easy reach of the 
northern frontiers of Fortugal. 92 
By the end of OCGober, Rochford's fears we~e thoroughly 
aroused, and he devoted a special dispatch to outlining the reasons 
for his fears. The movement of regiments across Spain could not be 
explained away as manoeuvres or routine replacements, as the 
Spanish ministers claimed they were, for the latest marches drew 
89. SP 94/168, f.157, Rochfc~·d to Halifax, 27 October 1764 ; f.159 is the 
"State of the present military force in Spain." 
90. AECP Espagne 541, Ossun to Choiseul, 31 December 1764 ; AECP Espagne 
542, Choiseul to Ossun, 15 January 1765 quoted in the Abarca thesis 
(see above, note 72), pp.198-199. 
91. SP 94/168, f.134, Forrester to Halifax, 6 October 1764. 
92. SP 9 l t/168, fos.136, 139, Rochford to Halifax, 8 and 15 October 1764. 
regiments :trom. Catalonia, the cheapest province in Spain for 
winter quarters, to Estremadura, perhaps the most expensive at this 
season of the year. Furthermore, although the harvest had been 
plentiful,- corn was very SC8.rce ; the government. 't;as buying up all 
it could, and even bringing in extra supplies from Alsewhere. 
, 
R0chford's was that the Spanish planned to fall upon Portugal 
by surprise in the depths of the winter, if there was any sign of 
renewed war with Britain. Rochford wonderet if the stockpiled corn 
\'lere not intended to feed n"ench reinforcements in such an event. 
The Spanish army i ::self ""(l.S clearly being increased ; Ro~hford 
noted that tl;ley we:r:-e recruiting !I\"ith great .;)iligence l ; at Hadrid, 
ana that several (':!3valry squ3.drons were being augmented. 93 
Witbin a few weeks, however, quite unexpectedly, all this 
activity ceased the regiments on the march were halted, and 
higher ranking officers \'Jere given leave extending in some cases 
to }lay instead of February of the ne\" year. Rochford concluded from 
the arrival of three French couriers in ten days ('Jne c")urier being 
Choiseul's o .... m valet) in an air of great secrecy, that France had 
called off the warlike preparations, suspectin~ that their intentions 
had been discovered. In the m.eantime, Rochforlt had seen the original 
of the paper from which his first information had COnie ; it confirmed 
that the plan had been to attack Portugal in the winter, before any 
assistance could arrive from England. 94 
Halifax was very pleased at this news, and warmly commended 
Rochford for his vigilance. He had himself kept the Portuguese 
93. SP 94/168, f.157, Rochford to Halifax, 27 October 1764, Separate & 
Secret. 
94. SP 94/168, f.187, Rochford to Halifax, 12 November 1764. 
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ambassador in London fully informed of Rochford's reports. Hali 
also mentioned another possible reason for the Spanish pause ; the 
new Portuguese ambassador to Spain, Count Ayres de sft de Hello, 'vas 
at ready to set out for Hadrid. Rochford vias to s11m1 de S~ 
every friendship, and give him his fullest support. 95 
The Portuguese amba.:sador arrived at J\1adrid on 3 December 
1764, and immediately assured Rochford that he was instructed to 
enter into lithe closf'st Confidence ll with his Brittsh ,~ounterpart. 
The Spanish Court, Hfrom highest to I Oi.vest ,fI paid de s?i the utmost 
attention, but th,'! ambassador gave no sign that he V3.S even aware 
of the Spanish plans to invade Portugal 1 though ";0 Rochford "nothing 
in the i'lorld was ever clearer .. " 96 
Rochford's continned enquiries revealed that two French 
contractors for armaments and provisions haa. been told to stop 
their dealings ~nd return home, which seemed to indicate that the 
scare was over for the time being. Rochford also delig~tedly 
reported that one of his informants at Court had heard that Choiseul 
reproached the Spanish ministers for having let slip their plans, 
and in return, G.":imaldi had retorted the same accusation against 
the French. Though Grimaldi remained very affableto1:rards Rochford, 
and held a peaceful tone, Rochford gathered that he "JaS Ilmuch out of 
Eumouru over this affair ; ltThe Discovery of their Scheme has 
disconcerted all their Heasllres ll ; and Grimaldi had v;ritten asking 
Hasserano in London to find out where the 'leakage I had o~curred. 97 
~f5. SP 94/168, £..227, to Rochford, 18 Decenber 1764 ; see also 
R,epertorium del' d..inlomatischen Vertreter aller Ltl.nden, II. Band 
(1716-1763), edited by ~'. Hausmann (Zurich,1 ), p.289, for de S~. 
96. SP 9/+/168, fos.239, 211-1, Rochford to Halifax, 3 and 10 December 
1764. 
97. SP 94/168, f.261, Hochford to Halifax, 2lt- December 1764, Secret. 
In fact, the rumours that some sort of danger was 
threatening Portugal at -chis time had become 1:lidespread amongst 
diplomats and ministers at most European capitals ; as far away 
as Vienna, Stormont discussed them with Kauni'tz I 11ho thought that 
France and Spain 'vould do well to remain quiet, sinCe neither was 
rPddy for another war. Rochford's anxiety may at first have been 
a trifle alarmist, although it was his duty to treat seriously such 
an important possibility as an attack on Fortugal. Nevertheless, 
by January 1765, his o','m thoughts coincided with those of Prince 
Kaunitz, albeit UnknO'l'1ll to either : "they Hill through Necessity 
be quiet for the Irre.8'7nt .. lt 
The last few l'leekb of December 1764 were taken up with 
a round of dinners in honour of the newly arrived Portuguese 
umbassador, but in between times Rochford managed to have 
i:alks \vith de Sa, who seemed' ffa very discreet sensible Han" ; 
he told Rochford that he had orders "not to take anyone Step!! 
without consulting Rochford first. His Instruction3 rel~ted chiefly 
to the basic cati.se of ill-feeling between Spain and Portugal, 
namely, Brazil. 99 
Spain I S few successes in the wa,r of '1762 ha.l been virtually 
confined to South America, where several Portuguese forts and 
outposts on the Rio de la Plata had been overrun by Spanish forces. 
98. SP 94/169, f.49, Rochford to Halifax, 9 January 1765, Secret & 
Separate ; SP 80/202, stormont to SandI-rich, 26 January 1765, grinted 
in Sandwich Diplomatic CorresDondence 1763-1765, edited by F.Spencer 
(Hancl1este-r,-1-9'61),-pp .. 276-277 ; Dr Spencert"!;tcomment that "Rochford 
was inaccurate and alarmist in his reports" seems n~t entirely fair 
~'lhen vie\-red aloneside Rochford's judicious 9 January report. 
99. SP 94/168, fos.258, 266, Rochford to , 17 and 31 December 
1764. 
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Though Portugal '-laS not formally a party to the Peace of Paris in 
1763, Britain had ensured on her behalf that Spain and France 
agreed to withdraw from all Portuguese territories overseas, 
restoring 'matters "sur le m~me Pied au Elles etoient H in accordance 
with earlier tr~aties. 100 However, reports from Rio de Janiero 
indicated tha'!; the Spanil;;h hc..d restored only Nova Colonia, and 
moreover had recently ~topped all border traffic between Brazil 
and la Plata. The ma:i.n purpose of de Sa f s embassy was to insist on 
the restoration of the remaining forts and territorieB which Portugal 
claimed to posses~ before the outbreak of hostilitie3. 101 
In order to ::.chieve this end, de Sa " .. /a/;;:" instructed to 
present three Notes to the Spanish ministry, ".t regula!' intervals, 
and if there was no prompt ~esponse, the third and final Note was 
to threaten fUrth;;r hostili'i;ies. The Portugv.ese ambassador hoped 
for Rochfordfs sup~ort in all this, and asked if he would join the 
first submission, making it a joint protest by Britain and Portugal. 
Rochford, however, very prop0rly and cautiously declined this 
invitation, pointing out that he was not authorized to take such a 
step, and reassu:..~ing de Sa that he could probably do more to help 
behind the scenes than if he were involved in a formal submission. 
De S~ thereupon submitted his first Note alone. 102 
Halifax commended Rochford for his caution in this respect, 
as well as his support and friendship towards de Sa ; but such an 
important step as a joint submission should not be made without 
100. Article 21, the definitive Treaty of 10 February 1763 ; in 
Z.E. Rashed, The Peace of F~ri~ .176~ (Liverpool,1951), p. 
101. For further details see V.IJ. BrOtm, Studies in the History of S-oain 
(1930), pp.63-69 ; F.P. Renaut, "Etudes sur Ie Pacte de Famille,tI 
(1 ), pp.97-98 ; Coxa, f 
102. SP 9~/169, f.49, Hochford to Halifax, 9 January 1765, Secret & 
Separate. 
specific orders from London, on the King's own authority. 
Rochford himself promis~d Halifax that he would use all the 
caution "an Affair of thiB delicate Nature requires.1I 103 
·For a time it VlaS indeed a delicate affair at Hadrid, 
with a certain amount of backstairs intrigue bebveen the Spanish 
ministers and the French a~b~ssador. Ossun openly expected war 
he accosted Roubion ae Court early in January and ended their 
cOnversation l:1ith thE" cryptic expression, "le Pot bout ! It Roubion 
at once mentioned this to Rochford, \V'ho asked Roubicn to find 
another opportunity to dra\y Ossun out on this topic" vli.thin a few 
days, Roubion had done· so, and confirmed Rochfo~"d' IS impression that 
the ]:'rench ambassador fully expected the pre8~nt tensi(.;.:t bet1rleen 
Spain and Portugal to result in another war. Rochford suspected 
that Choiseul ''las pressing ~he Spanish ministry to adopt an 
intransigent attitude in hO}Jes of provoking such a conflict. 
Rochford \'13.S determined to US~) his influence vii th do S~ to thwart 
such schemes. After closer acquaintance, Rochford had concluded that 
ft}10nsieur de s.i is a very good and a very .sensible Han, but not one 
of the brightest ; He is however very tractable as well as prudent, 
and entirely disposed to follov1 my Advice.U 104 
Grimaldi was aware of Rochford's influence with de S~, 
how 
and anxious to know/the British ambassador viewed the situation 
between Spain and Portugal. Having already set his cousin the 
Nuncio to sound Roubion on this matter, Grimaldi nOlY' sent the 
Venetian ambassador to talk to Rochford, vtho vIas most amused ".hen 
103. SP 94/169, r.64, Halifax to Rochford, 1 February 1765. 
104. SP 94/169, f .11-9, Rochford to Halifax, 9 January 1765, Secret & 
Separate. 
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Hocenigo began in a livery awkward B:anner to pump me [SiC] abvut 
the Affairs of the Brasils. 1I Rochford gave him an answer he hoped 
Grimaldi would recognize as being designed for him rather than the 
Venetian ambassador. This had the desired effect, and within a fevl 
days Grimaldi at last broached the subject to Rochford himself, 
in his coach, whilst taking Rochford to dinner at his (Grimaldits) 
house. 105 
GrimF.ldi began by charging the Portuguese ambassador in 
London, Hello, 'ii th "blovring up the coals ll over the movement of 
Spanish troops near the border with Portugal, which, he assured 
Rochford, lias me:::.'ely the rt..utine changing of garr~Lsons. After some 
Further discourse on this theme, he turned to Rochford and said, 
"unless you force us into Heasm:'es that are repugnant to us, 
by supporting the unjust demands of the Court of Portugal, 
Nothin~~ upon Earth can make us quarrel \iith yoU.!l 
Immediately after dinner, Rochford called on Squilaci, and found 
him lias usual, very open. tI He too begged Rochford to believe that 
they were determined to remain quiet. He then paid Rochford a very 
handsome complimep-t, stating "that such '<las the King of Spain's 
Confidence in me, that He ",:lOuld leave me to be the Arbiter of the 
Portuguese Proposal. 11 (In his report to Halifax, Rocn.ford apologiz ed 
for the apparent v~nity of repeating this, but thought it necessary 
for his infor~ation.) All this Rochford found a trifle disconcert 
"Such solemn Asseverations on one hand, and such ill 
anuearance.s as have been on the other, are, I must ovm, 
.c.l: 
a little embarrassing; but from all I can combine, They 
are, in my Opinjon, determined, if possible, to accommodate 
Hatters with the Court of Portugal ; and the €:xtraordinary 
Court both the Spanish Ministers make to me at present is, 
--~------------------------------.--------'------
105. SP 94/169, f.49, Rochford to Halifax, 9 January 1765, Secret & 
Separate. 
I am persuaded, meant to induce me to soften the 
Portugue~e Minister, as well as"to make a favourable 
106 report ••• of their Intentions here. 1t 
Bochford in fact intended to use his 'softening! arts 
on Grimaldi himself, hoping that he would serve de Sa more 
effectually this ,-laY than "by openly or violently espousing his 
Cause. 1I This proved "to be the case ivi thin a 'vleck of Grimaldi t s 
assurances to Rochford in his coach. GrimaJni was annoyed by what 
he termed the unjust demana.s contained in the Portuguese Note about 
Brazil, Cl.nd in a "violen t Passion 11 told Rochford they would not be 
talked into an "Entorse fl or tvlisting of the "" ... rticle in the Treaty of 
Paris relating to Po?tugal. Rochford had some trouble calming him, 
but finally brought the minister to discuss the matter tI;l;'easonably 
10'1 and moderately.1I 
The Portuguese ambassador was na~urally anxious and 
impatient for a reply to his Note ; Rochford personally thought the 
delay W&S occasioned by its reference to Paris, and tnat de S~ 
would have to wait upon Choiseul's opinion. However, de Sa. \vaS 
bound by the timetable of his 0\-1n Instructions, and had to submit 
a second Office before the end of the month. F~ was very much alarmed 
to hear that Grimaldi was busy examining earlier treaties, because 
his Instructions forbade him to enter into 1....ny sort of discussion 
before the disputed forts had been restored. De Sa was so fearful of 
declaring this before he had an answer tc his first Note, that he 
felt himself in a dilemma. He was so anxious and worried that 
Rochford offered to draft the Note for him, carefully worded so that 
it went no further than was strictly necessary. De s~ readily 
106. SP 94/169, f.61, Rochford to Halifax, -14 January 1765, separate. 
107. SP 94/1 , f.108, Rochford to Halifax, 21 January 1765. 
'108. 
109. 
110. 
111. 
and gratefully accepted this offer, and submitted Rochford's 
draft over his O\fi1 name ; Rochford was gratified to hear later 
that this Note "had been r.mchapproved Of.1I 108 
268. 
'Grimaldi then fairly promptly replied to d~ sa's first 
Note, in a long and detailed Office which argued chiefly that 
Nova Colonia was the only one of these settlements held by Portugal 
at the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), even then under blockade, and that 
the other settlement0 were subsequent encroachmeni,s on Spanish 
territory. Grimaldi also pointed out that the delay in restoring 
Nova Colonia was Dimply because Spain viaS 'V:aiting for Portugal to 
fulfil her part of an agreement of 1760 revising- an earlier 
Convention of 1750, relating to this area. tr,::verthelesD, Spain 
was resolved to abide by th~ peace treaties, a~d would willingly 
enter a negotiation to clarify and settle the points in dispute. 109 
The PorhlGuese ambassador was at first greatly upset 
that this l"'e~')ly appeared so 1L.'1satisfactory in terms of his own 
Instructions ; Spain was obviously bent on that which de Sa had 
been asked to avoid, namely, a protracted negotiation. Rochford 
at once wrote a ~asty reassurance to de Sa, promising to help all 
he could; "je ferai tout ce qui depend de moL" 110 De Sa replied 
generously, convinced that the Spanish ansv/er might have been \-lorse 
. but for Hochford' s good offices \"rith the Spanish ministers on his 
behalf. There was nothing to be done in the meantime but refer the 
h · t t' 111 paper to Lisbon, and a\'Jai t fres J.ns ruc. J.ons. 
SP 94/169, f.114, Rochford to Halifax, 28 ~Tanuary 1765. 
SP 94/169, f.161, copy, Grimaldi to de , 6 February 1765. 
Nassau Papers, E/8, draft, Rochford to D.Ayres de so. y Hello, 
9 February 1765. 
SP 94/169, f .158, Rochford to Halifax, 9 February 1765. 
Rochford hoped to exert some influence on the Spanish 
ministry by means of Squilaci. Though Grimaldi was by not" beyond 
doubt the leading minister, especially in foreign affairs, Squilaci 
retained the King's favour and was consulted privately by Charles III 
on important matters, such as this regarding Portugal. Rochford 
sm., a useful opening here ; lias he [ Squilaci J is easily frightened 
I shall have opportunities of encreasing his fears without 
committing myself." Grimaldi naturally echoed Choiseul, and Rochford 
privately thought that Spain's next moves would d0pead entirely 
on whether or not Choiseul judged the moment opport-cme for war or 
t 112 no • 
As the early months of 1765 slipped by, it became 
lncreasingly obvious that n&ither Choiseul nor Po~bal, the chief 
minister of the Pcrtuguese King, Joseph I, cared to press the issue 
more strongl! at this time. To his immense relief, de Sd was 
advised to take no further steps until instructed to do so, which 
was the usual indicator that a crisis point had passed for the time 
being at least .. As late .a::; Hay, when feeling in Madrid still ran 
very high agains~ Portugal, de Yisme heard that Choiseul had urged 
the Spanish ministers to let the situation cool dovln, and to abide 
very strictly by the ter~s of the peace treaty~ With this, it was--
concluded that the crisis was indeed over. 113 Nova Colonia 
continued under virtual blockade, but the remainder of 1765 saw a 
gradual tha\,l in Hispano-Portuguese relations, with an increase of 
civilities on both sides. Rochford's small contributicns towards 
114 
smoothing a potential flash-point had not been wasted. 
112. SP 94/169, f.158, Rochford to Halifax, 9 February 1765. 
113. SP 94/170, f.98, Rochford to Halifax, 15 April 1765 ; SP 94/170, 
f.148, de Visme to lIalifax, 23 Hay 1765. 
114. V.L. Brown, Studies in the History of Spain (1930), pp.67-70. 
115· 
. 
116. 
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The passing of this brief alarm regarding Portugal also 
conveniently marks the close of the earlier phase of Rochford's 
Madrid embassy, after which he departed for six weeks' leave in 
Paris in April 1765. While he had been extremely busy for much of 
the time in his first year and a half in Spain, Rochford does not 
appear to have enjoyed his scjourn there nearly as much as his 
previous ministry at Turin. His initial impression of the dullness 
of the Court and of social life at Hadrid found no ca·l.~se for 
al tera tion. The Rochfords were plainly glad of tlw company of the 
visi ting French plaYl-lright-to-be, Caron de Beaumarchais, from Hay 
1764 to Harch 1765, "/ho in large measure compens:::ted for the lack 
of English visitors to Hadrid ; unlike Turin \ there Has no constant 
stream of people on the Gra!'l.d Tour at Hadrid. Beaumarchais naturally 
relied chiefly on the hospitality of the French ambassador for his 
meals, but his evenings he divided chiefly between the Rochfords 
and the vivacious Russian arebassadress, Hme Buturlin. 115 
In spite of the improvements instituted by Charles III, 
Madrid was still not a healt.hy place in which to live, and the 
rigorous climate further tested those of weaker constitution. 
Rochford himself lay dangerously ill from I1the Hadrid Cholick lT for 
ten days in August 1764, during \vhich time Squilaci alone of the 
. ." t t" "t h" b d °d 116 Span~sh m~n~s ers came a V~Sl lS e s~ e. 
Life at Madrid agreed even less with Rochford's Secretary 
of Embassy, ColonE:l Ligonier. His health suffered a rapid decline 
in the first part of 176~, and he applied to be rele~8ed from his 
Cynthia Cox, The Re,.;-g Fifiaro_..l.. the career of Caro,n de Beaumarchais 
(London,1962) , pp.28, 71, citing (without references) a letter 
from Beaumarchais to his father j on rIme Buturlin, see Rochford to 
Sandwich, 13 January 1764, Sandwich MSS, printed in Spencer's 
edition of the Sa~~ch "'piEl..:~2.::..tic.......Qs>rJZ..~'?P0ndence (1961); p.l 
SP 94/168, f.L~4, Ligonier to Halifax, 20 August 1764 ; SP 9L~/168, 
f .. 54. Rochford to Halifax. 27 Au~ust 1"[764. 
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duties in order to return to England. Halifax granted him this 
leave in June 1764, but Ligonier was so far weakened by his illness 
that he did not finally leave Spain until September, after the 
hottest p~rt of the summer was over. He carried dispatches to 
London for Rochford, and in a private note to Halif~~ paid tribute 
tf) Rochford I s '>lork at Hadrid ; "JJord Rochford • • has been 
117 indefatigable in promoting the King! s Affa~"rs. tt 
The burden of Ligonier f s work at' Secretary of Embassy 
had fallen upon Rochford's Chaplain, de Visme, who was also the 
ambassador's private secretary. Though de Visme capably managed 
the paperwork of the emb8.ssy after Ligonier's departure, writing 
the body of all Rochford's official dispatches, he had no formal 
credentials as Secretary of Embassy, and could not therefore 
appear at Court or visit the Spanish ministers in Rochford's name 
on official business. Before the end of 1764, Rochford therefore 
applied for ne Visme to je appointed Secret&ry of Embassy in place 
of Ligonier, who clearly had no intention of returning to Spain. 
But by Harch 17G5, Roch:l;ord had to remind Halifax of his request, 
stating that he ''1ould not have mentioned the t::1atter asain, "if it 
118 did not become daily more and more necessary. I. 
Rochford wondered if the fact that de Visme WaS also 
his Chaplain had delayed or obstructed a decision, but in a private 
letter to his friend Sand,dch pointed out that Lewis Dutens, also 
a clergyman, ,,,as actually Charge at Turin. Besides, if this \-/ere 
117. SP 94/167, f.204, Ligonier to Halifax, 25 June 176~ 
f. 74, Rochford to Halifax, 10 September 1764. 
118 .. SP 94/170, f.14, Rochford .to Halifax, 7 Barch 1765. 
SP 94/168, 
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a true objection, it ought properly to come from the Spanish 
themselves, and Grimaldi not only liked and approved of de Visme, 
but had "some time ago concluded it was done and wished me [ROChford] 
joy of it.'" 119 
Sandwich and Halifax had in fact warmly suppcrted 
Rochford's recommendation of de Visme, and the appointment had 
already been ma~e ; notification had not yet reached Rochford in 
Madrid. But it had caused a certain amount of f~iction within the 
Ministry, for Grenville as Chancellor of the Exc~equer had intended 
to suppress the HaJrid Secretaryship of Embassy aR an economy 
measure after Ligonier's return to England. Grenville was furious 
when he discovered that he had not even been consulted about 
de Visme's appointment, but George III upheld the decision of his 
Secretaries of ~jtate, and Rochford's Chaplain duJ.y became his fully-
120 
accredited Secretary of Embassy_ 
De Visme was therefore able to act as Charg~ during 
--
Rochford's absence on leave from April to June 1765, and for this 
purpose Rochford Jeft "lith him detailed instructions on matters 
still under discussion wit~ the Spanish government. Rochford's 
leave was occasioned by the deterioration of Lady Roonford's health, 
which had apparf'ntly suLfered more from the hot climate at Hadrid 
than it had even at Turin. She could stay no longe~ in Spain, and 
Rochford's leave was simply to accompany her aE far as Paris, on her 
Sand"lich HSS, Rochford to Sandvlich, 11 Harch 1765, printed in 
Spencer's editiou of the Sandwich Diplomatic Correspondence (1961), 
p.292. 
120. D.B. Horn, B~itish Diplomatic Repr~?entatives 1689-17~ (London,1 ), 
p.136, gives 23 January 1765 for de Visme's a~pointment, citing 
FO 90/62 ; but the Grenville Corrcs,2.ondence, edited by H.J. Smith 
(London,18S3), III, 119, has Grenville's angry reaction from his 
diary under 24 February 1765. 
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way home to England. It seems likely that she may have stayed in 
Paris for some time with friends, possibly on Rochford's own 
expectation that Paris might be his next appointment. 121 
Lady Rochford had her audiences of leave Vl~ th the King 
and Royal ]'amily shortly before 18 April, the day on vlhich Rochford 
presented de Visme at Court &3 the British representative in his 
absence. After final packing and farewells, the Rochfords set out 
on their journey to Paris on 20 April. Rochford ~xpected to return 
t S ' b h' If t' l' J 122 o paln y lmse some lme ear y ln une. 
1:::1. Sand\vich 1-138, Rochford to Sand\dch, 11 Harch 1765, printed in 
Spencer's edition of the Sahdwich D~nlomatic Corresuondence (1961), 
p.292. 
122. SP 94/170, f.104, Rochford to Halifax, 18 April 1765 ; SP 94/170, 
f.108, de Visme to Halifax, 22 April 1765. 
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B£.Q1lford! s Najor Negotiations at }-ladrid ; 
.t.he Honduras. Log, .. ood Cutters and the Hanila Ransom. 
backGround of British logHood trade aLd settlements 
in Yucatan and Honduras ; Spanish resentment at 
smuggling ; strict inter~retLtioL of Treaty of Paris 
expulsion of cutters frOD Rio Hondo, February 1764. 
Halifax instructs Rochford to protest ; G~imaldi 
at-mit::; report from Governor of Yucc.tan ; Rochford 
anticipates demand fOl' redress ; hi[~ stern tone ; 
Halifax's praise. 
Grimaldi attempts to stall for time ; Rochford traps 
him in conversation; Governor's report appears~ 
August 1764 ; Rochford's illness j British preparations 
to reinstate cutters. 
R~chford bullies Grimaldi~ 13 SeptGmber ; speaks to 
Squilaci, 15 SClJtember ; Coun~ Meeting next day 
concedes Hochford I s two mai~1 demands ; Rochford adds 
to instructions for Governor of Yucatan ; submits 
further Note on reparations ; dispute resolved. 
Halifa;}: overjoyed ; Rochford t1:rmks Sanci\'Tich for his 
advice ; Halifax content to drcp reparations c~aim. 
the Britis'l:l conquest of Hanila, October 1762 ; cerms 
of capitUlation ; the ransom demand ; Governor Rojo 
drat-IS on Spanish Royal Treasury. 
Rochford's first demand, December 1763 ; Grimaldi's 
flat refusal ; ranson issue delayed by the case of 
the San tisil;ta 'l'rinidad. 
--- ...... 
Comlay replaces Halifax; revives ransat1 demand, 
August 1765 ; Grimaldi's heated refusal; Rochford's 
rote of 6 Se~)te!:lber ; Rochford f13.vourl1 a firm line ; 
Grimaldi avoids him; Hochford's analysis of Spanish 
Hinistry. 
the Spanish Ans'tler of 29 September ; Commy delays 
draftins a Heply ; Spanish military preparcd;ions ; 
rUMo~rs of war ; Rochford fears weakening British 
attitude. 
Conway's ~eplyof 26 November ; Rochford adds his 
0\111 unoffic i13.l l1nenace 11 ; Grimaldi's 8.n8\,ler of 19. 
January 1766 not an outright refusal. 
Rochford insists on full sat ~20n ; anticipates 
•• " .." ... '" . .L t" • compromlse Oi~er ; bpa1n sugges~s arOl~ra -10n , 
Conwav offers cash comnosition after Rochford leaves 
lladrid ; tuicc rejected ; Hochford t s hard-
\-[on Ground lost. 
9HAP'l'ER 10 
Ro~hford's Major Negotiations at Madrid 
the Honduras Logwood-Cutters 
and the Manila Ransom 
The question of British logwood-cutters settling on the 
coa~of Honduras, and the more complex dispute over the so-called 
Manila Ransom, were both troublesome legacies from the Seven Years' 
War and the Peace of Paris. From the British vie'rlpoint, the 
Honduras logwood issu\:: had be€'u decided in Arti~le 17 of the peace 
treaty, and with this strong support the minor dis~grecment of 1764 
was fairly readily settled to Britain's advar.-;age.. By contrast, 
hov,rever, the !1a!-. .i.la Ransom was not sv much as mentioned in the 
-treaty of 1763, and tIle dispute which arose in 1765 developed into 
a prolonged crisis, even threatenil~g a renewal of hostilities, 
until, long after Rochford had left Madrid, the British government 
simply let the m~tter drop unresolved : a signal triumph for Spain. 
Rochford fulfilled a key r~le in both negotiations. 
Indeed, his zeal and success in the Honduras logwood affair suggest 
a partial explanation fOl Spain's sternly intransigent attitude 
regarding the Hanila Rall,som. In tracing Rochford's work at f.ladrid 
to resolve these two uisputes, this chapter sheds light not only 
upon Rochford's own abilities and shortcomings as a diplomat, but 
also upon his relationship with the Spanish ministers, and their 
relationship in turn with each other and with Charles III. In 
addition, the Manila episode sheds light on both French and Spanish 
policies towards Eritain after the peace of 1763. 
2'75· 
Camps and settlements for the extraction of logwood 
had been established by British subjects along the coasts and 
major rivers of Yucatan and Honduras since the early seventeenth 
century. This timber was then a major source of fixing dye for 
the textile industries of Europe, and made a profitable trade for 
the cutters and the privateers who transported their timber. The 
British settler~ came chiefly from Jamaica, and were originally 
established in lour main arHas : in the Gulf of ~ampeche, especially 
around Laguna de Terminos (whence they were expalled in 1717) ; 
along the Yucatan Peninsula to Cape Cateche ; in the Bay of Honduras, 
with their main centre at Belize ; and finally to the south, along 
the Nosquito Coast" from Cape Gracias ft Dios to the Rio San Juan. 1 
The logwood-cutters used African slave labour, yet were 
able to mainta'~n better relations vdth the native Indians than the 
Spanish authorities, so that recurrent attempts by Spain to exert 
closer control over these areas were usually frustrated. Although 
the Spanish government cont~nued to make occasional complaints about 
the presence of British ~nterlopers, in practice the logwood-cutters 
were left unmolested for m~st of the time. Any attempts by Britain 
to gain recognition of the cutters I claims to settlement were, 
however, strenu~~sly resisted at Madrid. 2 
1. See Appendix B for a Hap shmving the location of these areaS. 
2. J.A. Burdon, Archives of British Honduras (London,1931-5), I, 2-78 ; 
J.A. Calderon Quijax\o, Belies, 1663(?)-18'21 (Sevll1e,1941+), pp.1-50. 
I am grateful to Dr Juan Antonio Lalaguna for drawing my attention 
to these works, and to tho discussion in his "England, Spain, and 
the Family Compact, 176:'J··1783"(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University 
of London,1968) , pp.123-126, which also cites A.M. vlilson, liThe 
Log\1Tood Trade in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, II in Essay,s 
in the H~story of Modern Europe, edited by D. McKay '(New York,1936), 
and J. NcI.eish, ItBri tish acti vi ties in Yucatan and on the Hoski to 
Shore in the Eighteenth Century,'! (unpublished M.A. thesis, University 
of London,1926). I have not yet seen H.S. Soraby, lIThe British 
Superintendency of the Mosquito Shore, 1749-1787,lt(unpublished Fh.D. 
thesis, University of London,1969). 
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By the middle of the eighteenth century the logwood trade 
had suffered from over-supply and falling p~ices, encouraging some 
among the British settlers in Honduras to engage in cuntraband trade 
with Spain's colonial territories and to export mahogany under cover 
of the logwood. Both activities were not only highly illegal but 
also greatly offensive to the Spanish authorities, who lacked the 
means to curb t~em. It was therefore only to be expected that Spain 
should attempt to secure a ~tricter definition o~ the British 
presence in Honduras and Yucatan at tho negotiations for the Peace 
of Paris during 1762. Spain's misfortunes in the war of 1762 put 
her in a weak ba:cgaining position, however, and the British refused 
to be drawn into any such limitation, insistin.g rather on recognition 
of their claim to extract logwood from this otherwise neeJected area 
of the Spanish ~mpire. 3 
The final version of the article in the definitive treaty' 
relating to Honduras is perhaps the most inconclusive in the ,,;hole 
document as regards territorial definition, though its recognition 
of the presence of British logwood-cutters on Spanish territory is 
clear and unmista:keble. 0:1, condition that t.l.:e cutters demolish the 
forts they had built I'd~ns la Baye de Honduras, et autres lieux 
du territoire de l'Espagne, dans cette Partie du Monda," Spain 
guaranteed their right to continue cutting and extracting logwood 
4 
without molestation Hdans les dits Lieux." 
3. Lalaguna,pp.128-'133, has a full discussion of the negotiations ; 
see also Z.E. Rashed, Th~ Peace of Paris, 1763 (Liverpool,1951), 
pp.171,180, and F.P. R(~!:aut,IIEtudes sur le Pacte de Famille et la 
poli tique coloniale frant;?aise, 1760-'1792,11 Re_vue des Colonies 
franqaises (1922), pp.72-74. For a wider perspectiv:e on the logwood 
issue, see also L.H. Gipson, IIBritish Diplomacy in the light of 
Anglo-Spanish New World Issues, 1750-1757,!! American Historical 
Reviev1, LI (1946), pp.627-648, and J. McLachlan, liThe Seven Years' 
Peace," English Historical Review, LIII (1938), pp.457-477. 
4. Rashed, Peace of Paris, p.222 (text of the treaty, Article 17). 
Grimaldi later told Rochford that Bedford, as British negotiator at 
Paris, had been obstinate as a mule il j hence the compromise 
phrase, Illes dits Lieux.!l Bodleian Library, Oxford; Lyell NSS, 
Empt .. 37 ; Rochforci1s Madrid I~otebook, fos.184v-183v. (not in SP) .. 
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The treaty ruling was a distinct reverse for Spain ; 
within a month of receiving news of the peace, the logwood-cutters 
had returned to their accustomed camp-sites, and resumed work, after 
first dismantling their forts. Nevertheless, at Hadrid, the 
Minister for the Colonies, Don Julian Ariaga, was determined to 
place as strict an interpret&tion as possible on the imprecise 
wording of Article 17, and sent orders to the Governor of YUcatan 
that he should keep ~ close watch on the British logwood-cutters, 
respecting their rights under the treaty in their accustomed places, 
but not tolerating any new establishments' encroachi~g further on 
Spanish territory. 5 
The Governor of Yucatan, Don Felipe Ramirez de Estenoz, 
had already satisfied himself that the cutters had demolished their 
forts. But in so dOing, his officers had found newly established 
camps on the Rio H0ndo, barely five leagues from the Spanish 
outpost at Ba.calar. Acting in the spirit of Ariaga's instructions, 
Ramirez sent a small deputation to the Rio Hondo early in February 
1764, warning the cutters that unless they could produce a cedula 
from the Spanish government or a licence from their own government 
authorizing their presence there, then they should immediately 
retire to Belize. On 23 February, the Commander at Bacalar, Don 
Jos' de Rosado, on his own initiative threatened the cutters both 
at the Rio Hondo and at Rio Nuevo further along the coast with 
forcible eviction. At this, the cutters and their dependants, some 
500 people in all, hastily withdrew to Belize, abandvning valuable 
6 
equipment and stores. 
5. Lalaguna, p.133, citing Calderon Quijano, BE~lice, i663S-?,)-1 1, 
p.197. See also V.L. BrO\m~ IfAnslo-Spanish Relations in America 
in the closing years of the colonial era, II Hispanic .American 
B~storical Review, V (1922), pp.359-360. 
6. Lalaguna, pp.134-5 ; BrO\m, pp.36o-362, citing correspondenqe in 
SP 94/16?, fos.68-93_ Coxe, Kine;s of Spain (1815), III, pp.296-7, 
cites a contemporary estimate of £ 27,000 for these losses~ 
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From Belize, the displaced logwood-cutters sent a 
petition to the Governor of Jamaica, Lord Lyttelton, with copies 
of their correspondence with the Spanish authorities. Lyttelton 
was no longer at Jamaica, but the Commander in Chief, Sir William 
Burnaby, at once wrote to the Governor of Yucatan, and reported the 
whole matter to London. 7 
Rochford first heard of these evpnts at the start of 
July, when he received a bulky packet comp:--ising further copies of 
the papers received from Jamaica. Halifax's covering letter of 
15 June pointed out that the Spanish action WB.S in blatant violation 
of Article 17 of the peace treaty, and requested Rochford to make 
the necessary rep~~sentations to the Spanish government. Specifically, 
Rochford was to demand, politely' but firmly, immediate orders to 
the Governor of Yucatan for the restoratio~ of the British logwood-
cutters to their rightful position. 8 
Grimaldi agreeu, when Rochford spoke to him on this mateer, 
that the actions of the Governor of Yucatan and the Commander of 
Bacalar seemed unwarranted, and promised Rochford that orders 
would be sent at once to restore the cutters to their rights under 
the treaty. As a matter of form, he asked Rochford to submit this 
request in writing. Grimaldi's rejoinder to this Office repeated 
his promise to renew tithe most strict Orders" that no Olte should 
disturb the logwood~cutters, but pointed out that the King still 
awaited the Governor's own report, and until th~s was received 
no action could be taken. 9 
7. Brown, pp.361-2. 
8. SP 94/167, f.60, Halifax to Rochford, 15 June 1764, enclosing copies 
of correspondence between Joseph Haud, spokesman for the cutters, 
Burnaby, Rosado, and Ramirez de Estenoz, with various testimonies 
and depositions (fos.68-93). 
9. SP 94/167, f.214, Rochford to Halifax, 8 July 1764, enclosing copies 
of Rochford to Grimaldi, 4 July 1764, and Grimaldi to Rochford, 
7 July 1764 (fos.218-222). 
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nochford saw no cause for disquiet in this, and made 
his report of 8 July confident that the matter was as good as 
settled. It was, however, barely the start. A translation of 
Grimaldi's- reply, which Rochford enclosed , .. i th t.his report, was 
promptly pl,lblishedin the London Gazette, \'1here George Grenville, 
First Lord of the Treasury and head of the British Hinistry, 
noticed the phrase that no one should disturb the logwood-cutters 
Ifin the stipulated Places. II He immediatel~1 expressed some misgivings 
to Halifax, in a note cf July, that this wording held promise of 
further disputes with Spain over the definition and thereby limitation 
of the British cutting areas, which had been carefully avoided in 
Article 17 of the peace treaty. 10 
Halifax had ~~ready suggested to Rochford that he might 
d~op a hint to the Spanish ministers regarding redress for the 
losses suffered by the dispossessed cutters, and disavowal if not 
indeed puniShment of the Governor of Yucatan, !lfor a Proceeding so 
contrary to the Good Faith of Treaties, & destructive of the 
11 PUblick Peace." After receiving Grenville'S note, Halifax now 
hardened this suggestion into formal instructions, and ordered 
Rochford to demand and insist upon immediate s~tisfacrion and 
12 
redress. 
With his usual enthusiasm, Rochford had virtually 
anticipated these sterner instructions by dropping the suggested 
hint in the form of a strongly worded Note which he handed to 
Grimaldi on 27 July. Not only did the Note demand redress and 
reparation for the cutters, together with disavowal ?nd punishment 
of the Governor of Yucatan, but Rochford accompanied it with 
10. Grenville Papers, edited by \V.J. Smith (London,1852-3), II, 409. 
11. SP 94/167, f.176, Halifax to Rochford, 3 July 1764. 
12. SP 94/167, f .. 228, Halifax to Rochford, 24 July 1764. 
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a little speech of "great Firmness," in which he reminded the 
Spanish mini~ter that is~ues as apparently trivial as this had 
been the cause of more than one war in the past. Grimaldi listened 
with "uncommon Attention,1I and apart from complaining that 
Article 17 was very vaguely worded, ended the interview looking 
somewhat troubled. Rochford was not in the least alar:ned that he 
might have overreached himself, for in his opinion, "There is 
Nothing they will not do to avoid quarrell~ng with Us at this Time." 
tater he heard that Charl~s III had "spoken very favourablyU of 
Rochford t s spirited conduct to both his p!'incipal l!,inisters. 13 
Nevertheless, Rochford also though i; that the!'e '.'lould be 
no end of such diffe~ences hnd disputes until the cutting areas 
were more closely defined, for the Spanish ministers wer9, he found l 
convinced that the cutters wanted to operat~ only at those places 
most suitable for contraband trade. He felt sure that if Britain 
nominated more remote areas where the logwood wa~ plentiful and 
"easily ~ot," then the Spanish would prove very coSporativeo Rochford 
had heard an anecdote at Court which related that during the \iar 
Charles III had in a moment of exasperation proposed setting fire 
to the forests in that part of the world to pr~vent all possible 
connexion with Britain there llwhich Scheme [ROChford Observed] 
tho' a very wild one, proves how prepossess~d They are of our People's 
carrying on an illicit Trade, under the Pretence of cutting 
14 Logwood. It 
Far from disapproving of Rochford's anticipation of his 
instructions to adopt a firmer line at Hadrid, Halifax was delighted, 
13. SP 94/167, f.253, Rochford. to Halifax, 30 July 1764. 
14. SP94/168, f.5, Rochford to Halifax, 6 August 1764. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
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and so was George III. It is unusual to find any personal 
element in the letters issuing from the office of the Secretary of 
State to diplomats in the field, yet in his next letter to Rochford 
Halifax adopted an informRI tone, and confessed hl.s "great Pleasure ll 
to have it in particular command to assure Rochford that the King 
f~lly approved his "firm and spirited, at the same time moderate 
and temperate Language" at Hadrid. 15 
Before this exceptional praise cnuld make his ears burn, 
Rochford received Grimaldi's reply to his Note of 27 July. It Was 
yery brief, since there was still no report from the Governor of 
. Yucatan, and while G:t'imaldi repeated Charles Ill's aSSl.A.rances to 
uphold Article 17, his main point was that it would be manifestly 
unjust to punish the Governor without hearing hisversioIJ of the 
affair. Rochfor~ recognised this as a devi~e to buy time, and 
therefore drew Grimaldi into further discussi0n, in which Grimaldi 
inadvertently acknowledged that the Rio Nue\lo was an old-established 
cutting site, unlike that on the Rio Hondo. Rochford pounced on this, 
and asked why the cutters at Rio Nuevo had been threatened as well 
with forcible eviction ; Grimaldi was embarra8~ed for a reply_ 16 
In fact, Grimaldi was just as anxious and impatient as 
Rochford at the delay in receiving the Governor's repcrt. He had 
earlier complained privately to Rochford of the slowness which 
characterized the Department for the Indies, where the desired 
report was probably at that moment making its w~y through the usual 
labyrinthine channels. Rochford could well believe this, having 
already decided that Ariaga was "the most tedious C'.c \vell as the 
most confused Han in his Ideas I ever met with." 17 
SP 94/168, f.13, Halifax to Rochford, 24 August 1764. 
SP 94/168, f.17, Rochford to Halifax, 13 August 1764. 
SP 94/168, f.5, Rochford to Halifax, 6 August 1764. 
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The Governor's report did not in fact surface until 
the very end 'of August, and proved to be the anticlimax Halifax 
had prophesied. Rochford observed that it painted a markedly 
different picture from th~t contained in the ~orrespondence between 
Mr Maud and the Spanish authorities, suggesting the utmost mildness 
and politeness in their exchanges, as if the cutters had themselves 
wanted to vii thdraw to Belize! The report !'eached Roch.ford as he 
was convalescing from a severe bout of the 'Madrid Cholick' which 
had confined him to beel f n' ten days during August, leaving him 
much weakened . limy Head is not yet very fit for Business. II He knew , 
that Grimaldi had ser~t papers and maps to the Spanish ambassador 
in London in the ru~antime, intending to transfer the negotiation 
t.here and thus to incraase the opportunities for delay, but Rochford 
also knew that H~lifax was unlikely to cov~cenance such a change, 
'i~ 
and therefore "/arned Grima.ldi that he expected fresh instructions. 
This surmise was soon justified. Rochford's earlier 
reports had cOllvinced Halifax that a show of strength would have 
great effect, and that further delay would lose that advantage. 
There was no need for closer de.finition of Art~cle 17. since the 
Governor had clearly contravened the treaty as it stood, whatever 
excuses his report offered, and since his action had ~ot been 
disavowed at Madrid, it could only be assumed that he was approved. 
Rochford was again to demand immediate reparation, redress, and 
satisfaction, but this time with the threat that unless a prompt 
response was forthcoming, Britain would be compelled to take 
Ilproper Heasures!l to reinstate her subjects. This was no idle 
threat, for Cabinet meetings early in September authorized the 
18. SP 94/168, f.60, Rochford to Halifax, 29 August 1 ; the maps are 
earlier mentioned in f.17, Rochford to Halifax, 13 August 1764. 
addition of two warships to the Jamaica squadron, and the despatch 
of orders to Burnaby to collect forces for the reinstatement of the 
British logwood-cutters on the coast of Honduras. 19 
Rochford rec~i\ed his fresh instructions by special 
messenger on 11 September. He was clearly glad to be given such 
a positive directive, and relieved that he could now exe~t his 
efforts to the full, as his immediate comment to Halifax reveals 
"now I will be responsible that this Affa.ir shall be decided one 
way or another, for I am convinced that nothing but mischief can 
arise from its being suspended. 1I He was as gt>od as his word, and 
effectively reso~ved the crisis within a week of intensive 
t · t' 20 nego 1.a l.ons. 
Both King and Court were away on a great ·partie de Chasse' 
on 12 September. so that Rochford did not see Grl.ma1di ~nti1 the 
morning of the 13th. Convinced that the Spanish would do all they 
could to avoid a showdown, Rochford judged that "the mor.e I frightned 
them, the easier I could car'ry my point:' and he thereforg began very 
briskly, accusing Grimaldi of drawing him into 'a Scrape' by trying 
to shift the negotiation to London. Upon rea1ing out that part of 
Halifax's instructl.ons which rejected this move utterly, Grimaldi 
"clasped his hands together, and the Tears came into his Eyes 
Good God, says he, how then can it ever be adjusted?" Rochford's 
aggressive tone had greater effect than he had expected : I1Finding 
this operate very strongly, I took a softer tone ••• n 
19. SP 94/168, f.27, Halifax to Rochford, 30 August 1764 ; La1aguna, 
p.139, for the Cabinet meeting of 2 September, citing EM Add MSS 
35425, f.62 ; Sandwich Diplomatic Correspondence, edited by 3pencer 
(1961),pp.208-210 and 227 for the Cabinets of 5 and'21September. 
20. SP 94/168, f.78, Rochford to Halifax, 17 September 1764, contains 
a daily journal for this week, 13 to 17 September ; it is printed 
extensively in Coxe, Memoirs of the Kings of Spain (1815), III, 
300-304 .. 
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For two hours, Rochford and Grimaldi canvassed the 
basic issues raised by the logwood-cutters' expulsic~~ Rochford 
reminded Grimaldi that he still awaited a satisfactory answer to 
his Note of 27 July, and there viaS no conceivable reason for further 
delay now that a report had been received from the Governor of 
Yucatan. Grimaldi finally conceded that he was quite willing to let 
Britain have all that she claimed along the coast of Yucatan and 
Honduras, so long as there existed clear stipulations preventing 
any encroachments elsewhere, for example in Mexico. Since Britain 
claimed no right to go there, he could not quite understand her 
reluctance to ha'/e th:i.s stated plainly and publicly. 
Grimaldi was then called away to Court. Rochford went 
with him, and afterwards they dined together, then visited the 
Queen Mother, before l'eturning to Grimaldi I s office to resume their 
talks. RochfC'l:d -chought this indica ted how seriously Grimaldi 
-r{!garded the dispute ; IIhe does not like quitting his party of cards 
in an afternoon. 1I Grimaldi attempted to distinguish between the 
spirit and the letter uf Article 17, arguing that Britain's 
interpretation failed to accord with the literal sense of the clause. 
The difference, Grimaldi claimed, was that between an occasional 
privilege and the grantin:! of a prior right. 
At this, Rochford got up and said he was sorry to find 
that Grimaldi "stopped at such a trifle," for unless satisfaction 
was given at once, B~itain would be obliged to take her threatened 
measures, and this \-,/QuId inevitably "sonner Ie tocsin de la guerre. iI 
Grimaldi was startled by Rochford's sudden bluntness; !!Vous avez 
raison, dit-il, et j'atteste Dieu que je ferai tout ce qui depend 
de moi pour l'eviter.1! In support of this assurance, Grimaldi 
showed Rochford his latest lettdTs irem Paris, which he claimed 
demonstrated that France was as reluctant as Spain to pick a 
quarrel with Britain at this time. He pointed out a passage from 
one letter. in which Choiseul remarked that they would settle all 
their differenceo except that of the Canada Bills ; Britain claimed 
so much it would be cheaper to go to war again! Having thus eased 
the moment of tension, (trimalcli suggested that Rochford submit a 
Pr6cis of his instructions, which he could make use of with the 
King-;- and again promis~~d to do his utmost to resolve the matter as 
soon as possible. 
After this exhausting three hour discussion, Rochford 
and Grimaldi "cr-:tme out •• to~ether arm in arm in the best humour 
that could be,t: to find the French ambassador in the next room 
playing cards with thG other foreignministcrn ; "he seemed greatly 
confounded at sf.~ing such harmony be ";';we en us ,Il observed Rochford 
"'.i.th a trace of impish delight. Next day, 14 September, Rochford 
gave Grimaldi the Precis he had re~uestedt which was taken directly 
to Charles III. That afternoon, a Council was called for the 
following day, 15 September, and Grimaldi informed Rochford that 
he should have an answer for him on the 16th. 
Rochford therefore decided to visit Squilaci on the 
morning of 15 September, tefore the Council met. Squilaci listened 
to Rochford's account 0:: his talks with Grimaldi, then declared 
that Britain's dema:r>.c1 had greatly alarmed the King, and that he 
(Squilaci) had done his utmost to soften their impact the day before. 
Rochford merely observed that now it would be seen whether Grimaldi's 
IIPacifick intentions were as sincere as he had always professed. ll 
At this, Squilaci took Rochford's hand and earnestly added, liN ow 
I shall see if ,Y-0ur intentions are serious or no! fI 
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He then asked Rochford whether Britain would discuss 
the matter further if Spain disavowed the Governor and reinstated 
the logwood-cutters, "that you may not have an unlimited right 
to run over all America. 1I Rochford could not answer this directly, 
knowing that Halifax wanted to avoid any cloBer definition of the 
British cutting areas, but he assured Squilaci that Spain ran no 
risk in settling the affront first, for even if Britai.n refused to 
discuss the mat-l:er afterwards, Spain could always "/arn them if the 
cutters trespassed too far.. Squilaci saw that it ''Iould be fruitless 
and possibly dangero~s for Spain to insist on clarifying talks as 
a condition of sfttling the present dispute, and he assured Rochford 
that he would do all he could at the Council meeting to :preserve 
the peace ; "it .. 1111 not be my fault if this Affai!" is not a.djusted. II 
Immediately after the King's levee ou 16 September, 
Rochford went to see Grimaldi for neliS of t:,:.~ Council's deliberations, 
and "a great deal of very warm debate" proceeded to occupy the 
morning. Grimaldi had been instructed at the Council to reply to 
the two main points of Rochfordts Note of 27 July, namely, the 
disavowal of the Governor and the reinstatemp~t of the cutters. 
Rochford interrupt~d he~e. pointing out that thera WaS a third point 
as well, that of reparation for the losses suffered. From the 
information Halifax had sen-1:; him, Rochford had prepal.'~d another 
Office detailing the losses incurred, and now produ:ed this paper. 
Grimaldi became highly agitated, and begged Roc~ford not to submit 
it, as it would aigrir les esprits and defeat the solution he had 
secured in Council. Th:.s solution waS no less than a complete 
surrender by Spain on the first two points of Rochford's demand, 
and Grimaldi commenced drafting a letter of reproof to the Governor 
of Yucatan with Rochford looking on. It was a stern rebuke, 
21. 
22. 
pointing out that he ought to have referred the matter to Madrid 
instead of taking steps which could have international repercussions, 
and instructing him to reinstate the cutters to their former sites 
immediately. Grimaldi then handed the paper to Rochford, who 
altered one or two expressions, then added another ~hree lines 
himself ; !land let them know that they may return to the'l.r occupation 
of cutting logweod vlithout disquieting or disturbing them under 
any pretence \'lhcltever. 11 21 
Grimaldi promised Rochford a duplicate of this letter 
as an effective answer to his Note. Rochford reminded Grimaldi 
that there was no mention of reparations, yet his own orders were 
to insist on this and not be satisfied without it. Grimaldi at once 
remarked that the British ministry must be more unreaGunable than 
he had believe~~ 
Rochford considered for a moment, then decided it would 
be prudent to accept the duplicate as an answer ; as he explained 
to Halifax, III think the escential points are already gained, [and] 
I am sure I could not have gained more at time.1! As for the 
reparations, these could still be insisted u~on separately, without 
prejudice to the present settlement. 
As a r€sult, on the following day, when Grimaldi sent 
Rochford a duplicate of the order to the Governor of. Yucatan, 
Rochford in return submitted a revised version of his prepared 
Office on the reparc.tions, so that the duplicate could not thereafter 
be claimed as a full satiRfaction. ldith this, the immediate crisis 
22 
was resolved. 
SP 94/168, f.90, copy and translation, Grimaldi to Ramirez de 
Estefioz, 16 ember 1764. 
this and the preceding three pages are based on Rochford's detailed 
journal in SP 94/168, f.78, Rochford to Halifax, 14-17 September 1764. 
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Rochford's lengthy report of these negotiations, 
enclosing the dr~plicate of the orders sent to the Governor of 
Yucatan, reached London on 27 September·, just a week after Halifax 
had directed the Admiralty to order the assembly of ~ fleet at 
Jamaica to reinstate thE' logwood-cutters by force.. Halifax at once 
revoked this directive; George III observed to Grenville that 
"Lord Halifax was almost out of his wits with joy, at the answer 
from Spain.1I 23 This joy perva~ed his next letters to Rochford, 
which conveyed fulsome praise for Rochford's "Zeal, Dispatch, 
and great Ability': in executing his orders so succesofully. Both 
the King and Halifax agreed that Rochford was wise not to press the 
reparations issue; nit does much honour to y,)ur Judgment that, 
by your very Prudent Choice of the Time & the }1an!ler of formally 
re:uewing that Dcm:md," Rochford had preseryed the settlement as 
24 
well as kept the q~estion of reparations open. 
Nhile Rochford's prudence and judgment were undoubtedly 
his own, it seems likely that his unusually belligerent tone 
towards Grimaldi had received encouragement from another source. 
In a private let~er of 17 September, Rochford thanked Sandwich for 
his advice during August : 
UYour friendly hints have been of great use to me and 
I have put every art in practice to gain more than I [COUld 1] 
have done. They have certainly here done much more than 
they intended and ... will avoid a rupture at any rate." 25 
.. Grenville Papers, edited by '.l.J. Smith (-1852), II, 51, ... 7, Grenville's 
Diary, for 3 October 176It.(earlier on 27 September for the arrival 
of the dispatches.) 
24. SF 94/168, fos.111 and 118, Halifax to Rochford, 28 September and 
5 October 1764. 
25. Sandwich Papers, Rochford to Sandwich, 17 September 1764, Private, 
printed in Sandwich Diplomatic Correspondence, edited by F. Spencer 
(Manchester,i961), pp.221-2. 
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Charles III was also pleased that the logwood question 
had been resolved so promptly, and in an audience of 19 October, 
at which Rochford conveyed George Ill's assurances that Britain 
would stamp out any illicit trading by the cutters~ he chatted very 
freely, adding personal compliments which Rochford modestly 
protested to Halifax "would ~e too much Vanity in me to mention.1I 26 
Grimaldi, ho·,lever, grumbled that there seemed no 
inclination on Britaia's part to define the limita of the cutting 
areas in Honduras ; IIhe said a great deal more in thp. same peevish 
Stile, that we were ever an enterprizing Nation, and had extensive 
views of Commerce that could hot be borne .. " Roc:':"dord had to "let him 
cool a little!! before he could again raise the subject of reparations, 
but Grimaldi said he had done ~ll he could and wished Rochford 
would not speak of the matter again. Rochford guessed that this 
was partly because of If the Emptyness of their Coffers,fl but Grimaldi 
later admitted that he did not dare mention the matter to Charles III, 
?ince the King already felt he had conceded far more than Britain 
deserved. Halifax was content to leave the matter there. 27 
In fact, reparations were never paid, although Rochford 
had carefully laid the b~sis for any subsequent claim, and the 
logwood-cutters were restored to their former sites early in 1765. 
There they remained undist~rbed for more than a decade, only to fall 
easy prey lIfhen Spain joined the American War of Independence against 
Britain in 1779. 28 
SP 94/168, f .. 147, Rochford to Halifax, 27 October 1764 ; Rochford 
was introduced at his audience by limy Friend!! the Duke of Losada .. 
SP 94/168, f. 162, Halifax to Rochford, 23 November 1764 ; ibid., 
fos.147 and 258, Rochford to Halifax, 27 October and 17 December 1764. 
For the reinstatement of the cutters, see V.L. BrC\·m, IlAnglo-Spanish 
Relations in America,!I Hispanic American, Historical Revie .. r, V ('1 ), 
pp_366-8 ; Burnaby's report "!tlaS p:tin "Ced in the A:qnual Re.£istt;r ('1765), 
pp.99-100, and in the London Hagazine, XXXIV (1765), pp.3"!5-b. 
29. 
30. 
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Despite Britain's dark threats of 'proper Measures', the 
Hondura.s logwood issue vtaS much too trivial by itself to warrant 
another war, nor indeed were the powers of the Family Compact 
willing to renew hostilities at this time. It is surely significant 
that Grimaldi's concessions in the Honduras affair came soon after 
the Spanish government had received news from Paris t:aat 8hoiseul 
had decided to avoid any further quarrel in. the Tur~s Island dispute 
of June 1764 be ·;ween I3ri tain and France. 29 
The dispute between Britain and Spain over payment of 
the so-called 11ani1a Ransom, on the other hand, held out a much 
livelier danger of renewed conflict, since the Bri~ish demands met 
with determined refusal at Hadrid. 
The British conquest of Manila was une of the last major 
operations of the Anglo-Spanish War of 1,62, and ~as planned in 
conjunction with the British East India Company to provide the 
Company with an alternative ~mtrepot to Portuguese Canton. In fact, 
the appearance of the British squadron under Admiral Cornish and 
Sir William Draper at Eanila late in September '1762 was the first 
indication the city had that a state of war existed between Britain 
and Spain. Under thE' leadership of the acting Governor, Archbishop 
Rojo, the city mounted a spirited resistance, but after heavy 
bombardment the attacking forces breached the defences on 6 October 
1762, and the Governor immediately sued for terms of capitulation. 30 
Lalaguna, p .143, oi ting A,:'chi vo General de Simancas, ~;stado, legaj 0 
4565, Grimaldi to Fuentes, 13 August and 17 September 1764 ; legajo 
4681, Fuentes to Grimaldi, 3 September 1764. In London, Sandwich 
remarked upon the similarities between the Turks IsI~nd and Honduras 
logwood disputes; §andwich Dinlomatic Correspondence (1961), pp.193-
214, passim, especially p.199 of 15 August 1764. 
Documents illustrating the British Conquest of Manila, 1762-1763, 
edited by N.P. Cushner (London,1971), pp.11-120, is now the best 
printed account of the prepara~1ons and conquest ; shorter accounts 
appear in v.'r. Harlovl, 'l'he .F:ounding of the Second British Empir...£" 
1763-93 (London,1952) , I, pp.75-77, and in H.H. Stephens and H.E. 
BoltOD, The Pacific Ocean in History (New York,1917), pp.192-213. 
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The terms of capitulation were accompanied by a demand 
that the Gove::nor and Council of Nanila pay an indemnity of four 
million dollars to spare the city from plunder half to be paid at 
once and t~e remainder at a time to be decided. Archbishop Rojo 
immedia~ely agreed to this condition, offering the contents of 
various public funds and the silver aboard the vessel Philipina, 
shortly expected from Acapulco. If these sources did not satisfy 
the full amount, the Governor promised to iBsue Bills of Exchanee 
payable by the Treasury of the King of Spain. This was the 
notorious Hanila Ransom. )i 
British troops and their Sepoy auyiliaries had already 
commenced looting in some parts of the city, but Draper soon put a 
stop to this, even hangi::lg on the spot soldiers who \-.fere caught in 
the act of disobeying his orders. The goods plundered were then 
gatherea in a central place and their value (about 26,000 dollars) 
added to the total for the ransom. From public and privato funds, 
a furthe~ 500,000 dollars ~as collected, but it was a~su~ed that 
most people had hidden or buried their wealth. The silver-ship 
Philipina was never taken, and its treasure appo.ren tly found its \'lay 
into the hands of local resistance forces in th0 inter~or led by Don 
Simon Anda. In February 1763 Archbishop Rojo therefore drew up a 
Bill for two million dollars on the Spanish ~reasury anti handed it 
to the British Commander. 32 
31. Gushner, Documents illustrating the British Conquest of Manila, 
pp.122-'124 • 
• Guehner, pp.125-139, 161,168-174. Draper lei'tEanLt3. on '11 November 
1762. News of the capture of ~anila reached Europe too late to affect 
the peace settlement, and report of the ~reaty of Paris was not to 
reach Hanila until August 1763. The iJhilippines were thereupon handed 
back to Spain, and the British finally left the islands early in 1764: 
Cuehner pp.1S4-205; Harlow, =, 76-77. See also brief accounts of 
the CapIt;lation in Coxa, Memoirs of the Kings of Spain (1815), III, 
307, and Ranaut, :lEtudes sur Ie Pacte de Familla,;' R;:vue des Col1jnies 
Francaises (1922), p. • I have not yet seen H. de la Costa, liThe 
Siege and Capture of Man by the British, September-Cctobe~ 1762,11 
Philippine S..!.udies, X (1962), 607-653, cited in Cushner, p.2, note 5· 
292. 
Almost exactly a year to the day from the fall of Hanila, 
a copy of this Bill for t\fO million dollars was forwarded to 
Rochford (then at Paris on his ~lay to Madrid), with orders to 
obtain its full payment as soon as possible; "uoin£: your utmost 
endeavours." Rochford asked his Secretary of Embassy, Ligonier, 
who was travelling ahead to Madrid, to broach the subject with the 
Spanish ministers: Grimaldi therefore had an answer ready when 
Rochford arrived and marle the demand ear~ ~n December 1763. 33 
It was an absolute refusal. Grimaldi told Rochford at 
his house that Charles III had given positive orders not to countenance 
the draft of the Archbishop of Manila. As acting Governor, Rojo had 
no authority whatsoever to draw upon the Royal Treasury ; Grimaldi 
rE:torted that he "mie;ht &.s well have drawn upon the King of Spain to 
o.cliver up the Kingdom of Granada. 1I Apart from observing that this 
seemed a gross lack of good faith on Spain's part not to fulfil terms 
already agreed upon, Rochford did not press the point any further : 
"their Treasury is so low, that Demands for Money affect Them in a 
very sensible manner." 34 
Nor did the British ministers see any urgency in pressing 
the Ransom issue at this time, for there were t'IO further matters 
related to the capture of Manila still unresolved. These were, firstly, 
a claim by the East India Company for the maintenance of Spanish 
officers during the British occupation of Manila, and secondly, the 
fate of the prize-ship Santisima ~rinidad, the so-called Manila 
Galleon. The latter questicn was so inextricably entangled t'lith the 
Ransom issue that its consideration effectively suspe~ded the British 
demand for well over a year. 35 
33. SP 94/165, f.111, Halifax to Rochford, 7 October 1763 ; ibid., f.187, 
Ligonier to Halifax, 25 IIovember 1763. 
34. SP 94/165, f.203, Rochford to Halifax, 12 December 1763-
35. SP 94/166, f.50, Halifax to Rochford, 3 February 1764. 
293. 
The galleon Santisima ~rinid~d, bound from Manila for 
Acapulco, was seized in open ocean on 30 October 1762 by one of the 
British warships searching for the PhiliEina. The Council of Manila 
immediately protested, since this was' well after the signing of the 
capitulation, but the huge vessel and its cargo were held as lawful 
prize. A year later, in November 1763, an Admiralty Prize-Court 
upheld this view, and coad~mned. ship and cargo as legitimate prizes 
of war. 36 
Masserano, th~ Spanish ambassador in Lon~on, continued to 
protest that the Sant 1.sima 'rrinidad had beer. taken unlawfully, and 
on 6 Harch 1764 he claj.med restitution on the grounds that the 
ship and its cargo were origihally taken as part of the Ilansom for 
Manila, but should now be returned since the looting by British 
troops at Nanila re.lldered the terms of the Ra.n::;om null and void. 
Masserano was ch~n reminded that the capitulation made no mention of 
this particular vessel, yet when the ship arrived at Plymouth a few 
months later, he r(;;newed his demand. Halifax advised him that the 
only possible means of redress lay in an appeal against the Admiralty 
decision. Massera~0 delayed lodging this appeal until November 1764, 
and in his voluminous ccrrespondence with the Secretary of state in 
London, anticipated sever;;:,l major themes of Rochford I slater 
negotiation regarding the Bansom, notably the Spanish view that the 
British had broken the terms of the capitulation. 37 
36. euehner, pp.156~158, 160-161, for the capture and initial protests; 
SP 94/168, fos.'169-172, u summary of the case of the ~c;ntisima Trinidad 
by the Advocate General, James Harriott, 23 October 1764. 
SP 94/167, f.60, ax to Rochford, 15 June 1764 ; SP 94/168, fos. 
169-172, Marriott's summary, 23 October 1764 ; SP 94/167, £06.238-
242, and SP 94/1 ,fos.164-168, for copies of correspondence 
between Masserano and Halifax, July-November 1764, and SP 94/167, f.174. 
Halifax to Masserano, 2 July 1764 ; see also Lalaguna, pp.157-162, 
citing Archivo General de Simancas, Bstado, legajos 6956 and 6958 for 
Nasserano to Grimaldi, 27 January, 6 Harch, '17 April, ~~ 1 September, 
and I:ovember '176L~ .. "Arguments brOUGht by the Spaniards for refusing 
payment of the ransom bills for preserving lilanila," I·lith copies of 
Draper's letters of Cctober 1762, appear in the Annual Register (1764), 
pp. 'i38-141. 
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Rochford received no furtho~ instructions regarding the 
Manila Ransom until after the Lords of Appeals final:!.y reported on 
the case of the Santisima T.rinidad on 1lJ. August 1765 ; the Spanish 
appeal 'VIas rejected and the decision of the Admiralty Prize-Court 
was upheld. 38 By this time there had been a change of ministry 
London, and Halifax had been r0placed as Southern Secretary by 
Rochford's Eton school-f!'i~nd, H.S. Conway. 39 Hasserano had hoped 
that British ministerial instability would enable Spain to let the 
Hanila Ransom quietly f::tde and be 'forgotten,40 but Gonway now revived 
that demand, with some spirit ; though his dispatches must have 
seemed to Rochford vastly more prolix than those of his predecessor \ 
they were undenia'oly more vigorous as \,lell. 
In his fresh instructions of 20 Aug'i),st, Conway observed 
that the long silence in the correspondence may have led the Spanish 
to, think that '~h~ matter had been laid aside, but Rochford was now to 
-employ all his and ability to press for the full payment of the 
Ransom. Reviewing ~nd answering the possible objections, Conway 
acknowledged that there may be no law in Spain enabling a Governor or 
Archbishop to dral; on the Royal Treasury for so large a sum, but 
treaties made and signed must be fulfilled, as they engage the honour 
of nations ; the Spanish ministers would surely dishonour their King 
lIby advising him to act a ~art rather becoming the low,& mercenary 
Principles of a Banker o~ Scrivener, than the liberal and exalted 
Sentiments of a great Prince.1I 41 
38. SP 94/171, f.71, copy of the Decree of the Lords .of Appeals, 14 August 
1765. Lalaguna, p.162, appears to confuse the interim report .of 
23 October 1764 with the final decree. 
39. On 12 July 1765 ; see J. Steven'.iatson, 'i.'he R'2:i~'1. .of GeDrge III (1960), 
pp.111-117, for Conway's role in the Rockingham ministry. 
40. Lalaguna, p.165, citing General de Simancas, Estad.o, legajos 
6958 and 6959, for Masserano to Grimaldi, 25 March, 15 and 28 June 
'11765 .. 
41. SP 94/171, f.85, Commy to Hochford, 20 August 1765 ; see ala.o f.64, 
Conway to Rochford, ~6 August 1 ,accompanying the Decree of the 
Lords of Appeals. 
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The Spanish ministers had already seen Masserano's 
reports on the new spirit of firmness and resolution which seemed 
to have gripped the British government, and even before Rochford 
received his fresh instructions to renew the deMand for the Manila 
Ransom, the Secretary of State's office in London ha& intercepted 
ann deciphered orders from Grimaldi to Masserano which expressed 
hopes for delay, giving Spain time to prepare for defensive measures 
° th b ~ t b t SOd B °t ° 42 1n case ano er war rQ.e ou e ween pa1C an r1 a1n. 
Grimaldi was therefore very much on the defensive when 
Rochford revived the Manila issue on 3 September 1765. Rochford 
began cautiously and moderately, "Kno\,ring ho\v tender and disagreeable 
a Subject" it would Le ; but Grimaldi "flew out at the first mention 
of the word Ransom," and said they would go to all EterlJity rather 
than pay so unjuc.t a demand. He at once retracted this statement, 
and observed that he had no authority for such a remark. He lapsed 
into a bitter silence, and would have stopped there, had not Rochfnrd 
continued on the injustice of Spain's refusal and the moderation of 
Draper's forces at Manila. At this, Grimaldi grew very heated, and 
vehemently reminded Rochford that although the British had left the 
buildings intact, they had stripped the interiv:s. Af~er further 
acrimonious exchanges on similar themes, Grimaldi ended the interview 
with a request that Rochford should submit an Office making formal 
demand for payment, which Rochford agreed to do. 43 
In a private letter accompanying his dispatch to Conway 
reporting this stormy encounter, Rochford ventured to express his 
own opinion regarding the'Manila issue: 
42. Lalaguna, p.168, citing BMAdd MSS 32300, f.82, Grimaldi to 
Nasserano, 31 August 1765. 
43. SP 94/171, f.152, Rochford to Conway, 6 September 1765. 
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"I do not pretend to give Advice, but I think it my Duty 
to give it as my Opinion formed upon the best Intelligence 
I can get here, that if a Categorical Answer is insisted 
upon with Regard to the Ransom of Manila that They in 
s9me shape or other, may be brought to comply, unless 
jointly with the Courts of France and Vien.ca, They are at 
present determined to commence a War, which I seriously 
do not believe at this present Period is their Intention. 
Upon the \Jh61e, be assured that much will depend on the 
Language the Court of France holds ; if They yield, this 
Court must follow their Example. 1I 44 
Clearly. Rcch~ord himself favoured a very firm line, 
and he took care to make ~his obvious to both the French Ambassador, 
Ossun, and the French Consul-General, the Abbe Beliardi ; to Ossun 
he hinted darkly tJ!at Britain seemed to be giving France and Spain 
45 too much time to prepare themselves, while to Beliardi he lamented 
being constrained by his instructions to kr.:;..;:p a friendly moderate 
tone far removed from his owa feelings on the matter. He stressed 
46 to Beliardi that Britain would not give up the Ransom demand. 
Both these reports received some currencJ' in Madrid, as 
well as reaching in time their chief target, Choiseul. After giving 
Grimaldi his formal demand for the Ransom, Rochford attended Court 
~onstantly,and noticed that Charles III seemed a trifle cool ; he 
Ilhas not that easy Behaviour with me, He had • • H This did not 
surprise Rochford in the least, flfor I know that this Affair has 
been represented to him in the worst of Lights.!! Grimaldi avoided 
hi+. SF 94/171, [.150, Rochford to Conway, 6 Sept.ember 1765, Private. 
45. Archives Etrangeres, Correspondance Folitique, ZspaG~e 544~ f.36, 
Ossun to Choiseul, 5 september 1765, quoted in Blart, Rapports de la 
France et de l'Espagne (1915), p.84. Dlart erroneously identifies 
the British Ambassador as Bristol instead of Rochford. 
46. AECP, 544, f.54, Biliardi to Choiseul,g September 1765, 
quoted in Blart, p.84. See also Renaut,tfi~tudes. ," p.228, for this 
conversation between Rochford and B61iardi. 
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all mention of the Hanila Ransom, until he \vas rather bluntly 
reminded of it one evening when the Rochfords came to dine at his 
house. Grimaldi did not come home "till the moment Dinner "laS set 
upon the Table, II and immediately afterwards retreateiJ. )co his Study. 
But Rochford vias not to be put off so lightly. He excused himself 
from the assembled company a~d followed the Minister to his room, 
",here he chided him for the delay since submitting his formal demand. 
Grimaldi muttered peevishly that the delay might last some while yet, 
then after a pause, he burst out with a richly th~atrical protest : 
lIJe me soumettrois d!~tre hach6 en pieces, plutot que d'accorder une 
Demande si injustel" Rochford let thispa.ss ,l"hough he \'las tempted 
to suggest that the Spanish anS\-Ier waited on the return of the 
messenger from Paris j "but I did not chuse to flxasperate him, or let 
him know I vIas A.cquainted \vi th this Circumstance." 47 
Even so, Rochford privately wondered whether Choiseul 
meant to :rru.sh Spain to extremities over the Hanila Han.som, ready or 
not, for if France \'/anted another war with Britain, the Hanila issue 
48 gave the best pretext by \:h:1.ch Spanish cotlpera tion could be secured. 
But other consid~'rations, not least the attitudes of the individual 
Spanish ministers, grad.ually led Rochford to adopt the more 
optimistic view that the Spanish would try to turn the affair 
Ilinto a Paper Dispute, and gain as much ':.i:ime as they possibly can. 1f 
Grimaldi t'las of course the key figure in the Spanish ministry, and 
his personal sympathies Vlere well-knmvn to favour }'rench policy. 
Grimaldi 1 S personal atto.chment to Choiseul made him l:strongly 
SP 94/171, :f .192, Rochford to Com-Jay, 10 September 1 ,Secret; 
ibid., f. ,~ochford to Conway, 17 September 1765. =ochford's own 
account contrasts interestingly with the version given by Renaut, 
WEtudes. ,11 p.. ,"ihieh s'i;ates that 2ochford !ls'en:Clamme et 
reclame impetueuscaent 1e paienent imd~diat.I' 
48~ SP 94/171. f,,'jc)2. Hochford to Comlav. 10 SeDtember 1 15. Secret .. 
prejudiced" against the British claim, and Rochford suspected 
that it was he who chiefly misrepresented the Gase to Charles III. 
Squilaci and Ariaga, on the other hand, were less likely to advise 
hostile measures. Sqv.ilac::i. vIaS, in Rochford's opinion, tlexcessively 
timid ; frightned at the Expense that \</ould attend eyen the 
preparations for a vJar,iI since he knew they could not afford it, 
and convinced that a war itself would certainly ruin him. Ariaga 
as Minister for ~he Marine and the Indies knew better than any other 
the state of the Spanish Navy, "and though a little Spanish Quixotism 
may prevail with him" as a true Old Spaniard and a very great bigot, 
Hochford doubted if he would advise violent meaSUl'~S ; even if only 
to differ from Grimaldi and Squilaci, "Both of whom he dislikes 
much." 49 
While Rochford waited for an answer to his i'cl'mal demand, 
however, the Spanish Ministry went to sowe pains to makG a show of 
Btrength. Officers were called to Court for consultation, orders 
were issued for the rep~ir of fortresses on- the border with Portugal, 
and the King himself spoke at length to Rochford about the excellent 
condition of his cavaL~y .. Rochford was not 0'\ erawed ; "all this is 
to make a Parade. ~ney would certainly be more reserved they 
seriously meant anything.!! Knowing how deficient their finances were, 
Rochford was confident that Squilaci would throw cold water on any 
expensive plans for warlike preparations, and for his 0\111 part 
remained !!convinced beyond a doubt, that there ia Nothing They dread 
so much as VIai' at this June ture. II 50 
49. SP 94/171, f.209, TIochford to Conway, 17 September 1765. 
50. SP 9l+/171 , f.233, Rochford to Conway, 23 September 1765. Acknowledging 
this dispatch, Conway expressed some impatience for the 
answer, but assured l\ochford that George III '-JaS llperfectly sa tisfied" 
with his reports and his handl of the situation thus far 
SP 94/171, f.225, Gonway to Rochford, 4 October 1765. 
51. 
52. 
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Grimaldi finally produ~ed Spain's first full Answe~ on 
the l';anila Ransom at the very start of October 1765, although the 
paper itself was dated 29 September. It was a long and detailed 
Answer, which amountad to another outright refusal, based on two 
main arguments. In the first place, it was argued that the Archbishop, 
even as Governor of ManiJ.a, had no authority to draw on the Royal 
Treasury, and that the British were foolish to think that he could. 
Secondly, the A~swer claimed that the capitulation was obtained 
under duress, by the threat of a sack, and that the British broke 
the terms of the agreement by allowing looting to continue after it 
'las signed. These basic contentions "Jere supported by ample and at 
times even amusing illustration. For example, it was protested that 
even merchants do not make agreements of this kind ; if ~ne in Madrid 
were to draw on another in London without poss~ssing any security, 
the bill \vould be protested. If everyone ac:"ed this 1..,ay, the Answer 
continued scornfully, nations ~ould soon bankrupt one another, merely 
by putting a knife at a Governor's throat! 51 
Rochford simply acknowledged receipt of the Answer and 
forwarded it immedia teJ.y to London, ,.,here it ,-Jas not surprisingly 
regarded as being lli~st uns~tisfactory. It was expected in Under-
Secretarial circles that Rochford would be ordered to persist in 
the demand, but Gonway took a long while to draft a suitable Reply_ 
Early in November he asked Rochford to explain that the delay did 
not imply acceptance. 52 
SP 94/172, fos .17-23, Gd rrtaldi to Rochford, 29 September 1765 ; 
ibid., f .15, Rochford to Com-lay, 3 October 11765, is the covering 
letter. Grimaldi had earlier apologised for the delay, explaining 
that he had had to alter one or two expressions tlwhich, though not 
intended, might offence." SP 94/171, f.217, Grimaldi to Rochford, 
15 September 1 ; ibid., f,236, Rochford to Conway, 30 September 1765 
SP 94/172, f .. 71, ComJay to Rochford, 8 November 1 ; see also 
Historical Manuscripts Commission, 10th Report, Appendix I, p. , 
Sedgwick to Weston, 12 October 1765 (the editor gives Rockingham for 
"Lord R.II but this no sense; it is obviously Rochford .. in this 
context). 
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The delay extended in fact throughout October and 
November, while Spanish military preparations continued and the 
risk of vJar seemed to 100m ever nearer ; "Not...ri thstanding all their 
Professions [?Of peace] t1:ey are preparing, as "Jell as They Call, for 
the worst that may happen. 1i Rochford therefore made a few very 
discreet enquiries regarding the possibility of a Composi":'ion in 
place of full payment of the Ransom, and reported "I have some 
reason to think 'i'hey would not be averse to it, for though their 
53 Pride is very great, their Poverty is greater." 
Rochford himself was sure, however, that even if a 
Composition were ~ffered, Britain would need to in~ist very sternly 
b~fore she could carry her point. He personally endeavoureu to keep 
a firm tone at Nadl'id. annoyance and frustration must have been 
intense therefore when he heard that Nasserano han reported from 
I,ondon that the Manila affair \"'o.s not seen there nearly so seriously' 
as Rochford repre:;:ented it at Hccdrid. :!:tochford begged Conway to 
redress this impression a'i; once, and for the future to keep Nasserano 
as ignorant as possible of matters being treated at Hadrid ; "the 
higher he talked to the better Effect it wlll have." Shortly 
afterwards, Rochfora had co,lfirmation of the need foJ:' 8. firm tone 
from a surprising source ; Rn intimate friend of Grimaldi's First 
Secretary, de Llano, privately warned Rochford, "unless you make use 
of Nenaces you will not carry your Point, not even for a Composition. 'f 
Rochford determined to maintain his stern tone j "there is little 
TIisk & much to gain from being firm." 
53. SP 94/172, f.83, Rochford to Conway, 24 October 1765, Secret. 
54. SP 94/172, £.108, Rochford to Conway, 4 November 1765, Private and 
Secret, and f. of 24 October; Renaut, liEtudes • ,11 p.223, quotes 
from one of Masserano's reports late in September (but gives no 
references, alas) which stated that the British ministers regarded 
the Eanila issue Havee ser€mi te et detachement, II and would not 
a War over it. 
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Conway's detailed instructions to Rochford for the 
British Reply on Manila were finally copied out on 26 November, 
but they did not reach Rochford in Hadrid until mid-December, 
and another week was taken up transforming Conway's instructions 
into a formal paper. In its final form, this Reply contained no 
fewer than twenty-one propositions, most of which con~ernAd specific 
points or claims in the first Spanish Answer of 29 Septemb~r. 
The f,ritish claim rested primarily on the validity of 
the Capitulation, which it WaS held was !fa formal & regular Treaty 
of Ransom. 1I It Nas und.oubtedly a public treaty, and there was no 
question of the A/'chbishop's authority as Governor being sufficient 
to conclude such a treaty. Since Spain had never repUdiated this 
Capi tulation, the ransom vias 'bound to be paid ; how or b:y whom· or 
from which fund was Spain's problem, but could noc affect Britain'G 
claim. There could be no comparison with th~ transactions of 
merchants (indeed Conway thought this section scarcely deserved 
serious answer), since this was a treaty between nations. properly 
concluded, for which hostages and securities were taker.. The question 
of looting by the British troops after the si~ning of the agreement 
was hotly contested, stress being laid upon Draper's prompt action 
to stop the looting then in progress s and the fact that the goods 
taken were gathered and counted as part of the Ransom. Altogether, 
this Reply made an exceptionally strong case. 55 
55. The Reply itself (in French) is in SP 94/173, f.43, dated 25 December 
1765, \'Jith later marginal annotation in ;:)panish ; the instructions 
from which it was closely derived are in SP 94/172, f.111, Conway to 
Rochford, 26 Ilovember 1765. Cushner, pp.170-171 (note), points out 
that in legal terms Britain had a very strong case iqdeedto claim 
payment; he cites N.i'l. Sibley, liThe Story of the Hanila Ransom, '1768, 
[sic l and Britain's Debt to the United States," Journal of 
Comparative Legislation and International Law, VIr (1925), 17-32, who 
concluded that lia~ility for the two million dollars had in law 
passed to the United states, and that Britain still had a strong case 
then ; but Philippine independence now makes the matter doubtful. 
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After handing Grimaldi this Reply on December 1'(,65, 
Rochford took care not to miss a single day at Court for the 
follm.,.ing vleek, ana. thereby learned. that there vIere tW() Royal 
Councils held to consider the British Reply, with a third expected. 
Rochford gathered from his friends and informants at Court that 
Charles III and his ministers saw no danger in persisting with 
an outright refusal. In addition to warning those with \.,.hOlll he 
spoke of the gr~ve risk that another refusal might outrage opinion 
in Britain, especially in Parliament, thus forcing the ministry 
there into stronger measures, Rochford also submitted to Grimaldi 
in the first few Itays of the new Year an unsigned 'lmdated Office, 
w~ich put the British argument very succinctly and ended with what 
Rochford described. as "a Sort of a Henace,1! as strong as it could 
be, yet "Nothing that could exasperate." ,6 
This confidential piece of enc~uragement represents the 
farthest extent of Rochford's personal "tough linell at Hadrid early 
in January 1766, and \.,.hil,s he continued to "ha.ve it come to their 
Ears how fatal it might be if they meant either to chicane with Us, 
or absolutely refuse a Compliance,1I he remain.:;d confident that he 
had not offended. 57 He he~rd that a copy of their projected answer 
had been sent to Masserano in London, to see how it wculd be relished 
there ; \<rhether true or not, this showed how vi tal it ViaS for Conway 
to hold the same firm tone as Rochford held at Madrid. 58 
56. SP 94/172, fas.19.3 and 195, Rochford to Cammy, 23 and 30 December 
'1765 ; SP 94/173, :;:'.21, Hochford to Comlay, 6 January 1766 ;SP 94/173, 
f.71, the paper marked ".8}' is l~ochford's undated informal l:ote. 
57. SP 94/173, f.38, Rochford to Conway, 22 January 1766, contains a 
general account of developments in January; SP 94/173, f.27, Conway 
to Rochford, 31 January 1766, gave full approval of the paper 
marked ItA", but earlier, Hasserano had complained in private that 
his Court \-;as "I:lUCh offendedll \1i th the held to her by Britain 
on the Nanila Ransom ; IIistoric1l-L ~lanu.scJZjp..t<f? C Ot:1,:tj.ss ion , 10tJ:l Report, 
Appendix I, p.398,~ed6wick to Jeston, 14 December 1765 (which also 
remarks, llthat affair, I hear, has been push'd till it has grown 
rather ous ll ). 
58. SP 94/173, f.30, Rochford to Comray, ']6 January 1766, Private'. 
59. 
60. 
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For the early part of January, Rochford remained 
confident that Spain would at least avoid an open breach with 
Britain at this time lIunless They are greater Quixote than I 
believe They are." But by the middle of the month he was less 
certain. Grimaldi was heard to say that Spain would either pay 
the whole, if the claim proved just, or nothing at all, fer it was 
not consistent with the King's dignity to make a Composition in an 
affair of this " .• ature. Since Grimaldi continued to "keep the 
profoundest Silence upon this Subject t II Rochford \vas at a loss to 
guess what their answor iilOUld be. 59 
Fortunately he was not kept in suspense much longer. 
0nly a week later, on 19 Janu~ry 1766, Grimaldi completed the 
second Spanish Ans"lr/er on the Hanila Ransom, and handed it to 
Rochford the following morning. It was not, as Rochford. had feared, 
yet another outright refusal. Grimaldi gave an assurance that if 
the debt was just and legal, Charles III was as determined to pay 
or see it paid as Britain waS to recover it. .cut the main argument 
of this Answer was that as yet the Spanish government remained 
largely uninformed of the exact nature of eve.lts at Manila, and 
therefore could not decide to their own satisfaction how well 
founded the British claim was, or whether in fact the Royal Treasury 
ought to pay the remainder of the Ransom. Grimaldi suggested that 
the citizens of Manila should pay, and ought to have capitulated 
. 60 
only for wha~ they were possessed of. 
SP 94/173, f.30, 110chfor(l. to Conway, '16 January 1766, Private; 
ibid., f.25, Hochford to Conway, 13 January 1766. 
SP 94/173, f.67, Grimaldi to Rochford, The PardO, 19,January 1766 
(translation) ; ibid., f. ,Rochford to Conway, 20 January 1766 ; 
see also,SP 94/173, f. • Rochford to Conway, 22 January 1766. 
Grimaldi's plea that Court remained uninformed on the 
circumstances of the capture has some bas ; Archbishop Rojo died 
on 30 January 1764, and his lieutenants were heavily preoccupied 
with Andals revolt in the interior. Rojols reports had apparently 
been filled with pressing current problems rather than post-~ortems 
on the capture. See Cushner, pp.200-201, andlo7-199 pass • 
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Grimaldi read the Answer aloud before handing it to 
Rochford, but not without interruption: 1I\1e had several Altercations 
during the Reading and Contestations upon it, for it is apparently 
intended to gain r.rime, and to drive the Business into a Paper rJar.fI 
Rochford's personal opinion, expressed in his report to Conway, 
'!rlas that "They never mean to pay a Shilling of the Debt, unless 
compelled to it.!! If Grimaldi sincerely intended to start an 
impartial investigaticn of the Ransom claim, then Brit2in might 
properly co~perate and await the outcome, but Rochford privately 
thought other\.Jise ; It. • in their present 8i tua tion, if threatned 
with Reprisals, or a Categorical Answer be insisy~d en, I believe 
61 They will submit. if 
Com'lay was also aJert to the snares -:>f a paper war, in 
which, as he put it, "Memoires & Promemoires may mUltiply without 
End, 'till the real State of the Affair is lost in the Confusion of 
repeated False Representation.s .. " \'ihile cautioning Roch.ford 
against "any premature Aigreur," Conway agreed that it was now 
vitally necessary for Spain to be convinced that Britain would 
insist upon a sat!efaction over the Manila Ransom. So long as some 
sort of satisfaction was made, Rochford might accept whatever 
solution suited the delicacy of the Spanish Court. Rochford's earlier 
warnings about holding the same firm tone at London had taken effect, 
for ConvlaY \'lrote ; "I therefore leave it to Your Excellency's usual 
Hanagement & Dexterity to effect at I'ladrid \rJhat I shall endeavour 
with Prince Masserano, t~ let him see that it is a Point that we are 
not disposed to recede from.: 1 62 
61. SP 94/173, f. ,Rochford to Conway, 22 January 1766. 
62. SP 94/173, f .. 91, Com-;ay to Rochford, 11 February 1766. 
Rochford put these instructions into action at the 
Pardo on 5 Narch in "a long serious Conference tl with Grimaldi~ 
which he began by stressing, quietly and persuasively, the dangers 
likely to follow any misunderstanding"between Britain and Spain, 
and his Court's desire only to see justice done without any renewal 
of hostilities. Grimaldi readily reciprocated these sentiments, 
and volunteered his own confirmation of " .... hat had been Rochford IS 
conviction all along, namely, that Spain was so unprepared for war 
she would "bear more th(;in He hoped or believed ~le 1iwuld put them to 
the Tryal of, II rather than cause a rupture of relatior16. And yet, 
Rochford emphasised., his orders were to insist on a satisfaction, 
and not to enter into any further written discussion on the Ransom. 
Grimaldi suggested that if Rc~hfurd merely put this in writing, with 
his statement that i.f there ~.raS another absolul;e refusal by Spain, 
Britain would prubably insist on a cal;egorical answer, then he might 
~e able to secure a suitable satisfaction. Rochford accepted this, 
and they parted ami~ably, without the least aigreur. 63 
A few days later j -.111ile assisting at a Royal Dinner at 
the Pardo, Rochfo1 J 1iJas surprised to notice how gracious the King 
was to him, after his coolness of the previous two months, and with 
this encouraging sign, imm:.:diately \-lent to see Grimaldi again. 
Grimaldi produced the Note Rochford had given him on 5 Harch, and 
said that there had been two Council meetings to consider it, both 
with the King, who had remarked that the word "insist" VJaS in this 
context a palabra prenadf'!:.J suggesting more of a menace than was 
meant to be revealed. Rochford tried to join issue at this, tlfor I 
was determined to push him as far as I could with Decency in order 
63. SF 94/173, f .. '164, Hochford to Conway, 12 i"larch 1766. 
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to discover his real Intentions,'f 'out clearly this \vas what 
Grimaldi hoped to do with Rochford, for he swiftly changed the 
subject to the rumours of the previous year that Spain intended 
an invasion of Portugal, and taxed Rochford with spreading alarm 
"with such SUspicl0ns and Informations as Your Court have, I do not 
wonder you are instructed to speak in so peremptory a Hanner." But 
he then begged Rochford to believe him, as a Gentleman if he would 
not him as a Hinister, that Spain had no designs on Portugal, 
and any reports to this effect were absolutely false. Rochford was 
impressed by Grimaldi's solemn and serious tone, and later reflected 
"that he 'vJas probably sincere ; flthough I am not apt to "!::Ie too 
credulous, I woulf~ not ,,1111ing1y gi va a false h.li:~rm. II Having thus 
diverted Rochford from the offensive, Grimaldi made his main request, 
which was that Rochford should make another formal Demand in writing. 
Rochfr~d guessed that th1S was a test, to see whether he 
.wai3- really instr.ucted to use the threat that Britain would "probably 
insist" on a satisl"J.ction, or wheth1:.r he was simply bluffing to gain 
his point. Rochford waG to be able to agree to this request, 
but warned again he would not enter into any further debate on 
the Hanila affair, and the intervie\'v ended amicably once more, ltlith 
. 'th G' ld' 64 Rochford staying at the Pa~do to dlne W~ r1ma 1. 
From Grimalditc tone and his assurances, Rochford felt 
confident that the third Spanish Answer would be a mild one, and 
probably suggest somA :orm of This forecast proved 
to be perfectly accurate. t:ith a promptness that was remarkable for 
the Spanish Court, GrimalG.i gave Rochford their third AnSVler only 
64. SP 94/173, £.164, Rochford to Com-Jay, 12 Iiarch 1766. A copy of 
Rochiord1s brief formal Demand (in French) is found in SP 94/173, 
f. 171, Rochford to Grimaldi, 8 March 1766. 
three days later, on 11 Harch. Though it vias almost as long and 
detailed as the earlier answers, its tone was distinctly more 
cautious, and it contained an important proposal ; though convinced 
of their rightness, the Spanish Court was willing to .3ubmit the 
Ransom issue to an impartial arbitrator, and \vould abide by his 
decision. 65 
The offer of arbitration, though 9alpably ano·ther 
delaying tactic, was something of a persona: triumph for Rochford. 
Though it could not please the British ministers, it was a significant 
concession for the Spanish, and was infinitely better than another 
absolute refusal. Undoubtedly the concession Was motivated by fear 
of war and an awareness of Spain's unpreparedness despite the hasty 
efforts of the past year. But no concession would have been made 
haa there been any doubt of Britain's seriousness and determination 
to press for payment of the Hanila Ransom. It 'i/as largely thanks to 
Rochford's personally firm tone at Madrid tha~ any such do~bts were 
unable to have effect. 
The idea of submitting the dispute to arbitration 1'/as in 
fact Choiseul's, yet the available evidence shows that before he 
suggested this shrewd escape for the Spanish Co"rt, hie own thoughts 
coincided remarkably closely with Rochford's, namely, that Spain 
would be better advised to pay the Ransom, even unjustly, rather 
66 than risk another War with Britain before she was properly prepared. 
65. SP 94/173, f.173 fSic] , Grimaldi to Rochford, 11 March 1766 (in 
Spanish) ; trans1ition, f.180. 
66. Renaut, "Etudes!!, p.229, quotes from Choiseul to Gue~..:hy, !<'ebruary 
n;66, "11 vaut mieux payer quelques millions meme injustement que 
d'entretenir un pretexte de guerre bien plus onereux pour la puissance 
qui est oblig&t t8t ou tard de vider 1a querelle par 1es armes." 
Writing to Grimaldi, Choiseul defended the time-buying device of 
arbitration in view of the fact that neither France nor Soain would 
be ready for war for another three years at least (AECP E;pagne 545. 
f.213, Choiseu1 to Grimaldi, 21 March 1766), but to Os sun he was even 
more revealing; IlQuant a la guerre, je doute que nous l'ayons cette 
ann~e ; l' Espacne payera <'£5':c1 entre nous) la rangon de Hanille et 
nous gagnerons du temps. 11 ;~E l(emoires et ~ocuments, ,f. 184, 
Choiseul to (;ssun , 22 ~·jarch 1 '766 both quoted in B1art, pp.85-86. 
~ochford was therefore justified in thinking that if 
Britain insisted strongly enough and backed up her claim with 
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threats, then the risk of war would prove less than the likelihood 
of Spain's agreeing to some form of satisfaction. Clearly Choiseul 
would advise this CQurse rather than a premature and ~isastrous war. 
It is indeed tempting to speculate on Rochford's chances 
of success in such a task, so well-suited to. his personal inclination, 
but the British government was not willing ~o take the risk, and 
Rochford's o\m contribution to the Nanila affair as British 
Ambassador at Madrid had in fact already drawn to itn close. 
Com/ay lay gravely ill throtishout April, and Rochford guessed this 
to be the reason for his not having received any further instructions 
on the Manila Ransom before he finally left Hadrid about 15 May 1766 
f or his ne\'/ post in Paris. 67 
With the Rockingham ministry beginning to disintegrate, 
Conway was in no mood for brinksmanship, and instead he hoped for 
a swift 3ettlement by offering what Rochford had mentionad eight 
months before; a cash composition. Conway's instructions of 16 May 
to this effect \'fere received at Hadrid by Rochford's Secretary, 
de Visme, who made the offer to Grimaldi on 2 June. Grimaldi not 
surprisingly declined a cash settlement, and renewed the Spanish 
offer of arbitration on the Ransom claim. Conway had by this time 
transferred to the Northern Secretaryship, but his successor 
Richmond followed Conway's original plan by instructing de Visme to 
lower the price considerably to a mere £ 300,000. This new offer 
was made on 7 July, with similar lack of success. 
67. SP 94/173, f.193, Rochford to Conway, 24 March 1766, Separate; 
SP 94/174, f .... :8, Rochford to Comlay, 5 May 1766 ; ibid., f.22, 
de Visme to Conway, 12 1766. 
68. SP 91.~/174, f.5, Conway to l1ochford, 16 Hay 1766 (received by de Visme); 
ibid., fos.41 and ,de Visme to Conway, 2 and 9 June 1766-; ibid., 
f. ,Richmond to de Visme, 20 June 1766 ; ibid .. , f.173, de ilisme to 
Richmond, 7 July 1766. 
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With Spain's insistence on arbitration so unlikely to 
be accepted by Britain, especially after proposals to ask the 
King of ia to be the arbitrator, and with Britain's insistence 
on a cash c6mposition, so distasteful to Charles III, the 
Ransom dispute had arrived at the impasse in which it was to remain. 
Conway's offer of a compositi~n was a greater concession than Spain's 
offer of arbitration, and virtually lost the game for Britain by 
demonstrating her umd,llingness to risk a confrontation. Grimaldi 
having thus gained ground resolved, as Rochford feared he might, to 
pay not a shilling unl~ss by force. Before the end of 1766, a new 
British Southern Secretary, Shelburne, revived tI'o demand for the 
Manila Ransom, bu~ met with a stony refusal, p~rtly in consequence 
of the emergence of a more serious dispute over t;h~ Fall:land Islands, 
and the new British Ambassador to Madrid, Grf;',y, a year later 
confessed total failure in his efforts to revive the issue. After 
1767, the Manila Ransom was sicply allowed to drop into oblivion. 
Rochford had gained more ground for Britain in this dispute than 
he has been given credit for, and the loss of his carefully gained 
position after hi...:: departure from Hadrid was no 
than it was sudden. 69 
spectacular 
6~. SP 94/174, f.188, de Visne to Richmond, 28 July 1766; Renaut, 
llEtudes,1I pp.231-238, is a useful summary of the last e of 
the I;;anila affair, but cOiiipare also Lalaguna, pp. '1 191, and 
Ramsey, Anglo-French Relations (1939), pp.167-169, for the 
dispute and. its linking with the Manila issue,. The standard \'wrk 
here is of course J. Goebel, The St:;:y.f,r:le for the Falkl and j~GJ;.§:·n4,s 
(Yale,1927) ; see pp.224-225 on cianila. 2enaut, p.231, claihls that 
Snainfs chances for arbitration were improved by the departure from 
N~drid of IiI t imp~tueux r:ochford, si prevenu contre les ministres 
de Charles III et s1 comnrom1s 'oar son attitude instrans ce .. If 
Though inaccurate and mi~leadin~, this remark suggests the relie 
which Grimaldi must have felt at Rochford's departure. 
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-CHAPTER 11 
"Frequent Applications •• 
for His 11ajesty's Trading Subjects." 
~lhile it is difficult if not at times somewhat pointless to 
reconstruct the daily actiyities of an ambassador at his post, it is 
clear that much of Rochford's time at Hadrid, as at Turin, was taken 
up with matters commercial or consular rather than merely diplomatic. 
Comrq.erce and diplomacy were inseparable elements of Anglo-Spanish 
relations throughout the eighteenth century. 1 Soae of the more 
important items of this additional and time-consuming ambassadorial 
business were recommended to Rochford's care by the Secretary of 
State in Londoll, but for the most part little would appear in the 
official correspondence, except perhaps as enclosed copies of 
Memorials and O:fices relating to issues readily settled on the spot. 
-l!s Rochford v:rote to Halifax at the close of 1764 
ttThere art! many little Aff~lirs that occur frequently 
relative to o~r Commerce the details of which I do not 
trouble Your Lordship with, but I flatter myself you 
will be~deve I am attentive to them." 2 
Such attention was of course enjoined upon Rochford by his general 
Instructions, which besiQes reminding him to keep in constant touch 
with the British Consuls in Spain, advised him to seek redress for 
abuses or breaches of the commercial treaties on his own initiative, 
1. This chapter makes no pretence of being a general account of Anglo-
Spanish commercial rela~ions after 1763, though an up_to_date study 
is badly needed. For the earlier part of the century, the standard 
'VlOrk in English remains J .0. l',lcLachlan' s Trade and Feace with Old 
Spain, 1667-1750 (Cambridge,1940), which has full references; but 
see also V.L. Brown, Studies in the Eis~or;L of Buain Urorthampton, 
Hass., 1929), especially Part Il, flAnglo-~'rench Rivalry for the '.:.'rade 
of the Spanish Peninsula, 1763-8311 • 
2. SF 94/168, f.266, flochford to Halifax, 31 December 1764. 
without referring every trivial complaint to London for specific 
orders. 3 
It may understandably be wondered why Rochford as 
ambassador shoul~ be preoccupied with petty com~erci~l matters 
311. 
when Britain maintained her own Consul-General at Hadrid on a 
4 
salary of £ 1,000 a year. But the reality of Porten's situation 
WElS that he had never been formally recogn:i.sed as Consul-General at 
Hadrid. ll/hile admitting the convenience bud necessity of Consuls-
General, the Spanish Cuurt was prevented by its intricate rules of 
etiquette frow acknovlledgillg the presence of any foreign consuls at 
Madrid. Rochford's predecessor Bristol had refused to present Porten 
a~ Court except as the Brit~sh Consul-General. with the result that 
rorten had not been presented at all. This nleant that Portencould 
not deal directly with the Spanish ministers, nor submit Memorials 
under his own name as Consul-General. Rochford had to perform this 
function for him. 5 
Fortunately this clumsy and inconvenient arra~gement 
worked , ... ithout any serious difficulty, thanks to the firm friendship 
which soon grew between Rochford and Porten. :ndeed, Porten later 
wrote that his dependence on the ambassador in this rt:spect had 
6 proved a "peculiarhappyness ll of his bachelor existence at :Hadrid • 
. 3 .. see above, p.205 for Rochford's "General Orders," FO 90/62, i.58, 
and SP 94/165, f.50, dated 20 September 1763. 
4. Journal of the House of Commons, XXXII (Civil List l)ayments), pp. 
522, 530, 5:;7, 548~- ~55, 564, 572. He VIas appci-.lted to Hadrid in 
April 1760, returning to EnGland at the outbreak of vIal" in 1762 
D.N.B., XVI, 167. :ie arrived back at Hadrid in l:ovembGr 1763 ; 
SP 94/165, 1'.159, Portento Halifax, 10 November 17C?;. 
5. SP 94/172, f.175, Rochford to Conway~ 9 December '1765. Similarly, 
the ¥rench Consul-General, Deliardi, had not been presented at Court 
as Consul, and dealt officially through Ossun, the French ambassador. 
But Ossun had presented at Court as a private gentle~an, 
which enabled him to deal with the ministers. See P. ~uret, 
ilLes papiers de I' Abbi!'; li3.rdi et les relations comlTierciales de la 
France et de l' au milieu clu XVllle si~cle,!1 Revue d'Histoire 
Moderns at Contemporaine, IV (1902~03), 657-672. 
6. SP 94/172, £.180, Parten to Conway, 9 December 1765. 
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Rochford in turn paid tribute to Portents ltDiligence and 
Exactness." 7 But so long as this ad hoc arrangement continued 
to function adequately, the British government saw no need to 
press for formal recognition, and it was not until February 1766 
that Rochford was granted permission to present Porten at Court 
8 
merely as a private gentlemar.. Though far from a final solution, 
this was at least a seep in the right direction. 
Rochford's earliest task on Portents behalf was to 
secure the Royal cedu.la from the Spanish Court rene1tling approval 
of the commission~1 held by each of the British Cons111s in Spain, 
after the interruptior. of the war. 9 Normally, however, Porten 
nlaintained his own correspondence \>li th the C,,"'.&uls, gathering 
information regarding shipping movements and abuses of the customs 
regulations, whic~ he then passed on to Rochford for immediate 
redress or for rep"rt to London ; 
"I never fail to make known to the Earl of Rochford 
everJ' intelligence I ~an procure, & particularly 
all the notices I receive from the Sea Ports. 1I 10 
In addition, Porten made his own reports direct to the Secretary 
of State (or his Unde~-Secretary) on routine matters, such as 
forwarding the shipping lists received from individual Consuls, 
11 
or tables of trade statistics compiled from their reports. 
7. SP 94/172, f.175, Rochford to Conway, 9 December 1765. 
8. Following the exa~ple set by B61iardi. Rochford suggested this 
move not so much from existing difficulties, though he mentions 
that some inconvenience had been experienced in the p~st, as from 
the likelihood of f~ture problems. SF 94/173, £.27, Conway to 
Rochford, 31 January 1766. 
9. SP 9i l-/165, f.211, Rochford to Halifax, 22 December 1763. 
10. SP 94/166, f.62, Porten to 1;.Jeston (Halifax's Under-Secretary), 
26 J-anuary 1764. 
11 • l;'or example, see SF 94/169, f.138, Parten to Halifax, 11 February 
1 , and SF 94/173, f./IO'I, Porten to Conway, 27 January 1766. 
Another of Rochford's earliest tasks at Madrid on behalf 
of the Consul-G~neral was the presentation of Petitions from British 
merchant bankers or their agents for the special licence or cedula 
necessary to export silver bullion from Spain. Officially such 
export of bullion was prohibited to foreigners, but in practice 
it had proven convenient, ana remained necessary so long as British 
exports to Spain far exceeded the purchase of Spanish wines and 
frui ts in return ; !U()st merchants preferred to tilke the balance in 
silver. The licence::> were rarely granted in full, arc.d then only 
grudgingly, with the ~esult that bullion smuggling waS rife at most 
Spanish ports, providing a major source of dispr.-ces involving 
12 British ships and sailors. 
The first .of these p~titions which Rochford presented 
at Hadrid, in the name of one Salvador, had been carried by Rochford 
on his journey to ~patn in 1763. It is noteworthy, however, that 
subsequent report of the progress of this Petition was made by 
Porten himself, direct to the Secretary of State in London. 13 
Little could be done effectively to control the bullion-
smuggling, which nlany British merchants took to be their hallowed 
righ t, but Rochford unco'Tored a grave \4eakness even in the practic e 
of leaving the legal export of silver in the hands of private 
licensees. He had been told in Paris that there were special 
advantages and therafore greater profits to be had from exporting 
Spanish silver to France r3.ther than to England, so that few of 
the licences granted to British subjects actually brought silver 
into England. Porten had confirmed this remarkable fact upon 
12. For a detailed discussion, see gcLachlan, Trade and Peace with 
Old 0p;:~j-n, especially pp.1L~-i8. 
SP 94/1 ,f.66, Halifax to Rochford, 20 September 1763 (enclosures 
fos.42 and44) ; ibid., f.1 ,Porten to Halifax, 17 November 1763. 
14. 
15. 
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Rochford's arrival at Madrid; the private licensees sent their 
silver wherever the best profits lay, usually to France or to 
Holland rather than to England. Rochford therefore suggested 
that the Bank of England or the Treasury obtain lic6nces for the 
regular export of up to a million Spanish dollars' worth of gold 
a~d silver bullion each year to ensure a steady supply for coinage. 
Halifax forwarded this suggestion to the Treasury, and in March 1764 
he was able to instruct Rochford to apply for licences to export 
10,000 pistoles in gold e.nd 100,000 dollars in silver "for His 
lJJajesty's Service" in England. 14 
The questinn of bullion exports ir. one form or another 
continued to give Rochford "some employment ll in his first years at 
Eadrid. For example, early in 1764 he had to argue the case of a 
group of London merchants who had obtained a licence to ship bullion 
from Havana, and were being charged a nine per cent duty by the 
Governor of that place. The bullion Was the proceeds of the sale 
pf the merchants' goods after Havana had been returned to Spanish 
rule after the Peace in 1763. The Spanish government imposed no 
duty on proceeds from trading under the Briti~~ occupation, but 
understandably did so on those obtained after the restitution. 
However, Rochford found the Spanish ministers anxious to avoid any 
dispute, and eager not only to conform to the letter of the .law 
"but to go even a little further,1I and after a lengthy exchange of 
d . I . . bl 15 Offices the matter waS resolve fa1r y ana am1ca y. 
Nassau Papers, E/22, Draft (in Portents hand) of Rc~hford's "Scheme 
for Silver Exports from Spainll~ a further copy, SF 94/253, f.58 ; 
final version of -13 January ~1764 ,and copy to the 'i.'reasury of 30 
January, SF 94/166, fos.34, 35; SF 94/166, f.115, Halifax to 
Rochford, 13 March 1764. 
SP 94/166, fos.115, 226, Halifax to Rochford, 13 Narch and 15 It.ay 
1764 ; ibid., 1'.204, Rochford to Halifax, 9 April 1764 SF 94/167, 
f.164, ~ochford to Halifax, 3 June 1764. 
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A rather different case involving a similar principle 
arose early in 1765, "lith the wreck of a bullion-carrying English 
vessel, The True Briton, on the Galician coast near Cape Finisterre. 
Rochford acted promptly upon the news of this misfortune, and 
obtained an order that the bullion salvaged from the wreck should 
pay no new duty upon landing. After the gold and silver had been 
brought safely to Corunna, Rochford successfully applied for a 
16 
second order tllat there shoJ.;l,ld be no new duty for re-exportation. 
The problem of bullion smuggling at the major Spanish 
ports gave rise to a constant irritant in the visitation of British 
vessels by Spani~h customs officers ; exemption f~om this visitation 
was one of Britain's treasured privileges under the old commercial 
treaties. As a result, Rochford found it necessary to Il~ake protests 
Hfrom time to time" at Hadrid, as a reminder to "Ghe Spaaish ministers 
t~at this was a practice directly contrary to the treat 17 • 
But the more important cases relating to British traders 
upon which Rochford mada repeated representations at Madrid were 
those recommended tc his attention by the Secretary of State in 
London. Some of these were of such long standing that they seemed 
to be inherited along with the embassy by successive British 
ambassadors to Sp"dn. Foremost among these \>IBS the claim by a 
group of British merchants established at Malaga, Messers Thrupp, 
Kirkpatrick, and others, whose effects and goods had been seized 
at the outbreak of the War of Jenkins' Ear in 1739, despite their 
precaution i~ having first ceded these effects to a local resident 
for safe-keeping. Kirkpatrick had returned to Malaga after the 
16. SP 94/169,f.201, Rochford to Halifax, 25 February 1765 ; the Office 
notifying Rochford of the orders sent to the Intendant of Galicia 
is in Nassau Papers, • (original, in Spanish) Squilaci to 
Rochford, February 1765. 
17. SP 94/171, f.54, Rochford to Hali~ax, 22 July 1765 ; see also 
HcLachlan, Trade and Peace .witp Old Spain, pp.14-18. 
Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle and finally died there in 1758. But he 
had failed t6 apply before his death for a dissequester of the 
credits which the Spanish government had at last acknowledged as 
the equivalent of that which had been seized, and his partners 
18 despaired of recovering their losses. Likewise the claim of 
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one O'Donnell, which Keene had pressed in his time as al'.'1bassador, 
seemed hopeless both from neglect of the fo~ms and the 
'19 time. _ 
e of 
But the Case '-fhi.eh gave Rochford most trouble was that 
of one Beeston Long, a London merchant with interests in no fewer 
than ten vessels a!ld ~heir cargoes which had been seized as prizes 
at Havana after t~0 conclusion of peace in 1748. After repeated 
app~als in 1752 and 1'754, his claim had been recognised a:1U the 
orders actually given for the debt to be r~~olved into a 8pecial 
fund at Havana from l..rhich Be~ston Long \'1ould 12e reimbursed. But 
soniething had gone wrong. ':'he fund was mysteriously emptied, not 
into Beeston Long!s hands, and the Spanish authori~ies ~n their 
embarrassment maintained· a stony silence on the matter, despite 
fresh appeals in 1759. Rochford was charged with the renewal of 
these appeals at the start of his embassy, but having submitted 
the necessary Office, nothing was heard of the natte~ for over a 
year. When reminded by Halifax, Rochford pointed out that such 
matters passed through Ariaga's office, which was notorious for 
its delays, but upon renewing his appeal, Rochf0rd had a reply 
18. There is a useful summary of this case in an undated paper (in 
Parten I s hand) in ~~assau Papers, E/23. 
19. SP 94/172, f.48, Rochford to Conway, 7 October 1765 ibid., f.71 \ 
Conway to Rochford, 3 November 1765. 
within two months. However, it was in Rochford's opinion 
"so very extraordinaryll a reply (thanking him for the reminder, 
as no trace could be found of his previous Office!) that he resolved 
to pursue 'the matter further in a very stern and \~igorous Answer, 
which reviewed the complexities of the case in some detail. Yet 
even this was to languish several months more in Ariuga's department, 
unanswered, until Rochford remonstrated with Grimaldi in October 
over these unexplained delays. Despite na good deal of Altercation," 
Rochford found he coulu ~ot convince the minister of the justice 
of Beeston Longis claim, and was rendered ~lmost speechless when 
Grimaldi claimed that the lapse of time had ~ade the matter obsolete. 
Conway, the ne\1 Secretary of State in London, agreed that the 
Spanish attitude was lIurlfair and unreasonable, 11 and instr"ucted 
Rochford to persevere in the matter. But it was obvious from the 
further evasions and delays that the Spanish government had no 
intention of pa;Jing out ~ sum v,hich they claimed had been seized 
in the British occupation of Havana in 1762. 20 
The Beeston Long affair was typical of the worst 
frustrations Rochford met with at Madrid, but not all of the Cases 
recommended to his advocacy were attended with failur~. He had a 
notable success in obtaining the release of Captain Glas from his 
detention at Teneriffe, and it was a cruel twist of fate that 
cut his freedom short in tragedy_ Glas and his ship the Hillsborough; 
20. SP 94/165, f.66, Halifax to Rochford, 20 Sember 1763 ; SF 94/253, 
f. ,Parten to Beeston , 13 January 1764 ; SP 9}:/169, f.57, 
Halifax to Rochford, 29 January 1765 ; ibid., f.191, Rochford to 
Halifax, 18 February 1765 ; SF 94/170, :£'.140, Halifax to Hochford, 
7 June 1765 ; ibid., f.C4, Rochford to Halifax, 5 April 1765 
SP 94/171, f.7, Rochford to Halifax, 1 July 1765 ; ibido, f.1 , 
Conway to Rochford, 13 September 1765 ; SP 94/172, f.50, Rochford 
to Conway, 14 October 1765 ; ibid., £.58, 2ochford to Conway, 
21 October 1765 ; SP 94/1 ,i.126, Conway to Rochford, November 
1765. 
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carl.'ying a valuable cargo for Hessers Anthony Bacon and Company 
of London, c~lled at the Canary Islands late in 1764, ,.,.here to his 
amazement he vlaS arrested and thrown into prison on suspicion of 
smuggling,and denied all communication with the outside world. 
His crew were apparently glad to escape from his dictatorial rule, 
and took ship for other parts, so that it \vas finally thanks to 
thp. British Consul at Teneriffe that Glas's plight was made known 
in London. Rochford was then instructed to demand orders for his 
release, protesting 9.t the same time at the habitual mistreatment 
of British sailors at the Canaries. At London, :{alifax also 
protested to Nasserano, the Spanish ambassaCl.or. But Grimaldi 
had 
answered Rochford with the claim that the Governor of the Canaries/ 
proof of the charges against Glas. Rochford also heard from other 
sources that Glas had in fact been notorious as a smugglcr 1 though 
his pres€nt voyage had been sponsored by the British government to 
reconnoitre watering places on the Cape Hor4 route. He ~~erefore 
decided not to press the matter until more was heard fram Teneriffe. 
But the Governor, after further long delays, finally admitted he 
had no evidence against Glas, and feebly claim~d that he had been 
placed in quarantine, having earlier called at Moroccv where plague 
had been reported. At this, Conway indignantly instructed Rochford 
to demand, with his tlusual Clearness and FL. ... mness," the immediate 
release of Captain Glas j !lthis is not merely a private Affair, it 
is a National Concern." 21 
21. SF 94/169, f.1 ,Halifax to Rochford, 19 February ':765 ; SF 94/170, 
f.5, Halifax to Hochford, 22 Harch 1765 ; ibid., f.',14, IIalifax to 
de Visme, 10 Hay 1'765 ; SP 94/1'71, f.30, Comray to Rochford, 
2 August 1765. The Spanish case against Glas, such as it was, is 
outlined in Nassau Papers,. :6/10 ,(copy, in Spanish) Squilaci to 
Grimaldi, 15 May 1765. 
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Bochford accordingly made this demand towards the end 
of August 1765, and i'Jhenchallenged to sUbstantiate the charges 
against Glas, Grimaldi capitulated and agreed to his release, 
grumbling 'that Britain should adopt lisa deterr:lineti a Tone on the 
Liberty of this Delinquent." \;lithin a week, orders were sent for 
G:l.as I S release, and some\'lhat later a strong reprimand followed to 
the Governor. Consul Pasley reported that Glas was released on 
14 October, but his freedol:l "!.vas shortlived- Glas and his wife 
and child, vlho had camp, to join him at Teneriffe, were murdered in 
the course of a mutiny on the ship which was bringing them back 
22 to England. 
Few of Rtjchford's !'epresentations on behalf of British 
subjects were quite as serious as this case, and none as tragic 
in its final outcome. Eost of his applications vlere quite routine 
petty affairs, and usually met with some form of satisfaction. 
They \'iere, however, a cor.stant and time-con5uming diversion. 
Having pointed this out earlier to Halifax, Rochford tOvk care to 
remind Conway in Octobe~ 1765 ; 
"I make frequent Applications here for. His Hajesty's 
trading Subjects, which are not alway3 worth troubling 
23 you with •• !I 
Such applications resulted from a wide vari~ty of causes, ranging 
. . t d f . .r:- d 24 from the extradltlon of a man wan e or an lnsurance ~rau, 
petitions from the assignees of bankrupts with interests in Spain,25 
22. SP 94/171, f.124,Rochford to Conway, August 1765, S~parate ; 
ibid., f.162, Rochford to Conway, 6 September 1765, .;3eparate ; 
SP 94/172, f.71, ConwaY to Rochford, 8 November 1765 ; ibid., f,89, 
Rochford to Conway, 28 October 1765 ; ibid., f.161, Parten to 
COllVmv 25 November '1765 ; SP 94/173, f.5, Conway to Rochford, 
3 Jan~;ry 1766. ,in embroidered account of Glas' s career and his 
dea th aboard the f.;and"dch appears in the Annual Re.,gi'ster (1766), 
pp.85-38. 
23. SP 94/172, £.58, Rochford to Conway, 21 October 1765. 
24. SP 94/171, f.73, Rochford to Conway, 29 July 1765. 
25. SP 94/172, f .. 182, Cammy to Hochford, 31 December 1765 
SP 94/173, £'146, Conway to Rochford, 11 l;arch 1766. 
, . t f d 1 f . t . t . t· 26 comp~aln S 0 e ays rom exceSS1ve quaran 1ne res r1C 10ns, 
claims for g09ds salvagerl from wrecks, 27 and the usual claims 
for the recovery of debts from Spanish merchants. 28 Where the 
facts were. clear and no room for dispute existed, these matters 
were usually settled fairly readily, especially when Rochford 
pressed them vigorously. For example in October 1765 his protest 
at the unwarranted seizure of goods from an English vessel which 
had run aground near Cadiz resulted in a rpprimand for the local 
gubdelegate of Marine. 29 But more complex cases which involved 
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a conflict of testimony or a disputed right were likely to suffer 
considerable delays. '1'11e liS i.·range perplexed lffairtl of the Pasley 
brothers of Teneriffa, an attempt to reclaim ~hat they considered 
to be an unlawful prize of war, gave Rochford and Porten many 
h~adaches in the course of 1765, as they strove to secure a settlement 
without appeal to the Council of the Hacienda, which was certain to 
hand down an adverse jUdgement. 30 
In many cases either the initial complaint or supporting 
evidence Came from the nearest British Consul. This was certainly 
the first channel of intelligence when anything faintly resembling 
an international incident occurred. Fortunatel~ Roc~f0rd had only 
one such alarm, in Hay 1764, when a British merchantmo.n exchanged 
broadsides with eight Spanish xebecs off Cai.tagena. Both sides 
sustained injuries and damage, but luckily nobody was killed, and 
26. SP 94/,1 , 1'.211, Rochford to Halifax, 22 DecemJer 1763. 
27. Nassau Papers, E/3, Hochford to Captain f.1iln, 17 April. 1764 j 
(not SP) Rochford here advice on the Captai~!s duty under 
Znglish law to recover all he can, selling at the best poss 
prices, in order to reimburse the owners and satisfy the insurers. 
28. SP 94/1 ,f.231, Halifax to Rochford, 21 December 1764 
the claim by Claude Passavant of Exeter for payment for 
of woollen goods. 
f. is 
a shipment 
29. 
30. 
SP 94/1 ,f.68, Ariaga to Rochford, 14 October 1765 ; Nassau 
E/15 (translation, in Portents hand). 
SP 94/170, fos.25 and 194, Rochford to Halifax, 15 ~arch an~ 21 June 
1765 ; l;assau Papers, E/'12, (translation, in Rochford t s hand) Copy, 
Squilaci to Grimaldi, Aranjuez, 15 May 1765. 
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since the altercation had apparently stemmed from a simple 
misunderstandinG exaggerated by language differences, Rochford 
had no difficulty securing a prompt satisfaction at Madrid. 
Grimaldi even of.pered to have the Commander of the Xebecs punished, 
31 but Rochford thought he had suffered enough already. 
Even before Rochfordrs arrival in Spain, Halifax had 
instructed each of the consuls to report to the new ambassador 
any disabilities suffered by Bri~ish traders at t~e Spanish ports, 
"both from Innovations introduced, and any Infringer{'~nt, or Breach 
of subsisting Treaties." In theory, Porten as COilsul-General 
handled the correspondence with the consuls, ~enling them regular 
instalments of advice and encouragement, but ~"e found that their 
return corl'espondence consl.sted chiefly of complaints about petty 
ab1lses and infringements by harbour authorities, "which have caused 
sufficient Occupations to His Excellency" [RoChford] in obtaining 
redress. 33 Even so, Rochford could not avoid corresponding 
directly with some consuls himself, though presumably in close 
consultation with Porten, not only giving advice but even at times 
instructions for their guidance on certain delicate points. 34 
31. SF 94/167, £'.50, Rochford to Halifax, 30 liay 1764 ; ibid., f.60, 
Halifax to Rochford, 15 June 1764. 
32. SP 94/165, f.149, Bea'des to Halifax, 21 Oc:t;ober 1763. 
33 .. SP 94/169, f.. Porte:n to Halifax, 11 February 1765. 
34. Lists of British COJ18:11s in Spain and at the Hediterranean ports 
are contained in SF 94/169, f.156, (Spain; 5 March 1765) ; and 
SF 94/169, f.7 (l·iediterranean ports ; 1 January 1765). These may 
be of somc value for their additions to the lists in D.E. Horn, 
The British Diplomatic Service, 1689-1789 (Oxford,1 1), pp.25!.~-255. 
Spain: Porten (Madrid) ; Coxon (Alicant) ; Forrester (Barcelona) 
1 Vice-Consul until ':!i.tham's arrival] j J<esson (Cadiz) [another 
Vice-Consul, replac Tilson who died 24 ~ay 1764, until the arrival 
of as Consul J ; ?Iesbitt (Canary Islands) succeeded by Pasley ; 
Bomeester ( ) ; Banks (Corunna) ; Aiskell ( ) ; Beawes 
(Seville and St LUGar) £: This is presumably the author of Lex i·:erca torir 
Rediviva (London,1752) , cited in Horn, p.239~· 
MediterraneD.nand acent areas: i'Iadrid, es, Genoa, Messina, 
Nice, , Venice, Oporto, ~arcelona, 
Leghorn, Zant, I:adeira, Seville, Alicant, C. 
,Corunna, orca, 
, Lisbon, Cagliari. 
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Ruchford's direct dealings with the British Consuls in 
Spain also cast some light upon the problems faced by the Consular 
Service in the eighteenth century. An instance of this was Rochford's 
successful intervention on behalf of Aiskell at Malaga ~arly in 1764, 
to secure that Consul's release from imprisonment for not contributing 
towards the maintenance of the loeal militia ; Squilaci wrote a stern 
letter to the Governor telling him not to pester foreign consuls in 
35 this respect. 
But the Governor had his revenge within a year, and also 
occasioned one of Rochford's most useful pieces of work on behalf of 
the Consuls in Spain. In January 1765 Aiskell \ .. as arrested for 
delegating his dutie.s to a Vice-Consul , .. ho was not 'of the same Nation, 
and who had not received a Royal cadula authorizing him to act. This 
\ .. as not an isolated case. The revival of this old decree in -;764 had 
caused great confusion, for deputies of the same nationality were not 
easily found at some port03. Rochford immediately protested at l1adri.d, 
and secu.~ed Aiskell1s rele~se, along with that of the Dutch Consul 
who had been similarly c·harged. But he then \vcnt a step further, and 
after some discussion vJith the Spanish ministe ... ~s obtained clarification 
for the future in a fresh ruling that foreign c.:msuJs !:!ight name 
their own Vice-Consuls and Agents, whatever their nationality, 60 long 
as the Spanish Court had no objection to the individual so named. 
Halifax praised Rochford's IIZeal and Prudence!! in securing this most 
useful ruling, but perhaps the final comment was that of Stanier 
Parten, who later \vrote ; "This '"las looked upon by our Consuls and 
IIerchants as so very advantageous a point gained for the Commerce 
36 that they aCkn01tlledged their thanks in Letters to His Excellency. 11 
35. SP 94/166, f.1 ,Roch~ord to Halifax, 2 April 1764 ; ibid., f. 
Haliiaxto Rochford, 15 1764. 
36 .. SP 91t/169, fos.59, 33, Hochford to Halifax, 14 and 18 January 1765 ; 
ibid., f.1 ,~aliiax to 2ochford, 9 February 1765 ; ibid.~ f.195, 
Aiskell to Halil'ax, 21 l"ebruary i 765. Porten's circular of January 
is at f.102. For his later comment, see SP 78/273, f. ,Parten to 
Shelburne, 16 December 1767. 
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Possibly in reac~ion to this signal concession, the 
Spanish government thereafter examined all such consular applications 
more rigorously, and in Harch 1765 the new British Consul for 
Barcelona, Abraham Whitham, was denied the cedula on his commission, 
because a Spanish officer thought he remembered dining with him at 
Gibral tar in the uniform of the Royal Engineers. He \'<'as, however, 
only a clerk in that service, but Port en fGund that he would have 
to obtain a certificat~ frum London to tha'~ effect before a cedula 
would be issued at Mad~i~. 37 
Rochford's correspondence with the Dpanish ministers on 
matters relating to the Consuls often demanded as much care and 
foresight as migi."(; be expected of strictly dh)lomatic correspondence. 
i.Jhe:n Coxon at Alicante reported that great partiality was shown to 
French vessels there in respect of the vif.itation, and that(he had 
reason to b~liev~on orders from Madrid, Rochford had to tread very 
warily, and surely asked Port en for his advice in composing a Not~ 
to Squilaci. 'I'hat minister responded promptly, in I'a rr.ost obliging 
and satisfactory Answer,~' which promised a letter to the Administrator 
of Customs instructing him to administer the treaties more fairly. 
Yet Halifax gave Rochford all the credit for this minor success, 
attributing it to his original Note ; "Your IJcrdship se~ms to have 
drawn it very prudently, in such Manner as not to preclude yourself 
from reclaiming (if it should hereafter upon any other occasion 
become necessary) that Right of Exemption from "lisitationt' which had 
38 heen securod for Britain by previous treaties. 
Yl. SP 94/170, f.1;.3 (COllY), Porten to Hhitham, 2 Harch 1765. 
38. SP 94/166, f.88, Rochford to Halifax, 13 February 1764 ; ibid., 
f.104, Halifax to Rochford, 9 Harch 1764. 
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Quite apart from acting in defence of the Consuls at 
Madrid, Rochford also acted on their behalf with the British 
government. His dealings with Bomeester, the Consul at Cartagena, 
illustrat~ both these aspects. In February 1766, Rochford laid a 
complaint against the Govarnor of Cartagena for his interference 
to restore the Mediterranean pass which Bomeester had co~fiscated 
from a Hahonese vessel. This \vas not only umvarrantable intervention 
between the Cor,sul and one of his fellow British subjects, but was 
also contrary to the provisions of the Royal cedula authorizing the 
Consults appointment. Rochford had no difficulty in securing a 
prompt reprimand of the Governor. 39 It is inter~sting to note in 
passing that Bomeester1s confiscation ~as probably in consequence 
of a suggestion by Rochford himself the year before, that the 
cancellation of temporary war-time passavants ough~ to be supplemented 
by a proclamation against the purchase of captured Admiralty passes 
f th ~ h 40 rom e l'renc • 
Doubtless en('ouraged by RochfordLs action on his behalf 
against the Governor of Cartagena, Bomeester made a request in the 
following month for s6me sort of salary as Consul. Rochford fully 
supported this request, pointing out that while it was necessary 
to have a British Consul at Cartagena, the conSUlage there was very 
small, and that Bomeester had exhausted his private means in the 
hvo years since his appointment as Consul. This request vlaS not 
only granted, but Bomeester1s salary of £ 100 a year was back-dated 
to January 1766. 41 
39. SP 94/"173, f.142, Rochford to Comvay, 17 February 1766.· 
40. A further Proclamation vras issued in response to Rochford I s 
suggestion; SP 94/169, f.1 ,Rochford to Halifax, 11 February 1765; 
SP 94/'169, f .. 152, Iialifax to Rochford, 5 Harch 1765. 
41. SP 91~/173. f.162, Bomeester to Conway, 11 March 1766 ; ibid., f.189, 
Rochford to Conway, 17 March 1766 ; SP 94/174, f.164, Richmond to 
Bomeester, 22 July "766. 
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The chief entrepot for the Anglo-Spanish trade of the 
eighteenth century WaS of course Cadiz, and it is scarcely 
surprising that here lay the source of Rochford's fullest direct 
dealings with a Consul and English Factory in Spain. '.rhe large 
number of vessels trading at Cadiz, and its primacy as the port of 
the annual silver fleet to the Indies, made Cadiz the centre for 
bullion smuggling, from wftich flo\'/ed Rochford 1 s tvlO main problems 
involving British subjects there ; the visitation of British vessels, 
42 
and the imprisonment of British sailors on suspicion of smugGling. 
The visitation problem concerned Rochford from the very 
start of his embassy, though he deferred making Fl.ny complaint at 
first ; "avoiding, as long a3 may be convenient, entrir ... g on any 
Clisagreable Affair here. tI 43 But by Hey 1764, Ho:;rdord had grovln 
anxious that unless Borne stand was takan scan, the Spanish ministers 
might take fartber liberties with British shipping. The present 
practice o+' ,ri.sitation was, Rochford claimed, an inr.ovation since 
1760. No objection was held to the initial health inspection, nor to 
the customs search itse~f. but only to the surprise searches made 
after the ship's manifest had been cleared. Rochford therefore 
instructed Tilson, the 3ritish Consul at Cadiz, to lodge a formal 
protest. Rochford also spoke to Squilaci, who maintained that this 
surprise visitation waS mainly aimed at the French one-decked ships 
which were notorious for smuggling, and that British ships were also 
visited to prevent any accusations of partiality_ Rochford carefully 
refrained from seeming to admit or accept this explanation, and 
42. McLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old Snain, pp.14-15, has further 
details of bullion smuggling at Cadiz. 
43. SP 94/1 ,f.203, Rochford to Halifax, 12 December 1763, separate. 
44. 
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mert:l~~ stressed hm"r clearly the existing treaties established 
Britain's right to exemption from such visitation. As a partial 
solution, possibly at Portents suggestion, Rochford sent orders to 
all British Consuls in Spain that they should add a proviso to the 
additional Declaration on their cargo manifests, reiterating the 
British claim to exemption. This precaution was praised by Halifax 
as being Hextremely Proper & Necessary," and he a.dded that the King 
himself greatly approved Rochford's "care and attention" in this 
lIimportant Affair." 4lj< 
The problem of British sailors being a~r~sted on suspicion 
of smuggling was not capab10 of control by each precautions, however, 
and throughout his E;arly YC2.rs at Hadrid, Rochford had to apply 
for the release of such detainees quite frequently. In most cases, 
clear proof of guilt was hard to establish, and Rochford had little 
trouble s~curing pardons and prompt release. 45 But one class of 
prisoners, those arrested in the West Indies, proved muc~ more 
difficu:t to free, and finally drove Rochford to soma research to 
find out why. He discovered that while the treaties relating to 
Old Spain provided for the release of the crew when a ship \,ras 
confiscated for carrying contraband, the treaties relating to 
America were silent on this point. As a result, the Spanish 
authorities were very reluctant to release ~ailors arrested there. 
Rochford therefore took the matter up with Grimaldi, who held fast 
to the letter of the treaties and insisted that such prisoners had 
to be tried according to Spanish law. ~his did not satisfy Rochford 
li\>i'hat I thought I had a fair Right to insist upon 'lf/e.;:; that at least 
SP 94/167, f.23, Rochford to Halifax, 21 May 1764 ; ibid., f.36, 
Rochford to Halifax, Nay 1'764 ; SP 94/'167, f .60, fax to 
Rochford, 15 June 1764. 
SP 94/'166, f.-141, Halifax to Rochford~ 27 Harch 1764; ibid., f.196, 
Rochford to Halifax, 2 April!764 ; SP 94/166, f.220, Rochford to 
Halifax, '16 il <1764 ; Nassau Papers, 1:.:/1 L~, Hochford to CajJtain 
Stewart, 4 October 1764 (two of his sailors detained on suspicion of 
smuggling tobacco) ; Nassau " (original, in Spanish) 
Squilaci to Rochford, 9 January 1765. 
46. 
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since they l'lere brought into Europe there was no pretence for 
detaining them here." Rochford accordingly took his appeal to 
Ariaga, in whose department the matter properly lay, and within 
a fortnight Rochford was gratified to hear that orders had been 
issued for the release of the ten British sailors then languishing 
46 at Cadiz on charges laid in the i'Jest Indies. 
Cadiz obviously required an active and strong-minded 
British Consul. It was therefore with dismay as well as s6rrow 
that Rochford received ne,,,s in r1ay 1764 of the deE'.th of Consul 
Tilson at Cadiz. Tilson had been a personal friend of Porten, who 
immediately took in hand the arrangements for hi~ burial and the 
47 
sale of his property. The death of the Co~~ul had se~ious effects 
upon the English factory at Cadiz, which seems to have been divided 
between turbulent factions at this time. Rochford appealed to 
Halifax for a swift replacement ; or else "infinite misciliefs 
will arise. 11 Before his death, Tilson had appointed as his Agent 
I;he younger Bewicke, \'1ith the full approval of the E'actory. But 
Bewicke now had occasion. to return to Englatld, and named Jesson 
as his successor. Rochford hi~self recommended Jesson as the most 
suitable person to be Consul there, from his long experience and 
standing among the :;~nglisn at Cadiz. But Jessonts rivals within 
the community had procured the appointment of Dalrymple and French 
as acting Agents, even thOUGh Jesson had been recognized by the 
Spanish Governor as acting Consul. All parties concerned appealed 
to Rochford for guidance, and he recommended that in the meantime 
SP 94/17'1, f.7, Rochford to Ealifax, 1 July 1765 j ibid., 1..24, 
Rochford to Halifax, 15 July 1765. 
SP 94/1 ,f.. ,Archdekin to Ha.lifax, 25 ;,jay 1764 having already 
informed Rochford and ?orten at Madrid; Tilson died 24 May 1764. 
SP 94FI6'7, 1'.54, Porten to Halifax, 30 Hay 1764. 
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Jesson was the obvious man to act as Consul ; Dalrymple had been 
declared bankrupt as recently as 1762. This ad7ice was, as usual, 
f · 11 d by }-1 l"f 48 u y approve a ~ ax. 
Huch of the division ,'>1i thin the English fac tory at Cadiz 
arose from the large body of Irish.Catholics established there as 
merchants. Rochford found that this group caused great d~sturbances 
and trouble IIby changing their Nation as it suited their conveniency.1I 
This was not cC'llfined to the Irish ; it was common for Swedes and 
Danes to claim to be English one day in order to benefit from the 
exemptions and privileges of the commercial t~eaties in Britain's 
favour, and to revert to their O\..rll nationality on the next, as it 
.suited them. This thorny problem "laS at last resolved by a new 
regulation early in 1764 which required all foreign merchants and 
traders in Spain to register their nationality and sign their names 
with their Consul every year. Some of the British traders first 
asked Rochford whether they should comply, but while he doubted if 
he had sufficient authc~ity so to direct them, he admitted that he 
considered it a fair and beneficial measure, to which the King of 
~ " h d . 1 t 49 bpa1n a every r~~l • 
Thus thvlartea., t:le Irish contingent at Cadiz attempted 
another expedient, \-Ihieh ,vas to obtain the Governor t s consent to 
clear their ships returning to England without paying the National 
.or "Factory!! Duty. Rochford's predecessor Keene had submitted many 
Memorials on this but without any success. Rochford therefore 
48. SP 94/167, f.50, Eochfor:'l. to , 30 Hay 1764, B0parate 
SP 94/168, £.219, Rochford to ~alifax, November 1764 
ibid., £.227, Halifax to Rochford, 18 December 1764. 
49. SP 94/166, f.69, Rochford to Iialifax, 30 January '1764 ; SP 94/168, 
f.101, Rochford to halifax, 17 September 1764. On the English 
fae tory Cadiz, and the Irish Catholics, see ::.cLachlan, 'l'rad~ 
and Peace \vit..;;~ Old Spain, pp.140,144. 
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studied very closely the original Act of Parliament of 1736 which 
granted this duty~ and there found a clause which mada masters who 
failed to pay the National Duty on leaving Spain liable to a 
three-fold duty on arrival in England. Rochford \o.]8.S then able to 
argue cogently to Squilaci that lenience at Cadiz only made the 
Irish merchants liable to a g~eater penalty, and that it would save 
everybody a lot of trou01~ if the Spanish authorities insisted that 
the Irish pay the duty to the Factory. Squilaci readily agreed with 
this~reasoning, and sent the necessary orders to Cadiz. Rochford 
expected the Gover.nor to quibble, but clair ... ed he had ria remedy 
prepared for that .. 11 Since nothing more is heard of th::'s problem, 
it must be assumed that the !'cmedy was effective. 50 
The prevention of such evasions and abuse-s IIlas the duty 
of the Consul, and it would therefore have been with relief that 
Rochford lea::ne0. of the appointment of Josiah Hardy as Consul for 
Cadiz towards the end of 1764~ As an outsider, liardy would not be 
quite so susceptible to the factional pressures 1rlithin the Factory, 
and as brother to Admiral Rardy he would have a meaSure of prestige 
to assist him in composing differences. liardy arrived at Cadiz in 
May 1765, and as Rochford had predicted, matters there very soon 
settled back intosomethi~g resembling normality. Hardy's only 
complaint in the remainder of Rochford's embassy was that his mail 
was being interfered with by the Spanish postal authorities .. It is 
a measure of Porten1s capacity as Crinsul-General that he immediately 
devised a cipher for Hardy I s use in corresponding \1itb him .. 51 
50. SP 94/168, f.101, Rochford to Halifax, 17 September 1764 ; Uassau 
Papers, :8/6 (copy, Porten's hand), Rochford to Squilaci, n.d., 
(1 September,1764) , memorial regarding the duty at Cadiz. 
51. SP 94/'168, f.227, to l~ochford, 18 December 1764 ; SP 9l!-/170, 
f.187, IIardy to Halifax, 21 1765 (repor his arrival at 
Cadiz on 16 May) ; SP 94/174, f.23, Port en to Conway, 13 1766. 
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Porten1s counterpart, the ;.3panish Consul-General J.n 
England, did not inspire Rochford with the same confidence. In fact, 
Rochford thought it necessary to "larn Halifax to keep an eye on 
him : 
"I kno~., this Ventades particularly \\'ell ; He was 
Commissary to the Spanish Troops during the 
Campaign in Portugal; He talks English perfectly, 
pretends a great fondness for our Country 
bu~ notwithstanding his Partiality to us, he has 
a~ ways been the Instrument tlds Cou::-t has made 
use of to debauch our Workmen. 
The enticement of skilled craftsmen, especially shipbuilders and 
those experience~ in the woollen industry, was a sore point 
~etween Britain and Spain throughout this period, and Roc~ford 
particularly requested the Consuls to report any such ce.ses to 
him at once. 53 
Fortunately, none of the Consuls 'iound cause to notif~ 
Rochford of any fresh enticer~ent of British workmen in the course 
of his embassy. Their reportG were full of _sh:..pping nevIs, requ0sts 
for leave or salary increases, complaints at abuses such as have 
been touched on abo7e, and the usual persona l gossip vlhich marks 
the consular corre~pond~nc~ of the eighteenth century apart from 
that of today. There 'iere no firm rules about such reportage, at 
least not before the Board of Trade directive of 1765, and some 
Consuls reported direct to London when they were mOved to report at 
all. As a result, Rochford asked Halifax early 1765 if he would 
direct the Consuls to send him duplicates of such reports made to 
London, as he and Porten were perhaps better placed to judge of 
their accuracy and importance. 54 
52. SP 94/163, f .. 157, :10chford to Halifax, 27 October 1764, Separate & 
Secret. 
53. SP 94/166, £'.226, Halif'ax to Rochford, 15 hay 1764 ; see also He Lachlan 
Trade and Peace, pp.21 17, for earlier examples • 
• SP 9l~/169, f.~1 , nochford .to Haliiax, 11 :February 'i765. ,see also 
D.B. Horn, ·1Il'he Hoard of Trade and Consular Reports,li El?:E.lisl.! 
Historical Review, LIV (1939), 476-480. 
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Hochford summed up his dealings \'Ii th the Consuls in 
Spain, and his opinion of their reports, shortly before the close 
of his embassy in 1766 
"I must beg leave to observe that they ::1:;"'0 seldom well-
informed, take many things upon Trust, and though they 
mean very well, their Intelligence is not always to be 
depended on ; They would willingly put themselves upon 
a greater footing here than they ar~ entitled to, and 
any Disappointment they meet with n~turally exasperates 
them • " 55 
Nevertheless, their infor:,lation was better than nothing at all 
in respect of Spain I s cCl.paci ty to commence another War against 
England, and this consideration undoubtedly helps explain Rochford!s 
constant attentio~ ... to matters consular and cOL.lmercial. Lists of 
warships and their readiness ~ere obviously the most directly 
useful of the Consuls' intelligence reports, yet Rochford drew 
warning even from the ordinary shipping lists. In the sa~e dispatch 
of Janu~ry 1766, Rochford merely observed without wi~hing to seem 
officious or to give any alarm that there were then sixty-three 
merchan t ships at Cadiz, and reminded Conway !;ha t despite the 
trea ties, when the Spanish declare war, they IIlSeize 0:1' every thing 
in their power." Rochford thought this !!worth consideration 
55 whenever we should be obliged to break \-/i th them." 
He had already seen a similar instance of the vulnerability 
of Britain's overseas resources at the outbreak of war, and moreover 
had taken steps to remedy the weakness. ~his was the fund at Cadiz 
into 'Vlhich the proceeds of consulage and the National or "Factory" 
Duty were paid. Before the end of 1764, Rochford had suggested 
that this fund ought to be. transferred through a reputable banker 
• SP 9lf/173, f.88, Rochford to Conway, 22 January 1766, Separate. 
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in regular instalments to the Treasury or the Bank of England, 
to prevent the seizure of such monies by Spain in the event of war 
being declared unexpectedly. Halifax readily appreci~ted the 
point, and gave Consul HE'.rdy instructions to remit regular payments 
from this fund in future. 56 
This small but highly useful suggestion see,as typical of 
Rochford's whole approach to his relations with thB British Consuls 
in Spain, his .mpport of British trading interests, and his concern 
to fulfil the relevant clauses of his general Instructions. 
Though the degree of his indebtedness to Porten as Consul-General 
may have been co~siderable, Rochford nevertheless showed himself 
at Hadrid to be no less prudent, attentive, and successfui in 
these matters than he was as Envoy atI'urin. At both pests, his 
attention to matters consular and commercial ~onstitutes an 
important aspect of his work as a diplomat, not to be overlooked 
or lightly dismissed. 
56. SP 94/168, f.219, I?ochford to Halifax, 22 November 1764 ; ibid., 
f.227, Halifax to Rochford, 18 December 1764. 
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CHAPTER 12 
The Ln.ter :e£ase at Hadrid, 1765-66, 
and the Fall of Sguilaci. 
Rochford returned iTom his leave in Paris by "ray of 
Bayonne, arriving at 1·1adrid on 6 June 1765, where he had barely 
time to dash off a report of his arrival to catch th~ post, before 
pr'oceeding to Aranjuez for audiences with the Spanish King and 
Royal F'amily on the fcllowing day. 1 He ht.ld been greeted at I-Iadrid 
not only by his Secretd.r~·, de Visme, and Stanisr Porten, the British 
Consul-General, but also by a distinguished visitor, Prince George 
Augustus of Neckleilbt.)~g-Streli tz, a cousin to George III I G consort, 
Queen Charlotte f,uphia. Rochford took care to show the Prince 
'l averyattention" during his month's stay at Hadrid, and. WaS later 
favoured with a ~.etter thanking him, belat€::dly but warmly, for his 
"goodness & politeness" at this time. 2 
Rochford found everything quiet and peaceful on the 
political scene at I~drid, but at Court there was mounting 
excitement at the forthcoming wedding of the Prince of Asturias 
to a Princess of Parl)la, for vlhich preparation3 were already well 
in hand. The Princess was expected to arrive in Spain in August, 
and the wedding was to take place as soon as ~he a~rived. However, 
a shadow was cast over the preparations by the death of her father 
1. SP 94/170, f.164, f.164, de Visme to Halifax, 3 June 1765 ; 
ibid., fos0179 and 181, Rochford to Halifax, 6 ~nd 10 June 1765. 
2. The Prince left Madrid for Barcelona on 5 July, proce~ding from 
there to Italy for the Grand Tour; SP 94/170, f .. 12:.;, de Visme to 
Halifax, -;0 June 1765 ; SP 94/171, f .16, Rochford to Halifax, 
8 July 1'765 ; Bodleian IJibrary, Oxford, Lyell HSS, Empt.37 , f.14, 
Rochford's Madrid ~;otebook, 5 July 1765 ; The W.S. Lewis/Walpole 
Library, }'armington, .iass., aut letter from Prince 
Augustus of i';ecklenbure to Rochford, dated at Rome, Hay 1 
(Rochford has i>'lri tten 21 I-;ay -1766 on the back) ; I am indebted to 
U.S. Lewis for a photostat of this letter. 
shortly before her departure for Spain, and though the marriage 
ceremony went ahead as planned, on4 September 1765, with Rochford 
among the ambassadors and foreign ministers forming the first 
circle around the Roya,l Family, the public festi vi ties were 
"2 
postponed until early in December. J 
In the meantime, there was much speculation re~arding 
the appointment of a Regent for the new Duke of Parma, who was 
yet a minor. Fochford WaS told in great secrecy that the King 
himself favoured Prince f,1asserano, the Spanish Ali1ba.ssador in London, 
firstly to avoid sending him to Paris, \11here he IrJOuld merely dance 
to Choiseul's tULe, and secondly because he wante~ at Parma someone 
upon whom he could depend. Rochford's standing at the Spanish Court, 
and the excellence of his sonrces of intelligence, are testified 
by the fact that this ,vas knovl1l only to a very select ::':0\11, and to 
no other foreign minister~ It was not until the end of August that, 
Grimaldi confirmed this information, i~ s~rictest confidence, adding 
that it had first been suggested by the Queen Mother. However, he 
had no desire to see so useful a minister as Masserano consigned to 
the limbo of a pett.y Italian court, and with Choiseul's support, 
Grimaldi succeeded in convincing the King not to send Masserano to 
Parma. Rochford was greatly dismayed at this signal triumph by the 
French party at r'1adrid. 4 
The wedding festivities took place in the second week of 
December, with the usual accoutrements of triurnp~al arches, portraits 
of the Royal F9.m~ly, " emblema tical Figures," mili t!1_ry displays, 
3. SP 94/171, £.78, Rochford to Conway, 29 July 1765, Separate 
ibid., fos. 22 and 150, TIochford to Conw9.Y, 26 August and 
6 September 1765. 
4. SP 94/171, f.102, Rochford to Conway, 8 ~ugust 1765 ; ibid., f.124, 
,- - M L 5 ~ -'" . b' , f. ~14g • Rochford to Conway, 2b ,';,ugust 'I (0 , 0epara "e ; ~ J.et. tV, 
Rochford to Conway, 6 September 1765. 
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and fireworks. The buildings on each of the main streets were 
hung \"rith brilliant tapestries and silk hangings t while at night 
all houses of any consequence \'iere illuminated. Rochford's mm 
house in the strc>et of St Jerome was likewise i11ur.dnated for the 
duration of the festivit ~ which must have relieved some of the 
customary tedium of social life at Madrid. As Rochford described it, 
ttAll last week vias one eontinual Scene of Hurry and Entertainment." 5 
Yet behind c;he extravagance and frivoli"cy of such Court 
entertainments, the 1:'eali ties of diplomacy and polii:::'cal pm-ler 
remained, commanding Rochford's constant attention. Though he had 
found all quiet on his return to Hadrid from 1ea11'e, Rochford heard 
rumours that changas were imminent in the Sp~~ish ministry, and 
that Squi1aci t s credit .'lith tho King \1aS on tbf) decline. However, 
upon further enqui:!"y, Rochford concluded tha t these rumours \'lere no 
more than idle gossip, arising from a remark the King had made about 
Squi1aci ae a joke, which was taken seriously by those who heard it. 
Though Squi1aci's customary dilatoriness had been criticized by Ossun, 
the French Ambassador, who 'vIas rash enough to suggest that Ensenada 
was the better mart for the job, Rochford thought Squilaci's personal 
credit with the King remained as great as ever, and he concluded 
"there has been no very material Alteration during my Absence." 6 
Grimaldi remained pre-eminent among the Spanish ministers, and 
Squilaci still poss0ssed "an apparent Intimacy" \1ith the French 
Ambassador. Even so, while Squilaci felt secure from any attack by 
7- SP 94/172, f .. 185, :t10chford to COllVJay, 16 ])ecernber 1765 ; ibid., 
f.187, de Visme's summary of the week's activity, for the London 
Gazette. 
6. SP 9l~/JI70, £ .. 191, Hochfo!!d to IIalifax,17 ,June 1765. 
Grimaldi so long as he retained the King's personal favour, he 
was apprehensive of the threat posed by Ensanada 1 s scarcely 
concealed desire to return to office. 7 
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If Rochford had no change to report from Hadrid, the very 
opposite was true of his SIJanish counterpart in London, Prince 
l1asserano, who reported in July 1765 the replacement of the 
Grenville minis~ry with that of Newcastle's friendB, now headed by 
the Marquis of :?ockingham. Halifax and Sandwich as Secretaries of 
State, were replaced i~ their respective depart~ents by H.S. Conway 
for the Southern and the Duke of Grafton for the Horthern. 8 
Though the new ministry did not contain the redoubtable 
Pitt, as the Bourbon powers had feared it might, there was much 
speculation at Hadrid and Paris over the polioies to be adopted 
by Britain tOylF,l'ds her Continolltal neighbouI'sF Even \dthout Pitt, 
there were fears that the new ministry might e@ulate his stated 
views regarding a sterner line towards the powers of the Family 
Compact. Accordingly, even t-ofore hearing from Conway, Rochford 
took it upon himself to -reassure the Spanish King and his ministers 
tha t there vIas not the leat;t likelihood of allY change in 3ri tain I s 
resolve to uphold and defend the peace treaties. In doing so, he 
exactly anticipated the reassurances of Conway's circular letter 
of 19 July. 9 
Rochford \vas plainly delighted at the appointment of his 
old school-friond a~ Southern Secretary, and his pleasure was fully 
7. SP 94/171, 1.111, RochfOld to Conway, 19 August 1765. 
8. For a 'Useful summary of this change of ministry, see J.Steven Hatson, 
The Reign of George III (Oxford,1960), pp.109-111. 
9. SP 94/171, f.g6, Rochford to Conway, 5 August 1765 ; ibid" f.11, 
Conway to Rochford, (circular) 19 July 1765. 
337. 
reciprocated by Com..ray I who \'1rote of Rochford's Ilkind & friendly" 
congratulatory letter; III sm" in it the natural Language of an 
old Friend & Acquaintance, II \'1hich gave ten times the satisfaction 
f 11 h · th t' 1 t 1 " 10 o a J.S oer conven J.ona_ congra u a"cJ.ons. Yet Rochford1s 
pleasure was not withont s~lf-interest. Hertford had been recalled 
from Paris to become I,ord Lieutena.'1t of Ireland, and from his 
departure about 10 July 1765, the coveted Paris embassy ''las vacant. 
Rochford evidently h0ped that hi~ old school-friend wuuld put in a 
word for him the right quarters, but Conway was &0rry to inform 
Rochford that the matcer had already been settled ; Charles Lennox, 
11 Duke of Richmond,was named for Paris. 
Inheriting such outstanding probluilD between Dri tain and 
Spain as the Manila Ransom claim and recent Spanish menaces towards 
Portugal, Comlay lI;as anxious to be thoroughly informed from Hadrid. 
He asked Rochford Ior a full report, along the lines of his first 
masterly d:!.spa tches of 13 ,January 1764, adding wha te'rer fresh 
details occurred under the various heads of his Instructions. 12 
Rochford had already reported during August on Spain's 
financ situatJ.on and her readiness to renew hostilities. He had 
succeeded in drawing GrirJaldi out after dinner one evening, as the 
wine flowed freely, and Grimaldi had been indiscreet enough to 
cqnfess that they had jtiS';; enough lito live from Hand to Houth, but 
absolutely no Resso'lrces in case of an Emergency. II He quickly 
10. SP 94/171, f."142, Com"ay to Rochford, 19 September 17G5, Private. 
~1. Horn, British Dinlomatic Representatives, 1689-1789, p.22 ; 
SP 94/171, f.14-2, Comlay to Rochford, 19 September 1765, Private. 
12. SF 9l~/171, f.64, Comvay to Rochford, 16 August 1765, on the Hanila 
Ransom; see also above, pp .. 294-5. 
13-
14. 
15. 
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retracted this, as an overstatement, and Rochford was amused to 
observe how Grimaldi endeavoured to palliate his slip ; "a\'lk\vardly, 
for a long Time ll afterwards. 13 From his own enquiries, Rochford 
found that Squilaci had been using lIall sorts of llethods to borrow 
Honey,tI since 11 the Distresses of this Government are so great." He 
t:!:!ought it especially significant that Squilaci had even been 
reduced to asking the advice of his erstwhile rival, Ensenada, 
14 
on ways and means. 
In his reply to COllVlay I s request for up-to-date ne\'lS and 
impressions, Rochford therefore stressed Spain's weak financial 
si tuation ; "They ne'Yc:r 't!ere in so bad a Condition • • .. Their 
Coffers are not c~ly empty but • • • what renders their Condition 
:=;till ,,/Orse, 'l'hey have absolutely no Resources." AC!.mi ttedly, after 
prodigious efforts, there had been some iwrrovement in their armed 
forces, with the provinces supplying recruits and the press gangs 
rounding up vagabonds in the major tovms, S0 that the Cavalry was 
at last complete and "in good Condition.1! But few vf t.he Infantry 
regiments \V'ere complete.; "the Hhole in no good Condition, and not 
above forty thousand Hen fit to take the Field. 1I As for the Navy, 
Rochford I S estimation \'Ias very much the same ; "Their Fleet is 
ill-manned, and in a bad condition,lt as demonstrated by the length 
of time taken to outfit a small squadron to carry the Infanta 
Archduchess to Genoa. Rochford candidly admitted that he could 
not "exactly ascertain the Humber they have her-e, and in America," 
which was said to be about; sixty capital ships ; "Yet from the 
Accounts I have,1I he doubted they could equip ar-d man more than 
thirty in the event of another \-Jar. 15 
SP 94/171, f.96, Rochford to Conway, 5 August 1765. 
SP 911-/171 , f.111, Rochford. to Conway, 'i 9 August 1765. 
SP 94/17'1, f.1 , Rochford to Conway, 6 September 1765, Private. 
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The conclusion which Rochford drew from his various 
observations ~as that Spain would not willingly resume hostilities 
while she remained unprepared, but that her ultimate intentions 
lr/ere beyond doubt, and it was only a matter of time before her 
tone \"lould change : 
I~OU see Sir by this State of Affairs how little they 
ought to wish :for a ne\'IT War, and it is my firm Belief 
They will do their utmost to avoid it, and will endeavour 
by all Sorts of He3.ns to gain time but t~ey will not 
easily forget their late Losses, and will as soon as ever 
They are able, h,11d a different Language. lim! far it may 
be advisable to be beforehand with t~em, I must leave to 
others to determin€.,.11 
The hint that BI'i:::;.in might be giving Spain teo ample an opportun:i 
tc rearm 1:lO.S unmistakable. Yet on the othe~~ hand, Rochford vlaS 
sure tr.e nation as a Hhole did not 1tJish fer another \ofar so soon 
after the last ; liThe Ap,!)rehension of all degrees of People at it 
is not "':.0 be described • ." Though the francophile elements at 
Court sought to convince Charles III of Britain 1 s animosity towards 
him, Rochford was alert and "not deficient in my Endeavours to 
prevent the bad Effects of such sinister Insinuations.!! 16 
Conway agreed that Spain seemed likely to opt for peace 
in the meantime, and 'l'lholeheartedly shared rtocnford I s suspicion 
towards her ultimate intentions. After her instransigence over 
the Hanila Hansom and her threats against Portugal, Comvay 'Ifondered 
IIcan we, Ny Lord, think her Professions very Si!1cere ? •• it is by 
her Actions, not by her Hords, He must judee of her Intentions." 
He therefore urged Rochford not to relax his vigilance, but to 
16. SP 94/171, f.150, Rochford to ComlaY, 6 September 1765, Private0 
Rochford concluded Nith the hope that I1my feeble Endeavours to 
serve His esty may meet 'ofith His !~pprobation." 
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keep a close \"atch on the state of the Spanish armed forces and 
their readiness for war. Rochford's modest ,'lish that his efforts 
might be approved viaS surely ans\OJered by Conway's gen"rous 
testimony 'to lithe Judr;ment & Activity \.,rith which You have been 
al\.,rays ready to exert Yourself.1I 17 
Rochford found no cause to alter his estimatio.l of 
Spain's intentions in the remainder of his er:1bassy at Hadrid. 
Early in 1766, he repeated his belief that Spain was far from 
ready for another war, adding 
tlWhat Hill 'be their System, No one can absolutely 
determin~ ; Huch vlill depend upon the Cou't"t of :F'rance 
But as far as I can see into their V:.i.€ft.rs ~ Both that Court 
and this t-l:~ll seek to gain time. 1t 
He then went On to repeat, almost in the same words, the warning 
hinted at in hLs September report "EoloJ' fs.r 1. t is consistent 
\-lith the King's Vie,.,rs to allow them that Concideration I must 
leave to wiser heads than my own to d e t:ermine. 1I 18 
Rochford himself, wise or not, left no doubt of his 
own vievlS in diplrmatic 'circles at Hadrid. Both Ossun and Beliardi 
reported to Choiseu1 conve!'sations "lith Rochford :in September 1765 
in which he stated flatly that he thought his goverr-ment was 
giving France a~d 3pain too much time to prepare for another war. 19 
Ossun later gave a full account of his conversation ",lith Rochford, 
which is "!tlorth recounting at length : 
"}filord Rochf·)rd added that as far as he 'ItlaS concerned 
he was too well informed about the forces aLd resources 
17. SP 94/1'11, f.1 1+2, COllVlay to Rochford, 19 September !765, Private. 
18. SF 94/173, 1.'.88, Rochford to COllVlay, 22 January 1766, Separate. 
19. AECP Espagne, 5 l{-2 ; Ossun to Choiseul, 5 Septe:-:lber 1765, and 
Beliardi to Choiseul, 9 September 1765 ; quoted in R .. E. Abarca, 
IlBourbon 'revanche 1 against EnGland ; the Balance of Pm'ler, 1763-
17'70" (unpablished Fh.D. thesis, University of l';otre Dame,,1965), 
pp.,249-250 
of ~pain to give England the least worry respecting 
the w~r prepa:rations taking place here. For he kne\ .. 
that, \vhen all was said, they could not succeed in 
getting the different parts of the Spanish American 
Empire ready to meet any English attack. He was persuaded 
that, in spite of all these efforts, England vtOuld find 
the Spaniards very ,,,eak in case she attacked them. 
He then went on to speak of the land and sea forces 
of Spain vliththe greatest contempt and commented on 
the impossibility of Spain to find "'nough treasure or 
resources ever to dare attack Englandbyhe~self alone. 
But he could ~1.ot S3.y as much for }'rance, ab0ut .. :hich he 
spoke to me ... lith the greatest respect and esteem. He 
confided to Be that ).f the French Crc.'ln were gi 'Jen 
enough time to recuperate from its losses, England 
\-Iould have t)verything to fear from her Revanche and 
very little hOPe of making any furthe:r conquests at 
20 her expense." 
This rema~kable conversation has provoked ~he comment from one 
'<iriter that Rochford comr.litted an· inexcusab13 error for ;:\. diplomat, 
in underestimating Spain't; capacity to harm Britain. 'i'his same 
writer also accuses Rochford of arrogant contempt for the Bourbons, 
and claims that this so enraged Choiseul as to make him despise 
Rochford. Yet from the evidence which this wr-;.ter pr0vides in 
such abundance it is clear that Rochford's estimation of the 
Spanish armed forces accorded very closelYI<ith that accepted by 
Choiseul, and Rochfordts m1U \varnings that Britain "faS giving 
Spain too much time to rearm shOvl that he was fully alert to the 
21 
slow but steady improvement in Spain's preparedness~ 
20. AECP Espagne, 542 ; Ossun to Choiseul, 23 September 1765 ; quoted 
in Abarca, op_cit. (see note 19), pp.199-200. (Abarca1s translation.) 
21. Abarca, p.200. en the very next page, ,Abarca states that v[hile 
Rochiord's information was similar to Ossun's (they came from 
similar sources, after all), his estimate of Spain's readiriess 
agreed with Choiseul's. Compare Abarca, pp.178-1 ,195-202, and 
see also above, pp.254, 260. As for Choiseul1s personal dislike 
of Rochford, it will bo seen below (pp.531-2)thit this stemqcd 
from rather different causes than Rochford's l t cant 
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~'hough Conway had little faith in the verbal assurances 
of the Spanish ministers, it was at least of some significance 
that such assurances were not lacking. Early in October 1765, 
Rochford reported a long and interesting conversation he had had 
with Grimaldi a fe\v days before.. Grimaldi had "so1emnly assuredll 
Rochford that there was nothing within reason that Spain would 
not do in order to live well with Britain. When Rochford responded 
by questioning Spaj.n' IJ obligations under the Family Compact, 
Grimaldi admitted that he looked upon this alliance almost as 
!la Child of his o\rln, II yet hastened to assure Rochford that even 
if France wanted to dra,'/ S}lain into a nelol "far, they would first 
have to lay all t~0ir plans and reasons on th0 table, and allow 
Spain to decide for herself.. This \1aS espezially so regarding 
Canada. Grimaldi remarked that Choiseul ml.:st remember the things 
he said at 'i;he peace negotiations ; he Ifcould not have the Facel! 
to ask ~or Spain's assistance in further hostilities to recover 
Canada for France. 
Rochford had earlier noticed how pr0ud Grimaldi was of 
his role as Spanish plenipotentiary at the Paris peac? conference, 
and used this to draw him out ; lithe Subject is agreable to him, 
& many Indiscretions fall from him.1I As Grimaldi wE:nt on to explain, 
in vie\" of his position as one of the architects of the Family 
Compact, and on account of the hostility of many of the Old Spanish 
grandees, 1.:1ho 11talk publickly of the Scrape it is likely to bring 
them into," he had to give the best turn possible t.o Spaints 
relationship with :f"rance ltlhile remaining wary of l"rench designs 
for a 'revanche' against England. Rochford concluded, lIIt is 
evident therefore he must be very cautious in the Advice he gives, 
whilst he has this Check uyon him.1I 22 
---------------------------------- ---
22. SP 94/172, f .. Rochford to Conway, 3 October 1765, Separate. 
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Quite apart from the question of a Bourbon 'revanche' 
and the readiness of the powers of the Family Compact, Rochford 
was equally alert in the later phase of his Madrid embassy to 
the dangers for 5ritish trade offered by French commercial rivalry 
in the Iberian PeninsulD.. \'-'hile British trade \1ith Spain enjoyed 
favoured status in the first half of the eighteenth century, that 
of French traders in Spain was so privileged as to be superior in 
some respects to the native Span;i.sh themselves. :F;ut after the 
Seven Years' War, Squilaci had imposed a rigorously literal 
interpretation on Article 24 of the Peace of Paris~ greatly limiting 
French trading privileges in Spain, resulting 5.!l much acrimony and 
heated discussion between the two nations it the course of 1764. 23 
Hence Choiseul's al'lxiety to 11egotiate a new comlllercial treaty, or 
at least some amelioration of the strict Sp~nish interpretation of 
Article 24. B'li~rdi returned to Madrid from leave not long after 
Rochford, ~n July 1765, with instructions to obtain ~ new agreement 
restoring earlier privileges and resolving the disputes over silver 
smuggling and visitation of shipping, in \\1hich France had fared 
24 
much worse than britain since the end of the \var. 
However, Squilaci refused to deal directly with B~liardi, 
and the discussions \'1ere conducted by his l!~irst Secretary, Palayeula. 
Beliardi privately told Rochford that he \.Jas not interested in any 
secret agreements ; nothing less than a public treaty would do. 25 
23. Article 24 is printed iIi 2..E. Rashed, 'rhe Peace of PD.,.ris, 1763 
(Liverpool,1 1), pp.22b-7, and in L. Blart, ~cs rapports de la 
France at de l_~~-;;i?paG3~e ?,DreS Ie l?ac_te de }<~:::t::1ille (Paris, 'i 9'15), 
pp.48-9_ For a useful discu.ssion of Ii'ranco-:3panish comnercial 
relations after 1763, see Blart, pp.43-70, in particular pp.51 
for the disacree~ents of 1 • See also, V.L. Bro~n, 
H-istory of" S)ain (1929), ~)p.39-G2 ; especially pp.48-
24. Blart, r. ,note 2 (w~ich extends to p. ) ~emolishes the legend 
started by in 1771 a11(l re:;;Jeated by :1:1.aS50.n, I:uret, and F. 
Rousseau, of iardi's political influence at hadrid,supplantinc 
the French Ambassador, Ossun. 
25. SP 94/173, r.88, ~:ochford to Con111ay, 22 January 1766, Separate. 
3't4. 
Rochford had earlier heard from Grimaldi that Choiseul had 
censured Ossun, even threatening him with r3call, for not 
attending more to commercial matters. Grimaldi also 'Lold 
Rochford that he had received three or four letters from Choiseul 
complaining of the great partiality shown to British vessels at 
Spanish ports. Rochford was gratified to think that thib was so 
a t least at SOIDe> ports, though he \>las sure it vIas liot at Cadiz, 
"where the Frenc.:::t are entirely running away wi th "~he Linnen Trade, II 
because the Spanish officers were notoriously lenient in evaluating 
26 
such goods. De~pite Grimaldi's assurances, Ro~nford remained 
apprehensive lest Spain concede more specific privileges to the 
French trading in Spain. 
Early in January 1766 he obtained the reassurance he 
desired, in "ar: interesting ConverGation ll vlith Squilaci, who began 
by assuring Rochfcrd of his continued perscnal regard ; he 
"he had the most unbounded confidence tn me.!! After some preliminary 
discussion, Squilaci then "f"ntered into· insignifica~cy of the 
Family Compact,11 obf:lerving that Spain Has bound by it only to 
furnish certain st:.<:cours L'l time of i'Jar ; lib;;;:;; by no means obliged 
to act totis viribus, ncr to enter into their [that is, France's] 
Quarrels. II 27 
Encouraged by Squilaci's livery confidential Banner," 
Rochford casually remarked that he had heard the Frencb. Consul 
vlaS aiming at r,lakinr; a ne\." commercial treaty, in hopes of gaining 
some advantage for :i?rench traders in Spain. Rochfvrd felt he 
26. SP 94/169, f.158, TIochford to Halifax, 9 February 1765. 
27. SP 94/173, f.98, Rochford to Cammy, 27 January 1766. 
should remind Squil~ci th~t by their treaties with Britain, they 
could not extend favours to any other nation without also offering 
the same to Britain. Rochford was delighted with Squilaci's 
rejoinder 'to this ; fI\.;hat fell from him on this O<!casion I confess 
gave me the greatest Pleasure." 
Squilaci briefly confirmed what Rochford already knew 
of his First Secretaryfs talks with Beliarni over the past eight 
months, then went on to relate that on thE: Sunday just previous, 
B~liardi had in exasperation at his lack of progre~s approached 
Squilaci himself. The minis'ter had responded by making tvlO vital 
stipulations as prec("nditions of any constru.ctive negotiations : 
Firstly, that France should give an absolute security not to allow 
emuggling by French subjects in Old or New Spain, and sGcondly, 
that any treaty :nroposals must first be Sb("l1;lU to the Dutch and 
British ministers in case they contravened existing agreements 
with those two nations. At this, Squilaci &dded with a faint smile, 
t:the Abbe lost all patience, at finding, after eight months' 
Negotiation, he had proceeded upon so i..rrong a Hotion," for these 
were conditions France would never accept. S;uilaci concluded the 
conversation by saying that Rochford could make \-,he:, '.xse he \..rished 
of this information, so long as he did not commit him in name, or 
let it be knO\-Jn it was he vtho had told Rochford. This caused 
Rochford to add, prophetically, at the end of his dispatch, that 
Squilaci Vias fearful of the French influence at Eadrid, 11\1ell knO\'ling 
that he would not be the first Spanish Hinister who has fallen 
a Victim to their Resentment." 28 
28. SF 9l l-/ 173, f. ,1~ochford to C omlay, 27 January '1766. iardi 
finally got hiG now Convention signed on 2 January 1768, long after 
Rochford had le:i't I!;.adrid and Squilaci had been replaced as Finance 
Minister by the more accommodating Husquiz. Thereafter, the operation 
of the treaties with Britain became more strinsent, and Anglo-
Spanish trade relations entered quite a different e ; see Blart, 
Les rannorts de la ",'rar-cee at de l'Esna[;[.::.£ (1 5), pp.66-68, and 
Bro",;:'}, Studies -in the History of :~j1ai.l1:. ('1929), pp.52-62. 
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Though by the end of his earlier phase at Hadrid. he 
had given up an:y hope of using Squilaci as a direct advocate of 
British interests in the 2panish government, it is clear that 
Rochfordl~ care to remain on good personal terms with the Finance 
minister yielded some very useful information from time to time. 
Squilaci tended to echo Grim~ldi on matters of foreign policy, as 
in the Hanila Ransom affair, but Rochford found him to be " more 
easily frightened" b;r mention of the expenses of Gtnother , ... ar, 
as Squilaci was convin~ed this would infallibly mp.anhis ruin. 29 
Amongst the diplomatic corps at Hadrid, Ho~hford ruefully 
noted that the Fr~nch Ambassador held anascendc>.ncy in most matters, 
thanks to his close connexion \iith Grimaldi ; Ossun dinc3d tlconstantlyE 
at Gricaldi's house. 30 Th~ francophile party at Hadrid was yet 
further strengthened in the middle part of 1765 by the presence of 
Fuentes, who had rpturned on a six-month leave of absence from his 
Paris embaosy. Rochford f01.md Fuentes much more sympathetic tot'lards 
the French point of view as a result of his residence in Paris than 
he had seemed in their palmy days together at 'l'urin. But Fuentes 
showed no inclin~tion to return to Paris at the end of his leave. 
While he still drew ambassadorial pay, and could enjoy the company 
of his many friends at Court, he saw no pressing reason to depart. 
He was finally ordered to return in September 1765, just after 
Rochford had renewed J3ritai::1's demand for the Hanila Ransom 
"The hurrying him away in this Hanner is certainly owing to the 
present critical Situation of Affairs." 31 
29. SP 9l t/'171 , f .152, Rochford to Conway, 6 September 1765. 
30. SP 9l~/174, f .. 27, de Visrne to Commy, 19 I\Iay 1766. 
31. SP 94/170, f. ,Rochford to liD.lifax, 1 Anril '\765 ; SP9L~/I?I, fos. 
192, 219, ,Hochford to Comiay, 10, 17, ember 1765 ; 
on the !1anila l:ansom, see above, pp.29.5-8. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
Remarkably enough, in view of the tenacity of French 
influence in Sweden at this time, 32 Rochford t ... as on excellent 
terms with the S\ ... edish Envoy at Hadrid, Count Philip Creutz ; 
"who manages his affairs ,;lith great skill and is very serviceable 
to me." 33 Though he had found his old friend fron Turin days, 
Roubion, something of a disappointment as the Sardinian Ambassador, 
Rochford remained "a good deal connected with him. I; Eve:c. so, his 
secretiveness ~ . .Ll matters political caused Rochford to ask Conway 
for advice on Ilhow his Court at present stands with Regard to US,ff 
though Rochford guessed from his O\ffi experience of the Court of 
Turin thCi t they :'hCid nothing so much to dread CiS ~~he Union of the 
Houses of Austria and Bourbon." 34 
Rochford's closest ally amongct the diplomatic corps at 
MCidrid, apart from the Dutch minister, remained the Portuguese 
Ambassador, de Sa, who was able to help ~ocnford correct a rum our 
circulating amongst the capitals of EU1::'ope late in 1765. Commy 
asked Rochford at the vary start of 1766 if he could throw any 
light on reports that Spain and France were trying to tenpt Portugal 
into abandoning her alliance with England, even as far as to joining 
the :F'amily Compact. Rochf'::>rd already knevl that some of the foreign 
ministers from northern Europe had been reporting rur:;ours to this 
effect, but he had not taken them seriously, and after further 
enquiry he discovered that they did so on conjecture only, after a 
chance remark by Grimaldi that since the northern powers seemed to 
SeeD.B. Horn, Great :Sri +;.cdn and 3urone in the Eigh.teen th Century 
(Oxford,1967), p , and the .Lntroduction to British Diplotlatic 
Instructions, Volume V, Sweden 1727-1739, edited J.F. Chance 
~bamden 3rd-~eries, London,1928). 
Sand\vich ;;·;SS, Rochford to Ilal:i.i'ax, 11 Harch 1765 ; printed in 
Sandwich Diplomatic Correspondence, 1763-1765, edite~ by _. Spencer 
(Manchester,11), p.292. 
SP 94/171, f .150, Hoenford to Comwy, 6 September 1765, Private. 
be uniting more closely, perhaps those of the south should form 
a stronger alliance. De Sa, however, told Rochford that his 
Court would only laugh at such overtures, in the unlikely event 
of their being made. 35 
After the exchange of notes between Spain and Portugal 
earlier in 1765 over their disputed claims in South America, 
relations between the two neighbouring Crowns had, it is true, 
348. 
thav/ed a littJ.e from a mutual reluctance to provoke an international 
crisis. 36 Grimaldi was anxious to convince Rochford that Spain 
had no ulterior designs on Brazil, and in u conversation on the 
subj ee t in October, Rcchford found Grimaldi It:nm..'c open and free 
on that Subject than ever I found him before,lt He explained that 
the orders sent to their Governor at Buenos Aires were intended 
merely to prevent the very considerable contraband trade being 
carried on by the Portuguese in that part of the world .. ret as 
Rochford la.ter reflected, if under cover of preventing the contraband 
trade the Spanish succeed in ruining legitimate Portuguese trade 
in South America, ffthe consequence \vill be equally fatal. II 37 This 
sober reflection was given point by the fact that Nova Colonia 
remained under virtual bJ_ockade throughout that year. 38 
It was given yet further point by Spain's evident intention 
to keep Portugal in a\'le of a possible invasion. The British Consul 
at Cadiz reported early in .January 1766 significa.nt troop moven1ents 
35. SP 9l~/173,f.5, Commy to Rochford, 3 January 1766 ; ibid., f.1'i1, 
Rochford to Conway, 3 February 1766. 
see above, pp.262-269. A useful brief account of Spanish-Portuguese 
relations after 1703 is fOUlld in V.L. Brown, Studies in the Histor,Y. 
of Spa~n (1929), pp.63-91. 
37. SF 91+/172, f .. 83, Rochford to Conway, 24 October 1765, Secret. 
38. Brown, 
----, p. 
39. 
towards the coasts and the border with Portugal, and in the same 
month the Consul at Corunna reported the arrival of a large 
consignment of gunpowder from France, with similar quantities 
destined for Cadi? and Cartagena. 39 Comlay wrote to inform 
Rochford that the Portuguese Ambassador in London h~d told him 
that Spain now had perhaps six capital ships with frigates as well, 
and land forces totalling 2,000 men, on the Rio de la Plata. 40 
But Hochford \'IaS inclined to believe t'l.at all this \..ras 
mostly just to make a b:::-ave shot..r ; "more ~er"'orem and to prevent 
than with a Design to offend, which requires a \}or.lc of Time, for 
they have at present neither' Eoney, Troops, nor Narine." He trust61'1 
in Squilaci' s caution and fear for his place to restra:i.n the Plore 
bellicose members of the Spanish military, who were still smarting 
under the humi~~ations of the abortive inva3ion of Portugal in 1762. 
Rochford could not conceal a trace of uneasineas on this account 
"some of the mos~ Principal amongst th0ID are Romantick enough to 
believe they are defiClent ~,n nothing. II But like the earlier 
war scare, this one also SOOD blew over, with the trocpa being 
recalled to other ~utias, and both Courts oif~ring fresh assurances 
42 
of their devotion to peace. 
For a tim(~ during his later phase at Hadria, Rochford 
had nore reason to be anxious for Gibraltar than P01?tugal, 1tJith 
the appointment of a Frenchman, the IIarquis de CrilloD, as Commander 
SP 94/173, f. , Hal'dy to Conway, 17 January '1766 ; ibid., f.88, 
Rochford to Conway, 22 J~nuary 1766, Separate; ibido, £.107 •. 
Banks to Conway, 29 January 1766. 
40. SP 94/173, f. ,Conway to Rochford, 11 February 17~6. 
41. SP 94/173, 1'.88, Rochford to ComlaY, 22 January 1766, Separate. 
42. Brown, 0tudies, pp.69-70. There \-las a ld:lOr skirmish on the Ri vcr 
Pla te in June 176'7, which vIas so out 0:: "(8 v[i th the cordiality 
prevailing at home that the affray lIIaS blamed on the Jesuits! 
Thereafter all remained quiet until 1774 ; ~rown, studies, pp.71 
43. 
44. 
45. 
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of the Spanish camp facing Gibraltar. Crillon was notorious for 
his hatred of the Englis:l, and Rochford thought his appointment 
"a little extraordinary, II as if he had been se-I; to ''latch this vi tal 
British outpost. 43 But all remained quiet fo~ the remainder of 
1765, Rochford's only disquiet arising from a truce between Spain 
and Morocco, which he feared might prevent the supply of provisions 
- 44 
to Gibraltar from Ceuta. 
Early in February 1766, however, a violent storm wrought 
havoc at Gibraltar, and not\.,ithstanding his protestations of peace 
and friendship to General Cornwallis, Crillon immediately closed 
the border and impos~d an embargo on goods arriving from other parts 
of Spain for Gibraltar. HOl'S than this, he sent an express to 
t·~adrid suggesting 8. ,surprise attack \'lhile Gibraltar remained in 
disarray from tl:e storm. Charles III ilfou1d have nothing to do 'vii th 
such a treacherous scheme in time of peace, and promptly rejected 
the suggestion. But Crillon's habitual indi2cretion meant that thG 
proposal was common knowledge within a matter of we~kst and the 
Spanish government had no alternative but to recall him, sending 
the more conciliatory General Vandermark in his p1ace~ 45 
Crillon claimed that he had closed land com~unications 
only as a result of an fl.lgerine corsair having brought a prize into 
Gibraltar in the previous week. Under Article 10 of the Treaty of 
Utrecht, Gibraltar was a closed port to Algerine warships. ~he same 
article also prohibited land communications bett·wen Spain and 
Gibraltar, so that '''hen Rochford raised the matter l;lith Grimaldi, 
SP 94/170, f .. 55, Rochford to Halifax, 1 April 1765. 
SP 94/172, f.89, Rochford to Conway, 28 October 1765 ; ibid., f.150, 
Rochford to Conway, 18 November 1765. 
SP 94/173, fos.113 and 158, IIardy to COn\vay, 7 and 25 February 1766 
ibid., f.156, Rochford to Com-lay, 24- February 1766. See also the 
account in Stetson Conn, Gibraltar in British DiDlo~acJ in the 
~ightee.:nth Century" (New Haven,1942), .175-6. 
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he received the predictable response that since the British had 
infringed the tenth Article of Utrecht, it ",vas only fair that Spain 
should cease to countenance its infringement in the other respect. 
Rochford could only protest that while doubt existed as to the 
legality of the prize and the status of the Algerino, it viaS rather 
46 
violent of Crillon to cut off land communications so ablmpt;ly. 
Any f<O.9.rs of an imminent Spanish attack on Gibraltar were 
allayed by the :.;eport of SOffiG British officers "wnt out by General 
Irwin to spy on the Spailish camp; in their opir-ion, the Spanish 
were no,..rhere near ~eady to commence a siege, and ;vould need at 
least two or three years! preparation before doing so. By the 
close of Rochford's Madrid embassy, the affairs of Gibraltar seemed 
back to normal, with a revival of the usual com~laints abcut the 
smuggling of tC0acco through Gibraltar, and c~ncern on the British 
48 Gide about the sup~ly of provisions. 
Rochford also kept an alert eye on the affairs of Spain 
in Mexico and the l;!est Indies, in so far as they had any bearing on 
his observation of Spain's preparedness for another ... ",al"'. He was 
therefore most interested in the return to S},;ain in July 1765 of 
the Irishman, 0 t Reilly, \..rho had distinguished himsel~: in the 
campaign against Fortugal in 1762, achieving the rank of Hajor-
General in the Spanish army. O'Reilly had a commis8ion to encourage 
trade at Porto Rico, but Rochford heard that he had quarrelled with 
------.----------
46. SP 94/173, f.156, Rochford to Conway, 24 February 1766. 
47. Conn, Gibralta.:r i~ Briti';)l Diplomacy, p.176, citing Colonial Office 
/ 5 "-I- r< /" 'I 17/'/' 91 1 , IrW1n ~O 00nway, 0 apr1 00. 
48. SP 94/174, fos. 79 and 88, de Visme to Richmond, 18 'June 1766, 
Separate, and Secret. 
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the Governor of Havana, and had returned to Spain without leave. 
This was a matter of some interest, for 1I/hile Grimaldi held that 
he would probably be sent back at once with a sharp reprimand, the 
French Ambassador predicted that O'Reilly t'lould be well received 
at Court. OSBun 1IIaS in fact right; O'Reilly 1IlaS D;!'aciously 
received at Madrid on 5 August, and allowed to remain there until 
given a fresh commission in the Americas. 49 
Matte~s were far from well in Spain's ~merican empire at 
this time. Despite the IIgreat silence" maintainp.d at Hadrid on the 
aituation in ~exico, Rochford had no difficul~y o~taining intelligence 
of the bitter disagreements between the Viceroy, Gruilles, and the 
Gommander, Villalba, of the desertions from the army which necessitatec 
the use of press gangs in SpaiD to procure reinforcements, and 
finally of the Eascalan revolt in 1765. Rochford reported fully on 
these matters in Hqrch 1766, explaining 
liThe greatest Secrecy is kept aT; 'chis Court in relation 
to their Americc:..n Affairs ; all circumstantial Letters 
are intercepted, and Publick Reports are too vague or too 
contradictvry to' be transmitted ll [as reports to London] • 50. 
Rochford's chief sources of information were of course the British 
Consuls, especially Hardy at Cadiz, vlho reported inc~ta.t same month 
not only that orJers had been sent to suspend the reform programme 
in l'iexico and to stop the treasure flota from saili~lg until a 
st~onger escort was available, but that he had seen a letter from 
an English merchant ',larning his friends ; I1there may be a Hal' vii th 
England. I! 51 
49. SP 94/171, fos.54 and 96, Rochford to Halifax, 22 July "'1765, and 
Rochford to Conway, 5 August 1765. O'Reilly was later given command 
of 3,000 r.'1en to strengthen Spanish forts in Louisiana, \,there he 
arrived in AU[~ust '1769 ; V .1.,. Bro,:m~ !fAngIo-Spanish Relations in 
• . I 'I' .... . _..... 1'"'' '/ (192 ~ ) 3 r 9 70 Amerl.ca. • " JlJ.SDQ,nJ.C ;,merlcan Lls-corJ.ca j.~evJ.C\'l, . (.::., 0 - • 
50. SP 94/170, f08.120 and 131, de Visme to aalifax, April and 6 Hay 
1765 ; SP 94/171, f.18, Rochford to Halifax, 8 July 1765, Separate; 
SF 94/172, f.136, Rochford to ComJay, 11 November 1765 ; SP 94/1'73, 
f.1 ,Rochford to Conway, 12 ~arch 1766, ~eparate. 
51. SP 94/173, f.204, Eardy to Conway, 28 March 1766. 
353. 
Rochford had been hearing rumours of war &t Madrid ever 
since he had renewed Britain's demand for tne Hanila Ransora in 
September 1765, and as yet had seen litt reason to attach much 
importance to them. But by Narch 1766 he had grm-m somevlhat more 
anxious, for a rather unusual reason. lIe was stilJ. convinced that 
Spain 
"has no immediate Vie,!;l of quarrelling wi tl: Us ; 
they will prepare themselves little by little, 
and Yl~leneVer They are ready, or any EV0nt should 
happen to hasten on a \>Jar, They "till j.n that case 
begin by [an attack on] Portugal. If 
Even so, he was ~isquieted to find in conversation with the 
leading personalities at the Spanish Court that the Old ;jpaniards 
'.lfere so averse to the torrent of French influence on the King t s 
policies that they openly wished for a war, quite soon~ arguing that 
Spain \;rould certainly be b0aten and ~urr.Lliated, forGing the King 
to dismiss his b.-o Italian ministers (Grimaldi and Squilaci) as the 
chief promoters of Fren~h influence in Spain. 52 
Conway had also been anxious that changes might be imminent 
in the Spanish ministry, frem various indica~ions that the Duke of 
Alva "JaS gaining f.::'vour \¥i1~h the King at Squilaci1c expense. Cne of 
these was a report that Alva had been present at an interview between 
the King and the French Ambassador. But Rochford was inclined to 
doubt the truth of this report ; the King I s movements \ .. ere so well-
kn01;Jll and so regular, such an interview could not have escaped 
notice at Court. HO\vever, Rochford did kno\,., that both Ossun and Alva 
had been consulted (sepa~ately) about the tone of the Spanish Reply 
on the Manila Ransom. Rochford was not surprised that reports of 
Alva's intrigues had received such wide currency, lias the foreign 
52. SP 94/173, f.193, Hochford to Comlay, 24 Narch 1766, separate. 
53. 
Hinisters here have for some Bonths past employed their Pens in 
writing Volumes of incoherent Ideas about his Gonduct and Vie\-ls.ft 
Alva Was admittedly an extremely able and active man, Rochford 
conceded, 'friendly wi th the Prince of Asturias, and as an Old 
Spaniard highly acceptable to the Nation ; "but I am well informed 
the King of Spain has no confidence in him.1! Nor, i-c se0ms, did 
Grimaldi and thA francophile party, and the reason was not difficult 
to discern ; A:'v8. was a declared partisa:r: of the Court of Vienna, 
and on that account the French did not really trust him. 53 
Rochford's conclusions were based upon personal acquaintance 
and observation, as ;.vell as the opinions of others, as may be 
gathered from an interesting encounter in mid-November 1765. 
Rochford was at Court for the King'::.; levee, and looked in on 
Grimaldi, only to find Al va \-Ii th him, poring; over a map oi' Hadrid. 
Rochford excused himself and \vi thdrew, but the:' called him to join 
them, and he sper~t above an hour discussing \'li th them vlD.ys to improve 
and ornament theci ty, lneasuring the streets and comparing the main 
buildings. Rochford not,ed that Grimaldi and Alva debated warmly, 
though politely, tte minis~er reproving the ~~ke for building in 
Andalusia ins'cead of settling at Hadrid, to which Alva retorted he 
had no money to b1.~ild, lie,s that rogue Squilaci had prevailed \'1ith 
the King 
54 
to deprive him of a considerable part of his property." 
Grimaldi undoubtedly shared Alva's resentm.ent of Squilaci, 
as there was little love lost between the two principal ministers. 
Hochford noted a minor instance in January 1766 in ~'ihich Squilaci 
by-passed Grimaldi over a matter properly belonging to the Foreign 
Iiinister I S department, concerning the traffic in slaves betvleen 
SF 911-/172, f.169, Rochford to Conwo.y, 2 December 1765 ; Conway 
replied in January that Rochford's account led him to discredit 
his previous information regarding Alva; SP 94/173, 1'.5, ~omJaY to 
Rochford, 3 January 1766. 
SP 94/172, .169, Rochford 'to Comlay, 2 December 1765. 
Algiers and Cadiz by the Venetian Consul at the fOt'mer place. 
Squilaci must have obtained a decision frd~ the King even as 
Grimaldi was telling the French and Sardinian Ambassadors that the 
Venetian would still be allowed to come to Cadiz. Squilaci was 
evidently secure in his assurance of the King's person81 favour, 
though Hochford knelt' he IIdreads on many Accounts the least Possibility 
of a Rupture ll ; Grimaldi on the other hand 1rlas serenely confident 
of his ascendancy in the Spanish ministry, and R~chford wrote 
scornfully that Grimald.i If thinks himself a Great Politician" and 
ventures puffing upon the Ideas he has formed of the present 
Situation of Europe." 55 
In fact, Squilaci's days as a minister were already 
numbered. The first clear si3n of impending trouble w~s the sharp 
rise in the pr-:',.:;e of bread towards the end of 1765, vlhich provoked 
"great clamours arr.ongst the people of Hadrid. lI A nob evan stopped 
the Queen Nother's coach, crying out t~lat they were starving. Next 
day, the King sent for Squi:,aci and reproached him for not attending 
to the proper distribution of corn in the kingdom. Roch~ord heard 
from one who was present that Squilaci had r~plied it was impossible 
to reconcile domestic economy with the finances required to prepare 
for 1rtar. 56 
But the final stra\v \'laS Squilaci' s attempt: in Harch 1766 
to regulate the dress of the madrilenos. The traditional long cloak 
and vdde-brimmed ha4~ of the citizens of Hadrid represe!lted practical 
adaptations to the muddy ~treets and the habit of throwing slops 
from the windows into the street below. But Squilaci,&nd Charles III 
himself, felt that their reforms in paving and lighting the streets 
55w SP 94/173, f.88, :;]ochford to Com/ay, 22 January 1766, separate 
on Grimaldi1s notions regarding the state of Europe, see above 
pp. 347-8. 
56. SP 94/'172, £'177, l1ochford. to Com'lay, 9 December 1765 , Separate and 
Secret. 
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ought to be reflected in more civilized fashions dress, namely, 
in shorter cloaks and the three-cornered hats in the French style 
familiar in every other European capital. It was not only the 
measure itself \1hich annoyed the populace, s~eming as it was an 
attempt to impose French manners, but the way "Thich it \1aS 
enforced. Contemporary prints show officers at work on the streets, 
cutting cloaks ~o the regulation length and pinning up the hats of 
offenders, im::)(jJing a fine or good measure. 'J.1}w public resentment 
l1as enormous, and it focussed itself upon the one minister; as 
Rochford reported, !!Squilaci in particular is abhvrred, and the 
Threats that havo been posted up publickly against him are of a 
very alarming IJa ture. II 57 
The storm broke on the evening of Palm Bunda:l , Harch, 
lihen a riotous (,rowd marched on Squilaci I shouse. The minister ViaS 
not there, however, and the crowd amused itsel; by smashing all thA 
windows and threatening to set the hou3e on fire. The crowd moved 
on to Grimaldi I shouse, \-/here they again broke \·Jindot<Js, and through 
the city, the lamps \':h1ch vJere the King's pride and jcy ,,,ere all 
smashed. Troops were despatched to protect S'iuilaci I s house, and 
when the mob tried to set it on fire, the troops fired on the crowd. 
Squilaci and his faraily 'Vlere in fact on their \1ay back to Hadrid 
from a visit to the country ; IIHe narrot-lly escaped being massacred, 
[.Rochford recorded] but by going round the outskirts of the To' .... n 
till he got to the Palace, he avoided the People. His Lady \lias met 
by the Dutch Envoy \'Iho carried her to his House 'Ilhere she passed the 
Night. It The city ,'!QS left to the rioters, and throughC'ut that night, 
"a great deal of Lischief ",as done in the Streets. n .58 
57. SP 94/1 ,~.1 , 
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58. SP 94/173, f.191, 
Rochford to Comlay, 24 1larch 1766, Separate. 
, pp.118-9, and Henderson, 
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Next morn , Honday 24 ~farch, Rochford set out as 
usual for the Pe.lace to attend the IS levee, but he had not 
gone far before the crowds stopped his coach, obliging him to walk 
the rest of the ,,'o.y "through the People. 1I \~hat mieht have been 
a terrifying experience proved, however, sonething of a triumphal 
procession. The crowd had been shouting their slogan, Viva el Rey 
y muera ?quilaci! But on seeing the British Ambassador walking 
in their midst, the cry changed to Viva Inglo.te:r::t::~uera la Franci8., 
or simply Abajo Fran0ia! 
At Court th<:..t morning, Rochford found lithe greatest 
COllfusion" prevailing. Messages passed to and fro bet\·It.:~en the King 
and the rioters, through the mediation of tha Dukes of Eedina Celi 
and Arcos, who addressed the mu_ltitude from a balcony of the Palace. 
Inside, Rochford observed flthe Hinisters and Nilitary People going 
back\'/ards and for~"'ards in the greatest confusion." But the rioters 
continued si~ply to demand Squilaci's head, and no compromise could 
":>e found. The foreign ministers remained at t.he Palace throughout 
the day, while rioting continued in the city, until at three in the 
afternoon they were informed that the King would not stir out today 
"upon \<Ihich we all retiree;. home. n 
On his way home, Rochford noticed the bodies of soldiers 
lying dead in the streets, and determined lito night I shall not 
stir out of my Hous r;, II for fear of "some great Event." The bodies 
were those of the King's Walloon Guards,who had borne the brunt of 
peace-keeping tasks, since the regular troops and the militia were 
59 
reluctant to act against th8ir fellow citizens. 
SP 94/'1 ,1'.19-1, Hochford to Cammy, l:arch 1766. ~'he account 
of the I'~adrid riots printed in the Annual Register (-1-766), 1/+-18, 
adds further details to Rochfordls account, particularly on the 
incident which sparked off the riot on Sunday. 
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But in fact, not long after the foreign ministers had 
left the Palace, the King did stir out, to appear on a balcony 
and concede to the populace its principal demands. These were, 
firstly and most obviously, to dismiss Squilaci, and to repeal 
his edict against long cloaks and wide-brimmed hats. But also 
indicative of the causes of the revolt, the crowd demanded an 
immediate reduction in the price of essential commodities, bread, 
oil, soap, and bacon, together w~th the suppressiun of the monopoly 
which had been set up to supply the city with its provisions. 
Finally, as might be expected, the crowd demanded a general pardon 
for itself. 
Charles III agreed to these demand~~ promising to appoint 
a Spaniard as Squilaci t s su:,;ce.ssor, and gave his consent to each 
article as it was read out by a friar beside him with crucifix 
held high. That eveniLg a genaral amnesty was proclaimed, and the 
crowds melted away. as the citizens returned to their homes and 
60 ;he streets became quiet and deserted once more. 
But at midnight, in a step which has been sharply 
criticized and deoated, the King and Royal Family quietly slipped 
out of the Palace and tock coach for Aranjuez, accompanied by only 
a small escort of troops.. Squilaci and Grimaldi accompanied the 
noyal party, and an hour later, the French and Neapolitan Ambassadors 
follovled them to Aranjuez. 
Next morning, when the ne\vS spread throughout Hadrid that 
the King had fled,the townsfolk believed that the capitulation had 
been violated, "and rose again in a more violent Hanner." Vast crowds 
assembled and seized the arms and drums of the militia, and proceeded 
60. SP 94/173, f.206, Rochford to Conway, 31 harch 1766, encl 
(fos.211-214) c of the edicts giving effect to the King's 
concessions. 
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to surround the city, guarding the gates, and not allowing 
anybody to lea va on pain of death. The surviving \'ialloon Guards 
had marched to Aranjuez, a~d the Spanish Corps de Garde had shut 
themselves up in the old Palace, the Buen Retiro, so that the city 
'ltlas throughout :kuesday 25 Hareh and the night that followed 
entirely at the mercy of the mob. 
Rochford 'ltTrot~ that this day was "passed in a most 
tumul tuous Nam~er, 'I \'.'hich caused him to keep his llOusehold indoors 
there was "no stirring out \vi thout being insulted ar:.:1 running the 
greatest Risk of One1s Life." Even so, he thought tile crowds 
surprisingly well-behaved on the vlhole ; "the Town was left forty-
eight hours at. the Disposal of the People, tUG to do them Justice 
they did not offer to enter into any House exce~t Taverns and such 
Places to get Vic"t'lals and DTink.11 Great CIO\ofds , five ar..d six 
hundred strong, stl'eaMed through the streets, shouting the now 
familiar slogans calling for Squilaci' s death. At night, the "/omen 
~nd children carried torches and the palm branches which had been 
distributed in the churches on Palm Sunday. 
Rochford '''a tched these crowds, as they passed 
"numberless times by my Eouse" ; yet they offered "no Incivility 
or Disrespect, and some of them cryed out as they went by, Viva 
01 Embaxador de Ingla terrai 1t However, the spectacle was less 
reassuring elsewher~ in the city, where the rioters fired almost 
continuous vollies of musket-fire into the air, and vented their 
fury on the bodies of the Halloon Guards slaughtered the previous 
day, dragging them to a central place and mutilating them before 
burning their mangled limbs on a great bonfire. 61 
61. SP 94/173, f.206, Rochford to Conway, 31 Hareh 1766. 
On the morning of ivednesday 26 Harch, a deputation vias 
sent to Aranjuez to demand the King's return, which brought back 
360. 
a letter addressed to the Council of Castile declaring that the 
King was unwell, had been twice bled, and c0~ld not as yet return 
to Madrid. But the letter went on, confirming the conc~ssions 
given on the Monday, annonncing the dismissal of Squilaci and 
repeating the g~neral pardon, provided the people surrendered their 
arms and peacoLllly resumed their former occupat:'ons. 
This letter ~as proclaimed in every part of the city, 
and greeted with cheers. The populace returned the muskets and 
drums to the Guard-houses, and shook hands with the militia as they 
emerged from the Buen Retiro. For the first time in three days, 
people could walk in the streets with their hats cocked in the 
French fashion hithout being molested or shown violence. the 
afternoon, the .vhole c1 ty viaS again qui0t and pea':!eful. TIoehford 
noted this with some amazement ; II if o:e had not seen the Insurrection, 
It could not have been believed that there had been one. 11 
The next ti-!O days, 'l'hursday and Friday, 27-28 r·1arch, 
witnessed the Easter celebrations, and in Rochford's words were 
"days of great Devotion here. 1l No coaches \vere allo\'l~d in the 
streets, it being usual for the people to go on foot to visit all 
the churches in the city, so that the foreign ministers remaining 
in Madrid could not stir out until Saturday morning, 29 March. 
That morr lng, the foreign ministers all v/ent out to 
Aranjuez, where they found the King in perfect heal~h ; he had 
been out shooting that very morning. Rochford dined with Grimaldi 
and Squilaci's two principal Secretaries in the War TIepartment, 
who seemed quite reconciled to the turn of events, though Grimaldi 
was still not without apprehension for his own position. Back at 
62. SF 94/173, f.206,Rochford 'to Com/ay, YI Harch '1766. 
1 • 
Hadrid, Rochford found lithe greatest Quiet and Tranquility!! ; 
the insurrection ended as neatly and swiftly as it had begun. 63 
This apparent neatness, together with several other 
features of the revolt, intrigued Rochford a~d stimulated him to 
do his utmost to discover "the true Source of the Insurrection." 
He had no doubt that it had either been planned in advance or was 
adroitly exploit~d by the Judges and the prine grandees, from 
"the great regu:'arityll \vith 1tlhich it was cor~ducte(, the single-minded 
demand of the mob over s~veral days for the removal of Squilaci, 
and the universal contempt of the rioters for the money that '-laS 
flung to them from the Palace, together with the remarkably small 
amount of damage and the virtual absence of lootingo 
'.'Jhilst at the Palace on Honday 24 I"larch, ami(l,l::lt all the 
confusion, Rocl~,ford IIhad leisure for severa:. IIours to examine the 
Looks and Behaviou:: of all Sorts of People. ll lli011gh an attack on 
the Palace and a general massacre seemed imminent, the grandees 
who would ordinarily be most frightened by-arising of the common 
people "did not hO"!8ver shew the least Apprehension." Roc!1ford 
talked "some time ','!i th H. Ensenada, who ';Jas in great Spirits the 
whole 'rime ; l'lany others shewed the same Behaviour." Only Squilaci 
and his closest ¥riends were at all fearful. 64 
Some of the other foreign ministers believed Grimaldi 
and the French party at Madrid were the prime movers of the revolt, 
and that Cho eul WBd determined to rid of Squilaci because of 
63. SP 94/1 ,f .206, RochfG:l:d to Commy, Narch 1766. The account in 
Coxe's Hecoirs oi' the I:inr;s of S~Jain (1 5), 111,316-323, is an 
almost wo~d for word pastiche of ~ochford's dispatc4es ; that in 
11 (1915), 
, ",'(1:J 
Al..LJV _ 
64. SP 94/173, f.215, Rochford to Cammy, 31 ;;arch 1766., separate. 
his reluctance to divert sufficient funds into vmr preparations. 
Rochford thought this a plausible explanation, but if true, then 
the Old Spaniards had been made to look very foolish, and ,,,ould 
362. 
soon realise this ; IIthen perhaps \</e may seE' the same scene again 
for the Removal of Grimaldi-" That minister, Roch:l:ord noted, 
"affects however at present a great l'ranquility ; but if I kn01'l 
Mankind at all, he is far from being yet at his Eaze." 
Squilaci's fall \'las all the more remar~:able for occurring 
at the height of the King's personal favour t01v""rds him. Charles III 
had declared at hi3 levee, before all the assembl~d nobles, that 
if he vlere reduced to "but one Bit of Bread, II he would share that 
morsel with Squil.aci. It would be even simpler now to effect 
Grimaldi's removal, since the King's kno\-Jll aversion to violent 
measures and b:'.oodshed made it unlikely that r..e would suppl'esn 
another rising. It was said at Court that he had removed himself 
to Aranjuez only in the hope of preven~ing further disturbances. 65 
Naturally, the COkrt maintained a profound silence 
officially regarding the causes of the insurrection, and the only 
public indications of the ~overnmentls react10n to events were 
the ministerial changes following Squilaci's fall. The ex-minister 
and his family b~d departed under escort on the morning of 25 March 
for Cartagena, whence they embarked for exile in Italy. Squilaci 
was replaced as Finance Ninister by his First Secretary in that 
Department, Don Higlel Husquiz. The Har Department weni; to Don Juan 
de Muniain. Bath were 'Old Spaniards,' and therefore acceptable to 
the nation at large. There "laS some surprise, however, at Nuniain's 
65. SP 94/173, f.215, Rochford to Conway, 31 March 1766, Separate. 
appointment to the War Ministry, which it was expected would have 
been given to that venerable warrior, the Cande d'Aranda. But Aranda 
was appointed to the Presidency of Castile, which carried with it 
the post of Governor of l'Iadrid, a position n;)t only of crucial 
importance at this time for the restoration of ordq~, b~t sharing 
in some measure the Royal authority itself. He had a rep~tation for 
firmness, if no~ severity, and would have the assictance of some 
10,000 troops w~o were being drawn towards Madri0. But almost his 
first act, significantly enough, was to order Ensenada to quit the 
66 
capital and not to appear before the King again. 
There was much speculation over this banishment, and 
many people conc],uJed that Ensenada must have been implicated in 
planning the re-J'ol t. But Rochford was inclined to thijll~ >.;his a 
very mild puni;;hment if that \1ere true, and ncted that E:J..senac'l.a IS 
closest friends at Court remained perfe~tly at ease. Aranda had 
long been a sworn enemy to Ensenada, a~ld Rochford saw this order 
as a piece of personal spite. 67 
Rochford's own conclusions regarding the cause of the 
insurrection were thatalt'lough the French party may have been the 
first movers in a bid to remove Squilaci, the grandees and the 
clergy saw their opportunity and turned it to their advantage, to 
force the King to introduce a greater Spanish eleme~t into his 
government, with a view to devoting the country's energies to 
68 
internal reform ratller than a French-led 'revanche' against England. 
66. SF 94/173, £.218, ::lochf')rd to ComlaY, 7 April 1766 ; ibid., fos. 
226 and 235, Rochford to Conway, 14 and 28 April 1766. 
67. SP 94/173, f.228, Rochford to Conway, 21 April 1766 ; ibid., f.235, 
Rochford to Conway, 28 hpril 1766. 
68. SP 94/174, f.20, Rochford to Conway, 5 May 1766, separate. 
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Rochford had been his usual diligent self in making 
every possible enquiry into the causes of the revolt; !!vlhenever 
I have had a safe Opportunity, I have talked on this Subject ''lith 
those I could trust .. " Presumably from these conver.sations arose 
Ha Number of new Circumstances, which every Day come to light, 
[ from \vhich ] it appears that the Plot was very deeply laid, and 
th.at even the Clergy had a great share in it." 69 From his 
confidants at Court, rochford heard that some of the grandees in 
the King's Council opeal~r blamed Squilaci for the attack on Portugal 
in 1762, and for the continuance of the Family Compact, al1d that 
their present sentim~nts were to avoid if at all possible any 
quarrel with Britain or Portugal, while the government concentrated 
on internal reforms and the establishment of order and prosperity 
in Spain. l.vith p:nudent management, Spain rr lc;ht then becom~ a great 
. 70 power once aga~n. 
Rochford concluded from this information that, "if I do 
not err in my Judgment, this last affair will in the end turn out 
advantageous to Us,"and that France would 10s6 a large measure of 
her influence in Spain. Rochford already had :3cme hints of this 
til have received the strongest assurances from Musqui?" that there 
shall be the greatest Impartiality possible i;.7. all commercial 
Affairs, and I really believe there will ; but as he has not so 
much Authority as H. de Squilaci had, I am afraid there will be a 
great deal more Dilatoriness." 71 
69. SP 94/173, f.218, Rochford to Conway, 7 April 1766. 
70. SP 94/174, £.20, Rochford to Comlay, 5 Hay 1766, Separate. 
71. SP 94/174, £.20, Hochford to Commy, 5 I:ay 1766, Separate. 
Rochford was not the only one to expect a reduction of French 
influence at ~adrid ; Choiseul was alarmed for the very survival 
of the Compact; see ABCP Espagne ,f.186, Choiseul to 
OSBun, 8 ;\pril 1766, printed (in part) in Blart, l~apports, p. 
Another indication of a possible lapse in }rench influence 
at Hadrid \\7as t!:"le remarkable silence maintained regarding offers 
of troops and other help from 1rance, while every praise was 
given of the similar offer of aid from Portugal. Chdrles III was 
impressed and greatly pleased by the Portuguese offer, which in 
fact was a major step marking a resumption of cordial relations 
between the two neighbours. But Rochford pointed out to Conway 
that there \'!as good :'eaS011 to keep quiet about France I s offer of 
assistance to quell any recurrence of the revolt ; ::he mere mention 
of French troops ente~ing Spain would be enough to ~park of an even 
t t · 1 ., 72 grea er na ~ona upr~s~ng. 
Nevertheless, Grimaldi remained iL 0ffice, and retained 
the King's confidence for 50me years to come. Rochford was sure 
that he 'lIlould continue to be lIan Agent for ";he French," but hoped 
he \vould be "so fal' controlled, that the Venom will be dispersed 
before it r:an take effect." Rochford's Secretary, de Visme, later 
heard that Grimaldi had actually asked for his demission, knowing 
that he was odious to the people and fearing that he had lost the 
King's confidenc~ ; but Charles III had refused to dismiss him. 73 
Grimaldi wisel.] left all decision-making to the comite 
named by the King to carryon government in the meantime, consisting 
of hii:1self, Ariaga, Nusquiz, and Nuniain, assisted by Alva, }'uentes, 
Sotomayor, and Nascnes ; \-lall told Hochford that he preferred not to 
interfere, though he ,"as consul ted. Aranda took care of all 
domestic arrangements, and the King seemed to rely as much upon the 
h t f h ' ... 74 advice of his Confessor as upon tao ~s m~n1sters. 
72. SP 94/173, fos.226, 228, and , Rochford to C011\vay, 14, 21, and 
28 1766. 
73. SP 94/174, f.20, Rochford to Conway, 5 Hay 1766, separate 
f.37, de Visme to Conway, 26 1766. 
ibid. , 
74~ SP 94/173, f.235, ~ochford to Conway, April 1766 ; see 
Coxe, ~Iemoirs, III, 321-3, and Blart, Sor.)Qrts, .97-8. 
::,66. 
The 'Madrid uprising of 1766 provides a suitably dramatic 
climax to Rochford's career as British Ambassador in Spain ; 
whatever the truth regarding its causes, which arc still debated, 75 
Rochford reported honestly \'lhatever he heard or saw .. ;hich seemed 
significant, and in doing so has given a useful eyel;i t.'1ess account 
of the days of riot. His reports of the uprising and itti aftermath 
were in fact al~ost his last from Madrid. 
He h~d asked for home leave ,;an'l1ar;r 1766, for reasons 
of health and in order to attend to pressing private affairs in 
England. The la tte!.' \vas the stock reason given by every British 
diplomat in this period for home leave, but on grounds of health 
Rochford had a legitimate claim. He had suffered an accident in 
November '/hen his coach over'curned nea:i.~ the Escurial ~ ~,:;:'Hl ,·laS 
fla good deal irc.isposed" for a month after1tl::trus. His convalescence 
was in addition saddened by news of the death of his former patron. 
the Duke of Cumberland, for lv-hom he pUT; 'his household in to mourning 
on 25 November. 76 
Commy laid this request before George III ea:::-ly in 
February, but the i,:ing was reluctant to relec:,se Rochford from his 
post while the Manila Ransom issue remained unresolved. Rochford 
nevertheless rene~ed his request, and Conway, perhaps more 
sympathetic after his Ovlll severe illness in Harch, pressed the 
King to grant Rochford his home leave early in April 1766. 77 
75. Lalaguna, l'England, , and the Compact, '1763-83," 
(unpublished Ph~D. thesis, liniversity of London, 1968) , p.36, note 1, 
cites as the most recent account of the 1766 uprising V. Rodriguez 
Casado, La poli tica y 106;)01i tinos em 81 reinado de Car,los III ; 
but adds that it is currently being re-examined by ~r. F. Olaechea. 
Henderson, op.cit., (bibliography, pp.738-9) also cites D. Jose 
Navarro Latorre, TIacs Doscientes Allos. 2stado Actual de las Proble8as 
del t~otin de 3souilachel, (19S6). 
76. SP 94/172, f.'lLI-O, Rochford to ComlaY, 14 November 1765 ; ibid .. , 
f.159, Rochford to Conway, 25 November 1765. 
77. SP 94/1 , f.91, Conway to ;Rochford, '11 l;'ebruary 1766 ; ibid .. , 
f.195, Conway to Rochford, 11 April 1766. 
It vias not until 12 Hay, however, that R0chford had 
his audiences of leave-taking with the Kin€: and Royal Family, 
and with the Queen Eother. He was greatly pleased at the last of 
these, as the Queen Hother had seen nobody "ince the insurrection, 
not even the Family Ambassadors, yet she readily grallt~d Rochford 
a "most remarkably gracious" audience at Aranjuez. It was also one 
of her last ; s~e died after a long illness on 11 July 1766. 78 
Rochiord's delay in obtaining his audi,,"nces of leave 
~ay have been caused by the difficulty of settling his debts before 
leaving Hadrid, fo= which it has been said he had to pa'Vln his plate 
and jewels for the grand sum of £ 6,000. It is a pity that so 
little is knO\'1D of this most interesting episode 1 suggestive as it 
is of Rochford's extravagance, and the heavy expenses involved in 
n;aintaining an ,~mbassy at Hadrid. 79 
" Leaving de Visme as Charge in his absence, as he had 
done in the previous year for his shore leave to Paris, Rochford 
80 finally left Hadrid on or a':Jout 15 Nay 1766. It not known 
precisely when he ar~ived in England, though it may be assumed to 
have been sometime early 1\1 June. 
By the time Rochford landed in 3ngland, tne first sign 
of the decline 0f Rockingham's administration had been seen, in 
the resignation of the Duke of Grafton the end of April. 
His successor was Charles Lennox, 3rd Duke of f.ichmond, then the 
78. SP 94/174, f.22, l::ochford to Conway, 12 Hay 1766 
de Visme to Richr.lOnd, 14 July 1766. 
ibid., £.181, 
79. D.N.B., XXI, 13L~4, citing the Horning Herald for 6 Octcber 178-1. 
F.P. Renaut, llEtudes sur Ie Pacte de 1"amil1e et 1a po1itigue 
colonia1e francaise,1f Revue des Colonies Francaises~ X (1922), 235, 
speaks of Illa penible liquidation de ces dettes a Hadrid,tl but 
gives no references. 
80. SP '::Vr/174, f.22, Rochford to ComJaY, 121'iay 1766 
Dil2.lomatic Representatives, 1609-173..2,· p.136. 
Horn, British 
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British Ambassador at Paris, who had been in Ene;land on leave 
sinc~ February. Richmond was appointed Secretary of State for 
the Southern Department on 23 Hay 1766, and Com/ay transferred on 
the same day to t~e Northern Department. I~ was undoubtedly 
thanks to Com'lay that Rochford was chosen at the same tble as 
, 8'; Richmond's successor in the Paris emoassy. Rochford arrived 
home on leave t~ discover that he had at last realized his first 
major ambition. 
Rochford's appointment as British Ambassador to the 
French Court was officially announced on 1 July 1766, though his 
equipage grant and salary (of which he received the customary 
82 first three months in advance) both commenced on 29 June. 
On 4 July Richmond sent Rochfordfs Letters of Pecall to de Visme 
for delivery tJ the Spanish Court, and Rochford sent in the s~me 
packet a personal letter informing Grimaldi cf his appointment 
to Paris. 83 
For his Secretary of Embassy, Rochford unhesitatingly 
chose his new fri~nd Stanier Porten, the British Consul-General 
at l1adrid.. Comlay on the other hand knew that the King would have 
preferred a younger man of good family who might then adopt the 
Diplomatic Servi~e for ~is career, and suggested Colonel Robert 
Murray Keith, son of the former British Minister at Vienna. 84 
81. Grenville Papers, eClited by H.J. Smith (London,ri852-3)1 III, 
Whately to Grenville, 23 1766. Horn, 
~esentativ("..§..., 1689-1'789.., p.22 
George II~ (1960), p.117· 
82. D.N.B., XXI, 1311-4 ; Collins, The Peerage of England (1779), IV, 144 ; 
BM Add USS ,f., Allowance Warrant for the Earl of Rochford, 
4 July 1766, to commence as frat] 29 June. 
83. SP 94/174, f.112, Hichmond to de Visme, it July 1766. 
84. D.N .B., XXX! ; Commy at last secured Keith a post as Bri t1sh 
Hinister to ,Saxony in 1769, \-lhence he transferred to Copenhagen 
in 1771. See Horn, British Diplomatic Representatives, pp.37, 115, 1 
But Rochford was adamant, and Conway could appreciate 
his insistence ; HI know the thorough disag~eement of having any 
body in such situation that is not quite agreeable." 85 Porten 
was accordingly appointed Secretary of the P~ris embassy on 
11 July, and Richmond wrote that same day instructing him to 
repair to Paris with all speed, to take charge until Rochford's 
arri val. 86 Porten reached Paris on 31 August, vlhere the outgoing 
Secretary, Rich~ond's brother Lord George I,ennox: presented Porten 
to the French Court at Compiegne and acquainted him \'Jith the affairs 
of the embassy. 87 
Rochford himself did not arrive in Paris until late in 
October, having been delayed not only by the preparations for his 
embassy but also by Lady Rochford's pour 88 He vas therefore 
a most interestsj spectator both of the replacement of Hockinghamts 
collapsed ministry by the Chatham administr2t in July 1766, and 
of the new ministry's struggle to find so~eone to replace him at 
Madrid. 
In the week following Rochford's appointment to Paris, 
the Lord Chancellor, Northington, asked perm~ssion to res as he 
believed the Rockingham administration too weak to continue, and 
George III wrote to ask Pitt if he could form a ne\oJ' try. The 
formation of this new administration, and Pitt's elevat to the 
Lords as the Earl of Chatham, are thoroughly described elsewhere ; 89 
85. ComlaY to Rochfo:r-d, 10 1766, Private" ; in the possession of 
W.S. Lewis, ?armington, ~~5S., to whom I am indebted for a photodtat 
of this letter. 
86. SP 9Lf-/17l~, 1.120, Richmond to Porten, 11 July 1766. BN Add I,18S 
33056, f.251, Treasury Allowance Warrant for Stanier Porten, as 
Secretary to Lord Rochford's Embassy, from 11 July 1766. 
8? SP 78/271, f.1, Porten to Shelburne, 3 B~ptember 1766. 
88. ~onway to Rochford, 10 July 1766, Private ; the Lewis/Walpole 
Collection, li'arrningcon, _, cited in note 05 above. 
89. J. Brooke, The Chatham hdmil1i.strat~0l:l..L 1766-1'Z68 (London,1956), 
pp. 1-19. 
90. 
91. 
92. 
)70. 
Conway was retained as Northern Secretary, and bec~me the spokesman 
of the Hinistry in the Commons, but Chathar:l insisted that Richmond 
must surrender the Seals of the Southern Department to the brilliant 
though unpopular I':arl of Shelburne, who tool". office on 2 August. 90 
It ,·laS i'ri th Shelburne that Rochford \·JOuld therefor-s correspond 
from Paris. 
But vi~:'O \1aS to replace Rochford at Hadrid? Grenville 
and his irienio in opposition made no secret of their conviction 
that Rochford was much coo useful at Madrid to zhift him to Paris 
just at this time 
U as he, by knO\dng exactly the present eta te of the 
Court there, and by being an object of attention of 
the people, may be of more service where he now is [~adridJ 
91 than any other man can be." 
:I'hroughout Augwt and September, the minister:::; approached a n~~mber 
of likely prospects for the Spanish embassy, including Buckingham, 
Yorke, Hillsborough, and two c2.sual ties of th::: change of minie try, 
Grantham and Huntingdon, but all declined the post. The Spanish 
Ambassador, Masserano, was making almost daily enquiries about the 
matter, and by October it aad become an acute emtarrassment to the 
King and his ministers, until someone suggested Sir James Gray, 
who had only re':ently given up his post at Naples. Gray accepted 
reluctantly, for his health was not good, and it vIae almost a year 
before he took up his new post. 92 
Brooke, ChathaT:l Administration, pp.11-12, 16" 
Grenville PaDers, edited by W.J. Smith (London,1852-3), III, 237, 
i-1hately to Grenville, 23 J::ay 1766. 
Grenville Papers, III, 240; It ... the Einistry are at the greatest 
:CO;'s -(;0 lind a prop:er person to succeed himtl Hochford ; for the 
proGress of the search in Cctober, see Chatham CorreE~ondence, 
edited by ~aylor and e ( ,18,8-40), III, 96-106 pass 
see also, Brooke, Chatham hdministration, pp.35~37. 
Grenville made great capital out of this whole sorry 
business, and his remarks in Parliament in 1767 not only sum up 
the situation rather neatly but form in addition a postscript on 
Rochford's Hadrid embas3Y. Grenville lamented 
IlThat a minister every i'lay agreeable to the Cou.rt of 
Spain had been recalled from that country at a t!me 
when it was most of all necessary to have &n able person 
there, from the ticklish state of that Court, and that 
importa~lt negotiati(;n [the llanila l{ansom ] trusted to 
the care of a clergyman left there Charg~ des affaires 
[ de Visme J ; a Chaplain of the Church of England 
charged \lith the great and d,esirable object of breaking 
the family compact at the court of the Catholic King, 
\>Jhilst the ambassador appointed to go there was '\.·mi ting 
in England Itill time could be found to give hi~ his 
instructions. II 93 
Gray finally r ... 'cei ved his instructions in June 1 '/67, and reacl.ed 
Madrid about 15 October. 94 
,By that time, Roo:hford was well esta',lished at Paris. 
371. 
93. Grenville Papers, IV, 216-3 ; also quoted in D.B. Horn, The British 
Diplomatic Service, 1689-1789 (Oxford,1961), poSo. 
94. Horn, British Di)'Jlomatic l}s:nresentatives, 1689-1789, p.i • De Visme 
left Madrid on 24 November 1767, but continued his diplomatic career 
as Secretary to Cathcart's embassy to St Petcrsburg,~here he 
arrived 16 June 1768. D.N.B., XIV, 448-9, and Horn, FeDresentative~1 
p.117. 
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departure delayed by illness; Shelburne's briefing 
about 18 Ootober 1766 ; instrJctions largely same 
as predecessors' ; main outstanding issues Dunkirk 
and Canada Bills ; anxiety over }'reT'.{;h ::,'-:::vanche ; 
net-! featur€s of Rochford I s Instructions relate to 
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formal and receptions. 
ceremonial difficulty with Princes of the Blood ; 
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v!ants free hand vlith secret G8rvice money ; hi& salary. 
the Dunkirk problem ; treaty p:>ccvisions ; French 
attempts to e'Vatie full dem.:>lition ; Rochford's talk 
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complaints , IIay 1767 ; Choiseul' s Ilr:Jenace ll to 
repair the 
Roc.'1ford Dunkirk, August 1767 ; ]'razer called 
to london f,")r October 1767, Rochfo~d demands 
full execut,"l.On of 
threat ; Bhelburne 
press him further ; 
; Chois~~l withdraws his 
Rochford's judgment not to 
no further action oy Britain. 
t~e problem of Canada held by British subjects ; 
Convention of April 1 ; many rejeciud ; attempts to 
extend deadline ; Porten 1 s approach ~n October; 
Guerchy refuses 8.ny extension j nochiord sees Choiseul; 
extension granted, Hovember 1766 ; Porten appointed as 
Rochford's deputy; c of Committee of British 
Proplietors ; problem over form of oath. 
examination of claims, 
to London for talks ; 
arr~t delayed until December 
complaint of London C tee 
of several rejected claims. 
claim of English East India 
maintaininG French 
accounts mislaid at 
1 ; Porten returns 
settled ; definitive 
1767 ; Rochford answers 
obta reconsideration 
for expenses of 
of war in 
s ; long 
delays; Rochford's ,1, 
directive to settle it ; Rochford leaves Paris. 
CHAPTER 13 
Rochford's Instructions for Paris, 
his Arrival, and Najor Inherited Negotiations, 1766-6Z. 
Rochford kissed hands as the King's new Ambassador to 
France on 29 June 1766, but his departure was delayed for almost 
t\'lO months after this, not only by the preparations necessary for 
such an important embcssY1 but also it wO'lld appear by i1l-hea1th. 1 
Towards the end of September, Rochford wrote to Shelburne from 
his country seat at St Osyth ; 
lI1-1y Health i6 0 little mended with th:) Assistance of 
the Bark, but I have not yet ventured out, as my Strength 
encreases -::;ut slowly. I will however at all events set 
out for London next Monday, & have the honor of waiting 
upon Your Lordship the next morning, unless any return of 
2 Illness should prevent me. 1I 
Whatever it was, Rochford's illness seems to have retur~ed as he 
feared, for it was not until mid-October that he came to :'Condon 
for his Instructions and verbal briefing from Shelburne ; his two 
sets of Instructions, both the routine formai Instructions and 
the more detailed nSeparate and Private U , we!'~ dated 18 October. 3 
The routine formal Instructions, covering sllch matters as 
the presentation of credentials and the cO.u.duct to be observed in 
1. Daily Advertiser, 30 June 1766 ; cited in Walpole Correspondence 
(Yale,1937-J, XXII, 420, n.5. Rochford's appoi~tment is also 
noted in the London Masazine (1766), p.380. 
2. Lacaita-Shelburne Papers, Uilliam I,. Clements Libr~ry, Ann Arbor, 
Hichigan ; Rochford to Shelburne, 22 September 1766, Private. 
3. SP 78/271, fos.67-71, for the formal Instructions; ibid., fos.72-
84 for the Separate and Private. The new clauses in Rochford's 
Instructions are also printed in pritish Diplomatic Instructions, 
VII, France, Part iv (17l~5-1789), edited by L.G .. VJickharn L8 r;g, 
Camden Society, 3rd series, Volume XLIX (London,1934), pp.99-100. 
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audiences with the French King and Royal Family, were virtually 
identical (mut~tis mutandis) with those of his predecessors at 
Paris since 1763, the Earl of Hertford and the Duke of Richmond. 
Apart from the ceremonial aspects, the most importar..t clauses of 
these formal Instructions for Rochford were to be the sixth and 
ninth, which reminded him tv uphold Britain's trade relationship 
with France as defined by the 1713 Commercial Treaty of Utrecht, 
4 
and to assist all British merl'.!hants at French po:r-ts. 
Even the "Separate and Private ll Instruct-ioY1S preserved 
unchanged many of the clauses already commended to Rertford and 
Richmond. T:):le first and second clauses reminde:::' Rc:::hford of the 
vigilance required towards France's obligaticns under the Peace 
Treaty of 1763, and her in-:entions towards the lI'l'ranquili ty of 
Europe,tt whilst warning him to watch constantly Franc~'s connexion 
with the Court of Vienna. The ninth clause added Russi:ot and Prussia 
as powers with whom France's dealings warranted close attention. 
The most important of the tlpart:i,cular Heads of Business" 
still depending between Britain and France, namely Dunkirk (Clause 
12) and the Can&1a Paper claims (Clause 15), were explained to 
Rochford in exactly the Barne terms as they had been to Hertford 
and Richmond. Two other clauses, relating to the movements of the 
Young Pretender and the p~oblem of the Newfoundland fisheries, were 
distinctly dated ; the former made no mention of the death of the 
Old Pretender at the start of 1766, and the latter took no note 
of the partial rcsolut~on of the Newfoundland question in 1765. 5 
4. For the earlier Instructions to Hertford and Richmond, see 
British Diplom.atic Instruction.s, VII, Fl'ance, iv (1745-'1789), 
edited by L.G. Wickham Legg (1934), pp.85-90 , 94-95-
5. On the Nevlfoundland fisheries question, see P. Coquelle, IlLe comte 
de Guerchy, Ambassadeur de :Fra~ce a Londres, 1763-1767, t! Revue des 
Etu§es Historigues, 74 (1903), pp. 448-455.; and D.D. Irvine, 
"'rhe Newfoundland Fishery ; a French Objective in the \'Jar o:f 
American Indenondence, II C:madian Historical Revie\v, XIII (1932), 
pp. 268-284, e;pecially pP:- 270·.274. 
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Most of the clauses in Rochford's "Separate and Private" 
Instructions reflect the anxiety of postwar British Ministers that 
France would attempt to recover some of her colonial losses in 
the near future by a swift and sudden iRevanche' ; this was of 
course Choiseul's ultimate ambition. Rochford1s attention was 
therefore directed both to the means for such a 'Revanche,' namely 
the condition of France's armed forces and her financial resources 
(Clauses 6 and 11), a:.ad to the likely theatres of conflict, namely 
North America (Clauses 13 and 14), the West African coast (Clause 5), 
and above all the West Indies (Clauses 17 ane 18). 
Rochford was, as at least one writer has remal'ked, the 
first professiona..i. diplomat to occupy the B't'i tish Embassy in Paris 
after the Seven Yeal's l War. 6 The value placed upon his experience 
as Aml;assador ir. Spain by the British Ministers is suggel.3ted by two 
important 1",e\-1 clauses in his Instructions for Paris. 
The first new fE'!ature of Rochford's IISeparate and Privaten 
Instructions was the emphasis placed by the third clau3e upon 
France's relationship with Spain under the F~mily Compact. This 
was described as Ha Connection of the most i.atimate g.. Extraordinary 
Nature,r1 and Rochford was instructed to ffleave no possible 14eans 
untried to penetrate into the Nature and Tendency of this Connection 
as well as the Instruments and Means" by which it was supported. 
In addition to discovering wherever possible the "secret Resolutions!! 
of the French and Spanish Courts, Rochford was also to be alert to 
"all Transactions bett'leen them, particularly to any Cessions 
which may have been publicldy or secretly made or are proposed 
to be made by one to the other in the West Indies, South America, 
6. British Diplo~atic Instructions, VII, France, iv (1745-1789). 
edited by L.G. Wickham Legg (London,1934), p.98. 
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or elsewhere." To this end, Rochford was given the usual 
directive to k~ep up a regular correspondence with the British 
Ambassador at t-1adrid (Clauses 7 and 8), but in addition he 1I1aS 
also given a new and specific directive regarding Spain at the 
end of this important third clause ; tryou are to make the State 
of that Kingdom in every Res,pect a chief & principal Object of 
your Enquiries." 
The second llew feature of Rochford' a "S,;para te and Private ll 
Instructions for Paris was perhaps in part a reflecT;icn of one of 
the major themes of ~ia work both at Turin and Madrid, namely his 
attention to commercial matters. An entirely ne'N fo-arth clause 
noted with concern the "late Increase of th~ French Trade in 
several different Branches, IJ which was fIso great as to merit most 
exceedingly the A~tention of Great Britain.n Rochford was therefore 
to apply his utmost diligence to the d,iscovery of its present state, 
and any schemes or regulations for its future improve~ent, 
nparticularly the State of their Woollen and other Nanufactures,n 
and to procure exact information regarding the extent and management 
of France's lUcl~tive West Indian sugar trade. 
Rochford's Inst~uctions did not, however, extend to each 
and every minor particular of business still depending between the 
two Courts ; for example, no mention was made of the English East 
India Company's clp.im for the maintenance of French prisoners of 
war in India, nor of such minor cases as that of the ship ~. 
These would presumably have been discussed by Shelburne in his 
verbal briefing while read~ng through the Instructions with Rochford, 
in which he also apparently laid great stress on the question of 
Dunkirk. 7 
7. Shelburne Papers, ~'!illiam I,. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Hichigan 
Volume 23, £.35, Rochford to Shelburne, 5 November 1766. 
In addition to this briefing from Shelburne, Rochford 
had hoped to benefit from the advice of Ch~tham himself, but 
the Kingls Chief Hinister was nursing his gout in the country, 
and though flatterej by Rochford's request, would not think of 
giving Rochford the trouble of travelling so far ~ .. hen Shelburne 
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had already instructed him so capably at London. Chathaw declared 
the new clauseR of Rochford's Instructions livery '.proper, It and 
could think of nothing else to add or al1and. 8 
Nor was Chath~m the only elder statesman whom Rochford 
hoped to visit before leaving for Paris. Rochford's avoidance of 
any irrevocable entanglement in the world of political faction 
has already been noted earlier ; he seems to have adopted as his 
rule the maxim of personal loyalty to the Crown which ~ost of his 
contemporaries regarded merely as a convention, to whi~h one paid 
lip-service when ~equired but did not allow to cramp one~s style 
in day to.day political manoeuvers. ~ochford's personal friends 
were drawn from several of the major factions rather than any 
single one; Sandwich, Rigby, and Neville were numbered amongst 
the Bedfordites, tlbemarle and Conway were ~hen of Rockingham's 
friends, and Chatham's proteges Grafton and Shelbur~e were among 
his acquaintance. But Rochford did not regard Chatham as his 
father-figure in the way that Grafton did; Rochford's political 
mentor after the death of Cumberland was none other than the grand 
old wire-puller himself, the Duke of Newcastle. 9 
8. Chatham Correspondence, edited by Taylor and Pringle (London,1838-
1840), III, 115 ; Chatham to Shelburne, 5 November 1766. 
9. BM Add MSS 33070, f.46, Rochford to Newcastle, 20 June 1766 ; 
III believe I need not tell Your Grace hO\"I much obl:Lged to you I am 
for your freindly hint, it is a mark of Kindness I shall never 
forget, your Grace knov/S hm'/ \\lel1 our political Principles aGree, 
& I wish most sincerely on every Publick as well as private account 
to merit the continuance of your freindship •• " See also Namier, 
England in th.e Age. ~9.f the American Revoluti<?n (2nd edition, 1961), 
and Brooke, :l'he pha t,ha~il A d1!l...:i:ll.is.tra tion ('1956), passin, for _the 
political alignments at this time. 
Rochford wrote to Newcastle on 22 October, expressing 
appreciation for the Duke's goodness to him on so many previous 
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occasions, and lamenting that his illness had prevented him from 
visiting Newcastle in th~ country that summer : waF there, however, 
any chance of their meeting in London before Rochford's departure 
lor Paris, and failing that, was there any service Rochford could 
perform in France for his old friend ? 10 
Newcastle replied at once, regre~ting that he would not 
be in town for sorna w~eks yet, and would therefore be denied the 
pleasure of personally wishing Rochford all the best for his new 
embassy. Newcastle proceeded to convey these best wishes in writing, 
in suitably fulsc})·,:e and dignified terms 
III rejoice Ex'tre:.aely, for the Sake of the King, & the Publick, 
that Your Lordship is employed in a High Station of such 
uo~sequence to Both ; and cannot bu~ hope that your Situatio~ 
will be as agreablc to you, as It is useful to your 
Country •• n 
'Conventional sentiments t undoubtedly, but Rochford sur~ly found 
pleasure in their flattery, issuing from such an eminent oracle. 
As for Rochford's being of service at Paris, Newcastle confessed 
that he was almost lIentirely unknown ll to the present French 
ministers, but that Rochford might convey hib rega.ras to his old 
friend the Harquis de Puisieulx, and if possible on the \'/ay, to 
remember him to limy Honest Old Friend La Bouillie, Intendant at 
Calais,U assuring the latter that his IICommiss':'on about the Snuff" 
11 
was being attended to. . 
10. BH Add HSS 33070, f.413, Rochford to Newcastle, 22 October 1766. 
11. BN Add HSS 33070, f.417, Newcastle to Rochford, 23 October 1766. 
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Rochford must have left London shortly after writing to 
Newcastle, for the Duke1s reply did not catch him, and was sent 
on to Paris ; Rochford was therefore unaware of his duty to call 
th . 12 upon e Intendant of Calais. It is possible that they in fact 
met, however, for it was customary that a major embassy be greeted 
by the local dignitaries, and Rochford certainly travelled by way 
of Calais. His reasons for avoiding Dunkirk were explained by 
Shelburne in a letter to Chatham ; 
UThe Duke of Richmond made Dunkirk his road .. Lord Rochford 
begs not to do this} as he says it was the first thing that 
disgusted not only the Court but the People of France 
against the D~ke of Richmond ; but that he will be very 
ready to {?('I some time hence from Paris to examine the 
State of it." 13 
The Rochfords arrived at Paris in the afternoon of 
28 October 1766, where they were greeted by Rochford1s Secretary 
of Embassy, Stanier Porten. In his opinion, RochfoTd and Lucy were 
"in good Health tho' a little fatigued with the Journey.1i Porten 
had had ample time to prepare for Rochford's arrival, having been 
in Paris since the end of August, and in cha=-ge 0';;: the Embassy 
since Richmond's Secretary (his brother, Lord George Henry Lennox) 
had taken his audience of leave on 4 Octob~r. 14 After settling 
in at the house in the Faubourg St Germain, Rochford next morning 
sent word by his private secretary to notify the Duc de Choiseul 
of his arrival and to request an audience for the presentation of 
his credentials. 15 
12. BN Add HSS 33071, £.51, Rochford to Newcastle, Paris 20 November 1766. 
13. Chatha~2orrespondence, III, 113-4 ; Shelburne to Chatham, 18 October 
1766. Rochford first knelll of Richmond's visit to Dunkirk from 
Conway's letter of 8 November 1765 (SP 94/172, £.75, Separate). 
14. Horn, E£itish, Diplomatic Representat,iv,!Ls, 1689-1782, p.23. 
15. SP 78/271. f.100, Parten to Shelburne, 29 October 1766. Rochford's 
private secretary at .vas one Will Henry Higden ; see 
SP 78/272, f.74, Rochford to Shelburne, 4 February 1767. 
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Two days passed before Choiseul replied, in which time 
Rochford gathe7ed from other members of the diplomatic corps 
(the Spanish and Sardinian Ambassadors each made him a private 
visit) that he was unlikely to have his audience fur some time, 
as the Court \jas at Chois;- and the King was not expected back at 
Versailles for several weeks. But on 1 November, Rochford 
received "a most polite Letter,1t in Choiseul's own hand\'iriting, 
notifying that. the Ying wished to receive Rochfm:d without delay, 
and would be at Versailles the very next day to rec3i7e him. 
Rochford remarkea upon this ; 
lI,:rhe giving me an audience so soon, and the [ French King IS] 
coming f~om Choisy to Versailles • • • is 100k6d upon by 
all the Ambassadors herB a.s a great Nark 0:7 Distinction .. 1! 
He also thought this a promi.sing sign that I:~uis XV desired at 
16 least cordial ~clations with Britain. 
On the morning of 2 November, therefore, Rochford drove 
in his ambassadorial coach and six to Versailles, where he delivered 
a copy of his credential letter to Choiseul. The Hinister then 
withdrew to jci;t the Royal party, while Rochford was conducted to 
the Salle des Ambassadeurs. Here he was greeted by the Introducteur, 
M. de la Live, who withOut delay showed Rochford into the audience 
chamber .. 
After the usual obeisances, Rochford delivered lIa little 
speech in French," expressing his own Sovereign's personal regard 
for the French Crown, ~nd declaring Britain's desire for continued 
peace and harmony with her close neighbour. In reply, Louis XV 
assured Rochford that he fully reciprocated these sentiments, and 
16. SP 78/271, 1'.114, Rochford to Shelburne, 2 November 1766. 
18. 
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shared his brother monarch's concern for the peace of Europe. 
The French King then added the conventional compliment that in 
sending Rochford as Ambassador, George III had "made choice of 
a Person extremely agreel:l,ble to him." In relating this part of 
the audience, Rochford hastened to add, lilt is not Vanity that 
prompts me to mention this Circumstance •• but I think it my 
Duty not to omit mentioning any Attention ahewn." In this he 
was perfectly correct, for even the sligh~est coolness in the 
elaborate ritual of eXChanging compliments could indicate a 
change of attitude between Courts. But it is possible that 
Rochford had sense4 more than the usual politeness of the compliment, 
for Louis XV mutt surely have been glad to see as British Ambassador 
a career diplomat, ~xperienced, polished, and fluent in French, 
after the arrog(',nce and inep'titude of He:rtford and Richmond. 17 
Rnchford remained with the King for another half-hour 
after the completion of the formal exchanges ; URis Most Christi&n 
Majesty talked to me all the time, and in the most gracious ~ianner.11 
Rochford was then conducted to the Queen's a,artments, where he 
made another brief formal speech in accordanCe with fds Instructions, 
and thence to the remainder of the Royal Family, the Dauphin and 
Dauphiness, the Princesses, and the late D~uphin'6 children, all 
of whom made "the moat polite Returns" to Rochford's formal 
compliments. Rochford afterwards dined with Choiseul, and the two 
men sat late into the night in Choiseul's studr, discussing many 
. t ~ b' 18 pOlon a or uSJ.ness. 
SP 78/271, f.114, Rochford to Shelburne, 2 November 1766. See also 
for comments on Hertford,. S.and\'lich Diplomatic Correspondence, 176,3-
1765, edited by F. Spencer (1961), p.191. 
SP 78/271, £.114, Rochford to Shelburne, 2 November 1766. Rochford's 
report of this first interview is in Shelburne , Vol.23, f.35, 
Rochford to Shelburne, 5 November 1766 ; the matters discussed will 
be examined in turn below. 
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This very full day at least completed all of Rochford's 
formal audienci~s at Court ; Lady Rochford was not presented at 
Versailles until 2 Decembor, a month later, when she was received 
in "a most rema-:kable distinguished Manner." 19 Ini;he meantime, 
however, Rochford had many more ceremonial visits to perform. 
On 3 November he notified in form the other foreign ambassadors 
and ministers of his ~rrival and reception by the French King, 
and soon began exchanging visit a \·d.th them. He a.lso notified the 
leading members of the French Court and members of i.;he King's 
Council of State, and began making formal visits to many of them. 
By the middle of November, there only remained the visits on the 
Princes of the Blood, but here Rochford enc"lt:ntered .an awkward 
20 problem. 
The Prinoes of the Blood claimed that nevlly al'ri ved 
ambassadore., in making their visits, should offer them the same 
'formal co~pliment in their Sovereign's name as had 'been made to 
the French King and Royal Family. Rochfo~d found the other foreign 
ministers "scandali,zed at this Pretension ll ; the Neapolitan 
Ambassador had been in France for fourteen years and still had not 
visited the Princes of the Blood for this very reason. The Spanish 
and Austrian Ambassadors likewise refused to make their visits under 
such terms. 
Rochford 1;; own predecessors at Paris had however submitted 
and made their visits without any difficulty, except that Richmond 
had deliberately omitted any compliment in his Sovereign's name, 
\-/hicn II gave great offence. ~l Upon studying his formal Instructions, 
19. SP 73/271, £.147, Rochford to Shelburne, 4 December 1766. 
20. SP 78/271, f.114, and 132, Rochford to Shelburne, 2 and 12 November 
1766. 
Rochford agreed that Richmond's action was strictly in accordance 
with his instructions, but yet could not s~pport what seemed to 
him a grave tactical error in needlessly giving offence where it 
might have been avoided~ Rather than decide such a delicate matter 
by himself, Rochford appealed to Shelburne for guidanc~. 
While waiting for a reply from London, Rochford nevertheless 
sought some unc'fficial means of resolving the difficult~. He had a 
good friend uhv was a Ilprincipal Personagc lt in ~;he household of the 
Prince de Conti, through whom Rochford discovered that the Prince 
wanted to meet hi!2 and regretted not being on better terms with the 
other ambassadors. It was therefore arranged that Rochford should 
meet the Prince as if by chance, in the hope of f'indin.g some solution 
to I1this trifling Business." The meeting took place f\, :fe~..r day a later 
at the house (f the Gomtesse de Boufflers, but Rochford was dismayed 
to find that even after a discussion lasting two hours, the Princt" 
saw no need to alter his "high Tone, U a,.."Pld refused to accept any of 
Rochford's suggested comprcmises. Their conversation was, however, 
most amicable and they parted on the best of terms. 
Rochford also meutioned the affair to Choiseul t knowing 
that he was no great friend to the Princes of the Blood, and was 
gratified to heal' him declare that the Princes had no grounds for 
such a pretension, and that they ought to have accepted Rochford's 
suggestions for a solution. The Sardinian Ambassador, on hearing 
Rochford's news, p~atponed his intended visit, and declared that 
he would wait to see what directions Rochford received from London, 
then follow his example. Rochford was delighted by this ; "for in 
all Affairs of this Kind, Ambassadors should unite.: n 21 
21. SP 78/271, f.1 ,Rochford to Shelburne, 12 November 1766, Separate; 
Rochford had sent his card to the Gomtesse de Boufflers by 5 November; 
see Leth-es de r'~me du Deff~.d fo. Horace t'ia.lpole, edited by P. Toynbee 
(London,1912), 1., 159 Defland to vlalpole, 5 l';ovember 1766. 
Shelburne, however, lamely left the matter to Rochfordts 
own discretion, adding a flattering tribute to the skill he had 
always shown in such delicate affairs. Having failed to bring the 
Prince de Conti to consider a compromise, Rochford apparently felt 
he had done enough, and merely gave out that he would wait his 
turn until all the other ambassadors who had arrived before him 
had made their visits on the Princes of tha Blood. Secure in the 
knowledge that the o~her ambassadors would not yield, ~ochford 
th 1 t th tt . "th t .. ff 22 us e e ma -er res~ W1 ou g1v1ng a ence. 
He was not quito finished with mattel"S of etiquette, 
however; and this time it was Shelburne who asked for Roehford's 
advice. George III had received a letter from the Due de Penthievre 
hotifying the death of his mother, the Comtesse de Toulouse, and 
it wafl not knoWl~ \vhether an answer from tue King himself was in 
"rder. A f:earch of the correspondence had failed to reveal any 
notification of the Legi+.imation of the Illegitimate Princes in 
1714, which would have made a reply in form necessary. On enquiry, 
Rochford found that all the Courts of Europe which wrote to the 
Princes of the Blood wrote equally to the Ill~gitimate Princes as 
well ; the Court of Vienna was the exception, and wrote to neither. 
Choiseul told Rochford that George II had -:wice written to the 
Due de Penthievre, and offered to show him the originals. From all 
this, it was decided that a reply was in order, and Roehford later 
delivered it by means of his secretary. 23 
As for the Princes of the Bl()od, far from kL'ofiting by 
their intransigent stance, their attitude provoked retaliation from 
22. SP 78/271, f.1L~3, Shelburne to Rochford, 28 November 1766 ; 
SF 78/272, f.43, Rochford to Shelburne, 22 January 1767. 
23. SP 78/272, f.99, Rochford to Shelburne, 18 February 1767 ; ibid., 
fos.51 and 109, Shelburne to Rochford, 30 January and 27 February 
1'167. 
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the diplomatic corps ; the Spanish Ambassador, Fuentes, somehow 
procured a ruling that ambassadors were henceforth entitled to 
wear their swords and to enter'unmasked at the Bal d'Opera, 
privilege's hitherto jeal.")usly guarded by the Princes of the Blood 
24 
alone. 
Rochford's first impressions of the diplomatic corps at 
Paris were that most of the foreign ministers were little more 
than Choiseul' s lacb:ys. Souza, the Portu.~uese Ambassador, who 
might normally have been thought of as the ally of the British 
Ambassador, was notorious as a news-gatherer for Choiseul. Baron 
Gleichen, the Danisl .. Envoy, was likewise Ilqaite a Creature of the 
Duke of ChoiseuLII Rochforci. strongly disapproved of such proclivity 
". • if he is trusted by his own Court he is faJ:' from 
being a proper minister at this, as I am quite satisfyed 
he conceals from the Duc de Choibeul nothing that he 
is informed of.1t 
The Swedish Ambassador, Count Gustav Filip Creutz, was no stranger 
to Rochford; n~s I knew him intimately at Madrid I keep up my 
Connection with him. u 'But from all appearan.:;es, he remained in 
Rochford's opinion lIa most determined Frenchman. 1f Rochford was 
unwilling to relate gossip about the members of the diplomatic 
corps, and reserved his considered judgment for a late~ report, 
as he explained to Shelburne ; 
"Characters are Things of so delicate a Nature, 
that I will never trouble Your Lordshi~ with any 
of my Observations 'till I am morally sure that 
they are well-founded. 1I 25 
24. SF 78/272, f.43, Rochford, to Shelburne, 22 January 1767. 
25. Shelburne Papers, i .. lilliam L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Hichigan 
Volume 23, f.91, Rochford to Shelburne, 24 December 1766, Secret 
(not in SP). 
Rochford's impression of Creutz seems nevertheless to 
have been accurate enough, and received confirmation from a 
reliable source. The British Envoy at Stockholm, Sir John Goodricke, 
writing to Rochford early in 1767, noted tha~ Rochford's estimation 
of Creutz "agrees perfectly well not only with his Character, but 
with that of Count Fersen and other leaders of the French Party 
here. 1f 26 
After the isolation of l!'adrid and the long delays 
attending the correspond~nce between Spain and Eneland, Rochford 
was no doubt glad to be so ffiuch nearer home, where he co~ld expect 
an urgent dispatch to be answered in a matter of days rather than 
'tlCeks. Port en ha,i of course taken charge of the secret ciphers 
when he took over irom Richmond I s Secretar~r, Lennox, but Rochford 
rightly mistrustsd the French postal serv.'tees and preferred to use 
reliable messengers at all times. The French deciphering service 
was renowned throughout Europe, though it is ironical that some of 
Choiseul's correspondence with the French Embassy in London had 
been entrusted to the mail and accordingly dticiphered by the Post 
Office before this time. 27 
Rochford's method was to send a messenger to Calais to 
meet the Saturday packet for Dover, handinr; the SGaled package of 
dispatohes to the English captain. Rochford's messenger then 
waited at Calais for the return packet on Sunday night which brought 
the mail from London. In this way, Rochford po~nted out, Shelburne 
26. The W.S. Lewis / Walpole Library, Farmington, Conn.; autograph 
letter, Goodricke to Rochford, 27 February 1767. 
27. SP 78/271, f.3, Shelburne to Lennox, 12 3eptember 1766 ; ibid., 
f.31, Porten to Shelburne, 28 September 1766. See also, J.W.Thompson 
and B.K. Padover, .secret D.1J??pr:Jac,Y (JJolldon,1937), pp.244-265 , 
K.L. Ellis, "British ConullunicD.tions and Diplomacy in the Eighteenth 
Century," E..B1J..etin of the Ip.stitute of Historical Research, XXXI 
(1958), pp.i59-'167, on interceptions and ciphers at this time. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
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would have regular weekly reports, and his replies would reach 
Paris in time for Rochford's Tuesday conference with Choiseul j 
nand the Danger of a Cypher will be avoided. 1I 28 
This useful arr~ngement, which savea usin.g the already 
overburdened King's Hessengers and freed them for longer journeys, 
i,ook a little while to become established at the London end. Barely 
a fortnight after its inception, Rochford gent Shelburne a terse 
reminder that the cle~ks in his office muot take care to address 
his letters to the Agent for the Packets at Dover, with instructions 
for them to be sent over separately by the Cc>_ptain of the Packet 
and delivered to Roctiford's servant at Calais. Unless this was done, 
Rochfor~ displayed similar resour~afulness in establishing 
his sources of intelligence at Paris, and wi~hin a short time seems 
to have made some useful contacts in French government circles. 
But such services, though fairly readily available, \yere much more 
expensive in Paris than they had been at Madl·id. Early in December, 
Rochford wrote privately to Shelburne 
"I have made a Connection here with Persons fr0m t ... hom I 
flatter myself I shall receive some useful Int.elligence,1f 
but Shelburne must know better than most that the obtaining of 
information, especially ~opies of secret papers, cost a great deal 
• • and I believe I need not acquaint Your Lordship " 
that my private Purse will not allow me to defray 
expenses of that kind." 
Would the King allow Rochford a certain sum for this purpose ? 30 
Shelburne Papers, Vol.23, £.35, Rochford to Shelburne, 5 November 
1766. 
Shelburne Papers, Vol.23, f.57, Rochford to Shelburne, 20 November 
1766. 
Shelburne Papers, Vol.23, f.79, Rochford to Shelburne, 11 December 
1766, Private. 
Shelburne replied some six weeks later that the King 
was willing to allow such sums as Rochford thought adequate to 
obtain useful information, though where the amount might be very 
large, the request aho'Uld first be referred to London. Other than 
this, Rochford might continue to obtain information as and when 
he could, making an occasional bill for his expenses ana specifying 
the particularc. 31 
Rochford \'1as somet-lhat embarrassed. by this last point ; 
it was not quite as si::1ple a matter as purchas;"ng a ne\'1spaper. 
In order to obtain any information at all, hb had to favour his 
informants with regular small sums, and encourage them with the 
expectation of larger sums if their information proved valuable 
tt it is necessary to be connected with inferior 
Persons of Office here, who have oppC'r.ttmitieEi of giving 
essential Intelligence, and s':~h Connections are not 
kept up wi thou t paying for them. I' 
A tone of injured dignity pervades the remaipder of Rochford'~ 
letter. He was sure his contacts were good ones, ~nd worth 
cultivating, but if the Ki!'"g disapproved of such dealings he 
would never again mention the matter. Unspoken w~s the implication 
that such methods could not be avoided in eighteenth eontury 
diplomacy, and chat it ~as folly to neglect them when one's rivals 
and neighbours used them. Rochford was allowed hi:,; hill, ~ 
details. 32 
SP 78/272, fe40, Shelbu~ne to Rochford, 23 January 1767, Most Secret. 
SP 78/272, f.172, Rochford to Shelburne, 18 March 1767, Private; 
ibid., f.202, Shelburne to Rochford, 3 April 1767, ,Secret. For a 
further discussion of secret service money, see Horn, British 
Diplomatic Service, pp.259-283, and A. Cobban, Ambassadors and 
Secret Agents (London,1954), pp.110-120. 
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Just as Rochford had learned at Madrid the value of 
reliable intelJ.igence sources, so too he had learned much earlier 
at Turin that diplomatic emoluments tended barely to cover onels 
overall expenses, let alone provide for the purchase of information. 
Though his sal~,ry at Paris 'r/as now the largest of any in the whole 
British diplomatic service, Rochford still relied heavily on his 
salary, and may have b~grudgod meeting secret service needs from 
what he saw a "" .... the just reward of long service a~~road~ 33 
There was a steep price to be paid for enj~ying the premier 
post of the service, for Paris was notoriously one of the most 
e~:pensive capitals of Europe, and household ~os~s fur an ambassador 
of the first rank were enormous, from the hirh cost of provisions 
and luxuries to the lavish scale of constant Hnt~rtainments. It is 
a fair assumption that Rochford spent as much time and energy in 
social commitmentc as he ever did in actual business, for as 
Chesterfield observed, much of the real business of diplomacy was 
34 
achieved in the private exchange of information. 
Yet bu&iness there was, and in abundance, on Rochford!s 
arrival in Paris. He hac hoped to avoid at first "any business that 
might occasion the least altercation," until he had had time to 
settle into his new post ; but this was a vain hope, for Choiseul 
immediately plunger. him into the deepest of business on the very 
35 day of his first audiences at Versailles. 
33. Journal of the House of C6mmons, XXXII, 581, 589 (Ci~il List 
payments), gives £ ~,795 as Rochford's emolument and allowances 
from October 1766 to Cetober 1767. 
34. Chesterfield's Letters, edited by J. Bradshaw (London,1892), I, 155 
see also Horn, B:r:i.tish Dj:21..omatis Servic~, pp.61-69, and J. LaV.erne 
Anderson, li'fhe !.3ritish .smbassy in Paris, 1714-1763,° Histo:CL 'i'2day, 
XXI (1971), pp.49-56. 
35. Shelburne Papers, Vo1.23, f.35, Rochford to Shelburne, 5 NOV98ber 
1766 (not in SP). 
Their after-dinner discussion in Choiseul's study 
began with the problem of Dunkirk, that Ilconstant sorell in Anglo-
French relations throughmlt most of the eighteenth century, 36 and 
ranged over such outstanding issues between the two Courts as the 
Canada Bills, the English East India Company claim for maintenance 
of French prison~rs of war i~l India, two cases relating to English 
vessels seized by the French in the West Indies, and above all, 
Britain's disputes with Spain, over non-payment of the Manila Ranso~ 
and Britain's presence on the Falkland Islands. e last two issues 
involving Spain ware the most pressing, and ChoiseuJ. made an 
important proposal to Rochford at this first in .... erview which 
initiated a major negotiation in itself. Ror;tford's share in this, 
the first Falkland Islands crisis of 1766, desex-ves close examination 
in view of his role as Secretary of State i~ the later, more serious, 
Falklands crisis of 1770, and will be considered in th~ next chapter. 
The remainder of the present chapter attempts to trace his handling 
of those major inherited negotiations reg&rding Dunkirk, the Canada 
Bills, and the East India Company claim, which Choiseul revived at 
this first intel"liew on 2 November 1766. 
The Treaty of Paris of 1763 confirmed the provisions of 
earlier treaties regardin3 Dunkirk, notably those of Utrecht (1'713) 
and Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), which had called for the dismantling of 
the defences and port so as to prevent its use as a naval base. 
In each intervening war, the defences had been repair~d, and in the 
most recent conflict an additional work had been completed, namely 
the notorious cunette, which carried the outflow of all the local 
36. British Diplomatic .I,nstructions,1689.-.178.2, VII, France, iv (1711-5-
1789), edited by L.G. Wickham Legg (1934), p.xix. 
37. 
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canals along the fosse of the old town, to issue at the lower 
end of the harbour where its scouring action was more effective 
in keeping the channel to the sea between the ~tte~ deep enough 
for large vessele. Arti~le Thirteen of the Peace of Paris stipulated 
the immediate destruction of the c~nette, along with r~e coastal 
forts and batteries .. However, the l"rench plenipotentiaries had 
succeeded in s~curing a final clause that means'were to be found 
for the presel'V'ation of the salubrity of the ai.'" and the health 
of the inhabitants once the cnnette was destroyed, for the canals 
emptying at DunkiTk drained a large low-lying district which was 
prone to flooding in winter and pestilence in summer. 37 
Engineers ~ere appointed by both sides to superintend the 
demoli tion works 1t/hich proceeded steadily throughout 1764., The forts 
and batteries were dismantled, the King's 3a~on was demolishRd and 
partly filled in, and the ~nette completely 1illed in. Drainage 0f 
the 'country waters· was secured by rJopening the sluice of the 
Canal of Bergues at the very head of the harbour. 38 The British 
Engineer, a reneg~de Frenc~~an named Desmaretz~ insisted that the 
demolition would ~ot be effective without tlle destruction of the 
jettee~ protecting the channel to the sea, but Choisdul protested 
that this would obstruct the drainage of the district and contravene 
Reeueil des Instructions donn6es aux Arnbassadeurs et Hinistres de 
France •• XXV-2, Angleterre, iii (1698-1791)\ edited by P. Vaucher 
(Paris,1965), pp.5~5-6 ; for the text of Article ~3, see Z.E. Rashed, 
The Peace of Pfi:!:'is, 1763 (Liverpool,1951) , 1'.221. There is no full 
account in English of the problem of Dunkirk as it affeated Anglo-
French relatione in the eiehteenth century, though materials for 
such a study exist in abundance ; earlier works in French are listed 
in L. Lemaire, BiblioRraphie de l'histoire de ~unkerque (1929). 
38. For maps showing features of the to',m and harbour of Dunkirk at 
this time, and the system of canals in the district, see Appendix C 
and Appendix D below. 
39. 
40. 
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the treaty provision regarding the salubrity of the air. Desmaretz 
in turn accused the French of failing to open the sluice gates at 
the proper times, so as to give an impression of poor drainage. 
The British Government d~cided to insist upon the eernolition of 
the jettees, and did so by the simple expedient of substituting 
this word in place of ncunette" in the relevant clause of the 
Instructions given to Richmond in 1765. 39 
Plainly, Choiseul intended to use the clause regarding 
the health of the inh~bitants as a pretext for evading the full 
demolition of Dunkirk ao a port. His main COilcern was to prevent 
as far as possible the complete silting up of the channel, for 
while forts and batteries could be repaired quickly, it would take 
mu,~h longer to clea1' a badly silted entrance and build new jettees. 
Hal-leVer, Bri tisl' insistence resulted in two small experioen tal 
breaches b~ing made in the jettees in Septcmuer 1765, and when 
these produced no marked deterioration in the channel, a third alid 
larger c,Eupure we.s made. This larger cut soon created sandbanks, 
and made the channel so sinuous that even sm~ll trading vessels 
began to run aground. Choiseul at once ordered the w~rk to be 
stopped, despite British protests, and as the si~ting increased 
during 1766, he instructed Guerchy to prot~st at London against 
the danger of flooding in the lOW-lying hinterland. 40 
~ritish Diplomatic Instructions, VII, France, iv (1745-1789), 
compare pp.813 and 95. 'l'his chanf,e has been strmgely overlooked 
by recent writers, who assume that the disputes over Dunkirk 
continued to refer to the cunette ; see ~andwich D~R:omatic 
Correspondence, 1763-6.2, edited by F .. Spencer (196~), p.191, and 
M. Roberts, Splendid Isolation, 1763-1780 (Reading,1970), p.17. 
Vaueher, Recueil des Instructions •• XXV-2, Angleterre, i (1698-
1791), pp:LvI9-420 ;" lieu Letters of J?.§l._vid Rume, edited by Klibansky 
and Hossner (Oxford,1954), 1,110-111, "'"18-119, 'i25-127, from 
SP 78/267-3 ; P. Coquelle, :;Le Comte de Guerchy, II fu:.vue des Etudes 
Historiques, 74 (1908),pp.456-460. 
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It was this protest vlhich Choiseul repeated to Rochford 
at their first intervie\1I' on 2 november, yet at the same time, 
Rochford noted, Choiseul IItook a great deal of Pains" to convince 
him that "they intended to fulfil their treaty obligAtions regarding 
Dunkirk, and even went ,so far as to offer not to repair these 
demolitions in the event of another war. Rochford merely replied 
that they would have to wait until the ers reported on the 
drainage situation ~ Rochford Nas inclined to be ,<,cep tical of 
Choiseul's assurances ; III will not take upon me to answer for 
any man's Sincerity, nor am I apt to be too credulous!!; he 
thought Choiseul seerr,ed anxious to avoid a qaa:s.>rel over Dunkirk. 41 
The engineers T report early in Dece"::ber concluded that the 
sil ting of the channel in ~.o way impeded the ire inage of the district 
and vlaS unlikely to do so \'lhi10 the bed of the channel l'emained 
lower than the si)l of the sluice gates on the Canal of 42 
Informing Rochford of this, Shelburne pointed out that it was 
really up to the French to find a remedy for the s~lubrity of the 
air, since the obvious .solution suggested by Britain, the reopening 
of the Sluice 0":' Hardyke, had been rejected as too expen,sive. As for 
Choiseul's offer not to repair the demolitions in time of war, 
Shelburne scornfully remarked that if it vias difficult in peacetime 
to bring France to fulfil her obligations, it would be quite 
impossible in time of war! 
But \iher1 Rochford informed Choiseul of the engineers' 
report, and B.::-it:9.in's tence On the full Gxecution 
of the treaty requirements for Dunkirk, he net tll'ith a very hostile 
41. Shelburne Papers, Vol.23, f.35, Rochford to Shelburne, 5 November 
(not in SF); 78/271, , Shelburne to Roch!ord, 
October 1 
42. SP 73/271, f08.126 a::l.d 1L1-9, Dem:1'),retz and Frazer to Shelb¥rne, 
10 r;ovember and 5 December 1766, anclos ~lans and )rofile3. 
43. SP 78/271, f.156, Shelburne to nochford, 19 December 1 
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response.; III have never yet Geen him so warm as he was upon 
this Occasion." Choiseul resented the imputation that France 
would have to find her OWll remedy for the drainage of the district, 
as it Vlas never understood at the peace neGotiatione that the 
demolitions at Dunkirk should go so far as to put a whole province 
under "Tater and dispossess 30,000 people t Since Britain noVI 
regarded their compliance with the strict letter of the treaty 
as a test of the einceri ty for peace, France \'10Uld likei'lise 
regard Britain T s acquiescing over the provision 1"01' the health of 
the inhabitants "f Dt:nkirk as a test of her desire to preserve 
the peace. Rochford was unmoved by this heated and 
diatribe, and r.lerely repeated firmly that hE. \'las instructed to 
insist on the execution of Article 13 "in its full Extent." But 
he \-laS nonethe::!..ess a Ii ttl"! uneasy at Choie8ul t s vehemence, and 
gloomily anticipated that unless some alternative method vIas agreed 
upon for rreserving the salu'urity of the air at Dunkirk, he foresa'" 
in the near future "that this Business \..rill meet l-1i th great 
Difficulties." 44 
Yet fOl' the next fe,,, months, more was said to 
him by Choiseul on the Dubject of Dunkirk. In lfurch, Desmaretz 
reported to Shelburne ( duplicates to Rochford at Paris) 
that there was still no noticeable obstruction to the drainage 
of the 'country itla ters. r 45 But after heavy in the follO\'1ing 
month, there waG undeniable flooding in the low-lying district of 
the Moere. This was usual after heavy rain in the winter, but 
Choiseul seized the opportunity to renew his protests • .J.. agaJ.nst- the 
44. SP , f.3, Rochford to Chelburne, 7 
45. SP 78/272, f.178, Desmaretz to Shelburne, 20 March 1767. 
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effect of the cuts in the jett~es, and complained that the 
environs of Du~kirk Buffered greatly from flooding as a result. 
Guerchy made the same corilplaint at London, but suggested that 
a fresh examination of the whole question might wait until the 
pressure of iamentel';Y bus h d ,46 a easea. 
HOt-lever, the Bri ti&;l ers at Dunkirk again 
reported that the silting up of the channel had in no \vay 
affected the salubrity of the or prevented the of 
the district. Desmaretz went even further, and remi Shelburne 
that the treaties would not be fulfilled until the ttees were 
entirely levelled, and the channel thus closed to vessels. 47 
Choiseul on the contrary hinted to Rochford ~hat if the flooding 
behind the tOllln gre\'/ worse, he might be compe11ed for the sake 
of the populace to order the repair of the three coupures made 
in 1765. 48 
Fochford regarded this hint to repair the ~ettees as 
li ttle short of a threat, or as he terr:1ed it, a Hmenace", and 
Choiseul was careful at their next interview to qualify his 
earlier statemel. t, explaining that he sa"l this as an emergency 
measure in a very wet season. Porten was with Rochford at this 
interview, and agreed afterwards that Choiseul had, in contrast 
to his previous oll.tburs~, spoken IIwith Coolness and 
Hoderation.
'
.' Afte":' dinner that evening, Choiseul dre'.>! Rochford 
aside into a corner, and resumed his discourse on Dunkirk. 
46. SP 78/272, f.267, Rochford to Shelburne, 14 Eay 1767 ; ibid., 
f.295, Shelburne to Rochford, 26 May 1767. 
47. SF 78/272, f. ,Desmaretz to Shelburne, 30 May 1767 ; a copy 
of this reDor , and a covering letter, tz to Rochford, 
3 June 1707, o.re nOvI in the:cochford at the ',i.S. Levlis / 
~alpole Library, l~rmington, Conn. 
48. SF 78/272, f.267, Rochford to Shelburne, 14 May 1767 ; SF 
f.22, Rochford to :Jhelburne, 2 July 1767, Secret. 
3;5. 
Choiseul assured Rochford, as he had at their very first 
intervie\i, that they vlere resolved to fulf:U their engagements 
regarding Dunkirk, provided the salubrity of the air ~as secured 
and floods prevented, and said he wished there should not remain 
the least appearance of a. difference behleen the two Courts. 
He therefore suggested ,·,hen Rochford took his intehded 
leave in EnglaYld, he should travel by "lay of Dunkirk, and ,see 
for himself the situation there. 49 
Shelburne agreed that this was a "very judicious and 
fair" suggestion, and readily granted Rochfo!'c~ permission to 
make this visit, trusting he would thon be better able to 
convince Choiseul that Britain pressed the matter, not Bcut of 
Pique,1I but simply for lithe fair Execution of the 'l.'rea'ty." 50 
At the end of July, therefore, Ho~hford and Choiseul 
together reviewed the both sides of the Dunkirk question, with 
maps and plans before them \'lhich \'Tere examined "very minutely. II 
.\I/i th this ttmost interes-!:;ing Conversatioh ll -having made perfectly 
clear to Rochford the ]rench point of view, he set out from Paris 
for Dunkirk on 3 August, :proceedine from there to London~ 51 
There is no direct evidence of the discuss::1.ons Hochford 
undoubtedly had with Shelburne at this time on Dunki:t:'k and many 
other matters of note relating to France, but it is s~rely no mere 
coincidence that on 14 AUGust, Shelburne sent for Desmaretz' 
49. SP 78/273, f.22, Rochford to Shelburne, 2 July '1767, Secret. 
50. SF 73/273, f .2 l1-, Shelbul'i1C to Hochford, ? July 1767, 
51. 78/273, f.43, Rochford to ~h01burne, July 1767 ; ibid., 
f.49, Rochford to Shelburne, July 1767. De8maret~ and Frazer 
made a very de report even as Rochford set out from Paris 
to visit ther,1 ; SP 78/273, f.53, itObservations on thc.Jr2sent 
Situation of the 1:10rk8 of Dunk:i.rk,il 4 1767, larf"~eJ.y 
affirmed earlier opinion that the interior £looding could 
not be attributed to the silt of the ch~nnel beside the cuts 
in the 8 
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assistant, Andrevl Frazer, to come to London Hvlithout Delay,li 
to confer on the situation at Dunkirk. The only other 
indication of these talks is a list of c s from earlier 
correspondence about Dunkirk, delivered to Rochford on the eve 
of his return to Paris, on 17 September. 53 Altogether, Rochford 
t'el t himself "amply instructed!! regarding Dunkirk '''hen he next 
spoke to Choiseul on the subject early in October. 
After reminaing Choiseul that the treaty provisions 
relating to Dunkirk r8p.lc.:ined very far from being fulfilled, 
Rochford pointed out that instead of complyi~g with Britain's 
just demand, they h&d even hinted at repairing the start which 
had been made ir 1emolishing the es, which was in fact no 
..;.....;.....:....;.;.........;-
less than a "Henace. if At this, Choiseul IIbroke out wi tr. some 
Violence, and ~\terrupted 
but as Rochford went on, and 
, t et. i'Jous Ie ferons t " . , 
as falsa the charges that 
the cuts in the jettees had caused in the region, as he 
, had been on the spot to see for himself, Choiseul Ifgrtw calm and 
reasoned vii th great Moderation. II 
He at first d\-J'el t, "as usual Tl , on thsdr dot(-n'mination 
to maintain the peace, and said he could not imagine how it 
could appear that they meant to quibble ovtqr Dunkirk ; :i.I they 
seriously meant to dispute it, they would have proceeded in a 
different way! He then ed what Rochford recognized as 
"All the Old Arguments he formerly made use of,!! but 1tlent on to 
add a new argument that Britain should rest satisfiei with what 
had been done at Dunkirk • was that no mention of the jett&es 
• SF 78/273, f.63, Shelburne to Desmaretz and Frazer, 4 AUGust '1767. 
• SP 78/273, £.94, tiLisc 
17 September 1767 ; c 
mostly fro~ 1714, a~d 
in the districts b 
of delivered to Rochford, 
s extend from f. to f.1 ; they date 
concern the question of flooding 
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had been made when Britain first protested the construction 
of the cunett~, so that these were then cldarly not an object for 
redress, yet had a better right to demand the demolition 
of the Canal of Borsues; which had been rep::l.ired during the last 
\'lar after an demolition under the treaties of Utrecht and 
Aix-la-Chapelle. The drainage of the district, and thus the health 
of its inhabit~~ts, now depended on the outlet of that canal. To 
repair the Sluice of Mardyke would employ eight or ten thousand 
men and cost thirty millions ; lilt \'lould be better going again 
to war,l! Choiseul quipped, though Rochford was relieved to notice 
tha tit t'/as saiel 11 in good humour. II 
Rochfcrd conceded that the Canal of Bergues had been 
allowed to remain for the salubrity of the air, but reminded 
Choiseul that \',hile the jettees remained, .ar: flow kept the 
channel deep enough for large vessels, which vfas certainly not 
the ion of ehe trea ties ~ He dwe::" t livery strongl~TII on the 
-
impropriety of Choiseul's threat to repair the cuts already made 
in the jettees, and reminded Choiseul that until the jettees were 
entirely demolished, the treat remained unfulfilled. Rochford 
then fulfilled his own ions from Shelburne, dnd made a 
formal demand f0r the full execution of the Treaty of Paris as it 
related to Dunkirk. He made this demand in general t~rm~ only, as 
Shelburne had advised him not to add any particulars. 
After a lcng silence, Choiseul at last agreed that the 
cuts in the jett&es must remain, and gave Hochlord his promise 
that they would take no to repair them. He added that since 
Britain did not the treaties as be , she Has 
entitled to keep her on the spot. Rochford chose not to 
54. 
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press Choiseul any further for the full demolition of the jettees, 
as he judged that Choiseul would not concede this point, and knew 
that if he bullied him any further he would run the risk of 
provoking a more serious quarrel. Rochford merely warned Choiseul 
that this ans, ... er vlOuld not satisfy, and that he might expect 
further orders to insist on full comnliance with the treaties. 
. ~ 
Rochford left it to Shelburne and the Cabi.:let to decide hm>[ far 
it was desirable to push Choiseul at this time. At lea3t, the 
Ilmenace1! of repairL'lg tb.~ cuts in the jettees was no,"! "taken off" 
it was not much, but even a small concession from a minister of 
'-4 Choiseul's reputaticu was .:10 mean success. ~ 
Shelburn0 replied a fortnight later after discussing 
Rochford's report witl1 Cabinet. The King especially apprcved of 
his ambassador'::., discretion in not pressj..J.5 Choiseul too far, 
since it W2S decided that any further demand relating to Dunkirk 
was better deferred until after the winter. In the meantime, 
Rochford was to adhere strictly to his present position if Choiseul 
raised the rna tter o.gain. Desmaretz and Frazp.r were like,,!ise 
instructed to ensure that the sluice gates at Dunkirk were opened 
regularly between tides to carry off the 'country waters', and to 
prevent any letting in of the sea water to give an appearance of 
flooding, as had been done at Hardyke. 55 
But in fact, no further demand was to be made in the 
remainder of Rochford's Paris embassy. Neither Choiseul nor 
Shelburne made o.ny mention of Dunkirk to Rochford, a.:ld even in 
78/273, f.152, Rochford to Shelburne, 7 October 1767, Secret. 
55Q SP 78/273, £.176, Shelburne to Rochford, 23 October 1767, Secret. 
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July and August 1768, \-!hen Frazer reported routine dredging of 
the main canalE near Dunkirk, Shelburne did not even remark on 
these proceedings to Roehford. 56 Certainly the British Hinistry 
at that time war anxious to avoid the least quarrel with France, 
as became very obviouE d::.1ring the year with the l<'rench acquisition 
of Corsica, but perhaps Choiseul also held back a little over 
Dunkirk, having found in Rochford a i'lary opponent, less easily 
bullied or hoodwinked than other members of the diplomatic corps.57 
For the meantime, the question of Dunkirk lay dOJ'r:1a:1t .:lnd unresolved, 
only to trouble Rochford anew as Secretary of State in the 1770s. 
An importan t inherited negotiation ',rhich Rochford I s Paris 
embassy did, however, larg~ly resolve was that ~oncerning the 
so-called Canada ~8ills or Canada Paper. Uhen Canada became British 
as a result of thE: SE'ven Years' 'vIal', m'3.ny former French subjects 
were left holding various forms of wartime paper money issued by 
,the French administration for the payments of troops, v;orkmen, and 
merchants. Though these assorted billets d'ordonnance, certificates, 
and forms of card and paper money had suffered considerable inflation 
in the clos stages of the war, they were eagerly bought up by 
British speculators from Canadians returning to France, in the 
expectation of a generous liquidation by the French government. 
This question was not mentioned in the Treaty of itself, but 
an appended declaration promised to honour such bills held by 
Bri tish subj ects, \'lhether 8anadians or not, so long as these sums 
56. SF 78/275, f. '134, Desmaret:'~ aud FraC.',er to Shelbc:.rne, 8 July 1768 ; 
ibid., f .. 215, :;:"razer to Shelburne, 30 AUGust 1 ,in \Thich Frazer 
reports his c 's f health. Desmaret~ may have died not 
after, for t~e Dunkirk correspond8nce thereaftcr(and in the 
1770s) mana~ed by Frazer alone. 
57. For Rochford's comments on the tic corps at Paris, 'see below, 
1'77' ~"" r7';'/"72 l' P_'" '~Lx-orrl 1o.J1."' u.c , -. , Rochford to Shelburne, 7 
400. 
were not confused with the reimbursement made to holders who 
had remained French subjects. The French 30vernment then moved 
... Ii th unusual , and issued a series of arrets in the course of 
1764, calling for the rogistration of all Canada bills, and their 
swift liquidation at a considerable discount from thei~ face value. 
Letters of exchange were reduced by 50 %, and all other forms of 
card and paper money by 75 5;. A very short period "Jas allo\'ICd 
for registration, and any claims left unrecognised at its expiry 
were to be declared forever excluded. 58 
'rhese arrets fell he_rdost on British pr0prietors of 
Canada bills, as most could not possibly furnish proofs of their 
ownership in the 8hort time specified. A group of leading London 
merchants formed a Committee before the end of 1764 to represent 
the interests of the British proprietors of Canada Bills, and this 
Committee pressod their government to open n~6otiations with the 
French to reconsider their manifestly unfair proceeding. But the 
·attempts of Halifax and Comvay to induce the French to negotiate 
met with stubborn resistance in Paris through01.~t '1765. It '\las not 
until March 1766 that agr~ement was reached on a fresh Convention 
for the liquidation of bills held by British proprie~ors. This 
"las signed in Iondvn by Guerchy and ComlaY on 22 April 1766. 59 
This Convention upheld the enormous disco~nts of the 
original but proposed in compensation a lump sum of three 
million livres, in coin, part in promissory notes, which would 
-----------.~. 
58. There is a useful summary of the early 
SP 78/271, f.12, Shelburne to Porten, 
the more detailed account in Coquelle, 
~e d~t§~udes lIistorioll;,.cs, 74( 1908) , 
of the case in 
September 1766 ; see also 
-,.L d'~' 'II co,;]"e e \.Auercny, 
l'P.4LI-1 
59. 
etarre, 
; for the failure to start talks 
in 1765, see the ~orrespondence from SP 78/267-0 printed in full in 
New Letters of David EUQ~, edited by ~. Kl & E.8. Mossner 
(Oxford,;1954), xxiii-xxiv, 129, passir.1 (August-l\oveuber i 7b5). 
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be secured either as reconnaissances or Rent Contracts, to be 
divided in l! just proportions" amongst thos cl \'1ho could establish 
their claims. This Convention o stipulated a terminal date, 
1 October 1766, by which British holders we~e to have reGistered 
their claims for scrutiny by the French office of :::'iqlJ.:!'dation. 
The proofs were to be supported by a solemn oath, which carried 
stern penalties for forgeries and false witness. 60 
'Fne examination of British claims to Cc.nada Bills 
proceeded throughout the middle part of 1766, but it proved to 
be a slow process, and vJorsethan that, the }'renGh Commissioners 
rejected the greater part of t.he British clains, amounting in all 
to some two milliun livres. Thisl·las largely because few 
holders had been able to gather their proofs of o1tmersnip quickly 
.enough, especi.ally where affidavits had to be sought in CanaCla and 
else,.,here. The o ... "iginal holders vJere now ividely scattered, and 
many of the British-held bills had been obtained from ITe~ch 
'Canadians ,,,ho had not declared then for the first Register and 
had therefore bee~ rejected at the office of Ijquidation for 
French proprietors in 1764 • 61 
At the outset of Rochford 1 s Paris embassy, therefore, 
the British gov~r:r:ment had t.1tIO vital objectives to .secure with 
regard to the Canada Bills question ; firstly, to have the deadline 
for registration extended beyond 1 October, and secondly to arrange 
an alternative method of exanining claims, preferably by a joint 
commission of both French and British deput 
Colle~tion of all the 
(London, 1735), 
60. The Convention 
61. SP 78/271, f.5, Shelburne to Porten, 19 September 1766 
f. 12, Shelburne to Porten, September 1766. 
io . , 
Rochford's Secretnry of Embassy, Stanier Porten, \'Jho 
came to Paris at the end of August to prepare for Rochford's 
arrival, was fully instructed regarding the Canada Bills, and 
did his utmost to persuade Choiseu1 to extend the 1 October 
402. 
deadline. But Choiseu1 maintained that the matter W:::tS not stric 
his to decide, and said that Guerchy would doubtless be instructed 
on the answer he should 62 on his return to London. 
When Shelbur~e broached the matt~r to Guerchy in October, 
the French Ambassador !Iperemptorily dec1inedll to agree to any 
extension, claiming that the Convention was ~erfect1y sufficient 
on this , and. ao.ding that the sums claimed by British holders 
seemed to amount ;:0 more than was ever issued. A second il1.terview 
failed b ' G ' l' h' ~ 1 63 to uage 'uarc~y Irom 1S relusa • 
Rochfo:rd first to Choiseul clbout the Canada Bills 
on 4 November. He found Choiseul at first as unwilling to discuss 
the matter as he had been with Porten, protesting that it WaS an 
. intricate affair, outside his domain, and he thought Guerchy was 
handling it all in London. Rochford then proceeded to explain 
the position of many British proprietors, whoae claims took a 
long while to establish because the witnesses were so widely 
scattered. He laboured long to persuade Choiseul of the justice 
of extending the original closing date, and after "a good deal of 
oonversation,11 \"as successful; Choiseul agreed to write to Guerchy 
. 64 
next post, to recommend an extens~on. 
62. SP 78/271, fos.5 and 12, Shelburne to Parten, 19 &:'J.,l 23 September 
1766 ; ibid., fos.33, 39, , Porten to ~helburne, 1, 5, 7 October, 
1766. 
63. SP 78/271, fos.93 and 108, Shelburne to Rochford, 
7 November 1766. 
October and 
64 .. Shelburne 
1766. 
, Vol.23, f. , Rochford to Shelburne, 5 November 
55. 
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Upon receipt of Choiseul's letter, Guerchy at once 
gave way and ar,reed ;;0 extend the closinB date. 'rhis merult in 
addition that British claims rejected by 110 Lescalier the French 
commissioner for vlhat Shelburne termed I!frivolous reasons" \.;ould 
now be re-examined. 65 Before this, Rochford had appointed 
Parten as Deputy for cel"cifying the oaths of British holders 
who had yet to present their claims at the office of liquidation 
. 66 in Par~s. 
Beginning on 24 December, Parten attended ~ach day at 
1'1. Sartine's office, and received the oaths of a nUi.lber of British 
claimants. Early in January 1767, the li6t of registered 
claimants was submitted to Sartine, who sent all the papers across 
to Guerchy, to be handed to the j oint commission in London, '''hich 
then granted a general Certificate authori7ing the liquidation of 
these claims in Paris. 67 
It was an involved and tedious business, which Rochford 
. and Parten had hoped ,,,auld be sNiftly and smoothly resolved. But 
towards the end of January, Shelburne received an indignant protest 
from the London Sommittee of British proprietors of Canada Bills , 
that large sums of British-held Bills had again been rejected at 
the office of liquidation in Paris without any reason being given, 
and furthermore that a duJvY of four ~ per ~ had been retained 
on those admitted ,=or liquidation, ,<,hich British subjects ought not 
68 to have to pay. 
SP 78/271, 
SP 78/271, 
SF 78/2T1, 
fos.10 and 
f.136, Shelburne to Rochford, 18 November 1766. 
f.120, Port en to ~helburne, 5 November 1766. 
f.206, Parten to Shelburne, 31 December 1766 ; SP 78/272, 
, Porten to Shelburne, 7 and lL~ J:.muary 1,(67. 
68. SF 78/272, f.19, Rochford to Shelburne, 13 January 1767 ; ibid., 
f. 55, Ilacleane to Porten, January 1767. 
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A further difficulty then arose over the form of the 
oath to be administered to the latest batch of Brit claimants 
yet to be examined in Paris. Shelburne had authorized a fe,v minor 
changes designed to remove certain ambiguities, and thus to prevent 
any disputes, but: the 11e1;[ French commissioner at Paris, H. de 
Harolles, protested to PorteLl that he could not administer the 
oath in any other form than that given in the Convention of 1766, 
,,,i thout fresh instrr.ct to that effect from his Court. 69 
Fortunately, Shelburne's explanation that ~ . ~~ tll.S new oa l,h 
was strictly in accord with the intentions of that agreement 
carried some \'leight Ni th Guerchy, vlho recorntnonded his Court to 
accept it. In the cour3e of February, Porte~ observed a gradual 
change in Marolles' attitude, and at the s'cart. of Harch, he was at 
l!01.st directed by Praslin to accept the ne\'l oath. On 5 Harch, Porten 
and Narolles settled down to the task of examining each of the 
1 . .. 70 new c a1illP 1n ~urn. 
Porten took no step without consulting Rochford for his 
approval and e;uidance,but Rochford had suggested that it vlould 
be helpful if P~rten were ven the same powers of commission as 
his French counterpart, and \'lell before the examination of claims 
began, Rochford was given authority to grant such additional powers 
to his Secre 71 of Er.:1bat:>oy. Rochford also suggested that 
Porten should sooner or later spend a few days in London, conferring 
with Shelburne Bud the Co~mittee of Proprietors, so that he could 
exercise his powers of discretion with greater certainty both 
69. SP 78/272, f.61, Porten to Shelburne, 23 January 1767 ibid., 
f.79, Porten to ~helburne, 4 1767. 
70. SF 78/272, fos.1 
Fe br:tary and it 
, ~17, 143, Porten to Shelburne, 18 a~d 25 
1767. 
71. SP 78/272, f.61, Porten to Shelburne, 28 January 1767 ; ibid., 
f.68, 3helburne to Porten, 3 1767 ; ibid., f.91,·~ochford 
to Shelburne, 12 February 1 
Rochford and Parten were anxiously aware of their responsibility 
towards the many small-holders represented by the larger merchants. 
But Parten chose to 'defer this leave until after the confirmatory 
Edicts had been publishe~, lest his absence i!,Cl.ve r:ise to further 
72 delay or misunderstanding. 
The examination of claims proceeded throuehout I'larch 
and April 1767, with Parten sending regular reports to London 
relating details of t!1ose claims passed OJ; rejected. Apart from 
the inevitable crop of clatant forearies (Parten remarked that 
these were easily spotted, being usually very crudely doue) , few 
were entirely rej~cted, though some claimants representi!lg groups 
of small-holders ,- ound parts of their olai::1 accepted and others 
rejected for various reasons. Parten's lists of certificates gave 
detailed explanstions in each of these in~~ances. Some delay was 
encountered in \,<,ai tine for replies to enquir:.i..es made in l''rench 
coastal tOlms such as Bordeaux and La Rochelle, so that another 
arr~t was necessary early in April to extend the deadline yet 
again, but by the end o-f that month, Porten'::: vlOrk at Paris "laS 
completed and the sixth and last statement o~~ certificates was 
'13 signed. 
The definitive arret, authorizing J iq'J.idation of those 
claims passed by the joint commission was expected within a few 
days, but as there seemed so little likelihood of further problems 
arising, Porten decided to take his home leave without delay, and 
72. SP 78/272, fos.79, 87, 105, Parten to Shelburne, 4, 8, 18 February 
1767 ; ibid., f.85, Shelburne to Parten, '13 February 1767. 
73· SP 78/272, fos.158, 174, 180, 188, Parten to Shelburne, 11, 18, 22 
and 25 Harc11 1767 ; ibid., fos.206, 215, 227, and 245, Parten to 
Shelburne, 1, 8, 22, and April 1767. 
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he left Paris about 8 Hay. No record appears to have survived 
of his discussj ons "lith Shelburne and the London Committee of 
Canada Bill Proprietors, 'put at his return to Paris late in J'une, 
Shelburne wrote to Rochford in glo,'ling terms of Porten t s zeal and 
Huseful knov/ledge tt ; Rochford had made an excellent choice for 
his Secretary of Embassy, and Port en was to give further evidence 
of his ability in the of 1767. 74 
To all inteats and ?urposes, the of the Canada 
Bills had been settled at last to the satis ()f both Courts. 
It was understood that any late claims which could be established 
as bona fide \vould probably be accepted for liq...l.idatian as a mark 
of favour by the French Court, though not as of right. One such 
case, concerning the hos}Jital of a religious ord~r in Quebec, \I}'as 
admitted among thf! certificates by Porten even though 
it had missed the earlier registration. But not all of 'elle late 
claims were as straightforward as this, and those of Messars Vialars 
and Rybot \'lere to Give Rochrord problems later in the year. For 
the meantime, hOvlever ,the ereater part of the whole transaction 
seemed to have Leon settled, and only a'\'raited the publication of 
a definitive 75 
But the eX:gected arr6t had still not been published '\1hen 
Porten arrived back in Paris on June, and it \vas not in fac t 
until November tha~ the order was published ; the Parler:Jent 
registered the o.ocument on 4 December 1767. There immediately \-lent 
up a hOi·;l of t from the Committee of British holders of 
74. SP 78/272, f. 
ibid., f.320, 
, Rochford to Shelburne, 7 Hay 1767, Secret; 
Shelburne to , 24 June 1767. 
75. SP 73/272, f. ,Shelburne to Porten, 3 February 1 
f. 206, Porten to Ghe1burne, 1 i1 ~767 ; ib _, 
Shelburne to Rochford, 14 1767. 
; ibid., 
f. 219, 
76. 
77. 
Canada Bills , that the r;lethod of liquidation adopted infringed 
the 1766 Convention. The Committee's earlier protest regarding 
rejected claims and the feared duty of four ~ls per livre on 
accepted claims had been ans,,,rered as long ago as February ; then 
Marolles had explained to Port en that the clai~s rejected without 
~xplanation were the more obvious forgeries, and th~t rumoured 
duty was not only in deniers and not sols at all (amounting to 
about 1i %), but only to claims by French subjects. 
The Committee's protest at the definitive arret of 
November 1767 l'laS considerably more serious than this earlier 
complaint, and r€:quired detailed explanation. The p.rr~t merely 
stated that the !~connaissance~ issued for the liquidation of 
Canada Bills 'vere to -be converted into perpetual Rent Con tracts. 
The weys in l.<1hi<:h this change \'(ould be prejudicial to British 
holders of Canada Bills were set out in a payer drafted by the 
agent to be sent by the Jlondon Committee to confer \,/i th Rochford 
, in Paris, H. Guinand, \'1ho \.,.as himself a proprietor. 
Guinand made four main points of pr0test ; firstly, that 
English la'''' prohibited British subjects from taking ?ny part in 
French funds, and whereas the Bills had been the 1 property of 
British subjects under the protection of t~eir government, the new 
Rent Contracts would not be made under that protection; secondly, 
holders were likely to suffer a reduction in the amount of interest 
allowed by the original agreement, which was 4; % ; thirdly, Rent 
Contracts 110uld be much harder to sell than reconna_t-::.>sances ; and 
fourthly, they would be liable to all sorts of domestic duties. 
SF 
"'"0 
'-' .. 
SF 
to 
78/273, f.280, Shelburne to Rochford, 22 December 1767 ; 
78/272, £.87, Porten to ~helburne, 8 February 1767. 
78/273, f. 1, for Guinand's paper; SP 78/274, r.4, Rochford 
Shelburne, 6 JanuarY,1768, separate. 
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Upon receiving Guinand t s paper, Rochford conferred vii th 
various banlcers and holders of Canada Bills then in Paris, and 
ee.rly in January 1768 ansvlered each of his main points in turn. 
In the first place, the l~ent Contracts ,.,rere t.o bel1l"' the same 
number in the French funds as the original reconnaissances, and 
~he Contracts would. specifically state that they stemmed from 
reconnaissances of Canada which were the legal property of 
British subjects. In effect, it was merely a change of form, and 
the Contracts would rGrr~in as much under British protection as the 
reconnaissances. On the second point, Rochford noted that the ....... arre.., 
solemnly guaranteed the same rate of interest. The third point was, 
hm'lever, a justj l.;,able complaint ; Rent Contracts 'Vlere undeniably 
rec!'e difficult to sell or dispose of. Yet the French Court might 
argue that as tbe nevI regulation ~aused 1"':;' loss to the p!':'oprietors 
and gave no advantage to the French Governmeat, there \.,ras no real 
. ground for complaint. Rochford Was inclined ':;0 agree, pointing O1't 
that the Rent Contracts were not to be made before the end of 1768, 
allowing ample time for any who wished to seJ.l their ~~~ssances 
at a good price. As for the last point about duties, Rochford could 
make no comment since it '''as not made clear what du.t:tes Guinand 
had in mind. He concluded Vlith the observat:i.oll th2.t if the French 
Court attempted any further changes prejudicial to British holders, 
he could still make ministerial representations in protest ; but 
tfuntill such Innovations may be introduced, al'lj" Complaint must 
appear premature. 1I 78 
This masterly reply took rJueh of the vlind from the sails 
of the London Committee of British Proprietors of Canada Dills, 
but they were to nroceed 'lili th Guinand' s visit to Paris. 
78. SP 78/274, f. /+, Eochford to Shelburne, 6 January 1768, Sepq,rate. 
79. 
80. 
Quite apart from the intended conversion of ,reconY'.aissances into 
Rent Contracts, there were tt10 outstanding cases '-/hich ",ere 
strongly supported by the Committee ; that or H. Vislars, whose 
proofs of oi-mersh ip had been deficient, but vlho felt that his claim 
had been rejected primarily because of a personal qua~rel in London 
\.,.i th Guerchy, and that of JIlr Rybot 1I/hose "lhole c1aim had. been 
rejected becaucG it WaS an impenetrable tangle of genuine small 
claims and cle ler forgeries. Both men rep:::-esent,:;d numbers of 
honest small-holders, iJut their mm claims ',ler€' rather dubious 
examples of speculation. 79 
Shelburne was well aware of the personal interest of the 
larger claimants, and he \varned Rochford that the specmlators 
(of \'lhom Guinand \-las one) had a vested interest in reCtd. V'j.ng 
payment of thG~r Canada in a mode that would give greatest 
value '\tlhen sold again, and that they benefitc.-ld fron the rejection 
. of smaller individual claims, for this increased the proportion of 
. . 80 
'the compensatory Bonus remc'.ining to the larger claiman t.s. 
Guinand's departure for was delayed until late 
April by the Com~ittee's Dvm close scrutiny of the individual 
claims sponsored by Vial""rs and Rybot, and their rej:"ction of 
any "lhieh gave th8 lea.st evidence of fraud 0 Rochford conferred 
several tines with Guinand upon his arrival in Paris, and pointed 
out that it would be preferable to secure a rf-examination of these 
cases by deputies, as Parten had examined the earlier claims, 
ra ther than simply submi i; a llemorial on their behal.f, 'Illhich \;fould 
SP 78/274, f.50, Rochford to Shelburne, 13 January. 1763 ; on Vialars 
see SP 73/271, f.161, Rochford to Shelburne, 11 Decenber 1766 ; 
SP 78/272, fos.1 19, Shelburne to Rochford, 2 January 17~7, and 
Rochford to Shelburne, 13 January 17G7 ; also, .2. Coquelle, I'Le comte 
de Guerchy,H , 71+ (1908), lJ. 4411-. 
SP 78/274, f.154, Shelburne to Rochford, 19 April 1768. 
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only produce an evasive ansi/Jer, !Iand I,iemorials and Answers miGht 
be carried on forever. II l"ne biggest obstacle 'ias in obtaining 
Choiseul's consent for a re-examination of claims "lhich 
rejected before. When Rochford broached the matter with Choiseul 
tOiiards the end of April 1768, he \iaS not at all hopeful of success, 
and had difficulty even in getting Choiseul to discuss the 
Canada Bills again ; 
II •• but I kncl:1 it \'lould be a great Point gaine). to 
bring the Du~e of Choiseul to approve of the remaining 
claims exail:ined, and this I had the eood luck to 
succeed in. 1I 
Choiseul agl'eed tc have another deputy appointed to confer 
with Porten as ba~ore, and even went so far ~3 to concede that 
Vialars' claim ought to be allowed for the sake of the many small-
holders whom he represented. Rochford sutmitted the necessary 
81 Nemorial that same day. 
vIi thin a fe", \'lecks, Port en had notice from one H. Vilevault, 
his opposite ll'I.lmber as :B'rench deputy, that they should begin their 
examination of the re::1aining claims. Before "~he end of ~1ay, it had 
been decided that all the claims lodged before 1 October 1766 
for which Vialars acted on commission ought to be passed for 
liquidation, but that his own claims seeme]. less certain and \wuld 
require further ion. As for Hybot's claim,Porten thOUGht 
the proofs against him \"lere very 
to decide \'lhether they should cont 
, and it \'las up to Shelburne 
" 82 to supp?rt J. t. 
81. SP 78/274, f.214, Rochford to Shelburne, 28 April 1768 ; there is 
a copy of Rochford' G HeclOrial in Nassau , E/30, Hochford to 
Choiseul, 28 April 1768. 
82. SP 78/275, fos~19, 30, 41, Parten to Shelburne, 11, 18, and 
25 May 1763 ; ibid., f.77, ilochford to Shelburne, 9 June 1763. 
84. 
Parten returned to London on leave on 6 June, and did 
not in fact return to Paris before the clo$e of Rochford1s Paris 
embassy in September ; it may have been on Parten's advice that 
Shelburne took no further steps on behalf (f Vialars and Rybot, 
for nothing more is heard of them in the rer1ainder of Rochford's 
correspondence from Paris. 83 Yet as in the case of Dunkirk, 
merely ignoring a problem did not ahlays cause it to go auay ; 
the Committee of British Proprietors of Canada Bills remained to 
pester Rochford again 9.S Secretary of State in the 1770s. 
The affoirs of Dunkirk and the Car-ada Dills were by far 
the largest of the negotiations Rochford inherited along with the 
Paris embassy, but they were not the only important iBBuos between 
the tVlO Courts ; equally important was tile claim of the Enslisr. 
East India Compc.ny for thei1"" \'lartime expenses ill. maintaining French 
prisoners of ",ar in India. 
This claim 1IlaS kept quite separate frol,1 the main settlement 
of prisoner of war maintenG'_l1ce bet1:/een Fran"B and Britain, which 
\vas finally agrec8 UpO:l after much at ~ne end of 1764. 84 
As the troops engaged in the Indian theatre of the Zeven Years' War 
had been paid s.~ld maintained by the respective }~ast India Companies, 
it was intended that the two claims should as far as possible be 
balanced, EO that each Company was reimbursed its mm counter-
part. Thisinval ved the prepara·~ion of detailed accounts, \"hich 
SF 78/275, £.77, Rochford. to Shelburne, 9 June 1768; ibid., 
f.84, Shelburne to Rochford, '18 June 1768, Secret; a detailed 
report by GuLland of 7 July (SF 78/275, f. '127) seems to have 
evoked no Official response. 
The Bum aGreed u:?on Has £ 667,000, to be 
three to four years ; for the negotiations of 
D i pl9i~ t i G2R~f2.l?2.ll9- eJ:1-:£.§L,_1Z.9.J_-.t22 , e cl it e d by 
pp.17G-214, passim. 
over a neriod of 
1 ,,("11 ~., - b (0....-, Gee !2::..~:jl.C :. 
F. Spencer (19~ 
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were then to be scrutinized by the other Company, before a f 
figure i'laS agrc;ed upon. The accounts prepared by the English 
East India Company had long since been sent over to Paris, but 
nothing more ha~ been heard of them for many months, and Rochford's 
first task '!tlhen revivi~g ehe matter with Choiseul \\las to ask 1I1hat 
had become of them. Choiseul frankly admitted that the accounts 
had been received, but that Praslin had "forgot what he had done 
1r1i th themll 1 Rochfcrd reminded Choiseul that this lIIG.S no trifling 
matter, that large Bums were involved, and a ?art cf the peace 
treaty remained to b~ fulfilled. Choiseul was visibly embarrassed, 
and promised to estigate the matter, thoush he was sure the 
accounts had ·oeen passed to their ot'lU East IL',diaCompany. 85 
Rochford reminded ':::hoiseul of this ill the follo\.;ing week, 
on 11 November 1766, and pointed out that [; duplicate of the demand 
would have been given to either Guerchy or Durand in London. On 
enquiry, l'hoiseul found this lr/as so, but the demand 1I18.S really 
only a general covering letter for the accounts, and did not 
specify in any detail the actual sums required. He assured Rochford 
that they had l:nO Intentions to make any Difficul tyl! in paying 
the demand, but the acco<.:nts \V'ere truly lost, and could not be 
found in the offices of either the French East India Company or 
the Hinister responsible, namely Praslin. 11uch as it lI[as to be 
regretted, another set of accounts would have to be ~repared. 86 
8j. Shelburne Papers, \1'01.23, f .. 35, Rochford to ShePmrne, 5 November 
1766 (not in SF). 
86. S? 78/271, £.129, Rochford to 2helburne, 12 November 1766 
SP 78/272, f.49, Rochford to Shelburne, 22 January 1767, 
Choiseul here re~1.d l1ochford part of Guorchy' s rc])ly of 13 January 
1767, '.1l1ich he uas L::Lrod 0 sayine; the accounts had been 
whenever ioned about them Shelburne. 
4'13. 
lbe Directors of the English East India Company acted 
swiftly to begin preparing a second set of accounts, but the 
copying took some time ; Shelburne remarked to Rochford that they 
" 87 \-/ere "pretty volur.linolJ,s .11 Shelburne fil'all~J' sent them over 
to Rochford on 20 February, and the delay ~.;hich thE'l1 <:?lapsed 
before they were presented to Choiseul WaS entirely Rochford's own; 
he was determined to deliver them into the Minister's haads 
personally! but Choiseul '''as absent froEl C,)urt for the early part 
of l'1arch. It 'vas not until 2l~ Harch that Rochford took his first 
opportunity to deJiver them. 88 
Again, llothingl,ras said about the claim in the Heeks 
which followed, and as the weeks drew into months, Rochford 
became a little uneasy. At the start of July 1767, h~ £eminded 
Choiseul that ::lle English East India Compar:y had yet to receive 
a reply to their demand for the maintenance of prisoners of '<far, 
but Choiseul said that the accounts wpre still exmllined by 
the French East India Compauy, and 1tloul-d. probably take some time 
more. He took care not to interfere in their deliberations, \1hich 
ga.ve an obvious hint to Rochford not to peS1,.er him until they had 
finished their examination of the accounts. 
Rochford tllerefor-e said no more on the subj<:?ct, and many 
more months \vent by \1ithout comment by Choiseul. Finally, Shelburne 
himself grew impatient, after ions had beon asked in the 
House of Lords, and in February 1768 he instructed Rochford to 
renew the demand. Choiseul again showed the greatebt readiness to 
87. SF 78/272, f .53, Shelburne to Rochford, 30 January ,1767. 
88. SF 78/272, f.93, Shelburne to Rochford, 20 February 1767 
f.184, Rochford to 3helburne, 25 March 1767. 
89. SP 78/273, f.20~ Rochford to Shelburne, 2 July 1767. 
ibid. , 
90. 
91. 
414. 
oblige, and assured Rochford that he did not expect any problem 
over payment, as he kne .. ',! that the French East India Company could 
well afford to pay_ But qS nothing had yet been heard from them, 
he assumed that they 'l;lere still checking the accounts. 90 
Shelburne thought this a most evasive and unsatisfactory 
answer, and told the nel'l l!'rench Ambassador in London that the 
delay Was both extraordinary and inexcusable. Rochford again 
pressed Chois0ul to hasten payment, and at the Btart of August 1768 
he submitted another formal Demand. This at las'.; ~ovcd. Choiseul to 
mention the matter ill Council, "lith the result that. he '.vas ordered 
by Louis XV to settle it at once. 91 
Having made this final and successi\tl contribution to 
a long-depending legacy of the Seven Years' War, Rochford left 
Paris on leave at the end of ~..:hat month, ard was not to return. 
He vIas fortunate to have seen h/o of his three major inherit 
negotiations resolved within the term of his embassy. But we must 
now return to the start of that embassy, to consider an even more 
important negotiation which tvas much less capable of resolution, 
and which invol~ed Rochford the most serious misunderstanding 
of his entire diplomatic career. 
SP 78/274, f. , Shelburne to Rochford, 12 February 1768 ; ibid., 
f.65, Roch~ord to Shelburne, 25 February 1768. 
SP 78/275. f.171, Shelburne to Rochford, 29 July 1768 ; ibid., 
f.182, Rochford to Shelburne, 11 August 1768. 
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The Manila Ransom and the 
first Falkland Islands Crisis, 1766. 
e~rly visitors to Falkland Islands ; British 
expedition of 1749-50 abandoned after Spanish 
protestB ; r·j.val French and British settlements 
after the PGace of Paris ; Bougainville hands over 
Port St Louis to ; British preparations to 
reinfol'CQ Port ; Spanish \>Iarnings up to 
September 1766. 
Choiseul's letter of 2 October to S~imaldi ; 
his scheme to resolve Ilanila Ransom and ]'alkland 
Islands issues together ; Hertfo~d'G 
ve~sion causes misunderstanding ; Choiseul repeats 
his proposal to Rochford, 2 November. 
at London; Rochford's report reises hopes 
of resolving mounting crisis ; Shelburne assumes 
w:l0le Ransom tC' be paid ; his inotructions to 
Rochford unclear ; Rochford f~0~eeds on nore 
realistic assumption ; Choiseul suggests Ransom 
be negotiated by Rochford at Paris Rochford1s 
letter of 28 November to Chathdm. 
~terchyls malentend~ with Hertford ; Chatham declares 
the French proposal too far changed to be acceptable ; 
Rouhford's optimism; Shelburne's bluut correction of 
12 December; causes of misunderstanding; Rochford's 
exy,lanation of 18 Dr;cember. 
Shelburne apologizes for inQdequate instructions; 
but insists on scheme ; Rochford tries 
to pressChoiseul to obtain Spain's co~peration ; 
Rr.;:;hford warns of danger in not maintaining a resolute 
stance. 
Spain decides to call Britain's bluff; renewal of 
formal ; Grimaldi asks Choiseul to stop 
interfering; Rochford's cold; Choiseul conceals 
Spanish reply ; warns Grinaldi not to count on French 
aid in eve:ct of ".,ar over Falklands ; Spanish dismay 
complaint not pressed. 
Rochford urges insistence now on ~anila Ransom ; 
but (:onfusion and disarray of Hinistry 
prevents action; Rochford's role assessed. 
CHAi?TE:R 14 
The :t.~anila Ransom and 
the first Falkland Islands Crisis, 1266. 
The greater part of Rochford's after-dinner discussion 
with Choiseul on 2 November ~oncerned Britain's current disputes 
with Spain. The 1'1anila Ransom demand, which had taken up so much 
of Rochford's time B.'!ld energy at Hadrid, remaine1 unfulfilled and 
unresolved .. Far from there being any improvement on the position 
Rochford had won, the British demand had been reducpo., which only 
encouraged Spain to i~'lsist all the more on hcrsugg"lstion of an 
independent arb~tration. 
Added to , Spain uas nm" protesting ago.inst Britain I s 
presence on the F~lkland I&lands, which she claimed were close 
enough to South America to count as part of the Spanish colonial 
empire. noel.ford noted that Choiseul regarded these two issues 
very seriously, as the most important and potentially dangerous 
then afoot among the pO)'lel'S of Hestern Europe. The Falkland Islands 
question in par~icular he described as "an Affair of a very delicate 
Na turo. II Just hO\'1 delica to it had bec ome by November 1766 requires 
1 
some preliminary explana~ion. 
1 .. The standard authority in English is J .. L .. Goebel, The Strugp:l,e for 
the Falkland Islallos i a St.ud7{ in legal and diplomatic hi story 
(NevI Haven ,1927), ba;scd larGely on French and Spanish archives, and 
still unsurpaSSed on the aspects. The most recent account of 
the crisis of 1766 is found in J .E. Hartin-Allanic, Itsugainvilk' 
navigateur, et les decouvert_es de soD: t~ (Paris, 19:)4), ~·.rhich 
follows the E~ench sources in considerable de • I Was unable to 
make use of bIO standard S accounts ; H. Hidalgo Nieto, 
La cuesti6n de las Malvinas, contribuci6n al estudio de las 
relaciones hiGpa:.co-inr,le,~,as en el .si~~lo X'J.lll Olctdrid, 1947), and.. 
O. Gil Hunilla, ;t~ac3 ;:alvinCls i 6 1 conll ioto anp:lo-esprtp;nol de 1720 
(Seville, ! 91~7). 'I'~le brief Clccoun t in J "l<'. Rams ,Anp~lo-:::'renc~ 
Relations. ~763-'l?'lO ( ,1939), is useful bu~ot \vitJ:~~t 
minor ~rr~r (p.17?: for names the Brit AmbassadQr in 
Paris in 1766 as Hertford of Rochford). 
The small group of barren vlinds .... rept islands in the 
South Atlantic noi'! knovm as the Falkland Islands "lers so named 
after being visited and surveyed by a British expedition in 1690. 
This was the latest in a long succession of visits by explorers of 
various nations throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
none of which had led to &ny rernanent settlement; and the eighteenth 
century dat·med \'Ii th the islands still uninhabited. In the first fevi 
decades of the century, hOvJever, they \vere visited morc frequently 
by French vessels which used the islands as a she1t;er <:lnd vlatering 
place, and proved c'specially popular \·li th tl:e sailors of St Halo, 
who named the group Lab Isles Malouines. still no settlement was made, 
but British interest revived a:tter Anson's cirf'umnavigation of 1739-
1740 had revealed the need for a secure bese in the South Atlantic. 
Anson recommended the Falklm:;.ds, and by 1749 the Admiral t;r had 
decided to mount an expedition to establish an outpost thare. 
T!::.e~~(; plans dre\'/ indj.gnant protests from ST!ai~:l. Though the 
Spanish had made no attempt to surveyor settle these J.slands, they 
\vere claimed as part of the Bpanish American Empire, access to "r11ich 
was denied the sh~ps of other nations by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). 
The British Government stoutly maL~tained the right to navigate in 
southern waters and to send scientific expeditions to unexplored 
parts, but rather than c&US~ a dispute so soon after the conclusion 
2 
of peace, the project was in 1750 simply dropped. 
Increas:Lr"g friction in the following decade and the brief 
Anglo-Spanish War of 1762 made the British Governnent less inclined 
to bO\1' before the pretensions of Spanish imperialisr:1, and in 1764 
2. Goebel, 
Goebel), pp.1 , 
(hereafter cited as 
, 
pp.169-170. 
(hereafter cited as 
.'~n:;;lo-:?re!lCh Helations 
the idea was revived 0: an exploratory expedition, t'!nich sailed 
in June that yea" under the command of Commodore John Byron. 
This expedition made a rather sketchy survey and 'took possession' 
in the na[.le of Ge :)rge III in fact only of the vlestern island, and 
returned to England in .Tune 1765 tvithout establishing any permanent 
settlement. 3 
In the meantime, and quite unkno\m to Commodore Byron, 
a French expedition fl'om st Nalo :Led by Antoine Louis de Bougainville 
had actually establiched a settlement on the eastern island in 
January 1764. It was ndmed Port st Louis, and stood at the head of 
vlhat is nm'l Berkeley Sound, where it vIas not visible from the open 
sea. In April 1764, BouGainville also 'took 1,0'3session' in the name 
of Louis Y:V~ before returning to France for more colonists and 
. t 4 equJ.pmen • 
Thus the }!osition at the start of 1765 "las that Britain 
had surveyeC: one of the islands but left no settlement., \-,hile France 
had actually colonized the other main is12.nd. In terms of the La'" 
of Nations as it was then understood, Britain's claim by virtue of 
discovery viaS insuf'fic:i €lnt. So too vias Spain's theoretical claim 
under the Treaty of Utrechi;, since it could not be proven that these 
islands \'lere part of the ,spanish Empire in the time of Charles II of 
Spain. In legal terminology, the islands ''1ere res null~us, and open 
to the first permanC(lt occupant, \'lhich \vQS nOVl France. 5 
Huch confusion anu uncertainty remained as to the precise 
location of the islands in question, and their proximity to south 
3. Goebel, PI). ; RCd21sey, p .. 170. 
~. Martin-All~nic, Bourainville (heroafter cited as Martin-~llanic), 
I, 70-163 ; Goebel, p,.22j-7. S08 also on Bougainville, J. Dunmore, 
French :::':x'Cilorors in the F2.cL·i~ (Oxford, 1 ), I, 58-64. 
5. Goebel, pp. 'j 17, 223. 
l~18 •. 
America. HhenBougainville made his public announcer:lent in Europe 
in August 1761.!- of the discovery and settlement of an island in the 
South Atlantic, it 'ViaS as,::n:med by the British Government to be an 
entirely different group from the :E'alklands, but the n€'n!s stimulated 
the Admiralty to consolidate possession of the Falklands all the same. 
Accordingly, in Aug~st 1765, a small expedition set sail 
under Captain John HcBr::Lde of H.H.S. Jason, which arrived at the 
Falklands in tTanuary 1766. NcBride proceeded to erect 8. blockhouse 
and o'ther buildings at a sui table harbour on the \'I'8stel'U island, 
and he named the settler:1ent Port Egmont after the Fi1'3t Lord of the 
Admiralty. HcBride als(' surveyed the island r:lOre closely, and even 
sailed around the eastern island, but he did J:!?t enter 1,0rkeley 
Seund and Se.'Vl no sign of allY other occupant. 6 
Bougainvillets pub:i.ic announcement had not at first 
elici ted any strengP!' complaint than a fe1rl r,1ild warnings from Spain, 
but by the ;:,.ddule of 1765, l'i'hen it \.,.as plain that thE: French Hinistry 
sapported Bougainville's colonizing enterprise, Spanish protests 
gathered strength and vehemence. In September, Fuentes told Choiseul 
that the Halouine;.} 'Vlere out of bounds to all other nations by virtue 
of the Treaty of Utrecht, and demanded cession or immediate evacuation. 
Choiseul Has reluctant to yield, but rather than cause a rift in the 
Family Compact it 1;las agreed that France would cede the colony to 
Spain as soon as Bousainville had been compe~sated for his investment 
and efforts by the Spanish Crovm. Bougail1ville Vlent to Hadrid 1766 
to negotiate the terms o! compensation, towards the close of Rochford's 
embassy there, and in Nay a settlement ''18,S concluded. 7 
6. Goebel, PP. 9 overlooks this expedition. 
7. ElP 91+/174, fo27, de Vi[c~me to Com·1D.Yi 19' 1766; Hartin-fllianic~ 
I, 161+-294, 306-308, 358-379 ; Ramsey, pp.170-171. 
Bour;ainville's negotiation at Hadrid had fin3.11y made 
the British Gove-:-nment realise that the Halouines and the Falklands 
vlere in fact the same group of islands, and in £.larch 1766 a vlarning 
,.,ras sent by the Aflmiralty to NcBride that there \'laS hi. all probability 
a F'rench settlemont else~1here in the islands. This ne1:lS reached Port 
Egmont in November~ HcBride then mounted yet another survey, in "'hich 
on 4 December 1766 he discovered Port St Louis, v/here he informed the 
startled but 1.m~.mpres[;ed French c<;>lonists that the:l no business 
being on British territory and had better leave as scon as possible! 
l{cBride then set sail :ror England, yet by the time he reached 
Portsmouth, Bougainville had sailed on what 'lllaS to be a voyage of 
circul7tnavigation, the first task of uhich Haf :;he for;,lal cession of 
the Halcuintis to Spain. The act of cassiou took place on 1 April 1767, 
'ltthen Port St Loui.s became Puerto de la Soled[,d, and the island group 
\-Ias renamed the Nal-v'inas. 8 
'flle diplomatic crisis knmvu variously as the first 
Falkland Islands Crisis, or the Hanila-Malouines Crisis of 1766, 
was sparked off by British preparations to send reinforcements to 
the islands after it was publicly kno\'P..l that }rance had agreed to 
cede her settlement there ::0 Spain. The crisis "laS marked by a 
l.<trge degree of French intervention, to soften the tone of Spanish 
protests in an attempt to avoid war. Choiseul's major contribution 
, .. as the proposal to link the question of the Nanila Ranson ,.,i th the 
Falklands dispute, hoping to resolve both problems at once. Roch£'ord's 
role i'laS to receive and support this plan, but it v'laS pot accepted 
by the British Hinistry, and the crisis ended early in 1767 vdthout 
8. Goebel, pp. , 
1+04, 420-1+51, 456-548. 
, pp .. 170-171 Hartin-Allanic, I, 403-
420. 
any of the basic issues being resolved. Britain adhered firmly to 
her claims, and Spain chose not to press her objections to the point 
of an open confrontation, for fear of \'lar. But the confrontation 
became inescapable in 1770 \",hen the Spanish GO"lernor of Buenos Aires, 
acting on general instructions not to tolerate any interlopers on 
the South American coast, forcibly expelled the Briti~h from Port 
Egrr,ont. The second and major Falkland Islands Crisis of 1770-71 
was to be one of the moat i~portant episodeH of Rochford's career as 
Secretary of State, hut t~is fascinating affair lieH beyond the 
scope of this thesis, whose present task is to examine Roc~ford's 
role in the earlier c:!::Lsis of 1766. 9 
In Hay a'ld June 1766, after receivhjg de Visme' s report 
011 t:2e successful conclusion of Bougainvillc' s negotiatiori at !',iadrld. 
the British cabin(~t discussed the question of reinforcing the 
outpost at Port Egmont. It was decided to send a small squadron 
under Captain Wallace of H.M.S. Dolphi~, but the preparation of th~s 
expedition was repeatedly delayed and its destination kept secret, 
largely from nervousness and uncertainty at th~ risk of offending 
both France and Spain at once. HO\'lever, the F:conch ch.::!;;.~ in London, 
Durand, obtained details of the project from an Admiralty clerk for 
a bribe of £ 75, which left little doubt in ~hoiseul's mind as to 
Britain's intentions. He replied to Durand that Britain clearly 
intended by this expedition to assert her mastery of the seas, and 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
::. '.l'he account i'1hic11 £0110\'10 ::'6 of necessity baoed upon the secondary 
sources cited earlier for the :French and Spanish side of the crisis, 
since circu8stances prevented me from exu8ining thes0 archives in 
person. Nevertheless, it may be found that oy account is of SODe 
interest for the British side of the negotiations, ttllich has not 
hitherto been exe.nined in d.etail. The reason for this is that the 
vital correcpondence between Shelburne and Rochford is l~rgely 
missing from SP 78 ; these letters are in the Shelburne Papers at 
the Clements Library, Ann Arbor, hichican, and are here used for 
the first time. nacsGY, p.172, notes this gap in SP 78, and shows 
great uncertainty as a result. It is curious that previous writers 
have overlooked these letters ; they were clearly calendared-in the 
Historico..l l'::muscriJ~cG Cou'~;issio.!~, 3rd Report (1872), p.135. 
her claim to these islands by discovery, regardless of Spanish 
counter-claims under the Treaty of Utrecht. In July 1766, Prince 
Masserano, the Spanish Ambassador at London, expressed his concern 
over the reported British settlement on the !-falouines to both 
Commy and Richmond, \-lho replied vIi th assurances of pEw_~eful 
intentions vlhile defel1ding~ as Choiseul had predicted, Britain's 
right to navigate i-!l1ere she pleased and her claim to the 1:hlklands 
oy right of prio~ discoverYe 10 
Early in August, llasserano requested come I clarification' 
of the Bri tish pres~nce on the islands, though [Le stopped short of 
making any formal demand or protest. Shelburne was evasive, and 
refused to admit tha.t the British outpost ''las in the same group as 
the French colony \-lhich had been agreed to be ceded to Bpaino He 
argued ra ther t}~C\ t Utrecht imposed no limi ta :;icns on Britain's right 
to navigate and maka discoveries in the South Seas. Masserano Was 
outraged at this, a.lld recommended the d3struction of the settlenent 
l' 11 without delay, so as to pres€.nt Britain \'lith a fait accomp_::L. 
Fortunately these violent counsels ';Jere not taken up at 
11adrid, and Choiset:;.l urged J}urand to restrain Hasserano from any 
rash threats. In September, therefore, Durand added voice to 
~iasseranols -\'la.rni'YlGc, and pointed out to Shelburne that Spain's 
claim had been demonstrated by France's readiness to cede her colony, 
but Shelburne r:1erely retorted that Sl)ain had botl8ht the islA.nd, and 
no question of prior right vIas involved in that Jeransaction.12 
10. Goebel, :9:9.240-242 ; Hart;il1-.\11anic, I, 306-334 ; P. Coquelle ~ 
"Le conte de Guerchy, TI Revue des :Etudes Historiques, 74 (1908), p.LI-61. 
11. Archivo General de Sil::1ancas, Ingla terra, lecaj 0 696'),. Hassera'10 to 
Grimaldi, 11 i\ 1, cited in it barea, "Bourbon 'revanche! 
EnGland,!! (unpublished ",11.:0. t:'lcsis, Universit:r of notre Dane,1 
pp.387-8. 'see also Goebel, .2L[4-6, and lIartin-.,\llanic, I, 331-352. 
12 ' "-'1"' P '- r'l +- e L. 71 .r:o 1 • 1"-1-"'''-' , HIlt> e" rre, r ,.!.. •• 
cited in Hartin-;'.llanic I, 
IILe comte de Guc-rchy,ll 
citing .AECPAngleterre, 
1766. 
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Chois0ul summed up the situation in a le~ter of 2 October 
to the Spanish minister, Grimaldi. Already there were siens that 
an impasse was developinG ; Britain seer:1ed deterrJined not to yield 
her claim to a settlement on the Falklands, yet France was bound by 
the Family Compact to support Spain if 'orar threatened, ::'l~d Choiscul 
saw a very real danger of war in the present instance. He therefore 
urged Grimaldi nl..'t to submit any provoca ti va demand.'3 '1hile doubt 
ztill remained aa to the pre~ise location o~ the jslands in question. 
Unless Spain could furniBh proofs that there ~1er~ Spaniards on the 
islands in the time of Charles II, he doubted that the eighth Article 
of Utrecht would apply_ Above all he urged the avoidance of any 
rupture "lith Britain for at least the next ei5l1teen r.'1onths, for 
13 
neither France nor Spain l.Jas yet sufficiently prepared :1:or 'tomr. 
This 'j,imely ",ord of caution made Grinaldi pause before 
sending further instructions to Hasserano, ancl 1.;he nevlly returned 
French Anbassndor to London, Guerchy, p;;rsuaded Hasserano to content 
-
himself in the mean time "'1i th an unofficial verbal protest, "/hich left 
3hel burne quite unmoved • Tension remained high, hO\'leVer, cmd Choiseul 
feared the impatieli,ce of thA Spanish Court, especially \."hen Shelburne 
rejected ane", Spain I s earlier offer to submit the Eanila Ransom issue 
to an independent arbitrator. 14 
The Hanila issue was of course a complete1.y separnte 
matter, and by itself held little risk of a war, but Choiseul saw 
the possibility that Spain could be goaded to a rupture if Britain 
remained obdurate and uncocpera ti vo on the Falklnnds issue as i'Jell as 
Archivo Genernl de Simnncas, Inglaterra, lecajo 6962, Choiseul to 
" . 20' b 1r7"( "."" -z()O -z 0 2 co "e c 0"'0 Gr~mald~, coco er 00, quo:r;ed In ,\.oarca, pp • .:;>oo-.:;>./_; ~)l'u <-
Cssun and Durand in .~ECP Espa~ne547 and ~ECP Angleterre 471 are cited 
by Hartin-.",lhmic, I, 4!:06-7~ -See also Goebel, 2l~8-9. 
Goebel, pp. 252-3 ; i,IartLl-).llanic, I, 448-9, and II, 922-3 ; Jecu~il 
des Instructions donn~6s aux Ambassadeurs et Ninistres de France • • 
XXV-2, Angloterre, i-ii (1698-179'1), edited ;Y-P. Val~Cim- (~>ar)s~'19S5), 
pp.431-2. 
16. 
the Hanila Ransom. Choiseul believed (rightly) that Chatham 
would go to War rather than be seen to yield either point, yet 
he knew that neither France nor Spain was ready for another war. 
It \vas in his mm interes'c, therefore, to adopt thE'; role of 
peacemaker. He first of all sounded former Ambassador Hertford, 
who was then on holiday in Paris, and satisfied himself that 
Britain viaS not so bEmt on war as not to listen to a compromise 
solution. Choiseul then de-vised a plan "'hic:h he proposed privately 
to Hertford at the time cf Rochford's arrival in Paris. 15 
In vie,\! of the misunderstanding which bedevilled the 
British side of this negotiation, it essential to make clear 
what Choiseul unc'e~;:'stood by his first propos,3.1, and uhat Shelburne 
understood of it om Hertford 1 s report. ChoisGul claimed that he 
could bring Spair to pay the Hanila Ranson- next January, if Britain 
accepted thE" French as arbi tra tors, and desis';;'ed from making any 
establishment on the Falkland Islands, agreeable to the eJ.ghth 
article of Utrecht. Somaho'!.'/, Shelburne received the impression 
that the proposal \vas mu'ch simpler, that it d~d :aot involve any 
arbitration, and that Spain \<[ould pay the full ransom if Britain 
left the Falklands, \vi thout any reference to prior right under 
Utrecht or Britain's claim to navigate free:'y in the 16 South Seas. 
Choiseul repeated his proposal to Rochford at their first 
conference at Versailles on 2 Noveober. He boasted of having stopped 
Spain from lodging a strong protest over the FaLklands affair, and 
pointed to the cancellation of the proposed iOll of 1750 as 
0vidence that Britain recognized Spanish clair:1s under Utrecht .. 17 
Chntha:11 Corre~'1.dence, edited by Taylor and Pringle (1838-40), III, 
117-120, Hertford to Comlay, 20 Octo')er 1766 ::artin-Allanic, I, 
337, II, ; Goebel, pp.24g-251. 
See SP 78/272, f.29, Rochford to Shelburne, 13 January 1767, Secret 
and Shelburne Papers, Vol. ,f.97, Shelburne to Rochford, "2 
1767, ~ecret (not in SP). 
17. ;:>hel burne , Vol.23, f. ,Rochford to Shelburne, 5 Nove~bcr 1 
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Choiseul claimed that Britain had then clearly yielded \'lhatever 
right she had to the islands. Rochford had evidently been ",arned 
by Shelburne before leaving London not to become entangled in the 
details of the Falklands issue \"i thout prior instrtu-tions from home, 
so Rochford "waived entirely entering \vith IIim [Choiseul] into a 
Discussion of this Natter,lI and 4lerely observed in pe.ssing that 
to his knowledge that right had never been yielded, and it was 
ridiculous of to pre".;end that BritiSh ships had no right to 
navigate and make discoveries in any part of the ,"orld. Choiseul 
fell silent at this, and after some time murmt<.red, "but not in the 
South Seas. II He ther. immediately turned the conversation to the 
Manila Ransom, ani confessed that he 'IIlas puzzled by Britain f s 
t:;o:r:tinued refusal to submit this affair to arbitration ; 
" •• and thEm to my great Surprize [Rccnford. relates] he flung 
out that the tvlO Affairs of the Isles Halouines and the 
Hanila Ransom might accommodate each other ; and, says he, 
70U \'lho k.110\'1 the Vlrwle 'l'ransaction of the l1anila Rarwom, 
if the Tv!o Courts leave it to you and me to determine, [sic] 
I \'1il1 undertake .to finish it in half em hour. II 
After a moment's silence, Rochford could only say tha~ he would 
18 
refer the proposal to London and a\-Jai t further instl"uf.:tions. 
In the meantime, in London, Guerchy and H,:tsserano had 
continued their attempts to persuade Shelburne that Britain had no 
ousiness setting up a colony on a Spanish possession, and IIasserano 
like Choiseul made use of the cancellation of the 'i750 expedition 
to ShOv1 that Britain recogr.ized Spain t s claims under the 'i'reaty of 
18. Shelburne Papers, Volume 23, f.35, Rocn~ord to Shelburne, 
5 November 1766, :lIo.2 ; llartin-;Ulanic, II, 926, citing /J3CP 
j\neleterre, Lr71 , f .297, C:10iseul to Guarchy, 5 I\1 ovBGber 1766 ; 
Choiseul hs.d earlier rJade the that Brit;ain t s dO\n1 in 
1750 demonstrated her ~ccept2nce of the 8th Article of Utrecht, 
to Hichmond 1 s Secretary, Lennox, in September; SP 78/271, f.8, 
Lennox to Shelburne, 17 1766. 
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Utrecht, but Shelburne denied that any such conclusion could 
be drawn, and maintained that Britain had on the contrary fully 
asserted her right at that time, merely deferring the expedition 
to a more propitious time.· However, his attempt to i::i.lustrate the 
emptiness of the SpanLsh objections by reference to a nap was a 
blunder, for as soon e.S he se.\'1 it, IIassercmo exclaimed that the 
:ii'alklands and Halouinee VJere in fact the sar.l0 islands .. 19· 
The arrive.: of Rochfor¢j.'s 5 Hove::lber dispatch a fevl days 
later confirmed the possibility reported by Eertforci of a solution 
to the impasse \"hich n.m·l prevailed in ·London .. After intensive 
Cabinet consultations in the \'leek that follOt~'ed, the J<:ing directed 
Shelburne to infoI'm Rochford that it ''las agle::d Uto meet the Idea 
of Combining 
• • the '1'\-10 Qbj ec ts of the Hanila Ransom, [mo. the 
Establishment 07 the Faulkland IsJ.es. IT [sic J But this '-""lS a very 
tentative move, hea.ged about tlith cond5.tions and provisos \-thich 
Shelburne tempted to explain in a very long dispat~h 'II/hich he 
wrote himself, at night, !Ito avoid entrustinG it," even to his 
Under-Secretary. 20 
ShelbUrne fastened upon Choiseul1s phrase that he "lOuld 
undertake to finish both itlatters tin half an hour,' and observed that 
Nasserano had recently used almost the same irlords ; on the previous 
Honday, he had told Shelburne that the i-Ianila Ransom \'1Ould be paid 
21 in January, if the Falklands issue could be resolved. But Hasserano's 
Instructions \tent no further than authorizing him to listen to any 
19. liartin-Allo.nic 1 II, 927, ci ABCP Angleterre, 471, f.30 ll-, 
Guerchy to Choiseul, 7 November 1766, and f.310, 7 November 1766. 
20. Shelburne Pa?ers, Volume ,f. ,Shelburne to Rochford, 
17 november 1766, Secret a,."'1d Contidential (not in S?). 
21. '1'11i8 part of the dispatch is quoted in the brief account by Lord 
Edmo:::1d Fi t~:;]aurice, in his Life of.)lilliarl Earl of .;helburne 
(London,1G75-6),II, 12, for which he had access to the Lansdowne 
Papers, of which Shelburne's then forned a 
before be purcha3ed by the Aoerican collector, William L. Clements. 
Goebel, p. ,alono not es this clue to t~e missing letters. 
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British proposals, and Shelburne did not think it proper to say 
hO\'/ far he \'JOul'l be open to receive e,ny proposal from Spain, so 
nothing came of the exchan0e. But nov!, from Choiseul f s remarkable 
statement to Roc~ford, it seemed that sone sort of accommodation 
might be possible without ~ecourse to arbitration or mediation, 
both of \'1hich methods l'lere Ln,compatible with the King's diGnity. 
Rochford was therefore to encourage Choiseul to use his 
influence with the Ministers, to bring them to meet 
Britain's just claires. In so doing, Rochford wa2 to ~e very careful 
not to say "anythinG "..;hat can contribute to confirm a that 
we can never approve, or suffer the French to take Possession of 
the Negotiation under the Pretence of Hediat , or under any other 
Name. II He '>las also to be en the alert for !lany Instances of France 
in behalf of Spain, if they can be interpreted to conta~.r,. the least 
Degree of :Henace,,!l 
I~ short, Shelburne stressed that Britain uVheld her 
:>riginal claim to lithe Islands of Faulkland, improperly & affectedly 
called of late, by the French, the Isles Halouines," (!) and that 
Rochford must remind Choiseul that Britain '\IJould never yield her 
undoubted right to navigp. freely in the South Seas, lithe 
Romantick & absurd Notions to the Contrary nohrithstanding." 
for the eightk article of Utrecht 6n which these 'Notions' 
\-;ere based, Shelbur:le argued that this turned on the CODY:1erCe 
bot\'Jeen places actually oc(;upied and possessed at the tine, and 
covered by the .\rncrican Tree. of 1670, and moreover to 
individuals wishing to trad~ with Spanish territories ; '.J. 1." 'VIas 
never held to prohibit other nations from 
22 
southern oceans. 
ing in the 
22. Shelburne , Volune 23, .45, Shelburne to Rochford, . 
17 Iiovcuber ,,'3ecret al'ld Confidential. ( in:;helbur:::1e 10 mm 
hand, written at night, from Eill Street). 
23-
1:,27. 
These instructions, here summarized as clearly as 
possible, were anything but clear in the orieinaL 3helburne had 
written a very long, discursive, and poorly arranged dispatch, 
some points occurring almost at random, as if recorded in Hhatever 
order they came to mind. It was in fact not at all characteristic 
of Shelburne's usual style; some allowance should ba ma1e perhaps 
for the lateness of the hour and the lack of time for revision 
before sending off the courier. But \>lhatever the cause, there t..rere 
several points left unres.olved, \.,hich led to a serious misunderstandin, 
between Rochford and Shelburne. It may be noted here that while 
rejecting firmly any sort of mediation or arbitra~ion, no other 
Dleans 'Vlere suggested for meeting "the Idea of cOf::lbining • • the 
TVIO Objects., Il other than encouraging Choiseul to perGUcH~e Spain 
to accept Britain's position. Host important of all, Sllelburne 
nOl,There mentioned the amount to be de~;1anded for the Hanila Ransom. 
This was to prove a crucial omission, for despite the fact that 
Britain's last offer to Spain had been for-a· much-reduced amount, 
Shelburne was thinking in terms of the totality of th~ original 
demand. 
Faced witll these instructions, Rochford must have realiz,ed 
that it was up to him to devise a tIore specific prop0sal which 
would resolve the tvlO issues without recourse to French Gedia.tion. 
When he spoke next to Choiseul, on the morning of November, 
Rochford was relieved to hear the minister dC01&re that he had 
"no sort or Inclination to be the Nadia tor in this lI.ffair, H for 
For the later phase of the Manila Ransom issue, aft~r Rochford 
left ?·Iadrid, see above Chapter 10, pp.307-309 ; Sl}ain had rejected 
Britain's reduced demand, and insisted on arbitration by some 
d teresteo. , the King of l~russia, but Eritain had 
in turn rejected this proposal, leaving the matter at an impasse. 
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this \'/Quld expose him to the risk of bringing lithe ';1hole Spanish 
Hinistry on his backll if anything \'/ent \'lrong. His only ,vish "las to 
see the present dispute bet\'1een Britain and Spain finished, 
"and expeditiously.!! 
This led Rochford to speak of his mm thoughts upon vlaYS 
and means to resolve. the two main points at issue, along the lines 
already suggested by Choiseul. He \!las careful to avoid making any 
direct proposal, but nerely outlined a scneme that might. be suitable 
for Choiseul to reco:nmenCi to Spain. '1:'his vIas simply tha t Britain and 
Spain, without entering into any discussion 01 rights or claims, 
should both agree to desist for the present from making any 
settlement on th~ ?alkland Islands. 1bis coul~ be done privately, 
by an exchange of letters behleen the hlO respective Secre as of 
24 State. In return, Spain would agree tc an immediate settlement 
of the Hanil.a Ransom to Britain's satisfaction. 
Rochford hoped he had expressed himself in a manner, 
"though excessively civil, as firm as I believe Your Lordship "lOuld 
desire, and \·1ithout committing the King or hi':> Servants or myself 
in any shape vlhatsoever. II Rochford thought Choiseul "approved much 
of the language I held,'1 since he remarked upon Rochfordts "fair 
method of proceeding." 
Thinking in terms of the last exchanges between Britain 
and Spain over the Hanila Ransor;1, Rochford naturally assumed that 
someone, somewhere, would still have to adjust the actual amount 
of the Ransom to be pait?-- Choiseul warned Rochford tha.t if this 
further negotiation were to be held in London, l:asserano would 
24. It nay be noted in pass that here is an interest antic on 
of the llsecret pro;nise ll solution ,,/hich finally resolved the more 
serious crisis of 1770 ; on which sec Goebel, 31 363. 
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make no move vJithout referring to Hadrid for fresh tructions 
on every little point, thus causing great delays, and in that case 
he had doubts, !'from the temper and Dilatoriness of the Court of 
Spain, of this Affair's coming to a speedy ConcluBion. 1I 
Instead, Choiseul had a better suggestion ; 11he thinks 
that as all the Hanila affair passed through my [Rochi'ord I s J hands 
at !'ladrid, it may, with propriety, be a na t',lral pretence for my 
treating the affair he:X:'B with Count Fuentes." Choiseul assured 
Rochford in utmost conti~ance that though he would not himself 
interfere or mediate in any t'lay, if any serious difficulty arose, 
he ,"ould use his influence ',lith the Spanish Court to bring Fuentes 
to a !lreasonable c0mpliance. 1I Choiseul then repeated that he much 
preferred Rochford's suggested solution to any schene involving 
his 0\V'!1 direct mE,diation. 
RC'chford \vas suitably modest in reltl.ting this suggestion 
,that he should negotiate the amount of the Ransom at Paris ; 
It I hope your Lordehip 1Jlill not believe I· vlant to have the honor 
of transacting this Affair ( I am too sensibl0 hall arduous the Task 
will be, to covet it ) yet I must not conceal from y~'r Lordship 
the Due de Choiseul's Notions about .11 This sho\'l of' reluctance 
could not, h01vever, obscure the obvious fac+. that Rochford I S Hadrid 
experience made him the ideal choice for such a negotiation. 25 
That Rochford \'las pleased \1i th his morning I s "lork is 
evident from a letter he wrote to Chatham three days later, in 
,.',hich he claims that he found Choiseul: 
25. Shelburne Papers, Vol.23, f.63, Rochford to 3helburne, 26 November 
1766, Secret and Confidential (not in SP) ; written in Rochford's 
ovm hcl.lld. 
" •• so sincerely terrified (if I 
at the Court of Spain's some 
use the expression) 
abm~rd step, that 
4.30. 
I am confident there is no reasonable proposal he ~lOuld 
not come into, for accommodating the 
the' affair of the islands of Falkland. II 
Rochford later went on to add ; 
ransom and 
IIYour Lordship \>J'i11 have seen \'lhat I \1r'ote by the last 
messenger to Lord Shelburne ; and I did :'lct 
his I,ordship, \-lhat I answer for to bring about ivill be 
entirely agreeable to the views of our g0vernment ; and 
your Lordship may be assured, that the Duc de Choiseul 
does not mean to have it appear in any shape, that the 
French Court inter:eres in our disputes 1Ilith Spain 
any delicacy \'le may have upon that point I am persuaded 
I can set here in a minute's conversation with 
the Duc de Choiseul.1l 26 
But in fact, Rochford's init and enthusiasm had 
already carried hi.J further than Shelburne ha~ intended. It was 
doubly unfortunate that Shelburne shou:'d have given tJarning of 
this in a brief note that was, if anything, yet more cryptic than 
his earlier instruzt 
Shelburne merel~ observed that there had been a 
malentendu recently betvleen Guarchy and Hertford, ivhiGh caused 
Guerchy to refus~ to di::wuss the Falklands issue for a time. He 
had broken his silence by visi Chatham, and reaGing part of 
a dispatch fron Choiseul, 1IIhich Chatham told him tlretained so little 
of what had been at thro\m out, that the Idea vtas not only 
11 
changed by it, E~~i~s~a~!u~'~e~J~.l~.~~·~_s~._'.~_/a_n_o_u _ i_t. ,shelburne did not pause 
26. Chatham Corresnondence, edited by 
III, '131-13[r~-I:OchfOrd to Chatha~,1, 
and ?ringle (1838-40) 1 
November 1766, Private. 
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to elucidate this expression, and only added that the King's 
senti~ents remained the same ; he would adhere to his established 
principles, not yielding any just claim. Any sort of arbitration 
, 27 
was absolutely out of the question. 
On 3 December at Versailles, Rochford heard from 
Ctoiseul of Guerchy's malentendu with Hertford, but was surprised 
to notice that Choiseul seemed very pleasec ("in raptures ll ) \.,i th 
the ace oun t Guerchy h& d given of his talks wi th Cha thar~) and even 
"'expressed hO\." happy hI} 'Was to find His Lordship f.s pacifick 
Sentiments tally so exactly ",lith his own. II As for the Nanila-
Falklands affair, Chciseul had already ,."ri tten to Grimaldi, urging 
tha t II there ,'las T'.C other way of finishing an Affair ",hich, if left 
-:.mfinished, must be attended 'vii tIl sinister consequer:ces, than by 
following the Method I had the honor to ac~uaint Your Lordship 
with in my last dispatch." Choiseul had also mentioned Rochford1s 
suggested 'Eethod' to fuentes, the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, 
from \.;hom he gathered that Charles III might prefer to let the 
Hansom be settled as ifbet'vJeen the tOvln of Hanila and its English 
conquerors, represented by General Draper, th",n in hi.? O\'In name. 
But altogether Choiseul's consistent and helpful tene encouraged 
Rochford to be quite hopeful ; 
"I must confess my Lord I think upon the ,.,hole things 
seem to wear a very smooth aspect, & if no unlucky 
contr2.!.~ happens the points \'Thich \'Jere most likely 
to disturb the Tranquility of Europe 'vIi 11 soon be 
accommodated. I believe I need not say how happy I shall 
be if any part of my conduct here can in th~ least degree 
28 
contribute to it." 
27. Shelburne Papers, Vol.23, f.71, Shelburne to Rochford, 
29 November 1766, ?rivate ~ Most Secret (not in SP). 
28. Shelburne Papers, Vol.23, f.75, n6chford to Shelburne, 
4 Decer:lber 1766, l'rivate and Secret (not in SP). 
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Rochford's mood of confident optimism uas rudely 
shattered by Shdlburne's next dispatch: 
1' •• the Difference between the Duc de Choiseul's first 
pro'posal to Lord Hertford, and that aftervlard.:; communicated 
here, and since urged to you, does not seem to have struck 
Your Excellency, so much as it has done the King's Servants 
here. II 
At last Shelburne explained Vlhat he had understood by Hertford's 
report of Choiseul's first propoqal, naDely, thai; 
regarded the Falklnr:.ds affair could be accommocated, the Nanila 
Ransom \-lould be paid in January next, wi thou t men tien of any 
further diffioulties or necessity for negotiation. It was this 
prospect of a speedy settlement of a just clq::<.'.':.1, and .this alone, 
\'lhich induced the King to listen to the proposal. HO':lever, 
"any Change as to the Sum proposed to be paid, or the 
Hode of P<,yment, necessarily altered the very G:,.'ound 
of the Proposal, in '''hat regarded His Haj • It \vas 
upon thif Account Count dc; Guerchy [sic] \>1M; told, 
that the Idea \'1as not only changed, !!lais qufelle 
s' evanouiL As .i t now stands, little further seems 
29 
to be e:;::?ected I till the Arrival of Letters from Hadrid. II 
Uhat had gone itl!'ong? Ho\-! did the misunderstanding 
occur? It WQuld seem that Hertford had reported a simplified 
version of Choiseul's original proposal, \'ihich from simplicity 
any 
and absence of/hint of arbitration or further negotiation, had 
appealed to the British Cabinet. Rochford's first report of 
Choiseul 1 s proposal 1IW.S 8.1130 brief and siraplified, tho'J.gh it did 
contain a clear hint of Fre~ch mediation. Guerchy, on the other 
CO~)y in 
stands in S? 78 
, Shelburne to Rochford, 12 December 1766, Secret 
, Vol.23, f. • ~his single letter as it 
o~?rehensible without the previous secret 
correspondence now in the Shelburne Papers. 
30. 
hand, understood Choiseul's proposal in its full and correct 
sense, as embodying French arbitration on the amount of the Ransom, 
and it was presumably this difference \1hich, \'1hen it became apparent, 
caused the malentendu bebreen Guerchy and Hertford" Not surprisingly, 
vJhen Guerchy spoke of r;'rench arbitration, Chatham rejected the idea 
as so changing the original proposal that Britaiu could no longer 
t 't 30 aecep 1.. 
Yet Shelburne in his rebuke of 12 December claarly 
applies Chathat:1! s e:::clatr:&tion to "any Change as to the Sum 
proposed to be paid, or the Hode of Payment. II This must l.~efer 
to Rochford's D'\m sUGgestion regarding the adjustment of the ransom, 
made at seve.('al days aiter Guerchy's intervie\1 ,'lith Chatham. 
It canno'.:; to the idea of French medi~tion, which had been 
rejected by Chattam, and indeed by Ro~hforJ himself on November, 
and was promptly abandoned by Choiseu1 as a rusul t. HO"1 had 
Shelburne confused these two quite distinct ideas ? 
Roch~:ord himself had understood Chatham's phr3.se to 
refer to the idea of French arbitration, as hp hastened to explain 
in a letter of 18 December. He had gathered t~is from Choiseul's 
account of Guerchy 1 s interview \'Ii th Chatham. The real source of 
confusion "Jas Shelburne I s failure to state l,is assnrr:ption that the 
Ransom would be in full. This becomes apparent from Rochford's 
explanation of his own assumption that it would be a sum nearer 
the reduced amount last offered by de at '·iadrid ; 
l1artin-Allanic, II, ; Coquelle, "Le comte de Guerchy, f! 
Revue des Etude.s Historioues, 74 ('1908), 466 , citing _2,EC? ,\ngleterre, 
471, fos.352 ani 376, Guerchy to Choiseul, 21 Novenber 1766, and 
Choiseul to Guerchy, Eove~ber 1766 ; 
donnees au:;.: _~I.{:1;)n8S0.cJ.C11ra. e·~ ~'·~inistres de ll'rrtnce •• ~:{~{V-2, iingle-cerre, 
iii (1693-1'70-1-), euited by P .. Vaucner (Paris,1965) , pp.424, L!-32. 
31 .• 
II I could never guess vlhether it been fixed if the 
\·[hole DetJaJ:1 5. of the Hanila Ransom \<fas expected to be 
paid, or only \vha t I-1r de Visme had offered to accept 
in full for it by Ox'ders frOfJ our Court ; but as that 
afr'er '\lIas not at the time acc , It was nahural to 
me, who vas, a."1d am still in the Dark ,,,i th regard to 
the Totality of t~e Sum expected by Us, to conclude 
that after it \';us settled that the Ransom should be 
paid if the A ir of the Islands could be accommodated, 
that it must be adjusted somevJhere or other 1r1~at the 
':Cantum ,-las to b~. This 1I1as what led me in to s'J.y that 
the final ion of it could be settled here If . . 
Shelburne at last saw the reason for Rcchf0rd t s 
suggestion of a nee;otiation on the RanIS om , and. ','frote 
a long-t'linC!ed apology on 2 Ja!1U&,ry 1767 ; 111 am ve:::y sorry I 
did not con~ey my • • sO clearly as to render it 
impossible to f.15 stake its purport." In his resur:H~ of the 
31 
-correspondence on his side, Shelburne admits to some uncertairity 
in framing his In~ tructions of 17 !Jovember, because (:;f the sli3ht 
discrepancy between Hertford's report of Choiseul's t proposal, 
which was very simple, and Rochford's report of 5 November, with 
its suggestion of };'reJlc:1 mediation. In \-lOrding his Instructions, 
Shelburne was trying to ~void the two pitfalls of yielding too 
much on either point mel',,:ly for the sake of gainL:.g the other, 
allm'ling even a s~lad.0\>l of French interference in the settler_:ent. 
In view of Choiseul's promise that the Ransom would be next 
January, Shelburne co.thered that there I-las no intention of a 
gradual liquidation, and assumed from this that the original 
"Jould therefore be paid in full. 
1766, 
Vo1.2j, f.87, 
Private and Secret (not in B?). 
there could be no further 
to Shelburne, 18 December 
negotiation regarding the Ransom ; Shelburne eX::gected speedy 
payment of the amount, in return for Britain's desisting 
from an establishment in the Falklands, without even the shadov: 
of a negotiation, with the claims of the respective Crowns passed 
over in silence. He later added that Masserano himself had 
all along maintained that as the King of Spain's dignity was 
involved, Charles III would think himself obliged to pay the 
';!hole a.mount 01" notrdng. As late as this, 23 Janw'"ry, Shelburne 
could still not believe that Choiseul'sfirst held any 
idea of arbitration~ 
Shelburne had now tlbut very few vlords i.n Cominand from 
His Haj esty." Essentially, he had listened tt.: the French proposal 
in good faith, and would nei allow the substanc6 of the first 
proposal to be negot ad away. If S;ain raises fresh 
difficulties, B:-itEtin will retain the station in question on the 
Falklands, and continue to on payment of the Ranson, 
'mtil such time as Spain is more disposed :Ito do justice, where it 
is so unquestionably due.'1 Shelburne cO::1.cluded on a lofty note 
"In the meantime it may be easily judged '(,hether the Conduct of 
His Hajesty tends most tc' :preserve the Publick Tranquility, or 
that oi' Frtlnce and Spain." 32 
Now that the misnnderstanding had been clarified, and 
Rochford fully unde~:,stood that as the !1Totali ty of the Hanila 
Ransom \>Jas expected, II there 1rlould be no need for his proposed 
adjustment at , he returned to the task of encouraging Choiseul 
32. Shelburne , Vol.23, £.97, Shelburne to Rochford, 2 January 
1767, Secret (not in SF) ; part of this letter is printed in 
Fitzmaurice's (1876), II, 13-;4. 
33. SF 78/272, • ,Shelburne to ~ochford, 
copy in Shelburne Papers, Vol.23, f.117. 
1767, Most Secret 
to use his influence to help bring the Spanish to a settlement 
on the simple lines adopted by the British Government. In an 
interview on the morning of 13 January, Rochford was d.etermined 
lito push the Duke of Cho::seul as far as 'vas decent, to knoV! \vhat 
We had to expect or depend upon with Regard to the speedy Conclusion 
of the TvlO Affairs. fI 
But after some preliminary discussion, ChoiseuJ. confessed 
that he still ec'iifaited an an~\'!er from Spain. He hr'.d ltlritte:1. to 
Ossun, the French Ar.1bassador at Madrid, ordering him to press 
the Spanish Court to listen to the terms now ~ropo3ed by Britain, 
since Grimaldi f(.ared broaching such a topic befo:ce the King of 
Jpain, and Ossun had quite recently outlined the proposalB in an 
audience with Charles III. But until ::.!.ll the Cotmcill01's ,'lere 
gathered togetr~r, he reported (Alva being abGen~), there could be 
no decision taken and no anS1.'ler made to Choisenl. 34 
Rochfo~d was concerned at tho long delay in the negotiation 
while he and Shelburne were sorting out their differences, and he 
had warned Shelburne in ~id-December, as he warned hilli again now 
in January, that i:f:" either the :French or the f1panish beGan to doubt 
"lhether Britain attached. as much importance as she professed to 
her Falklands est~bJ.ishment, then there "lOuld be Ii t:::1e hope of 
any settlement combininG this affair with the Manila Ransom. Rochford 
therefore urged Shelburne to remember lIthe Necessity there is of 
keeping H. de Guerchy in Alarm about Our mak:L:J.g an Est3.b1ishment in 
the Isles ofI'alkland, untill the T\'10 Affairs are finally 
adjusted. II The only thine; to prevent a sett1e[lcnt \'laS "their being 
35 
firmly persuaded that Ve are not serious as to that.Establishment. I ' 
34. SP 78/272, f.29, Rochford to ,shelburne, 13 January 1767, Gecret 
copy in Shelburne Papers, Vol. ,f.109. 
35. ibid.; for the similar earlier 
Vol. ,f.87, Rochford to 
Secret. 
see Shelburne Pa~ers, 
December 1766, L v~te and 
Despite Chatham's insistence that Britain would 
never give up Port Egr.lOn t, the Spanish Hinisters had already 
guessed that Britain was not prepared to go to war on this issue 
alone, nor' even over the Manila Ransom, and thereforp decided to 
call Britain's bluff. Ossun's report of 12 January reached Choiseul 
on 25 January, him that the Spanish Court insisted on 
arbitration for the , and \vould listen to the project 
to link this ~ith the affair only if th~eatened with 
immediate hostilities. Charles III had not, after all, taken kindly 
to this II Grimaldi acc0rdingly was 
to instruct Hasser'ano t;o rene"lll his verbal complaints against the 
British presence on the Falklands, and to de",;r;nd the eVacuation of 
Par"!:; Egmont. Furthermore, politely infcrmed Choiseul 
that his assist2nce was not needed in an affair which now concerhed 
Bri tain and Spaj.n c.lone, and requested that he resume sole charge 
f th t · t' ~6 o' e nego" la lons. ~ 
Choiseul concealed this turn of events from Rochford 
until early in February,. assisted by the accident that Rochford 
had "a violent C,,11 and Sore ':J:hroatU \vhich kept him confined to 
bed for some time at the close of January_ Choiseul made his first 
mention of the anSVler from Spain to Rochford t s Secretary of Embassy, 
Parten, and even so merely observed that wished to treat the 
Hanila affair direct \'li th Britain, rather than \'lith French assistance. 
Rochford finally heard the full details from Choiseul on 18 F'ebruary, 
v/hen ChoisG111 !lflung out rather in a peevish Hanner against the 
Court of Spa. in ,II that they Reemed at Hadrid "as little "\.;illingl! as 
to let France assist in resolving the disputes. 
36. i';artin-Allanic, II, 929-930, citing ~,EC? ,,4.., Cssun 
, 12 January 1767, and ibid., £.119, Choiseul to ?Ossun, 
1767 ; Coquelle, ~;Le cornto de 
, 74 (1 ~;), L~67-D, citing .,:2CP 
.. i to 1;8.::~Gerano, 20 January 1767, and 
- 2 -'-, '\ .. nl-"j1 to Guerc!lY, _ l.'E.'OT"Uary 'i(O(. 
Rochford l.-laS not really much surprised at Spain I s viGorously 
independent att:itude. He had mentioned to Shelburne on 28 Ja.l1uary 
that he kne\v Choiseul \vaG not satisfied by Grimaldi I s private 
correspondence "lith him, and furthermore had heard tl
'
at the 
Spanish Court greatly rese~ted Choiseul's suggestion that they 
should pay the 1'1anila Ransom simply to get the British out of the 
Falklands and thereby avoid war .. Nor \vas Rochford at all surprised 
by Grimaldi f S D.ttituce in ,vishinG to take sole chp.TGe of the 
negotiations ; !las I perfectly knOirf the Fund of Vcmj cy he is 
of. " 37 possessed 
Choiseul had remarked at the start of the negotiation 
that France \\las bound under tht:. Family Compac-: to assis;; Spain in 
the event of unprovoked hosti1 i ties against her < But it '.Jas quite 
a different casa Spain was bent on forci~g the issues between 
herself and Bri tair. to the point of \var. On 5 Harch, OSBun reported 
that Spain \vould not take any violent action such af:> ou.stinG the 
British from the Falklands unless she could be assured of French 
support in any result war. Choiseul1s response to this had 
already been mad-:: plain by Guerchy to Nasserano in London ; that 
France \'lould not be reads to support Spain in another "Jar until 
the end of 1769 at the earliest. This caused consternation in 
r'1adrid, with the result t:]at Hasserano did not after all pursue 
the Falklands affai~ yJi th any vigour 91" firmness. 
But \\lhat of the j,Ianila Hansom? Rochford! s own opinion 
I 
''las that this should b~l)reSSed even more vieorously than before : 
37. SP 78/272, fos.59, 77, 91,,101, Rochford to Shelburne, 28 January, 
i+ February, 12 February, 18 February ; all r'mrked Secret. 
38. Goebel, .25 1, c inter alia AEC? 
Choiseul, 5 March 1767. ey, pp,1 
473, f.106, Choiseul to Guerchy, 21767, 
copy of Grimaldi to ~Iasserano, 20 I-hnuary 1767. 
, 5~,8, Ossun to 
J\ECP , e1"1'e, 
and :".77 f or a 
II 
• Hy Zeal for the ,success of this Business makes me 
venture to xepeat 'l'lhat I before said. • our 
insisting on its [the r·lanila Ransom J being paid and 
menacing [?withJ an Establishment in the Isles of 
Falkland ~.;ould infallibly have its 1:Ieight ; an.a I must 
at the Same time observe that I have still no Reason 
to change lay Opinio21 'vd.th Regard to the Duke of Choiseul 1 s 
Sentiments of this Affair, for I will take it upon me 
to assure Your Lordship that whenever He is called upon 
ei the!' by Us 0r Spain, He v/ill do his utmcst Endeavours 
to bring it to .9. Conclusion, for He is cert,ainly greatly 
apprehensive that by the Manner of ac of~he Court 
of Spain this Affair may meet with some Rubbo that may 
finally endangf;.r the Peace of Europe. 1I 39 
But nothing was done. Britain did dot press the 
Hanila Ransom delnano. any further than stating once again her 
undoubted right to a just claim. ~~e potential crisis passed, 
'Iod thout resel VilLg any of the points at issue, and b,deed \-1i thout 
making any discerr.i ble progl~ess frr)m the impasse fron', ,\;lhich the 
tension of November had developed. Both sides chose not to press 
their respective claims, and the situation simply cooled off, 
40 only to erupt anew in 1770. 
Why did Britain fail to press the Hanila Ransom at 
this time? It was to prove in fact her last opportunity to have 
any chance of bringing to pay the Ransom, and having lost it, 
the Ransom was never • 'The explanation lay vIi thin the British 
Hinistry, \'Illere Chatham had virtually abdicated his role as leader 
of the Cabinet after being rebuked in Parliament in December, and 
39"SP 78/c272 , f .101, Rochi'ortl to Shelburne, 18 ::'.:'ebruary 1767, Secret. 
40- ; Ramsey, D?181-2. ee also Recueil de3 
is, 
440. 
had his gout down to Bath, leaving the Hinistry in 
confusion and d~sarray. TIochford heard of this sorry state of 
affairs from friend Albemarle at the end of January. Albenarle 
summed up the si-:;uation in these tarDs ; 
liRe [Chat;ham] g()Ver1J8 absolutely, never deigns even 
to consult any of the Hinisters, is nO\</ at Bath, & 
all business is at a stop • • how long this sort of 
Government \'I1i11 last, God knollS • • I think it cannot 
last long ; t'issatisfied .people look shy at cne 
another, nee 
Lt.., later." .. 
,vill make them unite soon.al' or 
Chatham's Admintstration had already ShOi:ln signs or splitting 
apart with the r 01' the remainder of ~1.ocking1t~n '.s 
friends in November 1766, after the failure cf Chatham's attemut 
to bring in Bedford'~ fol10wers. Little wonder that Shelburne's 
dispa tches i-r.. if J"ember had less than his usual clarity ; he ' .. laS 
-o.istracted by the tensions uithin the Hinistry and preoccupied 
;,rith formulating f.. policy for America (before 1768 the Southern 
Secretary was also responsi for the Colonies). In the course 
of 1767, he was ~o become increasingly alienated from his fellow 
ministers. This was to affect Rochford again in 1768, in the crisis 
over Corsica. 42 
Rochford 1 s rolu in the abortive attenpt to combine the 
tvlO issues of the Nanila. Ransom and the Falkland at the 
end of 1766 has bee~ examined in perhaps excessive de 
previous \1riters have done less than justice to him, not 
4t. Pitt Papers, Villia8 L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, 
Albemarle to Rochford, Arlington street, Lo:a,doll, 23 
because 
42. Il'or these develo'-'r.lents, Gec Brooke ~ C'hO_thc.l'1 ).clJinistr:J_ttor-:., 
1 9,~-110, a:n.6. J. IIorri~3, SI1ellYl1.ri.1
4
e :.1.::'10 ~~eforr~ (r.ondon,1 ), 
-54. 
made use of the vital private correspondence bebJeen Roch£'ord 
and Shelburne. It is not strictly fair to say simply that Rochford 
misunderstood his Instructions ; the misunderstanding was on both 
sides, and 'vas more complex, invo1 vine deeper differences than a 
simple nistake. Shelbu!'nc' s Instructions of 17 November "Jere far 
from clear, and his basic assunptions '-lere not stated, l'Jhich 
resulted in Rochford's proceeding on a different assumption. Yet 
it is arguable that ~ochfordts suggested method for a solution 
was more closely in tune with the realities of the cituation, 
and had a better ~han~e of succeeding than the narrower, simpler 
proposal understood by the British Cabinet. Rocr_}:ord clearly 
thought it better to resolve the Fallclands cidpute by getting 
least some of the Ransom, r~ther than leave both issues at a 
dangerous impasoe, vlhich might flare into crisis yet • Events 
were to prove him cor~ect in this. Yet there was never any real 
likelihood that "IOuld agree to the siwpler solution, 1i!hich 
seerned to them to involve paying the whole Ra.nsom merely to get 
the British off the Falklands, \'lhen Britain had previously lowered 
her original demand to a much smeller sun. It "'as not surprising 
that Spab. should adhere to her request for independent arbitration. 
Rochford's expectation of a :urther negotiation to adjust the 
amoun t of the R£tnsom may "Iell have resulted in further delays, 
despi te Choiseul's 't)!'omise to help expedite any such telles, but 
it would at least have co~~itted Spain to pay some of the RansornT 
and above all \'lould have resolved for the time being the dispute 
over the Fall~lands. liuch "!':;luld have depended, ho\·]ever, on Choiseul ' s 
influence over Spanish counsels, ,·rhich 'VIaS here sho',-m to be rather 
less than he hi8self assu2ed. 
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routine "lork largely a result of general instructions; 
Rochford's close observation of Choisoul ; on good 
t~rms at first ; cleverness offset by vanity and 
illdiscretion ; Choiseul's power; his fear of 
prematuh'c vlA.r ; weakness of French finances. 
French policy in S\',reden ; Rochford's correspondence 
\1i th Goodricke ; sends i'larning of French expenditure 
there ; observation of French interest in Polish 
affairs ; relations beh!een Versailles and Vienna ; 
brief war-scare of February 1767. 
Shelbur~e's reluciance to advise Rochford on Northern 
EuropH ; trusts in his discretio:l ; 1; ~"'jcastle I s 
fulsome praise of Rochford's experienne and ability 
Rochfo~d's final estimation of Choiseal. 
report;.;:: .on French armed forces ; army in poor shape 
11C'chford's close attention to French Na'.:-y ; his spy 
tours dockyards at will ; investigation and report 
on French trade j Rochford's ~2commendation for a 
British Consul-General at Paris ; even names suitable 
candidate ; but not taken up_ 
applications on behalf of Brj tish r.lerchants residing 
':.1 France ; Choiseul :lenies validity of Commercial 
Tr(:)(;;Ity of Utrecht ; Rocbford strongly urges a nevi 
treaty ; case based on study of existing duties 
between France a,nd England ; but Shelburne coutent 
to establish validi~y of Utrecht Trea~y ; Rochford 
submits copy of 1714 Declaration ; Choiseul grudgingly 
concedes validity ; a major step_ 
seen in cases arising from new regulations 
f,)I' Capitation Tax ; Rochford f s close itlatch over 
Beliar~i at Paris, 1767 j interest in his 
gaining limit for visitation in Spanish ports. 
cases involving the Vlest ; the ship Jove 
the \lheel of Fortune; incident at st Domingue; 
Rochford ,i'-:;futes l~ur1oured c of Hispaniola. 
fresh French c ts over Turks Island ; Choiseul 
refuses to b01ieve Rochford1s assurances ; finally 
calmed, April 1768. 
individuals in 
the lad Cookson ; 
Rochford reports on Paris 
of Wilkes's libel; vis 
Benson the counterfeiter 
of the ship Livel~ ; 
; 1.1arnS Chatham 
Hme du Deffand's viei'! of the Rochfords their social 
life ; Rochford's view of the corps; 
application for leave ; financial ; hopes 
for cabinet post widely runoured ; but Conway s 
on ; Rochford's leave; inst • 
CHAPTER 15 
Ambassadorial Routine 
and Hinisterial Ambitions, 1262,. 
The greater part of Rochford's routine business at Paris 
o!:'iginated from his Instructions, '''hich have already b,een summarized 
above. 1 These included both specific and general directives, 
requiring either repre2entations to the Frqnch Ministers or the 
steady accumulation and reportage of information. N:my individual 
cases naturally stemmed f~om the Ambassador's traditional duty of 
assistance to Britisl' subjects abroad, vlhil€: others arose in 
consequence of Fr~~ch complaints. Nor was Rochford content merely 
to fulfil the letter of his Instructions ; as at Turin &p,1 Had.l'id, 
lJ.is zeal and initiative gave :::-ise to a nuwp-er of constructive and 
useful proposals. ~nis chapter intended to convey the range and 
diversity of Rochford's work at Paris, and to give some impressi0;u 
of the social and diplomatic circles in which he moved. His hopes 
for a Cabinet post at home just prior to his first short leave in 
August 1767 forra an important episode in Rochford's career 
which to end the chapter. 
Rochford's paramount duty as British tl.mbassador 'Ylas to 
assess France's sincerity towards the peace and her capacity to 
resume host in the near future. In practice, this meant close 
observation of her financial resources and her qrmed forces, but 
above all, a constant watch over the pol ies and activities of the 
French King's all-powerful minister, the Due de Choiseul. 
1. See Chapter 13, pp.372-375. 
443. 
The talks on the Hanila Ransom and Falkland Islands 
gave Rochford several opportunities of for~ing his first impressions 
of Choiseul as a minister, and cause to reflect upon J?rench policies 
to"lards the rest of Europe in addition to 81,ain and Britain. 
Judging by his reception ~l.t Versailles, and ChoisetlJ's attitude 
in their various conversations, Rochford cautiously decided that 
2 he had started out tlupon very good terms Hith the Duc de Choiseul," 
and he hoped that nothing would arise from the Manila-Falklands 
affair to change this happy start ; "I should be sorry on many 
t t 1 t " D d Cl' I' C f" !1 3 accoun S 0 ose ne uce lo~seu s on lnence. 
first considered impression he expressed in these terms 
liThe Due de (~hoiseul has no Objection to talking, 
and though very able anG clever, Indiscretions 
sometimes fall from him.1I 4 
Rochford's 
He had gathered this impression at their very first interview on 
2 November, and 8een it confirmed in subsequent conversations. 
At that first interview, when Choiseul boastea of having restrained 
the Spanish from lodging a strong complaint about the Fulkland 
Islands, Rochford remarked, "by way of Paren~hesis •• that he is 
Volatile enough to be easily led away from the Point he is talking 
of," and thought that in so boastinG! Choiseul 
II •• let himself go here, through Vanity perhaps, 
to shew the Influence he had over the Spanish IHnisters, 
but if that was his Motive he was not in my Opinion 
the less inciscreet.1I 5 
2. BN Add HSS 33071, £.51, ::ochford to Ne\vcastle, 20 November 11766. 
3. Shelburne Papers, Vol.23, f.63, Rochford to Chelburne, 26 November 
1766, Secret and Confidential. 
40 Shelburne Papers, Vol.23, f.91, Rochford to Shelburne, 2lr December 
1766, Secret. 
5. Shelburne Papers, Vol.23, f.35, Rochford to Shelburne, 5 November 
1766. 
Nevertheless, Rochford guessed that Choia 's was 
most times a calculated indiscretion, a<.: he indicated in an 
important letter to Chatham : 
I~our Lordship knows that a prime min~ster here has very 
extensive power, and I am convinced none of the Duc de 
444. 
Choiseul's predece3sors ever oyed it in a extent. 
He has made himself absolutely necessary to the French 
King ~id though much abuse in private is vented against 
him, it avails but little, and I see not the least 
probability of his losing any ground, unless War Was, to 
break out ; ~hat case, his ends seem to be apprehensive 
for him. From private motives, therefore, Your Lordship 
sees he nn ... st be inclined to pacific measures. He of 
a frank and senerous disposition 
not so indiscreet as people of 
a!.d though very open, 
turn generally are, 
and I believe, conscious himself of being rather superficial, 
he is gllprded in what he advances, ana remarkable for being 
exact in '-Ihat engagements he enters into. I have had the 
good luck to ~ain his confidence, and hOp0 when occasion 
6 
offers I shall be able to turn it to I?ccount." 
Choiseul repeatedly assured Rochford that he was sure Spain 
wished to avoid ar,otlier\mr. and gave Rochford his word on 
Rochford, though l'?,l'-lays c3.utious in giving my Opinion of \vha t 
vlere the Intentions of a Court," was inclined to think Choiseul 
sincere thesp assurances, since he had himself reported from 
Hadrid 11 the Court of Spain was not in a Si tua'Cion to quarrel 
\'lith any Power \'J'hatsoever." 7 Choiseul clearly shared this view 
of Spain I s si tUa tim' ; !lfor says he [to Rochford on 13 January 1767 J 
They of all the inree PO'4C::S are the least for a Rupture, 
et Quant . .;;:.a.:.....:::..;ro::..u::;.;s:::::...\,,~N..:o;..:u:;.:s:...·....::n:.::.~..Y0ulons 1Jas~:.h._~ peut s'~viter.o 8 
6 .. Chc:.tham Corresc:,ondcnce, III, 1 _1+, Rochford to Chatham, 28 :';over:lber 
1766, .\.:'";;1 va-t-e:-
7. Shelburne , Vol.23, f .57, Hochford to Shelburne, 20 I:~ovember 
1 '166 .. 
8. SF 78/272, £.29, Rochford io Shelburne, 13 January 1767, Secret. 
4'+5. 
Rochford twice reported that he was sure Choiseul 
"las lias desirous as \ve can \",ish to watch over the Conduct of 
Spain merely with the Vie,'! of preserving the Publick l''!';'anquili ty, II 
and that France seriolV31y dreaded a vJar behleen Spain and Britain 
over the Falkland Islands, Has They are al together ~m}Jrepared 
for it.1I 9 Not only Choiseul, Rochford thought, but IItIle rest 
of his colleaguas, as well as the most thinking 
10 \1ish for peace. !I 
of the Nation, 
Early in Jan~ary 1767, Rochford's intelligence contacts 
supplied him with valuable confirmation of hiD opinions reGarding 
a possible 'Revanche' by France and Spain to reCover their losses 
in the last war ; 
"I have lor ... g been of opLr..ion that neither the Co~<:;:·ts of 
France or Spain are disposed (nor are they able at this 
Moment) to commence a New War ; and ~our Lordship by 
looking illtO my Dispatches whilst I ~'U13 in will 
see that my Sentiments were then the same ; but that 
I thought, as SOf.>l1 etc ever They were pI"epared, \I6 should 
find them less accommodat II 
Rochford I S eclaircissement consisted of hlO remarks made by Choiseul 
to the Imperial Ambassador, Count Berci, 1I/hich "/61o'e as follo"JS : 
"Hon But es',; de m~r.ager les Esprits en AngletG!'re ; c' est 
ce que j( recOl::lman.de sans cesse a H. de Guercl'y ; et je 
m' applaudis d I ~tre parvenu a fa ire sui vre mon :l"::lan en 
Espagne ••• Nous aurons certainement en 1770, la :plus 
belle Arm~e, une Narine respectable, et de l'argent en 
Caisse ; les Ministres du Roi travaillent avec le 
grand Z~le, et la r,jsillure IntelliGence, a ces trois Objets. ,,11 
9. Shelburne Papers, Vol. ,f.87, Rochford toShelburl1,e, 18 December 
1766, ~rivate and Secret; SP 78/272, f.29, Rochford to Shelburne, 
13 January 1767, Secret. 
10 Chatham Correspondence, III, 131-4, Rochford to Chatham, 23 November 
1766, ~rivate.· . 
11. SP 78/272, f.5, l<ochford to Shelburne, 7 January 1767, Secret j also 
quoted in ?itzrnaurice's Life of William.Earl of Shelburne (1~76), 
II, 4·. 
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It would appear, therefore, that Rochford was correct 
in his belief that neither l.i'rance nor SpaiT: was yet in sufficient 
12 
readiness for the 'Revanche' against Britain. He rested this 
belief primarily ou the Imowledge that France could not 
afford the expense of her armed forces up to the required 
state of readiness for at least another t\1O years ; 
HTheir filLances are in a bad condition • • and though 
doubtleHs they will attend to their Mariu0, it will be 
13 
a Hork of Time to get it order." 
By Hay 1767, the situation 1'laS not much improved, in Hochford's 
view. Their finallCes rer:1aili.ed "in general in a ve~t:'y bad Condition," 
there \</as of a general bankruptcy immiEent, and the payment 
of many Royal pensions had b0en stopped for twelve months in an 
1lj. 
attempt to build up an euergency reserve in case of wa~. 
There were other drains on the }ycnch finances besides 
pensions ; Frenclk foreign policy eastern and northern Europe 
in this period was noto~iously few could guess \'That 
enormous sums had been devoted over the years to bribes and 
subsidies, and although Choiseul had cut dovL. considerably on such 
" .. asteful expendi tu:.::-e, Hochlord kept close i-latch on one survi vinS 
object of French subsidies, namely ~hleden .. 
Roch:ord made little mention Sweden in his dispatches 
to Shelburne, but relayed \ihatever in tellic;ence he gathered on 
that subject direct to Sir John Goodricke, the :3ritish Envoy at 
Stockholm. In 1767 Goodricke thanked Rochford for news 
1 :L'he same conclusion has been reached by -1:;\-10 r,lOdern "lrH,ers, 
Rnl;lsey, p~.173-4, 181-2; and Abarca, ItBourbon ':]evanche ' 
Englano.,"(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Notre Dame, 1964), 
pp.384-396. 
1 Chatr:.ar:1 Cor.respondence, III, 131- l j., Rochford to Chathan, 28 November 
1766, Private. 
14. SP 78/272, f .. 256, Roch::'ord to Shelburne, 7 Hay 1767, Secret 
Confidential. 
of the transfer of a very sum <500,000 livres) to the 
care of the French Ambassador at Stockholm, and added that 
Rochford had "judged very right of the Duke of Choiseults 
Intentions, and that He i3 not so indifferent \dth respect to 
Svleden as He ,,[ould appear to be. II 15 In fact, Choiseul had 
decided in 1766 that monies distributed to the members of the 
Senate had been largely ]'-lasted ; this latest sum ,.,as destined 
to pay the debts of the Kirlg of S\'leden, lito fix him in the 
interests of France,:t D.f; Corn'Jay bele, tedly informed Goodricke 
16 
three months later. Rochford's interest i~ the affairs of 
Sweden, or at least French influence there, stood him in good 
stead for his Olm ;,erm as Northern Secretary after 1768. 
He Vias sirnilal~ly attentive to French policy in eastern 
Burope, especialJ.y the response of the COVYC of Vienna to any 
action by Russia and Prussia regarding Poland at this time. 
447. 
Also in February 1767, Sir Joseph Yorke \-/rote privately to Rochford 
from the Hague, reporting \lhispers tha-b Frederick II of Prussia 
was making warlike preparations. Conway chose to regard these 
rumours as "chimerical, II but Yorke thought th2:!1 more serious, 
and relating to Poland, '>Jhich ill'ould be certain to evuke a vigorous 
response at Vienna. Rochford already had informations which 
suggested that Vienna Was alarmed by Prussian preparations, 
naoely that Count Merci had twice recently been ordered to demand 
i5. 'lne it/.S. Let-lis/ Library, Parmington~ Conn.; a'..~ letter, 
Goodricke to Rochford, 27 February 1767 ; th8re are ~nly two others 
fror:1 Goodricke in this collection, dated 5 ilay 1'767, and 19 l"ebruary 
1768,(which add details reGarding this sum) ; Rochford's letters 
may well be in the Goodricke !~pers at University, though 
I have not yet follovled up this :90ssibi11 ty, \1hich may be more 
useful for ord's Secretaryship. 
16. British Dinlomatic Instructions, Vol.V, Sweden, 1727-1789, edited 
by ~.F. Chance (London,1923) , £p.1 ,Conway to Goodricke, 5 
1767 ; the best recent account of 3ritish policy in Northefn Europe 
at this time is ,Michc-.el Roberts, :IGreat iJritain, Denrclc.rk,- anu 
Russia, 1763-70,<1 in Studies in edited by 2~.i:;. 
lIn teon and l~.:~" Anderson 
18. 
448. 
French assistance l;mder the tr of 1756, either ,000 men or 
an equivalent s:tbsidy. Choiseul declined such aid, maintaining that 
the 1756 treaty was purely defensive, yet Merci apparently persisted 
in the de!':land. T'.le Russian Hinister at Paris, Prine eGali tzin, was 
for his part distributihg to the other foreign ministers "a sort of 
Hanifesto,tI justifying Russic.'s intervention in the affairs of 
Poland. 17 
By Nareh, Rc.0hford \'/aS convinced his information had 
been "tvell-founded, I' for both Choiseul and Herci taken 
exceptional to assure him to the contrary, and to make 
sure that Britain 'vas not encouraging the King of Pruss in his 
warlike preparations. Choiseuleven \vent so Thr as to sho\v Rochford 
a dispatch received from Guerchy on this subject, t"hile Herci 
("\Tho is not by so expert a Ninister as the Duc de Choiseul tl ) 
held the same tone to Rochford, though greatly magnifyi.ng Vienna's 
fears of an. attack~ Rochford concluded that Vienna's fears must 
aave subsided, or that their plans were laid aside after Choiseulfs 
18 having "thro'l'lU Cold Water upon them.1! ':.chis conclusion was 
proven accurate; only a fortnight later, Choiseul spoke further 
to Rochford on this subject at great length, and mentioned that 
their latest letters from Vienna said that their earlier fears 
. 19 
were now qu~eted. 
In making these reports, Rochford several times asked 
for guidance as to the he should hold on these matters 
Let.;is/Ualpole Library, FarmIngton, Conn.; 
to Rochford, 19 February 1767 ; SP 78/272, f.91, 
Shelburne, 12 February 1 ,Secret; SP 78/272, 
to Shelburne, 25 February 1 ,Secret. 
SP 78/272, f.155, Rochford to Shelburne, 11 
letter, Yorl<.:e 
Hochford to 
f.115, Rochford 
1767, Secret. 
19- SP 78/272, f.186, Rochford to Shelburne, 25 March 1767, Secret. 
when Choiseul started a discussion on them, yet Shelburne made 
remarkably little comment on Rochford's rep0rts, and gave him 
no guidance \vhatsoever. Shelburne claimed that ne\'l6 from Eastern 
Europe was so unce~tain ~nd full of contradi~tions as td make it 
impossible for him to form a satisfactory judgment, He '.·ras therefore 
not at sure hOH to advise Rochford, and feared that "a vague 
Opinion might ol~ly mislead.!1 He could only leave to Rochford I s 
min judgment no,,, to manage h.is conversations Choiseul, trusting 
in Rochford's undoubted "Prudence & Discretion. II 20 
Rochford thereafter seems to have leftche reportage of 
events in Eastern Europe to those entrusted with that task, though 
he continued to be informed of them by his fellow British ministers 
21 
at other capitals. But Shelburne was not the only on& viho had 
such faith in ~0chfordls prudence that he Was content to see the 
Paris embassy left largely to its Olm d~vices ~ t!1e Duke of IJewcas+:le 
bad written in his usual fulsome style at the start of 1767, that 
II 
. . the Court of FraLce, if they are ed to preserve 
the Peace, & to live well with Us, must be glad to have an 
Ambassador of your Ability & Experien~a, who is so well able, 
& so \-/ell ed, to coHperate with TheM) in carrying those 
good Intentions into Execution, ;'Thich is, gc OUt;ht to be, the 
View of Both Nat • Happy also it for us, to have a 
Minister at so great a Court, who is so able ~o discover, 22 
vJha t is rrheir True Vie,v, & to conform His COilduct accordingly. 11 
It 1:/ill be evident from the remainder of 
not Rochford lived up to these expectations in the routine of 
business, but for the me<,ntioe, as regarded the 1!'J:rne Vie,-!\! of 
20. SP 78/272, f.202, 3helburne to Jochford, 3 April 1767, Secret. 
Lev!is/I'lc:tl=)ole 
to Rochford, Vienna, 
Poland, is one 
the Rochford 
Farmington, Conn.; autor,raph letter, Stormont 
March 1767, with news of RU3sian in 
example of the correspondence which was in 
in 1930 and has since been lost. 
22. BH Add HS3 , f.1, NeHc.:Lstle to }'~ochford, 1 January 1 ,copy; 
the ori[inal of this letter is now the collection of ~.~. Lewis, 
Farmington, Conn. 
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the French Ivlinistry, which in effect meant the Duc de Choiseul, 
Rochford's considered opinion from his first six months' observation, 
expressed in his masterly dispatch of 7 May 1767, was as follows 
,,[ Choiseul J is more absolute at this instant than ever, 
and has made himself so necessary to [the 1Trench King] 
that his Enemies dare not venture to make any direct 
Attempt against him ••• He is in my Opinion, though 
very quick, and attentive to Businass, not extremely 
deep, ready er.ough at finding Exp~dients, and inclined 
to listen to any Projects that are proposed to Him, 
which if He approves of, He makes a Ivlerit of them as if 
they were his OWil. He carries his franchise as most of 
his countrymen dc, even to Indiscre~ion, and often by that 
means lays bimse1f open to those who know how to profit 
of it. He is certainly inclined to ?~ace, but he has an 
high Sensibility of the Honor of his Nation, and would 
be more likely to be affected by any attack made against 
~hat, than against its real Interest ; a War he knows 
\ .. ould give his Enemies at home more opportuni ti0s to 
destroy him, and therefore he will do all he can to avoid 
it ; for though he is hurt at the great Advantages Ue 
gained in the last War, and has a Notion of putting this 
Country into a Condition to attempt CIt one tim8 or another 
the Recovery of her losses, He is we!l convinced of the 
Imprac tica bi1i ty of such an attempt cn; preser. t He ,vi11 
therefore do all he can to keep up an apparei.lt good 
Understanding with Us, and it is o')vious that he uses his 
influence 1:1i th the Courts of Vienna and Madrid to keep 
23 them quiet for the present." 
This vIaS at the time a fair and accurate estimation ; Rochford felt 
that Britain had little to fear from France in the immediate future 
at least. He could scarcely foresee that beiore the end of his 
23. SP 78/272, f.256, Rochford to Shelburne, 7 Nay 1767, Secret and 
Confid.ential. 
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Paris Embassy, and despite his own w'arnings and efforts to prevent 
it, Choiseul'would inflict upon Britain her most humiliating 
diploma tic rebuff since the '-lar, vd th the fait accompli of the 
French annexation of Corsica. 
The provision of Il cons tant infornationll regarding the 
state of France's military forces, especially her Navy~ was one of 
Rochford I S most important :;. .. outine tasks at Paris, as syecified in 
24 the sixth clause of hie lISer;arate and Private ll Instructions. 
Yet it \'laS Nay 1767, exactly six months after his arrival, before 
Rochford made any relJort on this vital subject, and even then he 
dismissed the stE ,~,~ of the French Army in a fe,,, sentences ; TIThe 
Otate of their Arr:iy is so '-1ell kno\m that it neeCiless to say 
anything about .; .; " 
..J... ". 
He merely added that there were at present 
no schemes Bfoct to augment it, and that its £lresent establishment 
was maintained only by m€&llS of the severest discipline. 
The French Harine seemed far more important in Rochford's 
estimation, and he showed his customary ini iva in devis a 
method for obtaining regular reports from eaC~1 of the major French 
ports, which \'Iould give "a constant and exact knoVlledge of it.1t 
Unfortunately, no details of this method ap~e~r in the corresuondence 
he left it for Parten to explain verbally to Shelburne in London. 
Presumably, Rochford had found a reliable agent, such as he had used 
at Nadrid for such purposes. 25 The first fruics of this method are 
to be seen, hm'lever, in a report of 28 Nay 1767, '''hie:: suggests 
24. See above, Chapter 13, p. 374. 
25. SF 78/272, f. , Rochford to Shelburne, 7 May 1767, Secret and 
Confidential. 
that Rochford made no idle boast ; the report included not only 
the usual lists of ships and their number of guns, but also 
details of the cre\'lS and shore establishments derived from the 
pay-books! 'Vlhoever Rochiord f s was, he could obviously 
move freely about the dockyards without suspicion. 
By contrast, Rochford "TaS a grea+' deal more prompt in 
anm-lering the important nevI fourth clause of his Instructions 
regarding French trade, and the main theme of his subsequent 
discussions with Gh~iseul on trade matters gave rise to one of 
h1S most signifi0~nt recommendations as Ambassador at ~aris. 
452. 
The collection and close examination of inforffiDtion on 
French trade WBB, in Rochford I swords, "a '-Jork of Time, II yet by 
the end of his first two months in Paris, he was able to present 
a full and detailed repurt, the main conclu.sions of which he 
. found no cause thereafter to alter. This report ranged from the 
value and concH tion of .France f s sugar trade, and her exports 
through Hamburg, Holland, Narseilles and s to her American 
trade from Bordeaux, the potential still remaining in the sugar 
islands of Hartinique Guadeloupe, and encouragement of 
agriculture \vithin France itself by the free transportation of 
corn from one province to another. He had evidence to shm'l that 
the exportation of :C"'rench cod from the Newfoundland banks \vas 
as to Italy and as it had been before the war, and 
that surplus corn was also being exported at consi~erable profit 
to countries, to incentives for planting a larger 
26. SP 78/272, f.299, TIochford to Shelburne, 28 1767. 
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crop than usual. Rochford apologized for not been able 
to obtain deta~led statistics for the returns of the sugar trade 
("though I am sparing in neither Pains nor for itll) , but 
in February he nroduced figures for the annual retu!':::ls from the 
French East India trade since 1750, and was c of being 
. 27 
a rel~able copy. 
Before he left London, Rochford had urged the appointment 
of a British Consul-3eneral to Paris, to fulfil the same useful 
rale he had seen Stanier Parten fulfil at Hadrid. "tt seems beyond 
doubt that this idea came from Parten himself, just as it seems 
over\·rhelmingly likely that Rochford had asketl P:Jrt611 to gather 
supporting evidence before Rochford's arriv:l: in Paris, for within 
a few days of his first audiences at Versailles, Rochford submitted 
for Shelburne'c consideration a very full and convincing case for 
such an appointment. Rochford could not possibly have gathered all 
this information himself in the short and hectic time since his 
arrival. 
The main argument favour of a Consul-General for Paris 
was that redres& for difficulties obstructing trade at the sea-
ports could only be obta.ined in Paris, where all essential business 
passed through the Clerks.t These men had !lan immense Influence" 
on the Ministers, who relied on their judgment in commercial • 
But the Clerks \ver0 "a set of People a Foreign Hinister, particularly 
an Ambassador, cannot to. II Yet a Consul-General might flvli th 
Decency cultivate an Illtir;lacy vri th them of creat Utility, and obtaiu 
informations 
27. SP 78/271, 
SP 78/272, 
t At the 
to be acquired through any other 
201, Rochford to Shelburne, 31 December 1766 
, Rochford to Shelburne, 4 February 1767. 
emen t de Harine, of ,·:hich Praslin 1<laS the er. 
Channel." Rochford observed that the bankers in Paris vJere 
mostly Court bankers \ofho had little knm'lle1ge of trade in general 
"It is the Seaports \ofhere Informations must be had and Observations 
made." A Consul-General \'lould be far bette,:, able than the King I s 
Ambassador to establish proper contacts with the seaports and the 
British merchants established in France, and gather therefrom 
useful information on French trade ; "of which, our not having 
Consuls has ¥:t:;Jt us entirely ignorant 'till the THo last Hars.!! 
Rochford claimed to have seen this demonstrate~ whilst he was in 
Spain, where he realized "the great Use it vIas t:) Us having an 
intelligent Consul-General at Madrid, and Consuls in the Spanish 
Seaports." 
It was not simply the idea which Rochford had to recommend 
in his usual resourceful fashion, he had apP9rently asked Porten 
to discover a lik91y man for the job, and ' .. las nOvl able to name one 
Hr Crammond as the best candidate a va:Uable. Rochford had already 
held "a great deal of Discourse vlith him,ff and concluded that he 
was "a most intellieent· Han •• tolell informed of the Commercial 
State of this Ki:r..gdom, and from his Connectl0ns here ""ould in my 
Opinion be the properest Han to be employed. II In E,ddi tion, Rochford 
had sounded Choieaul on the question of British Consuls in the 
French ports, and found that there \.Jas nothing to pre van t Britain 
from establishing as many as she wished. It was altogether a 
splendid piece of rractical initiative by Rochford and Parten, 
all too rare in the diplomatic service of the eighGeenth century, 
vlhich Rochford urged so strongly to the attention of Fis IvIajesty I s 
. . 28 I·hn~sters • 
28. SP 78/271, f.117, Rochford to Shelburne, 5 November 1766, separate. 
Sadly enough, this eminently useful suggestion was not 
taken up. One possible reason, though not probably the main one, 
may have been the expense ; Porten and his successor as Consul-
General at Hadria., Jarnes Brusby, received salaries of £ 1,000 a 
year at that post, and an appointee at Paris i'lOuld not have been 
content with anything le88.29 The successive Ministrieo of the 
17606 were all concerned, though in varying degreGs, Hith economy 
and retrenchmtnt, no less :in the diplomatic ser"rice than in America. 
But Rochford's proposal was in advance of its time. There had been 
no British Consul.s France since 1688, and it ·,vould require at 
least another Commerc Treaty with France to facilitate their 
return. This did not occur until the Eden treaty of 1786, though 
not for "Tant of by Rochford ; the pressing nee~ for a new 
treaty to rep}_C',ce the ineffective 1713 C0l:1!ll9rcial Tree,ty of Utrecht 
was the major theme to emerge from Rochford's dealings with Choisefil 
bl ~ t d 30 , over pro ems Ol ra e. 
In his first few f',onths at , Rochford made several 
applications on bene,lf -of Bri ti.sh traders established in France, 
claiming in SUpp01't the C~mmercial TreatJ 0-1' Utrecht 
"which whenever I done it (though the Du~ de 
Choiseul has sometimes complyed with what I ~ave 
asked) L~ has constantly told me that the tr~aty 
of Commerce of Utrecht had never been ratifyed." 
Choiseul claimed to have pressed this matter at the peace talks 
of 1762, strongly 0bjecting to its inclusion in the list of 
treaties to be renewed at the e, [).s Britain llnever had nor 
could abide by it, II and had been 'tperpetually infringing it.lf 
456. 
Rochford's most recent case was an application on behalf of 
a group of British merchants at Bordeaux 'vlho had been imprisoned 
for refusing to serve in the city Dilitia. Choiseul had refused 
to admit any grounds for their exemption, insisting that as Britain 
had never ratified the eighth and ninth articles, the Utrecht 
~1 
C ommerc ial Treaty ""ras of 110 force. tI ;; 
Rochford subr.1itted a Hemorial, though with lIno great 
hopes of succeqding, II in 1:1hich he claimed the sf:venth article of 
the treaty as exemptin~ British merchants from local duties such 
as militia service, a~d this paper at least had the useful effect 
of prompting Choiseul to state his views in writing. It was clear 
from his reply that the treaty in its old form was unacceptable to 
France and could not simply be revived, even with the omission of 
the eighth and ~inth articles so obnoxious to Britain. This meant 
that in the meantime British merchants in Fra~ce were exposed to 
the arbitrary will of provincial Gove~nors and minor officials, 
as Rochford saW it l!i~l short, a Treaty of Commerce iE' absolutely 
necessary. It 32 
In reply to Rochford's plea for gui~ance, Shelburne 
instructed him to continu8 treating the Utrecht Com~ercial Treaty 
as a SUbsisting treaty. It was true, as Choiseul claimed, that 
the British Parliament had never ratified the articles giving 
France preferential customs entry to British m'1.rkets, but he had 
forgotten that the French Commissaries at the time had signed a 
Declaration ~'clearly establishing the validity of all the remaining 
Articles. rt As for Rochford's urging for an entirely ne1:1 treaty, 
31. SP 78/272, f.49, Rochford to Shelburne, 22 January 1767, Separate. 
32. SP 78/272, fos.113 and 141, Rochford to Shelburne, 25 February and 
4 March 1767, Secret. 
Shelburne thought this would need very careful investigation of 
the extent to which commercial circumstances had changed since 
the time of the Utrecht treaty. 33 
Shelburr..e enclosed a copy in English of the Declaration 
in question. Rochford already knew of its existence from the 
Embassy papers, and had mentioned it in his conversat with 
Choiseul. But ~he Minister denied that any such Declaration had ever 
been made. He said he knew that the CommiBsarie~ were prepared to 
make such a declaratio!:i. 1rJhen and if the treaty was rat d by the 
British Parliament, but as this had not been donB, and France had 
waited over hal! a century for it, he could not admit its validity. 
Again he offered that if Britain proposed a new commercial treaty 
he would willingly nego~iate upon it.34 
Roch4:'~rd remained convinced that a neirl treaty 'vas the 
best solution. He heard Choiseul met with opposition in Council 
whenever he tabled Rochford's applications on behalf of British 
,merchants in France, as thf: other ministers" complained that Britain 
did not show them :::-eciprocity. Above all, he found his own task 
increasingly intc~erable '"hile the French d011ied the validity of 
the Utrecht treaty Ilit is almost impossible to go on much longer 
in the present 1:1o.y • our Nerchants here will be every year 
1II0rse used." He admitted the difficul ties involved ir~ drafting a 
new treaty, yet rather than leave the problem entirely to Shelburne 
to ",ark out, he of:Pered his mvn thoughts on the matte!' and indicated 
possible solutions. 35 
• SP 78/272, f.147, Shelburne to Rochford, 13 March 1767. 
34. SP 78/272, f.164, llochford to Shelburne, 18 ~arch 1767. 
35. SF 78/272, f.1 ,Rochford to Shelburne, 18 Harch '1767 ; ibid., 
f.256, Rochford to Shelburne, 7 1767, Secret and Confidential. 
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The central difficulty remained that vlhich had prevented 
the ratification of the Utrecht treaty, na'nely, the duties of entry. 
The other articles seemed straightfor\'rard and r.:lUtually beneficial, 
and should not neat with any opposition so long as this central 
problem vlere solved. The original eighth and ninth al~ticles had 
provided that dut of entry should be determined reci~rocally 
and published Ly both countries, but this had never been done 
because of tbe difficulty 0f balanc ine J!'rench lvxuries such as 
wines and brandy against British manufactures, which would not 
have raised nearly as much revenue. Since then, duties on French 
imports to Britain had increased, while British imports to 
]'rance suffered s-uch heavy duties that many art \<!ere in effect 
prohibited. In the meantime, l'rench mcmufactures i.mproved so 
nmch that theYf;; \'lould be less demand for s::'milar British pro(J>ucts~ 
Rochford VJas sure that the sort of treaty Ji'rance wished to adopt 
would result in a reduction of British trade vd th Spain Portugal, 
-
which was far more profitatle to Britain than any alternative trade 
\'Ii thFrance. These general Rochford supported with a detailed 
examination of thG presen'j; duties on British goods ent France, 
and the difficulties under which ish merchants ill French ports 
suffered, especta::'ly at Bordeaux, \'1hence most of his information 
seems to have come. His recommendation \'las that the a'.'1bTard problem 
of duties should be left to one side for the moment, and a limited 
treaty proposed to give force to the beneficial uncontrovers 
clauses of the old o!le, '\·.'i1ic11 would remedy most of the difficulties 
. 36 
at present facing British merchants ~n France. 
36. SP 78/272, f. ,~ochford to Shelburne, 7 May 1767, Secret and 
Confident ; ibid., f.26i, IlA state of the Duties British Goods 
are subject to in 2rance ll (no date). 
38. 
Apart from the British merchants res in France, 
there were other matters which needed the force of a recognized 
treaty. One such e was Rochford's failure early in Hay 1767 
to obtain the extradition of an English bar:kru:pt 1I/ho had fled to 
France vii th "effects to 3. great value." Choiseul reiu.sed to 
oblige, recalling a s case some years hefore in which France 
had eranted extradition in the belief that Britain would reciprocate 
like cases, but \vhen their request \vaS r:1ade, it \vas rejected. 37 
There "laS, ho\vever. a simpler remedy than a nei'i formal 
treaty, and Shelburne recommended Rochford to follow up this line 
of approach first. ':;:his \-las of course to convince Choiseul that 
the French Commicsaries had fact made just such a Declaration 
in 1714 as Britain claimed they had, giving force to the remainder 
of the clauses of the Utrecht treaty. Choiseul contil1ued 
to insist that no such Declflration existed i 3.nd he was not 
convinced by Rochford's assurances. Rochford finally had to ask 
Under-Secretary Sutton to search the correspondence for the 1711t 
original French. Itvlas November before Rochford received this 
document, but it had the desired effect; Choiseul grudgingly 
conceded that Britain l.vas fully entitled to claim the validity of 
the Commere Treaty 0:2: Utrecht. Rochford \vas vastJ.y relieved 
"I should that He shall hear no more of that Business.tI 
The effect of this conc \vas soen felt. rl1here had 
been a ne\'! 11: September 1767 regulating the Capitation Tax 
as it affected foreigne~0 living in France. It exempted only those 
SF 78/272, f. ,Shelburne to Rochford, April 1767 
f.271, Choiseul to Rochford, 10 Hay 1767, copy. 
SF 78/273, f.1 ,Rochfor~ to Shelburne, 7 October 1767, 
ibid., f.202, aochiord to Shelburne, 11 November 1767. 
ibid., 
Secret 
39. 
40. 
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not engaged in trade Vlho did not possess houses or in 
France, whereas before all foreign merchants been exempted. 
Rochford remarked that this \vould fall hardest on the many Swiss 
and GeneVan mercr..ants ).11 France ; the Brit:Lsh merchants could 
bear the imposition a little more cheerfully now t~at such vexations 
as militia duty had bean resolved by Choiseul's recognition of the 
Utrecht Commercial Treaty. The only problems to arise were those 
of private irJo.ividuals such as one Nr Pitt v/ho -.. ras living in France 
for the sake of his health, but Choiseul now gnve prompt redress 
in this and two similar casas when Rochford appealed to the Utrecht 
treaty. 39 In the follovJing months however, Choiseul refused 
redress to severaJ. British bankers 1,."ho had been charged vJith the 
Capitation Tax j but Rochford found he had "entirely !1istaken the 
Article of tht; Treaty, II and this l~O clso readily resolved. 
Rochford was not alone at Paris Ll seeking improved 
conditions for his ;count~y's traders; in th~ early part of 1767 
he kept a close watch on one icular visitor of special interest 
to himself and Pcrten, namely, the French Consltl-General at Madrid, 
B~liardi, who was home on leave for discussions with Choiseul. 
Rochford had of course been lImuch acquainted tl i-Jith him at Hadrid, 
and knew him n(·t only as one of Choiseul' s creature'3, but also as 
lithe most intriguing I have ever met \d th.1t Rochford \1Ias 
able to discover of the instructions which B~liardi 
carried back to , and his own correspondents there kept him 
in touch ivi th 's efforts to persuade Spain to lower her 
SP 78/273, f.90, Porten to Shelburne, 16 September"1767 ; 
SP 78/274, f. ,Rochford to Shelburne, 11 February 1768. 
SP 78/274, f.1 ,Rochford to Shelburne, 7 April 1768. 
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dut on French manufactured goods, especially 1iloollens, to the 
detriment of British trade there. But Rochford was c that 
Britain Was adequately protected by her treaties with , which 
bound them to g~ve Britain the same advantages ofiered to any other 
41 
nation. 
In November 1767, hOidever, Shelburne informed Rochford 
of a report from Const<l Tatem at Nessina that France and Spain 
were negotiating a new treaty to regulate the privileges of their 
Consuls in the Eediterranean, Gnd though Choiseul sulemnly denied 
this particular report, he startled Rochford with the news that 
B~liardi had succeeded in another aspect of ~is work at Madrid • 
The problem of visitation of foreign Spanish ports had 
been a source of constant irritation for Rochford at Hadrid, and 
h~s only consolation had been that this fell more heavily on the 
French. But no~ ~~li&rdi had succeeded in a linitation on 
this practice, by defining more clos the class o~ vessel liable 
42 
'to be rigorously searched as those of 100 tens or less. 
This ,-ras a distinct success for , though as Porten 
pointed out, it was a meagre return for so much effort. 
Al together, the vlOrk of Eochford and Parten both at Hadrid and 
Paris compared favourably with that of their }Trench rivals at 
this time. Parten seems clearly to have been the expert on 
commercial who could give Rochford's own interest and 
initiative some and direction. 'llhey made an excellent 
partnership, which Rochford was to preserve even as Secretary of 
1+3 State. 
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Small trading vessels and their usefulneRs for smuggling 
also formed the subject of Rochford's first dealings with Choiseul 
relating to the West Indies. The first such case recommended to 
Rochford at the very .s-cC".:t:'t of his Embassy vl2s tbat of the iJove, 
,.;hich traded beh-Teen Nevi York and Jamaica. The Jove had been seized 
by the French in Hay 1764., 8.nd condemned as a smuggler at Port au 
Prince under th~ Edict of 1727, which demanded a bond to prevent 
illicit trade by foreign vessels visiting ~~ench colon~al ports. 
The vessel and cargo had then been sold, as con:iscated goods. A firm 
protest had been :made against this proceeding in November 1764, but 
without success ; it was repeated with similar lack of success by 
Rilichmond's Secretary, Lennox, in July 1766. 44 
Rochford first mentioned this case in his long interview 
iV'i th Choiseul (,1 ... 2 November, but Choiseul "pretended to have quite 
forgot it," and :::l.sked Rochford to refr~sh his Jllemory vlith a written 
application. While preparing this Memo~ial in the following week, 
Rochford mentioned it again, and was surprised to hear Ohoiseul 
claim that the Jove had ·been obviously on a smuggling venture, from 
the quantity of S:f&nisil coin aboard. Rochforu si'riftly rel;!inded him 
that the vessel had been condemned merely under the Elict of 1727, 
and that the proce~aines a~ Port au Prince had failed to establish 
45 the suspicion of smuggling. 
'l'he argument '''hich Rochford used in r.is Nemorial of 
25 November '''as tha';, if France Hished to make use of such antic;uated 
regulations against Briti~h vessels in the West Indies, then Britain 
44. A summary of the case is contained in SP 78/271, f.87, Charles to 
Shelburne, 22 October 17660 
45. Shelburne PaDers, Vol.23, f.35, Rochford to Shelburne, 5 November 
.. - ~,.-1766 ; SP 78/271, f.129, ~ochford to Shelburne, 12 November 1700. 
would have to issue similar orders to her Governors in those 
parts regarding French vessels. Uhen he spoke to Choiseul again 
on this matter in mid-December, Choiseul said that both Hertford 
and I~.ichmond had made this same menace, and he maQo the same 
answer to Rochford as he had then, namely, that ,,;hile Britain 
~'!as free to make what lavls she pleased for her o1tm islands, he 
was sure Britain would not wish to be seen to protect smugglers. 
He also read out to Rochford many of the papers relating to this 
affair, and Rochford paid pa~ticular attention to one from the 
Intendant of Port au Prince, in i'lhich he accused the Jove of 
smuggling, and urGe~ Choiseul never to revoke the Edict of 1727, 
which ',vas the mc.i~lstay of their Caribbean tr~de. 46 
Choiseul pI-omised Rochford a copy of this letter, but 
none had appeart;;d by the tiE'!e Rochford next reminded Choiseul of 
the ~, 5.n April 1767. Choiseul had now cnanged his tune, and 
claimed that the ship t·ms not condemned under the Edict of 1727, 
but because the Captain had been found guilty of smugGling! 
Rochford 'VIas astonished at this vol te- ~ut Choiseul refused 
to budge from his contention. Rochford laboured in V!:'.in to persuade 
Choiseul to reconsider the case, but found him "determined not to 
yield in this Affair. 1t Rochford had to adYJi t failure ; "0..11 I can 
h I Id " It 47 say or do not t e Success cou \'11SD.. 
But Shelburne chose not to pursue the matter further, 
and there it rested for the remainder of Rochford's emba3sy. 
46. SP 78/271, f.186, Rochford to Shelburne, 18 December 1766. 
47. SP 78/272, f. Rochford to Shelburne, 16 April 1767. 
46f+. 
The case of the l;]heel of Fortune was very s:Lmilar. 
This schooner, under Captain Summers, ViaS also seized in 1764 by 
a }'rench guardacosta,,! in the Caribbean, and 1:Jas taken to 
Hartinique \",here it was condemned as a smuggler. Cl,H'1l!1erS protested 
that this was a thoroughly unjust and ill-proven verdict, and 
appealed to his own, Court to apply pressure on the rrench to 
reconsider the case. At the start of 1765, therefore, Hertford 
made the necessary representations at Par~s, but these were 
unsuccessful and \1ere noi~ IJersevered VIi tho The ovmers of the 
vessel did not give up so easily, however, aild finally in April 
1767 Shelburne agreed to jnstruct Rochford to revive the protest, 
\vhich had I!lain d()rmant for a good i'lhile." 
As the case had previously been handled in Praslin's 
department, Choiseul asked Rachford to stbmit a fresh Meuorial, 
to \",hich RC'chford appended copies of Hertford IS 1765 papers on 
the subject. Choiseul re~lied within the week, merely referring 
, Rochford to the replies then given to Hertford~ But Rochford 
could not find any not~ of these replies amo~gst the embassy papers, 
ll-9 
and had to appeal to Shelburne for copies frO';l the Lenden office. 
?hese revealed that the Hheel of F'ortune, like the ~, 
had been initially condemned under the }'rec:.eh Ediot of "j 727, though 
Choiseul now maintained that both had been been tried as cases of 
smuggling. Praslin had left the matter open until the arrival of 
further informations from Hartinique, 'tlhich di1 not appear ever to 
have arrived. Choiseul assured Rochford that he wouid will 
48. SP 78/272, f.194, Shelburne to Rochford, 3 April 1767 ; anelos 
f.196, a summary of the case to date. 
49- SP 78/272, f.223. Rochford to Shelburne, 16 April 1767 ; ibid., 
f. ,Rochford to Shelburne, 23 April 17 ,enclosing r.232 
Choiseul to Roohford, 21 April 1767. 
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reconsider the case if fresh evidence came to light, but until 
then he \wuld not even discuss it. Shelburne then dec ided to 
take it up with Guerchy in London, but apparently met the same 
response, for nothing more was heard of Captain Summers or the 
y/heel .of Fortune in the remainder of Rochford! s embassy atParis.50 
But this was not the last Rochford heard from the West 
Indies on the subject of French suspicions of English smuggling 
there. Only two month8 later, in June 1767, news arrived of a 
serious incident at St Domingue, \1here French Custom House officers 
had fired on a boat belonging to a British frigate, which they 
believed they had ceught in the act of smuggling. The frigate 
hoV/ever returned the fire, and seven of the French boat had been 
killed or \101,mded. Choiseul heard the news from Verdi, the 
C 1\ t / II' . II .J2.:~]._e:u.r-Generf;L, vlho had exe a~med exc1.tedly, NOus....1.'!..~ 
en Guerre avec les Ang;lais!1t Choiseul did not see the incident 
in so dreadful a light as this, however, and assured Rochford 
that he would await reliable reports from the nearest Governor. 
He ,vas confident it could be adjusted merely as a mesen tendu t 
and Shelburne agreed in reply to Rochfordts ~eport that there 
was no point in taking alarm until the true facta we::'e kn01;m. 51 
'l.nere had already been earlier alar:'1s in 1767 regarding 
the French in the Hest Indies \-.rhich had proved groundless, and 
Shelburne \las anxious not to be taken in again. Late in February, 
he had drawn Rochford's attention to rumours t~en current in London 
that Spain intended c her half of Hispaniola to France. 
SP 78/272, f. ,Rochford to Shelburne, April 1767 ; ibid., 
f.297, Shelburne to Rochford, 29 May 1767. 
SP 73/272, f..318, l:ochford to Shelburne, 18 June 1767, Secret; 
SP 78/273, f.']1, Shelburne to Hochford, 3 July 1767. 
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The third article of Rochford's Separate Private 
Instructions hr ... d warned him to be alert for any intended cession 
of territory bet1;leen France and Spain in the Arnericas, and Shelburne 
was sure that s 110h a rum our would not have escaped nochford's 
customary vigilance and attention. Rochford had indeed heard the 
rum our at Paris ; ttHhen I flrst came here, nothing else yms talked 
of." But he had not :reported it, because he ,vas sure it had no 
real foundation. He had heard exactly the same :r"..1mou!' i'/hile he 
\"'0.13 at Hadrid, and did not report it then becausf) it y"To.s such an 
unthinkable violation of the treat , and because he was convinced 
tha t Spain \>/a6 "full as averse to the French mc"'..king a.::1Y acquisitions 
in that Part of the \'iorld as They are appreh,msive of Us. !I If the 
rumour had continued, he \:';u1lld have reported it, but !fOf late the 
It:lea. seems to 'oe quite vanished. 1f ObviOUSlY, the rumour had gained 
strength in Loadml only after fading in the other two capitals. 
Rochford ciscredited entirely ; lIif They are insincere They will 
at least wait for a more favorable as 1I1ell a.s advantageous Occasion 
52 to unmask Themselves. II ' 
The oniy possible support he could find for such a move 
may itself have stemmed from the rumour, namely, the formation of 
a. partnership behleen one Bertrand of St Domingue and hJO l"rench 
merchants in London, professedly in anticipation of an expanding 
market in Hispaniola. But "l:lhen the rumours of a cession revived 
in London at the end. of Nay, and Shelburne mentioned them to the 
French and Spanish Al'lbassadors, Guerchy and r,Ia.sseranc disavoVled 
them very strongly Masserano even did so ministerially ; and 
no more was heard of the 53 thereafter. 
52. SP 78/272, .111, Shelburne to lloch~ord, 27 1767, Secret 
ibid., f.141, lloch~ord to Shelburne, 4 Harch 1767. 
53. SP 78/272, f.151, ~ochford to Shelburne, 11 1767 i~id., 
f. 307, to ~{ochford, 5 ,J'une 1767. 
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Nor did anything become of the incident at st Domingue, 
but Rochfora was not quite finished with the affairs of the West 
Indies, for at the same intervievr late in June at 'I.'ihich he assured 
Rochford he had no alarms on that score, Chciseul raised another 
rna t ter \'lhich did cause him alarm.. 'This was a report that Britain 
had appointed a Governor to the 1urks Island and \-la:;; actually 
in the proces~ of fortifying the place. T},is barren island to the 
north of Hispaniola had b'2en claimed by B:;.~i tain as lon;:; ago as 
1672, but was usually urinhabited, apart from seasonal salt-rakers 
from the Bahamas.. The French hOlvever regarde(: the place as a nest 
of smugglers, and ilL Hay 1764 the Governor of st Domingue~ d'Estaing, 
sent an expedi t5.';.;1 to expel British settlers from the island. This 
resulted in a miner diplomatic crisis, with Britain protesting 
strongly, and :r."'::'ance claiming she had acted on behalf of Spain. 
Choiseul was um'lilling to pick a quarrel, hO'::ever ,and ordered 
immediate withdrawal and restitution. He personally disliked 
dtEstaing, and after a decent interval ordered his recall in 1766. 
It was generally understood that Turks Island should remain 
54 
without fortifications or permanent settlerne~t. 
Shelburne, however, responded to Rochford's report of 
Choiseults alarm in a high and indignant tone, enclosing numerous 
papers to ShOi-l that Britain had every right to occupy the island 
if she wished, especially to protect the salt-rakers against 
another French descent, that there "VIas no GoYe:;.~nor but J:1erely an 
SP 78/272, f.322, Rochford to Shelburne, June 1767 ; on Turks 
Island, see Calendar of Home Office Papers, 176o-176~, edited by 
J. Redington (London,1878), Nos.1398 and 1406, for early reports 
see also J. Goebel, (1927), 
p. ,and edby 
F. Spencer 
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Agent, HI' Symmer, and that he had been instructed to avoid any 
step t-/hich might eive umbrage to Spain or france. Even with these 
assurances, Rochford an.ticipated u a great de.al of Altercation" 
with Choiseul over Turks Island. 55· 
It took Rochford a long while to convince Cnoiseul that 
his fears vlere gl'oundless. J::n October, he again accused Rochford 
of having deceived him in hi3 earlier assurances, as he had since 
received further rerorts from Rohan, the ne,·r Fre;Qch Governor, 
stating that fortifications were being erected, end all sorts of 
stores and munitions I'lere being landed there. Rochford could only 
repeat his previous assurances, but this did noc satisfy the French 
Hinisters, "'lho urged Choiseul in Council lat;~r that month to 
Rochford for a ,'>Tritten sta-::ement of Britain's intentions. 56 
Rochford drafted an unsigned Note of explanation, but 
wisely did not submit it until he had heard again from Shelburne. 
Shelburne flatly denied that there were any troops or fortifications 
on the island, and ,"arned Rochford that Choiseul had no grounds to 
demand that Britain demonstrate her right to Turks Island ; he Was 
clearly misinfol':11ed, and there \vas no need to submit any vlri tten 
statement. 57 
Choiseul said no more about 'l'urks Island until the 
follo\ving year, in H:arch 1768, "'hen he agai11 "a ttackod" Rochford 
in very strong terr'1s, after receiving a report from Rohan that 
Bri tain had set up a sixteen-gun battery on the island \vhich now 
threatened the WindwarQ Passage to St Domingue. On &eeing Rochford'3 
55. SP 78/273, £.11, Shelburne to TIochford, 3 July 1767 ; ibid., f.35, 
Rochford to ,shelburne, 9 July 1767. 
56. SP 78/273, £.1 ,Rochford to Shelburne, 7 October 1767, Secret 
ibid., f.174, Rochford to Jhelburne, 14 October 1767. 
57. SP 78/273, f.176, Shelburne to Rochford, October 1767 
£.1 ,Rochford to Shelburne, 29 October 1767. 
ibid. , 
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astonished look, Choiseul suggested that the BritiRh Ministers 
had changed their minds \·dthoutinforming him, but Shelburne soon 
put Rochford at ease on this point. ':Chere had been no change of 
policy ; on the centrary 1 ,.;hile Hr Symmer hed. repeatedly appealed 
for troops and cannon, Shelburne had ali-mys refused him, and had 
done so again as recently as 8 October last. 58 
This :ast piece of information enabled Rochford to argue 
yet more cogently that Choizeul should disregard Rohan's alarmist 
reports. He pointed out that the latest letter from Rohan 'I .. tas dated 
in November, long before Shelbur~els order of 8 O~tober could have 
reached Turks Island, so that if Symmer had set up a battery \·Tithout 
authority, he should by now have dismantled it. This c8.lmed ChoiseuJ. 
considerably, B.no. he made much of the .fact that he had Hot pressed 
the Spanish to complain, though they tvere equally affected by any 
British establishc9nt on Turks Island. To sho\11 th9.t he had avoided 
advocating a strong line, Choiseul rean aloud to Rochforo. part of 
his instructions to Count Cratelet, the ne~l French Ambassador in 
London. Rochford heard nothing therein to account for 'che truculent 
tone Chatelet had !leld \dti1. Shelburne ; HI SHould rather therefore 
impute it to the \.Jarmth of CountChatelet' s Imagination. II 59 
By April I Choiseul could assure Rochford that his alarm 
had been "entirely dissipated, II and contented himself "lith the mere 
warning that France could not look on quietly if Britain ever chose 
to fortify 'lurks Island. 60 lIe apparently made no further mention 
of the mattel' uhile Rochfo::d remained at PariSe 
58. SP 78/271/-, f. 76, Rochford to Shelburne, 3 Harch 1768, 
Shelburne to Rochford, 11 i:arch 1768. 
ibid., f.78, 
59. SP 78/274, f.94, TIochford to Shelburne, 17 March 1768, Secret. 
60. SP 78/274, f.137, Rochford to Shelburne, 7 April 1768. 
4?o. 
In addition to such matters of national importance which 
occupied Rochford's attention, part of his routine work as British 
Ambassador was on behalf of priVate individuals in distress. At his 
arrival in Paris, an Englishman named Benson had just been convicted 
of the capital cri:ne of counterfeiting, and condel;'med to be executed. 
On the morning of his execution day, however, a message came to 
the Embassy that Benson claimed to have sor;Jething "oi' the utmost 
consequence ll tn tell the King's Ambassador. Rochford had not hitherto 
intervened, for the man's guilt had been clearly established, and 
there was no question of reprieve for such a grave crime against 
the Law of Natio~s. But he sent his private Secretary Higden to 
hear Benson's story. After several hours, it was obvious that he 
had nothing to S3.y, and Rochford had to let the execution proceed 
61 
"by all Appear"?YJ.c es He seemed only to ,'lan t to gain Time ~ II 
Fortunat~ly no other case in the course of Rochford's 
embassy was as grim as this one. Mor0 typical was his aGsistance 
. to a young lad named Cookso,{). vlho had been -persuaded to 1esert from 
a British frigate and now repented his error. Rochford the 
lad's youth and i31.experieJ),ce deserved some ~_ndulgence, al1d asked 
Shelburne to intercede for him at the Admiralty, which resulted in 
his father's pardQn and his return to service on a different 
Apart from such highly idiosyncratic cases as that of 
HI' Henley who ''las imprisoned for striking an Irish officer at 
/'-;; 
Versailles, o~ or that of Mr Ker at Bordeaux over the custody of 
6L~ 
his children whom he ~ad sent to a convent school, most of the 
61. SP 78/272, £.74, Rochford to Shelburn , 4 February 1767. 
62. SP 78/272, fos. anci 57, :Joehford to Shelburne, and January 
1767 ; ibid., £.93, Shelburne to Rochford, 20 ~ebruary 1767. 
63. SF 78/272, f. ,Rochford to Ghelburne, 30 April 1767· 
64. SP 78/271, fos.145, 147, 161, Rochford to Shelburne, 26 November, 
4 and 11 December 1766. 
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cases Rochford had to deal with on behalf of private individuals 
concerned money, usually the recovery of debts. Not all came 
through the Secretary of State's office in London; in April 1767 
Philip Thicknesse, trusting in Rochford's knotm "inclination to 
make the wretched happy,tt recommended to him the case of one Hiss 
Fletcher \-lhose intended husband had absconded to France \vith her 
65 
whole fortune of 5; 1,500. Yet on the other hand, not all of 
those recommended by ~he office received 0fficial sanction ; an 
application by several New York merchants to recover a debt from 
the :French Governor of C"'.yenne drew the comment from Shelburne 
that this was not th0 sort of trade which o~ght to claim the 
protection of govprnment, and that Rochford should not exert 
't' 66 nimself over ~ • 
The most involved and difficult of these cases 1·ms that 
of the Hate of the ship Lively, one Sulli V'ln. 'Vlho had languished 
in prison at Bayonne from -;759 to 1763 as h0stage for a ransom 
..... /hich had been arranged when his ship vlaS taken by a F::-ench corsair. 
soon after setting out on a voyage from Bristol to Jamaica. Having 
proceeded on its way, however, the Lively had been seized yet again 
and taken in to 1lartinique, It/here she 1;las condf~mned af.. a pris e and 
the Bayonne ransom agreement declared null and void. The corsair 
of Bayonne appealed and secured an arr~t in 1761 which ordered the 
ransom to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of and cargo .. 
'l'his \'laS done in 1763, and Sullivan was released. The English 
mmers of the havifig already received insurance on their 
65. 'rhe u.s /\"Jalpole Library, Farmington, Conn.; autograph letter, 
Thicknesse to Hochford, April 1 • Thickncsse \"tas the author of 
~ treatise on ciphers and deciphering published in ~772. 
66. SF 78/273, f.218, Shelburne to Rochford, 27 November 1767. 
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loss, were persuaded to transfer the remainder of the proceeds, 
after the ranS01ll was paid, to the unfortunate Sullivan in recompense 
for his own losses and long incarceration. But the agents at 
Hartinique \vho held the money refused to remit it tr. England, 
claiming that they had not received the whole amount from the 
agents of the French prize-court there. Rochford's first enquiries 
uncovered the fact that part at least had already been remitted, 
but Sullivan had to pet on a second time befor~ or~ers were 
f''';n lly sent oln J '7"'7 t t "' t'. ., 67 ..... a ~ .... une ~I 0 0 ensure paymen 0.1 1.9 ':'em::u.naer. 
These routine rainor Cases helped to relieve the quietness 
of the Paris Embassy during the idle summer ;::~onths of ~J767, \'lhen 
Rochford's dispatches had little news to repo~t other than the 
proceedings of the Paris Parlement or the rrogres6 of the expulsion 
of the Jesuits frem Spain and the mounting pressure for their 
expUlsion from France as lJell.68 Rochford "las keenly interested in 
the affairs of the Parlement as the embodiment of the opposition 
to Choiseul's policies,- but observed that Louis XV had no difficulty 
breaking the ~ecrees when he disagreed with them. 69 It has been 
noted by at least one writer that Rochford was to be one of the 
earliest among British Secretaries of State to make official 
comment on the increasing strains visible in French society at 
this time. 70 
67. SP 78/271, f.145, Rochford to Shelburne, 26 November 1766 ; 
Nassau Papers! IV28, Choiseul to Hochford, 9 Decernber 1766 ; 
SP 78/271, f.161, Rochford to Shelburne, 11 Decanber 1766 ; 
SP 78/272, f.237, Shelburne to Rochford, 28 April 1767, enclosing 
SulliVan's petition of 15 December 1766 ; ibid., f.305. Rochford 
to Shelburne, 4 June 1767. 
68<:,' SP 78/272, fos& ,230, Rochford to Shelburne, 16 and 23 April 
1767 ; ibid., £06.254, 267, , Roeh ord to Shelburno, 6, 14, a~d 
21 1767 ; ibid., £.}10, }:ochford to ;3helbur::le, 1'i June 1767. 
69. SP 78/272, .256, Rochford to Shelburne, 7 May 1 
70. , VII, France, iv, 1745-1789, edited 
), p.viii in the Preface. 
But the tediuu was also relieved, as it had been for 
Rochford years before Turin, by visitors. Paris naturally 
had not only a steady stream of English visitors throughout the 
'season', but a num"ber of out-of-season residents, !'or reasons 
ranging from health ar.d pleasure to political exile. The most 
notorious of the latt0r waS of course Sohn Uilkes, who vias in 
France again after a brief and fruitless return to London in 
October 1766. ChatLam's refusal of his overtures seemed likely 
to produce a countel'blast no", that he was safely ba~k in Paris, 
and in April 1767 Rochford wrote privately to Chatham Warning him 
that lVilkes planned. to publish an attack on !lis administration, 
"/hich he believed could be stopped by a worr'l to Choiseul. Chatham f s 
response is not kUN1TU, but he may have chosen to ignore Rochford's 
1rtarning, for 1'iilkl21s ~'lent ah8ad and published his pamphlet at Paris 
with its f&mOUA Y'efel'ence to Chathal:1'E, "flinty and marble heart." 71 
Another ilisitor equally iLotable though for a very different 
:.reason \'las His Royal Highness the Duke of York, \I1ho i1as travelling 
incogni to 'through F:.rance in the summer of 1767. Rochford had 
received no warning vhatsoever of his visit, and had to arrange 
at short notice for his presentation at Compiegne as the Earl of 
Ulster, on 18 July. Roc:'~.ford attended the Duke at his audience and 
also took him to dine ',lith Choiseul. 72 But before the end of the 
year, it 'l'lal3 Rochfor-ell s private letter of 24 September \'lhich brought 
the first news to Engl~nd of the death of the Duke of York at 
Honaco on 17 eI~ber • 73 
71. Pitt Papers, Villiao L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan ; 
Rochford to Chatha:';;, 6 April 1767 ; see also G. Rude, \'Ji.lkes and 
JJi b crtY.. (()x~,.' orc. , 1 S62), p. 37 • 
72. SP 78/273, :!:'.1+'1, l·~ochford to Shelburne, 23 July 176'1. 
73. SP 78/273, £.144, Rochford to Shelburne, 24 September 1767, Private 
(in Rochford's own hand). 
Two other visitors in 1767 enjoyed the hospitality of 
Rochford's hour;ehold for LIuch longer periods. 'l'he first 1ITaS the 
noted Hebraist, Dr Benjamin Kennicott, who "'as attempting to 
collate the Hebrew manuscripts of the Cld Testament. He carried 
a letter of recommendat from the Earl of Oxford, 'Vlho recalled 
with lithe utmost pleasure & gratitude!! Rochford's kindness to him 
at Turin, but it is cJear from this letter that Rochford had 
previously prcL1ised Kennicott to give him every u.ssistance when 
71. he came to Paris. T 
The other notable visi'~or \vas none other than Rochford IS 
oun successor as Ambassador at fladrid~ Sir James Gray. Thoue;h his 
appointment had. finally been announced in Jlllte, Gray's departure 
was delayed by illness, ano. the same cause pr010:i:lged " !ll.S at 
Paris througholit August and September. 75 Gray was reported dining 
,'Ii th the Rochfords by yet another English visitor, an even older 
acquaintance, whose fame has shone more brightly fOT posterity than 
it did in his own time thanks to his incomparable letters ; namely, 
Horace YJalpole. 76 
Walpole had come to Paris to visit his chief correspondent 
there, the elderly Harqu.ise du Deffand, and it is in her letters 
that are found almost our only glinpses of Rochford and Lucy as 
they appeared in the dra"ring-room society of the French capital. 
The Rochfords lived quite near to Hadame du Deffand, in the 
Faubourg St Germain~ and they regularly attended her supper-parties 
74. T'lle \'J.S. Let,risl '3alpole IJibrary, :Farmington, Conn.; autograph 
letter, Oxford to Rochford, 25 ?July 1767. 
75. SP 78/273, £.75, Port en to Shelburne, 2 Sep-cenber 1767 ; Gray 
eventually reached Eadrid in mid-October. 
76. Gee W 's is Journal, August-September 1767, in Valpple 
Corresnondence, edited by V.S. Lewis (Yale,1937-), V, 315-321, 
• passim. 
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at the vleekend, ul3ually on Sunday, in the company of such leading 
society figures as the Comt~sse de Boufflers, President R~nault, 
and the Narlwhale-DuchesslS' de Hirepoix, then the reigning favourite 
before the appearance of R'11e du Barry. 77 
A t first, Hme du Deffand ltIaS not greatly impressed by 
the British Ambassador and his Lady she thought Rochford 
IIgai et fae ,II but Lucy se3med to her merely gossipy and empty-
headed. As she saH more of them, her opinio:1 imT'roved of 
Rochford himself ; 
"L f ambasE3ader;.r et sa femme son t extr3memen t polis, 
et moi en iculier jfai beaucoup de sujet de 
mten l0uer je mfaccommode assez bie~ du mari, 
il est facile ,ro;,lpu au grande mon2i (1 ; pour sa 
femme, je la trou~:e ;m peu amphigourigue • • f! 79 
ReI' first impression of Lucy, however, rer.la ined unchanged 
II 
. . 
80 
elle babille beaucoup, et ne dit pas grand'chose. 1I 
. Though Hm~ a.u Deffand \1aS blind, she insisted that .hel' companions 
describe her surroundings i::l minute detail, so that her letters 
are full of the most vivid descriptions. She has left just such 
a description 0:"" a dinner party \'lhich Rochford gave in April 1 
for the Due and Duehesse de Choiseul, also attended by Hme de 
Hirepoix, and the Dukes and Duchesses of Gramont, Lauraguais s and 
de la Valliere. The dinner itself was declared splendid, and the 
1ettres de Hme clu Deffand a Horace 1,lo.l1)01e, edited by Ers Paget 
Toynbee (London, 1"9'12), I, 181t, 194, 205, 224 ; ~~?le Corres?ond~ . 
(Yale,1937-), III, 199, 212, 224, 244 ; Deffand to Valpole, 4 and 17 
January, 3-6 a...l1d 21 }I"e'0ruary 1767. 
18. Toynbee, I, 241, 255 ; Deffand to Walpole, 15 ancl 
(Yale edition, III, 263, 278). 
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79· Toynbee, I, 382 Deffand to Ualpolo; 27 January 1768 (Yale edition, 
IV, 1 '16) • 
80. Toynbee, I, 191 Deffand to Halpole, 16 Januury 1767 (Yale edition, 
III, 208. 
dining room was thought charming ; there was such an abundance of 
candles that the scene was as bright as daylight, and all 'vas 
conducted vii th a Itpropriete • • a I' anglaise.lI 81 The only thine 
to dampen the evening 1IlaS that Lucy was unt<J'ell, ~"nd Hme du Deffand 
remarked subsequently, that she !Vas tltoujours incornmodee." 82 
Lucy found a good friend h01.'lever in the wid.01.·Jcd Comtesse 
de Forcalquier, who never ceased to sing her praises of the 
Rochfords to Hme du Deffand. The old lady may have been a little 
jealous of Lucy for thus stealing one of her constant companions, 
and \I1rote peevishly of Hme de Forcalquier ; 
IIToute son ambition est d'etre trouv-~e un bel esprit 
par votre o::nbassadcur et votre ambassadrice • • • 
elle adlliire tout ce qu'ils disent, e~ les trouve 
supel'ieurs a tout ce qu1elle a jamais connu. 1I 83 
The Rochford hO"!(sehold in Paris 'ViaS not v'l chout interest for the 
Gossips of Court society, for Mme du Deffand records that it 
included Rochford's natural daughter, Haria Harrison, nOvl kno\'ln 
. as Haria Nassau, '-Jhom Lucy had adopted as her O\'ln. 84 Nor 'VIas 
Maria the only young person about the Embass~ other than the 
servants ; \valpole I s nephevl Thomas 1IlaS in Pa:.. ... ::Ls during 1767, and 
was a frequent guest at the Rochfords' house. l'1me du Deffand 
noted approvingly that Rochford liked the lad ~ery much, and 
treated him like a son. 85 
81 .. Toynbee, I, 259-260 ; Deffand to Halpole, 12 April 1767 (Yale 
edition, III, 283). 
82. Toynbee, I, 267 ; Deffand to Walpole, 3 May 1767 (I~le edit 
III, 291). 
83. Toynbee, I, 276, 281 ; Deffand to vlalpole, 31 Hay and 17 June 1767 
(Yale edition, III, 303, ). 
84 • 'roynbee, I, 296 Deffand to I;Jalpole, 13 July 1767 (Yale edition, 
III, ). 
85 • Toynbee, I, 262, 283, 289 ; Deffand to , ole~ 26 , , 
3 Hay, 20 and 28 June 1767 (Yale ., ,.. +- - III, 285, 291, 311, 317). ca1. v 1.0n, 
86. 
87. 
88. 
89. 
477. 
Hme du Deffand also records her gratitude to Rochford 
for correcting reports of affairs in England given to her by the 
Swedish Ambassador ,Count Creutz j "Il [Rochford] m' eclairci t 
toutes les chases que je n'avois point compris.!! 86 Thereafter 
she sent to the Rochfords whenever she wanted nevIS of England. 87 
:earlier Nme du Deffand had noted Lucy's introduction to Creutz 
with this remark ; "8i elle se laisse entcurer de ces sortes de 
gens, je ne la verrai gu~re!!t 88 
Rochford's own 09inion of Creutz has already been noted 
above, and he held similar views on the remainder of the diplomatic 
corps at Paris, r~gal'ding most as Choiseul's creatures. 11me du 
Deffand remarked;,erceptively and significantly to \Valpole, on 
nearing Choiseul express a wish to meet him, that neither Choiseul 
nor Rochford seemed to her to be quite Wal?ole's sort of people. 89 
Rochford at least gave Choiseul his due with regard to the diplomatic 
corps ; 
Toynbee, 
n • • he has the peculiar Talent of gaining the 
ConfidE:nce of those he treats \vi th ; the Foreign 
Ministers to ~ man adore him, and if I except the 
Dutch and Sardinian Ambassadors, a t l1. RussiD..n Hinister, 
All the others ( I presume I need ~~t axe myself) 
are entirely His Creatures, led and governed by him. 
M. de Souza, the Portugal Hinistsr, [sic] who I have 
watched most attentively for some time past, is I am 
afraid devoted enough to him to listen to any Scheme 
I, 239 Deffand to Walpole, 13 Harch 1767 (Yale edition, 
III, 261). 
Toynbee, I, 249 Deffarid to Vlalpole, 21 Harch 1767 (Yale edition, 
III, 271). 
rroynbee, I, 211 Deffand to Walpole, 6 February 1767 (Yale edition, 
III, 229-230). 
Toynbee, I, 244 Deffand to '.'!alpole, 17 Harch 1767 (Yale ..,. -+- .. e01,,10n, 
III, 267) .. 
he would think proper to propose ; the same may be 
said .of the S\"ledish and Danish Hinisters ; the others 
have so insignificant a Part to act, and the greater 
Part of Them are so avowedly his Spies that it does 
not require great Penetration to see it II 90 
Nor was Rochford sparing in his criticism of those cf his own 
countrymen 1-lhom he had reason to dislike. Hme du Deffand \"las 
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startled to hear Rochford's comments on Richmond's first Secretary 
of Embassy at Paris, David Hume, the noted historian and philosopher. 
The remarks \-lere made 3. dinner at Hme de Caramnn's in Harch 1767, 
"'hen Rochford ViaS seated at table bet\-leen !·lrne du Deffand and the 
Comtesse de Bouff19rs, one of Hume's most ardent admirers ; 
"Il [Roch:c,rd J parla de H. Hume avec le plus grand mepris, 
." . t" sur sa gro:3e1.er~e e, sur son peu d l-u.sae;e du monde, SU!~ 16 
peu de connaissance qulil avait des hommes, sur llincapacit~ 
qu'il avait pour les affaires." '11 
Though severe, these cOhlments accord vii th the judgment of a modern 
author: ty, vlho considers that Hume showed competenc€: aG Secretary 
but nothing more, and that though he was probably better at his job 
than Richmond himself, did not mean very much! 92 Sor.wtning 
of the scorn of the professional for the amateur diplomat might be 
deduced from Rochford's comments. 93 
'1'he Paris Embassy Il1as certainly r "garded by contemporaries 
as the most important post in the British diplomatic service, and 
throughout the eighteenth century this attracted the grandest 
90. SP 78/272, f .256 ~ ~10chford to Shelburne, 7 Nay 1767, Secret and 
Confidential. 
91. rl'oynbee, I, 232 ; Deffand to Halpole, 5 Harch 1767 (Yale edition, 
III, 253). 
92. J~Y.T. Gre , David Hum~ {London,1934) , pp.324-5 • 
• See on this point DeB. Horn, 3ritish Dinlomatic Service, 16g9-1}S~ 
(Oxford,1g61), pp.12-14 
479. 
amateurs of all, the great noblemen who scorned lesser 
diplomatic app0intment, yet spent as little time as possible at 
their post, leaving the rOQtine worle to their Secretary of Embassy.94 
Rochford at lea~t attended to the routine work, as has been seen 
above, and \·]hen he did apply for leave it \vas for a specific 
reason and a suitably short period. But his first leave from Paris 
is of particular interest also for the I it sheds on his hopes 
for a place in the Ministry at home. 
Rochford fi£st applied for leave in , vJhen.i.;he last 
ripples of '!;he Nanila Ransom - Falkland Islands affai:r had long 
since died away. He suggested leaving early in June 
n •• as I have nothing but a private A!fair to settle 
in England j and some Papers t.o get from my House in 
the Country, I shall at farthest be l:mck by the 
fifteentb of J'uly." 
.. Not only would J~ly 1)e lithe idlest Time that I can possibly be 
absent,l1 but Rochford vlaS anxious not to miss going \dth the 
French Court to Compiegne, for this \-ms the best opportunity of 
the year for gossip and intrigue, and for watching the Ministers 
more closely. 95 
The King readily granted Rochford his leave, but Shelburne 
recommended Rochford to wait until Guerchy had also left London 
for his usual summer leave, for while Porten was still in Zngland 
it vlOuld be dangeroul1 to leave the Paris Embassy unattended, in 
case anythinG serious arose unexpectedly. This \'laS reasonable, and 
94. D.B. Horn, Grea.t Britain ar;.d Europe in the ~~ighte_~'1j:;h Century 
(Oxford,1967) , pp.39-40. 
95. SP 78/272, f.307, Shelburne to Rochford, 5 June 1767 ; ibid., 
f .310, Rochford to Bhelburn8 , 11 June 'j '767 ; Rochford I s letter 
of l:ay, Hhieh Snel burne 8.cKno\vle and summarizes, does not 
appear either in SP 78 or in the Shelburne Papers. 
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Rochford \'Jas content to have some of his papers bJ'ought over by 
the messenger, to be signed by himself and Lucy before witnesses 
at the Embassy. The papers were presumably those relating to 
Lucy's annuity or yearly rent-charge of £ 1,500, and the first 
mortgage which Rochford \'[as to raise on the St Os:,,7.h8.'3ta te, Hhich 
bear the dates 9 and 10 July 1767. 96 As the witnesses include 
among others b,'1th Rochford I s secretaries, Parten :;md Higden, it is 
reasonable to ::tssume that the papers were signe:i in Paris after 
Parten's return there at the end of June, and before Rochford's 
departure on leav~, for Lucy remained in It'rance throughout. 97 
Portents return was awaited by Rochford in a fever of 
anticipation, according to Hme du Deffand, and little 1IJollder? for 
there were rumoU.rs abroad both in London and in Paris, that Rochford 
\"las be reci,::"led to replace COni-lay as Secretary of State. That 
some change in the Chatham Administration was not only desirable 
but necessary had baen apparent for 60me time. As early as March, 
. Rochford had been ,,,,arnad by his old friend Sandirlich of an imminent 
change in the Hinistry; 
II my opiLion is that I,d Chatham's iluwer is very near 
its end. 'I'llere is 3. decided Hajority against him in the 
House of Commons, where he has notcarry 1 d anyone Point 
this Sefsion • • • I imOvl you are too zealous a Servant of 
the Crown, not to be affected with so Melancholy an 
Account of His Hajesty's Administration ... " 98 
966 Essex Record Office, D/DCr .. 1'.1 ; Hortgage for £ 12,000, dated 
9 July 1767, and CO'J.ntess of Rochford to Petcr Holford, Esq .. ; 
Release for securing an Annuity to the Countess of Rochford, 
dated 10 July 1767, of Rochford to Edward Young, Esq.(Lucyts 
brother?). 
97. Toynbee, I, 304 ; Deffand to Walpole, 3 August 176~ (Yale edition, 
III, 333). 
98 .. Pitt Papers, \lilliam L. Clements Library 1 Ann Arbor, Hichigan 
autOGraph letter, Sandwich to Rochford, 22 March 1767. 
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Amazingly, the Ministry dragged on. Chatham took no 
active part in politics after March 1767, and with the failure 
of negotiations to bring in Rockingham's friends in July, Conway 
decided he woul~ resign, and was persuaded only with difficulty 
to retain the Beals wi thou.t salary for the meantime. 99 The result 
of these agonizing uncertainties was described by the Pruss ian 
Minister, Maltzan ; 
IiLe d~pa1'tement du Nord est actuellement d.cpuis six semaines 
sans secretaire d t Etat, et le comte de Shclb1Jrne qui devrai t 
y suppl~er, traite les affaires avec une confusion et une 
nonchalance qui desolent tous ceux qui ont a faire avec lui 
soit paresse, il ne fait presque rieur ee n'entre pas m~me 
en discuGsion sur les affaires qu'ou lui propose." 100 
cut throughout June, there i3eemed every chance that Rochford might 
be called upon to join the :!iuistry, and H:ne du Deffand rightly 
identified this as the cause of Rochford's impatience for Parten's 
. return 
". • j I imagine que votre ministre lei [ Rochford] a des 
grands projets et qu'il avait ces jours passes de grandes 
esp6rances 0 •• il ~tait si occupe, si troubl~, que je 
lui dis eLL riant que .i' enverrais ce matin lui en demander 
"'01 des nouvelles • • II I 
There was no news that dcl.Y, and v/hen Irme du De ffand met Lucy, 
she said could not tell what would happen. But Nne du Deffand 
then heard of a significant remark which Lucy had made the night 
before to Hme de JO:J.zac, namely, that Rochford did not really \'Taut 
99. Brooke, 'Eha Chatham Ad~inistration (1956), pp.xiii, 200-202. 
100. Poli tische Corres-pondenz ='-!"cidricn I s des Grassen, adi ted by Droysen, 
Dunker, Kosen, at.al. (Berlin,1879-i939), XXVI, 221, n.4, lIaltzan 
to Frederick II, 31 July 1 
101. Toynbee, I, 235 ; 
III, 313). 
ffand to vJalpole,23 June 1767 (Yale adi tion, 
102. 
103. 
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a place in the ministry until it acquired greate~ stability 
(tlconsistanco"). 102 'This ''las also in accord ""i th the impression 
she had formed several months before about Rochford ; 
" Je me sui.::; bieD 'lper<;?ue qu'il n'est pas neutre, 
103 
mais qu'il est anti-Pitt." 
Portents return to Paris on 28 June brought, however, 
only the news that Conway had been persuaded to stay on, and 
Shelburne's ~epeated orders that Rochford shouli remain in Paris 
104 
until Guerchy had returned to France. Nevertheless, rumours 
continued throughout July, to the effect thai; Rochford was being 
recalled to replace ConltJaY .. The London Chron:i.cle t,,'lice reported 
this as reliable news, before finally contradicting the rumours 
with the statement that Rochford ivas returni::J.g only b~ie:fly on 
105 private busin~':':;:is. ':Lhe French Court movec. to Compiegne in 
mid-July, and the Rochfords followed soon aft'~r .. Guerchy at 
arrived towards the end of the month, and Rochford found that he 
, had been "extremely ill,lI and was by all accounts IInot quite 
106 
satisfyed" with the reception he had met at Court. 
Rochford finally set off for London on 3 August, Lucy 
107 having decided to remain C?"t Compiegne with Hme de i"orcalquier. 
He travelled by way of Dunkirk, as has been noted above, intending 
to arrive in London about '10 August, but no detail,g are knOi"Jl1 of 
Toynbee, I, 237 . Deffand to Ualpole, 23 JUil:'; ~767, a P.S. of the , 
follovting r.1orning (Yale edition, , 315). 
Toynbee, I, 233 Deffao r: to '.lalpole, 8 Barch 1767 (Yale editj.on, 
III, 25 l l-) • 
104. SP 78/273, f.20, Rochford to Shelburne, 2 July 1767. 
105. London Chronicle, XXII (1767), 50, 
CorresEondence, edited by U.S. Lewis 
, 162 ; quoted in ~e 
(Yale,1937-), III, 31 i--5. 
106 .. SF 73/273, £'06.39 and 1+9, Rochford to Shelburne, 16 and 30 July 1767. 
107. 304 ; Deffand to Walpole, 3 August 1 (Yale edit 
his stay in England. It \-.ras clear, hOt"/ever, that t;here "las 
no immediate place for him in the Ministry, whatever his views 
on its stability, and he returned to Paris on 22 September, faced 
108 
with the prospect of aT, least another year there. 
His disappointment had a price, however, as S~~lburne 
discovered in a private letter of 29 October ; 
"I am so:,,'ry to say that unless the King is 80 gooo. 
as to (;onsider my services by restoring t.o me the 
pension that was taken from me, that it is impossible 
for me to remain here. I do not mean this by 1:Jay of 
a threat, but must entreat your Lordship to represent it 
in its tl'ue light II 
Rochford claimed to have diocussed the ma,tter thoroughly i'lith 
Grafton, and reminded Shelburne that he had spoken of it to the 
King before leaving London. The consideratior.. which ra:lkled most 
,,>as that Gray had been allo1;/ed to keep his pension in add.i tion to 
the Hadrid Embassy, 1:1hen it Was clear th3.t his health "lQuld prevent 
him from exerting half the effort Rochford had at that post. 109 
The scarcely-veiled threat had its effect ; but the 
pension, for all its £ 2,000 a year, was surely of little comfort 
to Rochford in January 1768, when Con1:Jay finally did resign only 
110 to be replaced by the dissolute 1tleymouth. Once again it seemed 
that diplomacy \'JaS the only alternative to the \-lilderness for one 
vIho scorned party connexions. 
108. SP 78/273, f.1 ,Porten to Shelburne, 23 September 1767. 
109. The HoS.Le1lris / Vlalpole Library, Farmington, Conn.; autOGraph letter, 
Rochford to Shelburne, 29 October 17 ,Private. 
110. Toynbee, I, 356 ; Deffand to Walpole, 9 December 1767 (Yale edition, 
III, ); Rochford told Deffand it \<las only his threat of quittinG 
which Got him the pension~ 
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CHAPTER 16 
The Later Phase at Par7.s 
and the Crisis over Corsi ea, 17.68. 
By comparison with his first hectic nine months at Paris, 
the second half of Rochford's Embassy after his return from leave in 
September 1767 \Vas remarkably quiet. His bus month was perhaps 
November, when a number of separate issues demanded his attention, 
but the idleness of the first part of 1768, bBfure the gathering 
storm over the F~ench annexation of Corsica, is suggested very 
distinctly by a remark he made late in January 1768 ; 
"There has not happened a single Occurrence here for 
some time past, worth troubling Your Lo~2ship with 
I hope therefore I shall not be thought defective 
either in 11y Duty or Ny Diligence in w:"'iting such short 
Dispa tchf~s." 1 
For the most part, Rochford's work on his return to Paris seemed 
to consist in refut:i.ng inaccurate or alarmist reports which had 
given concern to the British Hinisters, or in confirming judgments 
"lhich he had earli",r formed. regarding French polic towards 
Spain and Austria. 
The first alarming rumour, of "lhich Shelburne made mention 
in October 1767, concerned a suspected negotiation behlcen France 
and Hesse-Cassel, for a large body of troops to enter French service. 
This came from a usually reliable source, and ViaS 211 the more 
puzzling and disquietinc; in view of Britain's suppo:1.'t of the 
1. SP 78/274, f.35, Rochford to Shelburne, 28 January 1768. 
Landgrave in his futile attempts to recover some captured cannon 
2 taken by the French at Cassel in the Seven Years' vlar. Rochford 
agreed that this seemed a most unusual and unlikely step, and 
though he used as Shelburne instructed flaIl possible I'leans, II he 
could find nothing to support the rumour. He suggested, h01:!ever, 
a likely explanation ; there had been proposals afoot to exempt 
the subjects of certain German states from the J.;"'rellch droi t d' aubaine, 
since the exemption granted to Vienna late in 1766, and Hesse-Cassel 
was one of the states involved. That this seemed the probable 
explanation of the rum our \~as confirmed in Ha~ch 1768 with the 
publication of l~tters pate~t regarding the £!~it d'aubaine including 
Hesse-Cassel in the list of exemptions, and nothing more ''ias heard 
3 of the troop negotiations. 
The spr-ond rum our viaS a great deal mCJl'e alarmil1g, though 
as it turned out, equally unfounded. Shelburne had receiVed reports' 
suggesting the preparation of an invasion force at Brest j there 
was a flurry of ship-r~pairing, and an English vessel close inshore 
observed large bodies of. troops on the march. Rochford kne", that 
Choiseul was directing much effort· into the :iJ:.Jprovement of the French 
fleet, and earlier in "1767 had reported an increase of 7 million livres 
ll-in the budget for the Navy, but his usual sources or intelligence 
had heard of no unusual activity at Brest. In such an important 
matter, hO\vever, it vias necessary to make sure ; Rochford immediately 
tlsent a Person thither to procure me as good an Account as possibly 
2. 1'hese attempts uere revived by Rochford in April 1768, i:lith as little 
success; SP 78/274, f.201, Shelburne to Rochford, 22 April 1768 ; 
ibid., f.218, Rochford to Shelburne, 28 April 1768. 
3. SP 78/273, f.187, ;::helburne to Rochford, 30 October '1767 ; ibid., 
f.204, Rochford to Shelburne, 11 Novecber 1767, Secret SP 78/274, 
f.68, Rochford to Shelburne, 3 Earch 1768. 
4. SP 78/272, f.267, Hochford to Shelburne, 14 Hay 1767. 
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he can of to/hat is doing there. It This person, Rochford assured 
Shelburne, was f!extremely proper for the Business, and one I can 
depend upon." Knowing hm·[ extremely watchful the French vrere at 
all their major ,?ort,g, Rochford advised his agent to take elaborate 
precautions in travel15ng to Brest, so as not to cause suspicion. 
But his man did remarkably well, even to securing letters of 
recommenda tion \-Jhich enabled him to vIander at his ease throughout 
the naval dockyard. (In his return to Paris he han·led Tiochford a 
detailed report, including a list of the ships chen at Brest, and 
assured Rochford there was no exceptional activity. Their magazines 
he had observed to be poorly furnished, and there ';lere no large 
bodies of troops stationed anywhere nearby. knehford concluded that 
the troops seen marching ~·1(?r€ nerely changing tv -1'1 in ter quarters, 
as many regiments had been Ol.~ the move acro~s France in the previous 
month. 5 
Rcchford had another good reason for doubting whether 
Choiseul was yet quite ready to embark on any provocative action 
"It is almost incredible the bad State the J?rench Finances 
are in, no:' is it obviollS to Those who are best informed, 
what Resources '111ey can find to extricate Themselves." 
'rhis observation was prompted by a recent Edict ennobling a number 
of les gros Commercants, ~ncluding two prominent mercers of Paris, 
to whom it was rur,loured the Court ovled some 300,000 livres apiece. 
Cancelling debts by e~1lloblement "las not a ne", device, but this Edict 
5. SP 78/273, f.187, Shelburne to Rochford, 30 October 1767, Secret; 
ibid., f.195, Rochford to Shelburne, 4 November 1767 ; ibid., f.204, 
Rochford to Shelburne, 11 November 1767, Secret; ibid., f. 
Rochford to Shelburne, 3 December 1767 ; £.260 gives the list of 
warships at Brest. There were now 30 ships of the line~ where there 
had been 21 in the previo1.ls ,but lINone of the above 
their r:Jasts or are r;:'hey preparing in the least to be 
have 
ted out$ll 
1767. Compare SF 78/272, f" , Rochford to Shelburne, Nay 
Rochford makes no comment on the undoubted steady increase in the 
number of capital ships under Choiseul's building prograf1r.l6. 
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"Jas widely regarded as lIan Aot of Despair, 11 and "a most extraordinary 
Resource." Rochford drew from this the most obvious conclusion 
U\vhilst their Finanoes are in this \'lay it is not 
natural to conclude that They have any hostile Vie1.oJs." 
To this he added another reflection, which indicates his attention 
to events in Eastern Europe as well ; 
It • ,. the5.r looking on so very quietly on \\1h",,-t is passing 
in Pola.pi. (which They \'lould most likely not do, if They 
were in a more flourishing Condition) is, I think, some 
Proof of their meaning to be quiet at this Period." 6 
Shelburne had only just reminded Rochford to keep alert 
for any signs of overt or covert interference in Polish affairs 
by either the Fren:;h or Austrian Courts, "3..'3 lithe least Pro13pect of 
Foreign AS13istance might kindle a great Flame in that Country." 7 
Bri tain \,Ias co.'rting a Russian alliance, and could not :help bt".t 
approve Russ '13 policy of religious toleracion in what was fast 
becoming her puppet kingd0m. But the risk of ~"ustrian Llterfer:mce 
on behalf of the Polish Roman Catholics seemed to increase as Russia 
protected and enccuraged the claims of the Dissident minorities. 8 
Tmvards the end of November, Rochford dre\'~' Choiseul into 
a discussion of the Polish situation, by remarking that "as a Uell-
wisher ll to cont:" nuod haruony beh-Ieen Bri tai11 and Fre.nce, he Was glad 
to find that the affairs of that unhappy country \<Jere "not likely 
to dra\v Europe in the Scrape." Choiseul agreeo. that it \-Ias too far 
off to affect them, though the Court of Vienna Has more closely 
6. SF 78/273, f.214, Rochford to Shelburne, 19 November 1767, Secret. 
7. SF 78/273, f.1 , Shelburne to Rochford, 13 November 1767. 
8. See \i.F. Reddaway, "Great Britain and Poland, 1762-1772,11 
Historical Journal, IV (1932-31+), pp. , especially pp 
'for developments in 1767. 
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concerned. Even if the situation there worsened, Choiseul assured 
Rochford he would do his utmost to prevent any Austrian intervention, 
as this \vould infallibly spark off a European \-lar.. In his last 
talk with Merci, the Aust~ian Ambassador, Choiseul had found him 
quiet enough on this issue, though he thought RUssia's conduct in 
Poland IIrather violent and extraordinary." Choiseul concluded with 
the arch comment "that he was much more taken up 1Ilith what \'Ie were 
doing in America than ',,J'hatever VIas carrying on in Poland." 9 
In January, Rochford 1IlaS a little anxious when Fuentes 
and Merci had an unusualJ.y long conference with Choiseul, after 
which Fuentes came: 01:.1; and left Nerci alone \vith Choiseul another 
half hour ; "thif' joint Conference in the Face of all the Foreign 
Hinisters was rather irregular. fI But the general consensus of 
opinion was that this confer~nce concernec. the proposed marriage 
of the King of Naples to an Austrian Archduch0ss. This was presumahly 
what had given rise to the rumours of a marriage alliance being 
negotiated bett'leen France and Austria, which Shelburne had asked 
Rochford to investigate. This had led Rochfor~ to uncover yet another 
scheme of political marriages which interesteJ. him :personally 
he heard that Louis XV had spoken of a double marriage bet,·teen the 
French Royal Family and the hiO elder child"'er~ of the Duke of Savoy, 
both of whom had been born 1r/hile Rochford was Envoy at 'lurin. He had 
mentioned this privately to the Sardinian Ambassador, 1tiho at first 
said he kne\v nothing lilha tever of it; then, ra t~ler than mislead, he 
10 
added with a smile that it was not at all improbable! 
9 .. SP 78/273, f.251, Rochford to Shelburne, 25 November 1767, Separate. 
10. SP 78/273, f.216, Shclburn~ to Rochford, 27 November 1767, Secret ; 
SP 78/274, f. ,Rochford to Shelburne, 22 January 1768. 
Nevertheless, it did not need a marriage alliance to 
remind Rochford of the close relationship between the Courts of 
Vienna and Versailles ; Iltheir Union seems if possible to encrease 
and gather dayly more Solidity. II Rochford \'laS unli}:ely hereafter 
to entertain nostalgic notions of reviving the 'Old System' of an 
ailiance bett-Jeen Bri:tain and Austria, \vhich many British politicians 
continued to dream of. 11 So formidable an alliance, especially 
alongside France's conuexion with Spain unuer the Family Compact, 
might not be thought to ~ave much anxiety about entering another 
war ; yet Rochford remained convinced that 
"This Court h&Ye not only at present no hostile Views, 
but would on the cor.trary do Every Thing in its PO\1er 
to turn aside rwy Event that should tend that 1'Jc.y ; 
In the frequent Conferences I have with the Duke of 
Choiseul I can plainly Bee his Aversion to Every Thing 
that would be likely to interrupt the Peace. His 
Apprehensions of some wrongheaded Conduct in th0 Court 
of Spain frequently alarm him • • It 
Spain was indeed Rochford's touchstone in assessing Choiseul's 
attitude tmiards the peace. The impressions ~'le had gathered at 
Hadrid of the Spanish King and his Hinisters, and the:i.r dependence 
on French assistance in case of hostilities \'lhatever their independent 
peacetime poses, continued to suggest to him that ChoiBeul could 
exert a significant restraining influence at a time of crisis. Even 
further, Rochford still thought that if Britain had seriously 
persisted \'!ith the Hanila Ransom demand, ChoiseJ.1 \I[ould finally have 
12 
prevailed on Spain to come into some acce,table arra~gement. 
11. See the discussion in H. Roberts, !3111endid Isolation, 1763-1780 
(Reading,1970), pp.20, 
12. SP 78/271.", f.86, Rochford to Shelburne, 10 Harch 1768, Secret. 
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The failure of the Hanila Ransom demand \vas of course 
something of a personal sore point for Rochford, yet his opinion 
of Choiseul's influence with the Spanish ministers had received 
recen~ support in the aftermath of a clash between Spanish and 
~ortuguese forces in South America. In June 1767 several Spanish 
forts north of Rio Grande (bet1l1een modern Uruguay and Brazil) were 
attacked by the Portuguese, though unsuccessfully, and lives were 
. lost on both sides. The news of this incident reached Europe in 
September, and Shelburne ~sked Rochford for the Fr0nch reaction 
13 late in October. 
At first, Rochford was inclined to think from his own 
observations that nothing serious would result, and that Spain and 
Portugal were not on such bad terms over Brazil as was commonly 
supposed. He was sure that France was endE~vouring to bring about 
a rec oncili& tion, \\li th a view to \.,reaning Portugal a"lay from her prn-
British stance, after hearing what instructions Choiseul had given 
to the French Minister at Lisbon to encourage the substitution of 
French for British linens and woollen goods. ;,nd he had ahlays 
mistrusted the close connexion between Souza ~ld Choiseul at Paris, 
more so since he had heard from a reliable source that Souza's 
messengers regularly paused a day or two at Madrid on their way to 
P . 14 ar~s. 
These conjectures ''!Tere largely confirmed by Souza himself, 
in a rare confidential aside to Rochford a week later. The report of 
the incident was true, but neither Court condoned its officers' action, 
13. SP 78/273, f.187, Shelburne to Rochford, 30 October 1767, Secret ; 
see also V.L. Brm·m, Stu~.tes in the History of Snain in the secon4. 
half of the 3ighteenth. C'&ntury CI'~ortham~)ton, Nass., 1930), pp.69-'72. 
14. SP 78/273, f.204, Rochford to Shelburne, 11 November 1767, Secret. 
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and a satisfaction vlOuld easily be arranged. This '-las in accord 
with the cordiality Rochford had observed of late between Madrid 
and Lisbon, but Souza went on to explain the rumours about a 
negotiation afoot between the two Courts ; Sp~in had been "extremely 
reasonable, II and they lvere negotiating "amicably" over how best to 
expel the Jesuits from South America, Rochford suggested that France 
would surely approve of this, and Souza let slip that they did, and 
moreover, "avoit donne des bons Conseils.1I 15 
The frequent exc.!1ange of couriers to and from Hadrid, and 
the close connexion between l!'uentes and Souza at Paris persisted for 
some time, but Shelburne was satisfied that Rochford had uncovered 
the most probable ~~xplanation, and gave no heed to the continuing 
~umours in London Portugal viaS about to join the Family Compe.ct. 
As the affair of the Jesuits faded, Portufdl drifted back to her old 
pro-British stance, and an attempt by France ~o secure a secret 
defensive alliance with Portugal late in 1768 came to nothing. 16 
By January 1768·, all vIas quiet for Rochford at Paris, 
as was noted at the beginning of this chapter. Nor was there much 
to occupy him in the next few months. The French Queen's illness, 
the departure of Chatelet, the new French Ambassador to England, 
and a visit from Rochford's former Chaplain, de Visme, on his way 
home from Hadrid, 17 received perhaps undue prominence in Rochford's 
15. SP 78/273, f.204, Rochford 
16. SP 78/273, f.214, Rochford 
ibid., f.208, Shelburne to 
Studies, pp.72-74 
to Shelburne, 11 November 1767, Secret. 
to Shelburne, 19 Novembe~ 1767, Secret ; 
Rochford, 20 November 1767 ; V.L. Brown, 
17. SP 78/273, £.267, Rochford to Shelburne, 16 December 1767 ; SP 78/274, 
fos .. 18 and 20, Rochford to Shelburne, 6 and 13 January 1768. The 
French Q,uee!1, Haria Lese , finally died on 24 June 1768 ; see 
SF 78/275, f •. 102, Rochford to Shelburne, 26 June 1 
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dispatches from the paucity of other news. The only real business 
Rochford performed in January 1768 was to secure the release of 
three EnGlishmen imprisoned at Le Havre for smuggling tobacco .. 
Though their boat and cargo had been confiscated, they faced being 
sent to the galleys if they did not also pay a heavy fine. Rochford 
had been arguing aga~nstthis fine for almost a year, and only now 
did Choiseul relent and send orders for the fine to be dropped. 18 
February wa~ almost as quiet, bu~ for the pUblication of 
an old regulation 1;:hich lequired foreign travellers in France to 
have a passport from the French IHnisters as 'dell as their own 
Ambassador at Paris. As a result, several English travellers had 
been detained at Calais, even though they had Rochford's pass. 
Ghoiseul explained tllat the regulation had been revived without 
prior publicity 2.n the Gazett<~s solely on account of the insulting 
behaviour 0:1: the Russian Hinister, Gali tzin, in going a"Vtaywi thout 
leave-taking or passports. Rochford pointed out that many British 
subjects coming to France on commercial business never came to Paris 
at all. Choiseul accordingly sent orders to the seaports that such 
persons did not require their Ambassador!s pass, but were merely to 
register with the principal Officer of the place where they were 
. 19 gOl-ng. 
After this matter 1;las settled, Harch looked like be 
another quiet month, enlivened briefly by the arrival of a bulky 
package from Sir William Hamilton, the Brit Envoy at Naples. 
This contained a presentation copy of the first volu~o of what was 
18. SP 78/274, f. ,Rochford to Shelburne, 28 January 1758 ; see also 
SP 78/272, f.123, Rochford to Shelburne, 4 March 1767, and SF 78/273, 
f.264, Rochford to Shelburne, 10 December 1757. 
19~ SF 78/274, f08.65, 68, and 84, Rochford to Shelburne, 25 February, 
3 and 10 Harch 1768. 
t.o become famous as Hamil ton I s ~'< and Roman Antigui ties, \.,.hich 
he was then being published under a pseudonym at Naples. Though 
this copy was intended for George III, Hamilton begged Rochford to 
glance over it b~fore sending it on, as he would ba glad of his 
comments. Unfortunately, Rochford's comments do not appear to have 
survived. 20 
But no sooner had Rochford sent this volume on to London, 
than there buret out a great clamour in Paris over the hijacking of 
a French sloop by ten shipwrecked English sailors t·!l:=> \·:ere being 
brought from Cherbourg to Le Havre on the first stage of their 
journey home. The facts were soon revealed.. It. viHS a v\~ry small 
vessel, manned only by two men and a boy, whom the sailors had 
prevailed upon to sail dir€'ct to POl"tsmouth, so al1xiouswere they 
to get home. The sloop had since returned s~fely to France, but its 
Haster was making }oud noises in hope of gaining compensation. 
Rochford smooched the whole affair by sending to his correspondent 
at Rauen, to pay the Haster trlhat he asked, and by thanking the 
authorities at Cherbourg for facilitat the return of the castmV'ays! 
Choiseul merely grumbled at the lack of reciprocity sho"m in similar 
cases of French vessels I::~hip\"!recked on British shores. 21 
The remainder of Rochford's Paris Embassy i'las to be 
dominated to the exclusion of almost all other business by the 
crisis over the Fre~ch annexation of Corsica, but a few remaining 
points of interest may briefly be summarized before considering 
20. Lacaita-Shelburne Papers, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan ; Rochford to Shelburne, March 1768, Private. on's 
covering letter to Hochford of 16 February 1 nm'! in the 
'vI.S. / Ualpole Library at Farmington, Conn. 
21. SF 78/274, f.117,Shelburne to Rochford, 
fos.105 and 1 ,Rochford to Shelburne, 
1 April 1768 ; ibid., 
Harch 7 April 1 
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this important climacteric in Rochford's Career. 'rhese remaining 
points all concerned the possibility of a French 'revanche' against 
England. 
Early ~n March, Rochford warned Shelburne of one d'Angeul 
who was then "much conr.ectcd.11 vii th London society ; this man, he had 
found, was employed by Choisoul in Northern Europe as "a sort of 
honnete espion," and "1b.3 thought to be heading for Ireland where he 
Id t · 1 ' t h" 22 wou cer a1n y neeo wa c 1ng. , He was only the first of several, 
including Irish and Jacobite officers in French service who seemed 
interested in Ireland at this time ; when Rochford applied for a 
,assport on behalf of yet another French officer, Shelburne remarked 
that the "unusual Resort of French Officers +'0 Ireland" VfaS surely 
with no good intent. 23 
Yet Rochford's most noteble piece of intelligence in the 
. follo\.,ring month pninted to Canada rathEr than Ireland. His Secret 
and Confidential letter of 14 April., enclosing the p~per supplied 
by his informant, appears to have been lost, and few details are 
given in the two extant 'letters about this tlDesign on Canada. II 
Shelburne merely conveyed the King's approbation of Rochford's 
"Vigilance and Attention, ,I 2.ssuring hirn that his expenses in getting 
this intelligence would be reimbursed. But Rochford's further letter, 
giving details of his informant's contacts, added a genuine piece of 
news the 3ignifican~e of "Thich Rochford does not remark upon, 
namely that merchant vessels at certain French ports had recently 
24 been surveyed and registered, to be ready whenever de:rlanded. 
22. SF 78/274, f.119, Rochford to Shelburne, 3 Narch 1768, Secret. 
23. SP 78/275, f~1, Shelburne to Rochford, 6 May 1763, Secret. 
24. SP 78/275, f.1, Shelburne to Rochford, 6 May 1768, Secret (co~y in 
Shelburne Papers, Vol.161, f.27) ; Shelburne Papers, Vol.38, Pt.II, 
f.66, Rochford to Shelburne, 25 llay 1768, Secret & Private~ 
This was presumably part of the survey which Choiseul 
had ordered to 'Je made in 1767 of the condition, capacity, and 
local shipping of many smaller ports in Northern France, as part 
of his planning "for the 'revanche' against England. As Rochford's 
correspondents 1::ere onl:,r in a few of the major ports, it is not 
surprising that he was unaware of this survey, just as the British 
Government was Una\'lare of the espionage then being carried out by 
the Jacobite l"rench (Ifficer, Colonel Grant of Blairfindy, along the 
south coast of Eng12nd. 25 
Part of Choiseul's survey involved the takiIlg of soundings 
0n parts of the French channel coast, and this at least did not 
escape Rochford I s notice ; he ... laS even gi ven ~;he name of one of 
the engineers employed in t:i:iis work, one Aubert, who had since been 
reported in London. The soundings were ~lso noticed by an Englisr 
traveller who sent hil'> ovm report to Shelburne, adding that France 
was thought to be hoarding coin and importing unusually large 
shipments of lead, which suggested hostile preparations. But Rochford'E 
correspondent at Rouen, '\'lho was well-informed of \\fhat passed in the 
,seaports, declarbd that any exceptional importation of lead ,,!ould 
be sure to be reported to him, and he had heard nothing as yet. 
As for the hoarding of specie, Rochford was inclined to doubt it 
"they are too much distressed to think of hoarding.fI 26 
The touchiness of French coastal authorities at this time 
was demonstrated shortly in June, \·lith the arrest at Vannes 
of a British Naval Officer, one Captain on, \'Iho had been 
arrested 'II!hilst fishing fro:11 a small boat, on suspicion of taking 
25. H .. C. iIorison, lI:;:he Due de Choiseul and the invasion of 
1768-'1770, Ii ~.'r,:msactio!'ls 0:" the HOyJI .Historical Society, 3rd 
IV (1910), especially pp.86-87. 
26. SP 78/274, f.145, Shelburne to Rochford, 15 April 1768, Secret 
ibid., £.216, Rochford to Shelburne, 28 April 1768, Secret._ 
soundings. Hhen Rochford applied for his release, Choiseul at 
first gave two very short and frosty replies, and finally agreed 
to Sax,tonl s release only on condition that he travel inland on his 
return to Paris, ,<,her:e Rochford had first given him his passport. 27 
Rochford took note of all these signs, b~t refused to 
take alarm, adhering firmly to the opinion he had expressed to 
Shelburne in Ap~il ; 
"They pre::?are themselves as fast as They crJllveniently can, 
but I am still of Opinion it \vill be a great while before 
They are ready ; although in that- Case They may deceive 
h 1 ,. 28 t emse ves.·· 
Rochford fully expected that he would be ablE" to spend the coming 
summer at at Osyth. so little prospect did he see of any hostile 
action against England. 29 In this he \\Tas in a narrow 
technical sense! ; but the object to which Choiseul
' 
s a ttenti01:' vms 
diverted proved capable of inflict a sev~r3 diplomatic defeat 
upon Britain that very summer, confirming Cho~ seul' s stl.!'rnise t~a t 
France could prepare herself in good time \llhile the British Hinistry 
remained too \lleak and di"vidf7d to place any serious obstacle in her 
\ .. ay. 
\vhilst at ~L'ur:i.n before the Seven Years i War, Rochford had 
witnessed a phase of French ~Jithdrat'IaI from Corsica. ;;~fter expensive 
and fruitless efforts to subjugate the rebellio~s islanders for her 
ally, the Republic C'f Genoa. 30 But the onset of war soon after 
27. SP 78/275, f .140, Rochfo:'d to Shelburne, 11 July 1768. 
28. SP 78/274, f.216, Rochford to Shelburne, April 1768, Secret. 
29. J:'he Chelmsford and Colchester Chronicle for 4 Harch'1768 reported 
preparations alreaG.y m;ldng at Be Gsyth in antic ion of Rochford 1 s 
return (I O1;le this item to Hr Kenneth Halker, of Ror:lford, Esse;:.:). 
30. See above, Chapter 5, pp.134-1 
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Rochford's departure from Turin, soon had French troops back on the 
island ; the First Treaty of Compiegne between France and Genoa in 
1756 increased the French subsidies to the Republic. After the war, 
France sought a mere permanent solution to t~e Corsican question, 
and Choiseul opened secret negotiations with Paoli~ the insurgent 
leader, over a plan to make Corsica a French protectorat~, to the 
exclusion of GeLoa. But \voro leaked out, and the tX'ansaction Was 
hastily disavow0d. Choiseul returned to the nego.':iation called for 
by Genoa, and the result \vas the Second Treaty of Compiegne (6 August 
1764), by which French troops were to guard certain key places on 
the island for the next four years. 31 
This bree.thing space 111aS intended as an opportunity to 
work out a final solution, and while Genoa offered a Variety of 
proposals to tr.!;, Corsicans, each to be reje0ted, C11ois6111 resumed 
his secret corrasp~ndence with PaOli. But this approach also faile~~ 
and by the end of 1766, the insurgents had decided to rene\-T guerilla 
warfare against GenOa and hE:!' pOl-lerful ally. The Republic beCame 
increasingly anxio1 s as -the French troops began their planned 
withdrawal in the oourse 01 1767. 32 
Rochford's interest in Corsican affairs had been rekindled 
on his appointment to Faris, and he clearly kept himself informed 
31. Thadd E. Hall, "France and the Eighteenth Century Corsican Question!! 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hinnesota, 1966), pp.139-
146 ; thour;h there j,s a considerable literature in French (see Louis 
Villat. 1.2~ Corse--i~ ,1768 ,,\ 1739 ; These com·olement.,:,dre·; Essai de 
bibliogranhie critique (Besancon, 1924), for the range of v.'Oric), no 
comprehen;ive study "Ins : et" in English concerning the French 
acquisition of Corsica. 11here is a brief but useful account in J .:!:'. 
Ramsey, AnGlo-f'rench Relations, 176.;z-1720,pp.183-191, and some of the 
correspondence was published in Fit3maurice's Life Of Shelburne (1876), 
II, 119-1211-, 1 1~·0, but the most detailed studies remain unpublished., 
notably, E.S. Anderson 1 lIBri tish or~atic Relations t'/i th the 
Mediterranean, 1763-1778 11 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Edinburgh,1951), 
Hall (cited above), and R.E. Aba.rca, 1130urbon 1 revanche I 
England •• 1763-1770" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hotre 
Dame, 1965). Of these, Abarca ts Rochford's role detail. 
32. Hall, pp.156-176 ; Ramsey, pp.183-1 j Anderson, pp.229-231. 
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of developments there, reporting in June 1767 details of the latest 
offer made by Genoa to the Corsican leaders. One of the terms \>lould 
have given half the strong places to the Corsicans, but another 
gave France one strong place, as a guarantee of the agreement. This 
offer, like the others, was spurned by the islanders, but Rochford's 
comment was to prove. strangely prophetic; 
liThe French Hinistry still continue interfering greatly 
in the Affairs of Corsica •• It is very easy, in my 
Opinion, to discern that the French mean nothing but 
their ovm Aclvanta:se in this, and to secure to Themselves 
a Post and Place of Security in that Island for their 
future Vie,,,,s.1I 33 
He had recognized whilst at Turin the strategic value of Corsica 
for li'rance, and had declared that its posses8sion by BritFlin' s 
breat rival \'10uld 'be of the utmost importance in time of vlar. Even 
then, there had been recurrent rumours that France planned to acquire 
Corsica for herself. 34 But Corsica aroused little interest in British 
Government circles ; the fate of the island was a ~atter for apathy 
and indifference at London, even though the Fren.eh constantly feared 
some for!!! of British intervention there durin:; the Se~ren Years' VIar. 35 
The evacuation of French troops from the ish~nd continued 
during 1767, while large numbers of Jesuits were arriving in search 
of refuge after their expUlsion from Spain and Parma. Genoa1s frantic 
anxiety reached new heights of desperation that summer, and \-lhile 
Rochford \>las on leave in August and September, his Secretary, Porten, 
33. SP 78/272, f.314, Rochford to Shelburne, 18 June 1767. 
34. See above, Chapter 5, p.1 
35. Anderson, pp. , convincingly establishes this point" and 
argues that the iGnorance of British Hinistcrs regarding Corsica 
prevented the for2ul&tion of any coherent ~olicy on the subject. 
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noted frequent exchanges between Choiseul and Sorba, the Genoese 
Hinister at Par~3. It \<1as generally thought that these talks 1I1ere 
to do with the Jesuits on Corsica, 36 but in fact, they were to 
decide a much more important matter. In Hay, Genoa h:..d made the 
first tentative suggest;,ons that she might cede Corsica to another 
power under certain conditions. In June and July, Choiseul had 
decided that if any power were to have Corsica, that power must be 
It-'rance, but Oil France f s terms. The first specifi-:: proposal for a 
cession was rejected. by Choiseul, who then propo.G(J(i :J. counter-project. 
These highly secrE;t e::changes occupied the latter mcmths of 1767, 
and were still not {;ompletely settled atche :start of 1768, though 
it seemed likely that Genoa would finally aC00pt Choiseul's terms. 37 
It ''las impossible r..o'!', to believe that; these exchanges 
still concerned the Jesuits on Corsica, and speculation began to 
mount at Genoa and Pa:ris as to their real purpose. At last, in Harch, 
a. runlOur spread at Paris that French troops were to be sent back to 
Gorsica, which suggested that a new Convention was being formed 
bet1.<1een France and Genoa to take effect from the expiry of the 1764 
agreement. Choi&eul \vent out of his lIJay to reassure Rochford that 
"as yet Nothing was fixed~1! Yet Rochford thought he could perceive 
"an Uneasiness in him that this had been so much talked of," and 
wondered whether something bigger than the mere renewal of the 1764 
Convention \vas in t.lle wind 
"If these Troops are sent to Corsica, and the Convention 
is renewed, it is 60 directly opposite to what the Duke 
of Choiseul has allways declared, that I should be inclined 
to think 'l'hey had some more distant Vie\,. !! . . . 
36. SP 73/273, fos.G5, 67, 69, ,87, Porten to Shelburne, 13, 20, 21, 
27 August 1 and 9 September 1767. 
37. Hall, pp.176-177 ; Ramsey, pp.185-6. 
Once people were used to seeing troops collected each year to 
replace those on duty in Corsica, France co~ld b8gin to build up 
her forces there without causing any alarm, if she ha;:L some Itdistant 
View" in m'ind. Rochford thought this might be their plan for two or 
three years hence ; "for if 'rhey think of Any Thinr; for the present f 
They are madder I mU,qt own than I believe them to be." 38 
Mad o~ not, however, the acquisition of Corsic& Was very 
much a present view for Choiseul, and Shelburne 'Jas being warned of 
this from at least hlo sources in March and April. Horace Hann at 
Florence hlice reported strong rumours that Gonoa was about to cede 
Corsica to France, and Consul Hollford at Genoa (a. worthy successor 
1.0 Rochford's old friend Birtles) Was even able to send a sketch of 
the terms under discussion. 39 But ShGlburne remained .stubbornly 
disbelieving trf't Choiseul could contemplat'3 such a in time of 
'peace. He gently sounded Ch8.telet about the troops rumoured to be 
sen t to Corsica, Rnd vIas easily assured tna t the rumours ,.;ere grossly 
exaggerated and nothing had yet been decided. 40 Shelburne informed 
Rochford of the reports £rom Mann, and admitted that if true this 
would prove "a Hat tt:r of s2rious Considerati.:>r;.. II But he gave no 
advice or guidance for Rocnford to follow, other tha~ asking him to 
be alert to any f4rther details. 41 No such advice could be given, 
for nO policy on Corsica other than indifference existed in London 
42 
at this time. 
38. SP 78/274, f.119, Rochford to Shelburne, 3 Harch 17G8, Secret. 
39. Anderson, pp.235-236, citing SP 98/73 for Hann to Shelburne, 
26 March and April 1708, and Hollford to Shelburne, 9 April 1768. 
Hollford had sugges-c;ed that the "alienation" of the \'Thole iGIRnd 
was being mooted in September 1767. 
40. SP 78/274, f.123, Shelburne to Rochford, 8 April 1 • 
41. AECP eterre, 478, f. ,Chb.telet to Choiseul, 8 April 1768, 
cited in Ramsey, p.187. 
42. Anderson, pp.233-234. 
Shelburne's scepticism seemed to be justified as the 
rumours of troops for Corsica subsided and lied away entirely at 
Paris by the end of March. 43 Nor, apparently, did he anticipate 
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any more serious deYelopl11ents, since he readily agreed to Porten's 
request for a spell of home leave, to be taken in the :ollowing 
44 
month. But in thE:. early part of April, a ne,v e.nd more alarming 
rumour began to circulate widely in Paris, that Genoa definitely 
intended making a cession of Corsica to France. I1ochford wondered 
i'fhether this had been Sdt on foot deliberately to test Britain's 
reaction ; "for a fIotion prevails here, that l;le s:LOuld not interfere 
in it, if the Frc;uch had such a Design.!! Accordingly, \'1herever he 
heard this opinion expressed, Rochford took it on himself to deny it 
most strongly ; so much so, that Choiseul chided him for suggesting 
j.n public circ:.0s that Britain would not remain indifferent to any 
45 larger French involvement in Corsica. Ch&t~let adopted the sam~ 
bold reproving tone with Shelburne in London, insist 
. 46 
that the rumours vlere wildl;r exaggerated. 
once more 
But Rochford I s· suspicions l..rere now thoroughly aroused, 
and he did his utr:;cst to (Ltscover ,<,!hat \vas autually afoot, obviously 
sparing no expense. His contacts within the lower ech\Jlons of the 
French Hinistry !Soon pro·liCted him \v1 th information of the utmost 
importance, and on 21 April Rochford was able not only to confirm 
the rutlours of an intended cession, but in addition to supply a full 
and accurate forecafc of the agreement under nesotiation. Genoa's 
43. SP 78/274, f.137, Rochfo~d to Shelburne, 7 April 1768. 
44. SP 78/274, f.150, Porten to Shelburne, 13 April 1768 ; ibid., f.204, 
Shelburne to Porten, 22 April 1 
45. SP 78/274, f.1 ,Rochford to Shelburne, 14 April 1768 ; did 
not mention Choiseul'a rebuke, which known only from the 
sources ; see Anderson, p.238, c t;.ECP Angleterre, 478, Choiseul 
to Chatelet, 3 1768. 
46. AECP Angleterre, 1t78 , Ch8.telet to Choiseul, 8 and 22 A:pril ~768, 
cited Anderson, p.23S. 
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first project had involved a guarantee against Bar~ary pirates, 
which Choiseul had rejected, but the Frencr counter-project now 
being considered by Genoa was that France should occupy Corsica 
with twenty Battalions, make herself mistreFs of the islanders and 
receive the vlhole revenue of the island, and that GDIIC? ivould agree 
to pay France her ey.~enses in thus pacifying the island before 
restoring it to Genoese control. It required little genius to see 
through these terms 
til have also Reason to believe that this Court have 
adopted this l1ethod preferably to hav-i.ng the Island 
yielded J~o 'fhem ou:richt, as it ''lill ansver as fully 
T.heir Intentions, ar.d not give the sume Jealousy to Us 
but when once T\<)'enty Battalions of E'rench 'frooT's are 
landed there, and the French hl. Possession of the Island, 
I do not apprehend the Genoese will rspaJ" Them the Expenee 
of the Expedition, or tha t the French \'lil1 be disposed to 
47 restore it to them .. !! 
Remarkably eno1tgh, Shelburne still made no p0sitive 
response to this clear and urgent warning, other than to commend 
Rochford for his vigilance, and to discourse pletitudinoTIsly upon 
the seriousness of a Frenel1 acquisition of Corsic'3.., "by any collusive 
Bargain or other\vise .. II He also conveyed the King's approval for 
Rochford's havil .. g "therefore judged very properly" i.n discouraging 
the notion that Britain would not object. But all he could suggest 
\1aS that Rochford find out \'lhat the Sardinian Ambassador at Paris 
thought of the ne~lS ; there Was no hint of any protest to Choiseul. 48 
47 .. SF 78/274, f.206, Rochford to Shelburne, 21 April 1768 ; Hall,p.250, 
is mistaken in saying that the British Government knew nothing of 
the teros until the end of June ; he is evidently uria,..rare of this 
accurate forecast by Rochford in April. Nor were .Rochford's the only 
spies at work ; Frederick II of Prussia had a carbled version of the 
project about this tine (see Poli tische Corres~)o!1(3.enz :;;:r:..eiCirich' s 
des GrosseJ1.,XXVII, 140, No.17180, diJ.ted 21 April 1768). 
48. SP 78/274, f.210, Shelburne to Rochford, 29 April 1768, Secret. 
Yet the very thing 1,-lhich Choiseul most feared at this 
time \>las a strong British protest, especially if accompanied by 
active interference,such as the sending of a fleet to blockade 
Corsica ; 'he warned Ch@. telet to keep a very c.~05e \;1'<" tch on Britain 1 s 
reaction, and to avoid giving any opelling \-Thereby Britain might 
seek to involve herself in the agreement "lith Genoa. 49 Ch£.telet 
accordingly sent a man to tour the Brit naval yards, but he 
reported no activity cut of the ordinary, ~nd positively refuted 
the rumours that reinforcements were being prepared for Gibraltar 
and Hinorca. By the end Df April, Chatelet had seen littJe likelihood 
of serious British i!1"i;ervention c The silence of the British Ninistry 
he attributed to l~ck of any definite policy regarding Corsica and 
continued ignorance of Choiseul's intentions. He doubted if the 
Hinisters had su~ficient foresight to act in concert with the Court 
of Turin. 50 
Choiseul no'V! kept a profound silence with the foreign 
ministers regarding Corsica Rochford observed, lias at first They 
were infinitely indiscreet in the Language the:ly held, They no,,' affect 
as great a Hystery.1I In fact, Britain's best chance i;o make an 
effective protest was rapidly slipping away, as Rochford reported 
at the end of April the arrival of Sorba's ~owars to trp.at formally 
\'1i th Choiseul. 51 On 5 Hay, Rochford further reported the public 
announcemen t of hoTel ve Battalions of troops for Corsica, 1L.'1der the 
49. AECP Angleterre, 478, f.63, Choiseul to Chatelet, ~~ 18 April 1768, 
cited in Ramsey, p.187. 
50. 
51. 
AECP Angleterre, 478, f.131, Ch&telet to Choiseul, April 1768, 
cited in Anderson, pp.238-9, and Ramsey, p.187. 
SP 78/274, f.216, Rochford to Shelburne, 28 il 1768, Secret. 
Rochford noted that Choiscul had received a messenger from Genoa, 
and nredicted that the rrench counter-project would now go ahead, 
thou~h the troops \'1ould nrobably be sent as if on the same foot 
as b~fore, 11 and- Co.re Hill be taken to give as little Alarm 
about it as possible. lJ 
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c.ommand of his former rival at Turin, Chauvelin. 52 Vlith the 
fi ve Ba ttalionG already in Corsica, this ':Iould make seventeen in 
all. Rochford had sounded the Sardinian Ambassador, who confessed 
that when he bro~ched the subject of corsica, Choi8e~l had "talked 
.~ 
very mysteriously and ir.. vF;.8;Ue Terms. II Rochford was nOvl thoroughly 
alarmed, and moreover impatient at having no clear instructions ; 
"Your Lordship and the rest of His Hajesty's Servants 
are' the best Judges \'lhether it will be proper for me 
to demand from the Duke of Choiseul \'Ihat the Intentions 
of this Court are \-'lith Regard to Corsica., whElt I \-lOuld 
not take up()n myself to do, least I should have received 
such an ALswex as perhaps would not have been liked. 
I shall 'Jnly therefore be very a ttenti vo in attending to 
what passes further on this Subject, untill I receive 
Other Instructions fro!:"! Your Lordship. \1 
It \vas as broad a hint as politeness and co:r.vention perL1itted from 
a diplomat the field to his indecisive chief. 
Yet even as Rochford drafted this dispatch~ Shelburne 
'lias giving Chatelet his first clear vlarning that Britain could not 
remain indifferent to any sort of French acquisition of Corsica, 
as this ''Iould contravene Article Fifteen of the Treaty of Aix-la-
Chapelle, which guarante{,d the status quo in Italy. Ch&.telet replied 
in mock astonishment that he knew of no such scheme (1), but pointed 
out that Genoa. had clear sovereignty over Corsica to arrange its 
affairs as she pleased, since that article of the 1748 Treaty vIas 
understood to apply only to the mainland states at the time of the 
52. See above, Chapter 5, pp.131- 133. 
53. SP 78/275, f.9, Rochford to Shelburne, 5 May 1768, Secret ; 
Abarca, p.311, overstates the case when he says that Rochford 
here asked for oernission to demand an from Choiseul, 
just as he earlier (p.310) misrepresents the n~ture of Rochford's 
advance telligence of 21 April. 
of the treaty. Shelburne had no answer to this, nor ta 
Chatelet IS decl.?ration that France could not reasonably be expected 
to lay bare every stage of such a negotiation to the rest of Europe. 
Shelburne remain0d uncertain whether to believe Chfit~let's assurances 
or to suspect the worst as Rochford had done. His only instructions 
to Rochford vlere for him to use "Caution & Prudence!! in talking of 
this with Choiseul ; quite the reverse of what Rochford felt was 
~rgently necessary. 55 
Despi te Rochford! sample vlarning of what W"ts ~doot, 
Choiseul succeeded in keeping Shelburne in doubt as ~o his real 
j.ntentions until it was too late to intervene effectiVely. Choiseul 
instructed ChAtelet to make little of the wh~:e affair, and to assure 
Shelburne that the current agreement was broadly similar to those of 
1727, 1737, 1756, and 1764, to which no objections had been made. 56 
Shelburne could only fall back on general arguments regarding the 
Balance of Power, and the necE:ssity of preventing anyone power from 
waxing over-mighty at the expense of its neighbours. 57 
At Paris in the meantime, on 15 :f:lay, the new Convention 
between France alid Genoa to decide the future of Corsica was signed. 
The terms were exactly as Rochford had forecast in April, the fourth 
Article being the key one which stipulated repayment by Genoa of 
France f S expenses before the island vlould be restored to her ; in 
effect, an outright cession to France. Choiseul had achieved his 
fait accompli, and Britain had lost her best opportunity to intervene. 
SP 78/275, f.1, Shelburne to Rochford, 6 May 1768, Secret; but 
compare AECP Angleterre, ,f.166, Ch&telet to Choiseul, 6 
1768, cited in Ramsey, pp.' 188; Anderson, pe239, observes that 
Shelburne's nccount of interview is much less adequate 
of Cha.telet. 
56. AECP Angleterre, 
cited in Ramsey, 
p.237, follows; 
57. S? 78/275, f.11, 
478, f.210, Choiacul to Ch&telet, 12 May 1768, 
p.237 (but there misprinted as ~D.rch, which Anderson, 
see IS notes, p.258, n.17). 
Shelburne to ford, 18 Hay 1768, Secret.-
58. Hull, p.200 ; Ramsey, pp.188-9, summarizes the treaty. There were 
fifteen published nrticles and two secret (on which see below). 
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Admittedly the information available to Shelburne ,,'as 
scanty and impossible to verify, but what he had was quite adequate 
for the formulation of a more positive policy and a dem.and of 
Ghoiseul's intentions such as Rochford had suggested. A strong 
protest in April or early in May might have made Chniseul pause, 
especially in view o:f' the French King's fear of \\Tar and -ehe nature 
of Choiseul's u:.timate dO'omfall over the Falkland Islands crisis in 
1770. But once the Convention was signed and the French occupation 
of Corsica had begun, there 'vas little effectivA action Britain 
could take short of \\Tar. 59 
It '-laS only as public opinion stirred in Britain in 
support of Paoli, largely in consequence of Boswell's publications 
on Corsica and his idealized portrait 0f Paoli, that a policy had 
to be found by the Ministers. Gallophobic fears of giving France 
such a marked stre.tegic and (as was ignorantly supposed) economic 
advantage in the Hedi terranean left no doubt in most Eng;lish minds 
of the action to be taken ; a British squaaron could have blockaded 
Corsica, preventing the landing of any more French troops, until 
Paoli and his fol10wers had dealt with those ~lready there. As for 
the future, this \vas left to vague suggestions of so;r.r; sort of 
60 British protectorate. 
But instead, Shelburne deferred any decisior. on Corsica 
until the matter could be discussed by a full Cabinet, and this viaS 
delayed by "a necef'sary Attention to Home Affairs at the openine 
59. Anderson, pp.24o-242, eG~ablishes the loss of opportunity ; 
Fitzmaurice's Life of Shelburne, II, 119-122, also argues that 
an earlier protest backed up by stern threats might ,have stopped 
Choiseul and enabled his opponents at Court to join forces. 
60. Fitzmaurice, II, 138 ; on Boswell and the stirring oX public opinion, 
see Anderson, pp.242-244. Bom,ell l s Journal of' a 'L'02..r to CorGic~l 
and Memoirs of Pascal Paoli were already being translated into 
French by Hia.rt ; Deffaud to Ualpole, 11 July 1 ,',,'al"Oole 
Correspondence, edited by W.S. Lewis (Yale,1937-), IV, 106-~07. 
of the Parliament, & to a tumultuous spirit. • shEH..ring itself 
among the different Glasses of the Lower So:-t of People." (This 
one of the clearest instances of foreign policy waiting upon domestic 
affairs~which continent2l observers saw as t~e chief weakness of 
Britain's archaic shared Secretaryship of State before 1782.) 61 
Shelburne's only instructions for Rochford v/ere that he should 
main tain, 11\..ri th your usual Discretion, II the same eeneral language. 
as before, in &~pport of which Shelburne encloaett extracts from 
earlier correspondence. One of these, from 1743; contained precisely 
the statement Roch!'ord lrlould have wished to mElke to Choiseul, "That 
Great Britain \'lOuld not suffer the Republick of Genoa to sell Corsica 
to any PO\1er \vhatsoever." Times had. indeed changed ; Shelburne seems 
to have been ner~ous of plunging in more deeply, lest he gave his 
62 
enemies a pretF~t for forcing him out of office. All he could 
do was to try to bully Chatelet a little, with accusatio~s that 
Corsica was but the first step in a final rupture with England vlhich 
France and Spain had long bC'en preparing ;-but Chatelet could for onC9 
honestly laugh this cff -as preposterous. 63 
The one person vll10 might have kept up the pressure on 
Shelburne for more prompt and positive action \;laS Rochford himself. 
Yet by an unfortunRte coincidence, at this very t Rochford fell 
gravely ill, and vIas fighting for his life in the middle part of 
Hay 1768, just as Choiseul and Sorba \lIere sisn1rrg the ne,V' Convention. 
61. See the discussion, with abundant references, in Mjchael Roberts, 
Splendid Isolatj.on, 1763··~780 (Reading,1970), pp.4-7. 
62. SP 78/275, f.11, Shelburne to Rochford, 18 Hay 1768, Spcret ; ibid., 
f.14, for the enclosed memoranda. On Shelburne's deteriorating 
position and the d of his colleagues, see further below, and 
also Brooke, iX'he ChC".thar:1 ;tdrr0nistrr"tion, pp.328-331, 363-4. 
63. AECP Angleterre, 478, fe 274, elat to Choiseul, 20 Hay 1768, 
cited in , p.189. 
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Rochford's illness was indeed very serious. He later 
described it 'himself as "a continued and a putrid fever," "'hich 
broke out on 3 May and kept him abed for more than two weeks. 
'I'he physicians declared the crisis passed vJhen Rochford I s fever 
subsided on 17 May, but the illness left him very ",eak ; lIStrength 
ard Appetite come but slowly. II He was of course muoh too \-leak to 
appear at Court for some time, and anticipated a lengthy convalescence 
flafter so violent an Illness. II Yet by 26 May he vms able to sit up 
in bed, and felt "well enough to attend a little to Business," 
64 
promising that he would be Has diligent as my Health \vill allO\'1 r.Je." 
Shelburne exprl':ssed the Ilgreat con;;ern" of the King and 
hIs Ministers at R0chford's illness, 65 but the business of the 
E!!lbassy remained in Port en I s trustworthy car(~, and Rochford hi.m 
l.'eport to bedside every conversation P01;'ten held tvith "'rhose ,ve 
can most depend on here. 1f Thus it was that Rochford directed Port en 
to report on 18 Hay that the expedition for Corsica was hp,stenine; on 
III'Jore suddenly than was at first imagined. II This hasty departure 
of the first seven or eight Battalions might have been in consequence 
of a fresh outbreak of hostilities on the island, but Rochford and 
Porten agreed that it seemed far more likely t~at the French meant 
lito put in Execution their Project before declare openly or 
publickly the 110tives of it to the Courts of Europe.!! 'Dlis inclined 
Rochford to think that the Convention had already been signed, as in 
66 fact it had been, just three days before. 
64. SP 78/275, f. , Port en to Shelburne, 18 May 1768 ; ibid., f.47, 
Rochford to Shelburne, Hay 1768 ; VIe.lnolo CorresDondence, edited 
by VI.S. (Yale,1), IV, ,Deffand to 1:lalpole, 22 l-lay 1768, 
remarks of Rochford ; lIil i3. 6te fort malade.!I 
65. SP 78/275, 1'. , Shelburne to Parten, 1768. 
66. SP 78/275, f08.16 and 27, Parten to Shelburne, 11 and 18 May 1768, 
Secret. 
Hhile Rochford was recovering from illness, Porten 
attended at Court in his place, where Choiseul continued to assure 
him that the Convention would soon be made publio, and that they 
intended no more than had been previously concerted 1lfith Genoa. 67 
Choiseul came to visit Rochford at his house on the evening of 
Tuesday 24 May, to ensure that he had received these assuranoes. 
But even though Rochford remained without i~structions from Shelburne, 
on his own initiative he seized the opportunity to sound Choiseul 
as to the probable rep:y s:hould he make a formal demand. of intent ; 
"He heard me \vi th great Patience, and as I am still 
extremely Heal~" he affected the great(lst Civility and 
Attention, and. indeed, spoke \vith the Greatest Douceur 
imaginable •. , 
Rochford merely observed that as they were ao obviously hastening 
their troops to Corsica, he would probablJ be instructed to ask 
what their intentions werB ,'lith regard to Corsica, and 0hoiseul 
replied that if that \-rere so, he would "confidently concert the 
Ans\'ler along \1i th me, and agreeable to my ~vay of Thinking. 1I But he 
added, more ominously, that France had been a-. an enormous expense 
in assisting Genoa with auxiliaries, and they were naturally desirous 
of being repaid in one way Or another. 
In the oourse of their conversati)n, the two men ranged 
over most of the arguments already raised, notably that based on the 
fifteenth Article of Aix-la-Chapelle, to which Choiseul made the 
same reply that Chatelet had made to Shelburne in London. Rochford 
then attempted to·use the Turks Island dispute as a narallel case, 
in 1tlhich France had, in response to Bri t<:lin' s 11 fair & open" dealings, 
refrained from making Han ;I:nnovation since the Peace,H which Corsica 
67. SP 78/275, f. ,Porten to Shelburne, 25 Hay 1768, Secret. 
510. 
in French hands would undeniably be. Choiseul howoyer argued that 
the cases were entirely different, and that France's intervention 
in Corsica ,-las purely in defence of her southern coasts. From all 
this, Rochford gathered that 1!there vTill be at; lee.st the Risque of 
a brusque An12>\'J'er. II 
Choiseul had taken pains to reassure R:)chford and to lull 
his fears and suspicions ; 
[Choiseul J II •• in +;he most solemn Hanner assure,:'!. me that 
there viaS nothir..g in Nature he \'JOuld not do to preserve the 
Peace for T\-1enty Y dars to come ; that the King his l-:laster 
dreaded the Thoughts of a \var, and that indeed They \'lere 
very far from being in a Condition to undertake one. l1 
Here WI3.S a charact:.ristic mixture of deception and truth, Tdhich 
~eemed to Rochford ~erely to reflect Choiseul's anxiety that Britain 
might after all cause a fuss over Corsica ; 
II • • the Truth is, that many People o'f: the first 
consequence here, have blamed the Duke of Choiseul 
::'or this Expedi tio~, least it should tend to c.re.:1. te 
Mischief behleen France and Us. II 
He ''Tondered whether Choiseul had assured Louir; Xv that Britain 
would not take umbrage, and that the King had then bean surprised 
68 
to hear of Rochford's contrary declarations in the Balons of Paris. 
Yet even as Rochford vms making t.'ese tentative soundings 
on his own initiative, Shelburne 'lltas at last drafting his first 
major instructions on Corsica, which authorized Rochford to make 
the formal demand of intent to Choiseul he had so long awaited. 
There had been two full Cabinet meetings in London C'l'1 the subject 
68. SF 78/275, f. ,Rochford to Shelburne, 26 May 176&, Secret. 
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of Corsica, and the I'Iinisters had unanimously agreed that 
Rochford should impress upon Choiseul that the French acquisition 
of Corsica \"rould endanger' the peace of Europe, and that Britain 
could not remain idle or indifferent in such an event. This would 
be a step so Iltotally departingll from France's professed adherence 
to the peace, that Shelburne saw it as "a very sufficient Ground to 
apprehend a Change of System in the French Court, as far as the 
Professions of any C(,urt deser;re the name a .System. I! 
Yet Shelburne's uncertainty persisted, &.110 !'cvee.led itself 
in his advice to Rochford. vlhile trusting in Rochford I B "Coolness & 
Firmness" to give Choiseul a distinct ir.'ipress:Lon of Britain's views, 
he stressed that Rochford should Ittake Care t" preserve the utmost 
'Iemperll (viz. composure] until the actual terms of the Convention 
were made public, in order to avoid committjng either Court to an 
extreme stance. 
Ghatelet had again that week assured Shelburne that the 
Gonven tion 'vIas not yet concluded (1) and had repeated Choiseul' s 
argument that France's interest in Corsica itlaS purely defensive. 
Shelburne had co~ntered this with the statement that whatever their 
purpose, the fact of possession was a matter of serious interest for 
Britain. To Rochford, he observed ; 
1I0ne need but look upon the Hap to see its Importance 
with a View to Offence as well as Defence ; Not to 
mention the Re0ruits, the Sailors it may supply, the 
Timber for Shipbuilding, &c.; It will be from its 
Situation at onet: a Protection to their OlV'n Coast, 
& an effectual Bridle on the Port of Leghorn, as i."el~ 
t ~dd' t . f P · .... h" d' t 'I 09 as a greal'i. 1 lon 0 m·ler ln " e he 1 erranean.' 
69. SP 78/275, f. ,Shelburne 
printed almost in full in 
1789, VII, France, iv (1 , 
(London,1 ), pp.101-1 l"rederick II had 
strate~ic value of C ; see Politische Correspondenz, 
,C) -- .~ 196-7, Ji'redericJ: to Haltzan, 2 June 17bo. 
Shelburne'S Instructions reached Rochford on 30 Hay, 
just in time for Choiseu1 1 s visit to Rochford on the evening of 
31 Hay. Rochford noted that Choiseul spoke "not only with the 
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greatest Coolness and Temper, but with an unaccountable Frankness 
and good Humour" ; \<,e11 he might, almost certain of having carried 
off a major diplomatic coup. But Rochford, in re1at very closely 
Shelburne's instructions from a unanimous Cabinet, \lIas "nevertheless 
excessively serious" as he impre~sed upon Choiseul, 11 the strongest 
but the civilest Terms,!' how seriously the British G~vernment viewed 
France's Corsican venture. In addition, Rochford tried to dray, 
Choiseulout, "as he is apt enough to speak freely on every Subject, 
and sometimes indiscreetly, II by suggesting tlk.t unless he could quiet 
the alarms of his countrymen this affair llmigh";:; be: attended vii th 
fatal Consequences. 1I 
HI sm", I :ran no Risk in going thus far, as by the Humour: 
he "It'as in, I do not believe a Threat ,"ould have ruffled 
him, or have drawn a severe Reply from him.1t 
Yet this tactic proved successful. Choiseul admitted that Ch~teletts 
dispatches "lere f'11l of anxiety at the talk of ,,,,ar and expeditions 
current in London, of Lord Howe's be sent to the Mediterranean, 
and Sir Ed'dard Ha\"rke I s being summoned to Cabinet meetings. "lhen 
Rochford reassured Chois(l:l that Hawl<::e "las in fact a member of the 
Cabinet Council ordinar~ly, as First Lord of the Admiralty, Choiseul 
complimented Rochfo~d on hi0 evident sincere desire to preserve their 
friendship, and began to discourse in a much more relaxed and 
confidential fashion. Rochiord steered the conversation tOvlards the 
terms of the Convention, and was rewarded with Choiseul's first 
explicit admission that the present arrancements would probably 
result in an outright cession to France. 
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Having admitted that he believed Genoa i10uld not only 
never be able tJ reinburse them, but never intended it, Choiseul 
hastened to add that this ",vas the only possible method of settling 
the vexed questi::m of Corsica, as Genoa novl refused absolutely to 
trea t \vi th Paoli and he 'Vdth therl. Rochford here asked "lhether there 
were not any secret articles to the new Convention, and Choiseul 
promised that he \'Iould soon let Rochford read the 'vhole docunent in 
the original. Choise~l then paused a little, and said ; 
"This has beer.: a Project of ny 0\1n ; Hany Othc::,i:"s \'1ere 
proposed or: the Genoose applying to Us, some of which 
would justly h::we given offence. f! 
But he insisted that he had net imagined his present scheme giving 
any umbrage to another Court, much less to Britain~ "so far distant 
from the Place in question. 1I 
Ror..llf,)rd at once replied that considering Choiseul's 
k:io'V'In wisdom..L'1d prudence, III was amazed he did not sound us before 
he engaged so far it," and reminded Choiseul that "'lhen Rochford 
first mentioned this affair, "his Language vias rather different then 
from what it is r.0W. II Rochford added, 
"that the Hurrying on this Affair looked as if They had 
intended not to h8.ve given us time to interfere, untill 
They could say It 1:lD.S too late. II 
This simple statement of truth \1aS a Shre\1d and telling point, 
which visibly embar."assed the Hinister. Yet Choiseul insisted 
that 
that 
they \vere nm'l too far committed to think of retreat. He said 
if the troops had not alre8.dy been sent, he \vould give it up, 
"cotte qui coute, mals de 10. fD.ire " / Irous serions a present, 
deshonore " jamais dans les Yeux de tout Ie Honde, et la a
Ruine tomberoit particulierement sur moi ainsi, que faire ? 
car pourto.nt nlest pas possible d'avoir la Guerre pour 
Corse! -- cela seroit trop ridicule, pourtant si on nous 
attaque, il faudroit nous defendre. L'alternative est 
terrible! II 
5'14. 
Choiseul solemnly assured Rochford it wae not his 
intention to deceive ; but by now Rochford ~ad learned to recognize 
that this exaggerated solemnity usually accompanied Choiseul's 
greatest deception.s. Even. so, he reflected l:tter that the "1hole 
intervie,.." tended to confirm his impression that 
flPeace is cert5.inly their present Object ; the very Alarm 
the \1hole French Nation is at this Homent in, a strong 
Voucher "'.ow much 'Ehey dread a vlar, and it may be added 
that the Duke of Choiseul is personally interested to 
prevent it." 
Rochford gladly agreed to Choiseul's request that he submit a 
formal Note containing the demand he had been instructed to 
make of them. 70 
Two days after this long and revealinp; inter~ .. ievi, 
Rochford submit ted his Note, \,,}].ich Choiseul acknm'lledged that 
same day, deferring a formal Reply until after a Council had met 
"1 upon the matter with the French King. f Now that Rocht'ora. was 
up and about again, Porten Frepared to leave for England on his 
home leave, which had been delayed by Rochford's illness. 72 Also 
at this time, Rochford's contacts uithin the :French administration 
supplied him with the gist of the two secret articles, which were, 
firstly, that FrR.nee 'I.'las to pay Genoa a subsidy of 200,000 livres 
a year for the next ten years, and secondly, that France promised 
never to yield any part of Corsica to a third party, which meant 
73 not only the insurgent Corsicans but any other pm-Ier whntever. 
70. SP 78/275, f.59, Rochfor~ to Shelburne, 2 June .1768, Host Secret; 
extract printed in Fitzmaurice, II, 129 see also AndBrGon, p.2lr7, 
and Abarca, pp.319-321. 
71. SP 78/275, f.69, Rochford to Choiseul, 2 June 1 
Choiseulto Rochford, 2 June 1768. 
72. SP 78/275, f.65, Porten to Shelburne, 5 June 1768. 
73. SP 78/275, f.67, Rochford to Shelburne, 6 June 1768. 
ibid., f.71, 
Choiseu1's formal Reply on 5 June was remarkably mild 
in its tone, an~ merely recapitulated all the familiar arguments, 
that France's interest in Corsica was purely defensive, and that 
the present agreAment in no 'ltJay contravened the TreaJ..;y of Aix-la-
Chape11e. 74 A few days later, Rochford felt well enough to visit 
Choiseul at his house, \"here they talked a .1ong 'Vlhile on Corsica. 
Rochford's Note had said. that the conduct of the Court of Versailles 
had given just grounc',s for doubting the pacific H3surD.nces of the 
French King ; Choise111 remarked that he thought thif: ll,"as , ... rote 
in very strong Te!ms,Jt and \'Ihen the Note was read OHe in Cound.1, 
Louis XV had been heard to murmur, did the Englioh King take him 
to be a rascal ? ("Est-ce que Ie Roi d I Anglet",rre me eroi t un }"ripon?!I: 
Choiseul's reply had streBscd ~·!hat he again dwelt upon to Rochford, 
namely, the Frer.ch King t s fr::'endship and cor. fidence towards George III ~ 
and his desire to quiE"!t Brita.in's alarms. Rochford replied sternly 
and with djgnity, 
"that Facts spoke for chemsel ves ,Rnd that Assur'ances of 
pacifick Intentiono whilst they were apparently acquiring 
Extent of ~orce and Possessions, Was so contradictory that 
it could not b1tt give Doubts ; and that my Court desired 
nothing more than to have those Doubts cleared Up.1I 
Choiseul promised to show Rochford the whole treaty on his return 
from the country next week~ and trusted that when he saw the whole, 
his Court would be Gatisfied. 75 
But in fact, Choiseul was nervous of Britain1s reaction 
once the full treaty \'[a:::> knoun, and he took care to d.elay this 
74. SF 78/275, f.73, Choiseul to 30chford, 5 June 1768 ; Vaucher, (ed.) 
Recueil des Instructions donn6es aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de_ 
France, X}:V -2, erre, iii, p.l+51, prints un extr!].ct from a copy 
in AEc:e Anc;leterre, ,f 
75. SP 78/275, f.75, Rochford to Shelburne, 9 June 176&, Secret. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
revelation as long as he decently could. Rochford knew that the 
Ratifications had arrived back fro~ Genoa the day before, but did 
not mention this lest Choiseul guess his sources of information, 74 
so that it· was doubly odd for the Sardinian Ambassador to be told, 
when he asked for a confidential communication of the treaty, that 
he would in time receive this from the Englis~ Courto It became 
obvious that Choiseul If/as merely for time "'hen he sent the 
Genoese Hinister, Sorba, to visit Rochford in an attempt to convince 
him that they were not actually ceding Corsica to France 
Choiseul had already admitted to Rochford tha·t-, they were. 75 
It was ~ot until 18 June that Choiseul finally handed 
Rochford a copy of the Convention with Genoa, together with the two 
secret articles, ~lhich 'Vlere e-:<:actly as Rochfol"'d had earlier been 
informed. In the midst of his fulso:.le assurances of pec::.ceful inte.Llt, 
Rochford noticed that Choiseul stressed above else Britai~'s 
obligation to shew \vhere it inlringed an:r exist treaty before she 
made any further objections, In reply, Rochford stated flatly that 
such a acquisit.ion of territory "could not but give a just 
Alarm" to the rest of Europe. 76 
But Choiscul refficlined confident and untroubled once he 
saw that Rochford had no immediate instructions to protest the 
de facto cession so ulainly revealed in ihe fourth Article. He wrote 
two letters to Chatelet on 20 June, supplying arguments with which 
to defend his ful intentions to Shelburn", 'i7 and after 
Chatelet's reports from London, he remarked to Rochford that the 
SP 78/275, f.75, Rochford to Shelburne, 9 June 1768, Secret. 
SP 78/275, f.86, liochford to Shelburne, 16 June 1768, Secret. 
SP 78/275, f .. 90, Rochford to Shelburne, 18 June 1768, Secret. 
AECP Angleterre, ll-79 , fos.160 and 161+ , Choiseul to Chatelet, both 
20 June 1768, cited in , p.190. 
British Hinisters seemed at last to be "un peu adouci" over the 
Corsican affair. 78 
517. 
For once, Choiseul was better informed of the decisions 
of the British Hinis-l;ry th.an Rochford himself. There had been a 
further important Cabinet meeting in mid-June, at which the divisions 
within the Ministry had become acutely obvioua. Shelburne, Grafton, 
Camden, and Haw~e, had all pressed for stern measures over Corsica, 
but the Bedfor6ites, Weymouth and Gower, and eve~ North, had opposed 
any stand which might risk a war, arguing that Corsica was simply 
not worth a major war. The rift between the two Secretaries, Weymouth 
and Shelburne, Wa3 particularly obvious. Weymouth had told ChAtelet 
~rivately at the end of May that he cared little for Cors~ca, and 
Ch~telet had thereafter taken care to rrime Weymouth and Gower with 
sui table arguments to use against Shelburne. '::.'hese arguhlents nO\'1 won 
the day, and the Cabinet finally decided not to intervene over Corsica, 
nor to make any stronger threats or prote~t to France. 79 
Shelburne's position in the Hinistry was steadily being 
undermined by his Bedfordite adversaries, as had been made plain 
earlier that month with thA appointment of t~eir nominee, Lynch, to 
Turin without any consulta~ion with him in whose Department that post 
80 lay. But Rochford's communication of the text of the Convention 
on Corsica, with its clear pI'oof of an intended cession to France, 
78. SP 78/275, f.96, Rochford to Shelburne, 23 June 1768, Secret. 
79. AECP Angleterre, 47~, f.115, Chatelet to Choiseul, 18 June 1768, 
cited in Anderson, p.248, Ramsey, pp.189-190, and Vaucher, p.451. 
Fitzmaurice, II, 124, quotes at length from reports of the Neapolitan 
Envoy, Carracciolo to Tcmucci, 27 Hay and 3 June, on the divisions 
within the Cabinet; Weymouth's main argument was that Britain had 
nothing to fear while she held superiority at sea. See also Anderson, 
pp.247-8, and R~msey, p.189, for AECP Ansleterre, 478, Chatelet to 
Choiseul, 29 Ha.y, and ibid., 479, Ch3.telet to Choiseul, 10 June 1768. 
80. See Fitzmaurice, II, 128, 2_nd Brooke, 'The Chatha!:) Administration, 
pp.363-4~ 
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gave Shelburne fresh e.mmunition, as public opinion again stirred 
in protest against a French acquisition and criticism of the lack 
81 of any clear British policy began to appear in the London papers. 
Shelburne called another Cabinet meeting for the e:n::1 of June, and 
in the meantime warned Chltelet there was still a lively danger of 
war unless his Court explained itself in a less 00ntr2dictory manner. 
Shelburne could not, of course, give Rochford any fresh instructions 
vii thout the sanction of Cabinet, but his nE::xt letter of 21~ June 'YIaS 
as firm and vigorous in t~ne as he dared make it, reflecting bitterly 
82 
on Choiseul's duplicity and delaying tactics. 
Rochford gll7.dly took up this tone at Paris, and in the 
week which followed he kept Choiseul on edge ahd fearful that 
Britain might after all take more decisive action over Corsica. 
On the morning of 28 June, Rochford ''lent to see Choiseul, and found 
him "greatly agita:ced • • as soon as he sa\v mt,;, he said, Nous voil~ 
~ 1a Guerrel II He had just received Chatelet I s dispatch reporting 
Shelburne I S "vlarning that a war might yet result over Corsica. After 
this melodramatic opening, Choiseu1's convers~tion became, Rochford 
noted, "rather serious," as he laboured in 0.1: earnestness to 
persuade Rochford that while they could not possibly retract, they 
would do all they could to avoid a war. In repo~ting this long and 
rambling interview to Shelburne, Rochford declined to comment on 
the sincerity of these assurances ; 
\I I \-.rill not pretend to determine, or make myself 
ans'YJerable for the Asseverations of any Hinister 
vlhatever, especially a French One ;" 
81. AECP Angleterre, 479, f.203, ChStelet to Choiseul, 24 June 1768, 
cited in Anderson,:9_ , and Ramsey, p.190. 
82. SP 78/275, f.92, Shelburne to Rochford, June 1768, Secret. 
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but he was firmly convinced that Choiseulreally did dread a war, 
and indicated to Shelbur!.G that here lay Britain's sale remaining 
chance of successful intervention ; but only 
II • ~ if a Nethod CQuld be pointed out tc Thera that 
,,,auld save t)1eir Honor, and satisfy Us, and 'tIe insist 
upon it i..rith firmness." 83 
This ':las a.fair assessment of the situation at the end 
of June, and Rochford \,'as not alone in it ; Frederick II of Prussia 
i·ras \'latching the courSE; 0 f this affair ,,,i th great interest, through 
Haltzan in London und ThtJ.lemeier at the Ha.gue. He too waG convinced 
that Choiseul feared war at this juncture, a~d approved of Rochford's 
Itton fort haut!! at Faris, fo!' an unopposed victpry over Corsica he 
g(lessed vIould only encourage France and Spain to make larger ventu:~~es 
c.nd provoke another war. But he \'las equally convinced that the 
present British l1inistry was too divided and pusillanimous to 
.... t Ch' 1 C .. 84 ou~s are o~seu_ over crs~ca. 
In this Frederick \'1 as , as usual, shrewdly cor:::-ect ; the 
firm insistence :ihich Rochford had advocated was not taken up, much 
less any positive threat of intervention. \'lhen Cabinet met at the 
end of June, it tamely accepted the evidence ol cession as a fait 
accompli, about which nothing could be done. 85 
83. SP 78/275, f.115, Rochford to Shelburne, 30 June 1768, Secret; 
this dispatch is summarized Fitzmaurice, II, 136-7, but there 
vlrongly ~i ted as 4 July. 
84 .. See Poli tische Correspondenz, XXVII, 1 , p.;ssim, notably letters 
to Haltzan of 7, 11, and 23 June (Fitzmaurice, II, '137-3, prints ;em 
extract from that of 7 June), to Rohd of 21 June, ah1 to Prince 
Henry of Prussia dated 28 June 1768. 
85.. Angleterre, l~79t f.270, Chatelet to Choiseul, 1 July 1768, 
cited in Anderson, p.251, , p.190, and Vaucher, p.452 ; 
Grafton remarked to Chatelet that wi thin one ye'J.r Corsica. would be 
as ent a French e as Alsace or Lorraine. ChQtelet's 
opinion of the British Ministers was that they had no experience, 
opinions, or prine s, and little sense. 
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Shelburne's next instructions to Rochford, of1 July, 
were therefore ~stonishingly weak. Though the Cabinet had agreed 
unanimously that this VIas clearly an absolute cession, and as such 
a departure from the system hitherto professed by the French Court, 
the only task they could think of to commend to Rochford was that 
he try to ascertain the true causes of this step; was it Choiseul's 
own scheme, or a change of policy by the French King himself? : 
as if Rochford's recent dispatch~s had not already answered this! 
Shelburne clothed this lame response with much bitte::.' descanting 
upon Francels deceitful conduct; the whole scheme h~d been 
flcarried on with that Reserve and Obscuritj in the 
Commencem&nt of the D&sign, and Rapidity in its 
Execution, which give jUBt Reason to suspect further 
Vie'v13 than ~hey even no .. : prcfess 
" 
He was especiallY e.nnoyed that Cho.~seul should think them "un peu 
adouci sur catt6 6ffaire" but his bitterness seemB chiefly to stem 
from resentment th~t he had been overruled in Cabinet and defeated 
by a cleverly executed fait accomnli. 86 
If, as Frederick II believed, the resolution of the 
British Cabinet was notable only for its feebleness, 87 the same 
could not be said of their representative in Paris. Rochford was 
glad to see that their se~timents regarding Corsica tallied so 
closely \'1i th his mm 1 but he chose to follow the spirit rather than 
the letter of Shelburne's instructions in his next interview with 
Choiseul. 
86. SP 78/275, f.104, Shelburne to Rochford, 
extracts printed in Fitznaurice, II, 1 
DiDlomati~ Instructions. 1689-1789, VII, 
* . { 
1 July 1768, Secret ; 
131, and in British 
France, iv, pp.10~·-105. 
87. XXVII, Frederick to Ealtzan, 
, ,264, ,for similar sentinents in 
letters to Rohd at Vienna of 10 and 20 July, and to Thulemeier of 
21 July. 
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Shelburne had reminded Rochford to continue refuting 
the notion that Britain in any \1ay condoned France's acquisition 
of Corsica, "but on the contrary to set in a strong Light the 
Imprudence and UD:tdvisedness of such a Heasure." Roc~1ford took 
this as his real touchst0ne. He repeated to Choiseul his warning 
that Britain could not remain indifferent to such a large increase 
of territory and pow~r, 
!land made Use 0 (' the strongest ~['erms to she,\' Him the 
fatal Consequences that must necessarily arIse from 
his, destroying the Confidence that subsisted between 
the Two Nations ; I reproached him with having told me 
in a former Conference Ilque Nous etion2 auoucis sur cetta 
Affaire" ; but that now I should make it my particular 
Business to undeceive the Foreign Hinisters, and Every 
Body else , fa]:, that Hy Court considered this r'Ieasure, 
not only as imprudent, and ill-advise'l, but which must 
infallibly endanger the Peace of Europe." 
It will be ~ot~d how Rochford contrived, while using Shelburne's 
(I,m expressions, to go just a little further a.nd suggest the 
shado'Vl of a threat. Choise,;,l did not fail to notice it, either 
"This put dim greatly out of Humour, and some very 'V/arm 
Expressions fell from Him, such as, 'that if we had no 
Confidence in thbr.:, had none in Us ; that the King 
his Master was excessively picqued at Our meddling in a 
Business which we had no t to interfere in ; that 
"'hat 'fuey had dcne, 'I'hey had a Right to do ; and although 
They \vished to avoid a \'Jar, yet if 1;/e vJOuld drive Them 
into one, They would not try to avoid it, for Nothing 
"Iould induce Ther:] either to retract, or to reeRll Their 
Troops.' 11 
Choiseul realised he had gone too far, and endeavoured to soften 
this with earnest professions of peaceable intentions, calling God 
522. 
to witness that he had " no distant View \'lhatever in this Project.!! 
Choiseul then warned Rochford that if he n0ised it about that 
Bri tain thought this an ill-advised measure lr/hich would endanger 
the Peace of Euro:pe, he ,-muld only aigrir IE'~pri ts and increase 
that very danger. 
Bu t Rochfo:i.'d chose to ignore this en tree ty, . fo!' he knew 
that at this jUi:.cture "Nothing could give him more personal 
Uneasiness. II Hochford '\fas convinced the Corsica:, adventure was 
Choiseul's own scheme, !!relying on Our Party Divisions not e.llmving 
Us to attend to it," and assured Shelburne that the dread of a war 
had raised many enemies against him because of it. Yet Rochford was 
not carried al.!IaY with hopes of seeing Choiseul o'lerthrmm .. Indeed, 
he judged that Choiseul would probably hold his place if he could 
stave off a \'/a~_, because of the French King I s aversion to busi.ness 
and dislike of change. He ,\fould fall only if Lt)uis XV could be 
brought to believe the accusations of 0hoiseul's enemies, and there 
was little likelihood of th~s from the opposition's identification 
with a fractious Parlement. 
There rer::.&ined in Rochford's opinion a slender chance 
that Choiseul might be forced to retreat from Corsic~ rather than 
risk a 'I.</ar 
" as I knolrl for some Days past, He has been uneasy and 
has had his Fears, I cannot help thinking that h Fears 
may cverballance Securi ty, and perhe.ps if he sa,., an 
immediate Wal inevitable, even dishonourable as it would 
be, he '~!ould recal}. the ':L'roops. II 88 
88. SP 78/275, f.120, Rochford to Shelburne, 7 July 1768, Secret; 
Frederick II noted 1:Fith approval Rochfordts strong and vigorous 
representa..tions (tltres fort at tres nerveux ll ) ; ?oliti,sche 
Correr:.:;-Qondenz, XXVII, 266-7, Frederick to Haltzan, 21'"""July 1768. 
But he doubted if the divided British Kinistry would support this 
with sinilarly vigorous action. 
Though it is debatable whether this slender chance 
would have proven as fruitful as Rochford hoped, he \'1as given 
no opportunity to exploit it ; Chatelet returned to Paris on 
9 July, and sioJiftly erased 1tlhatever doubts and fears Rochford 
had succeeded in raising in Choiseul's mind; 
!iSince his Arrival the Hinds of the People herti ar.::; 
a little quieted, as he gives out everywhere that 
there is not the least probability of a warm Account 
89 of CorsJ.ca.!I 
Chatelet assured Choiseul that Hochford' s spiriJ.;ed remonstrations 
went beyond the ag~eed decision of his Governm~nt at home, and 
; .-from London the French Charge, Frances, reported that the usual 
barometer for a crisis or impending ',Jar, the marine insurance rates, 
remained at their normal peacetime levels; in short, ~ochford's 
threatening to-I(:;! was revealed as a piece of unsupported bluff, 90 
It was not only Chatelet who reas8~red Ghoiseul that he 
need not fear a War over Corsica. Abou;; this time, Lord Mansfield 
who was then on a visit to Paris, was heard to declare at table 
'that the English Hinistry "Jere too ,,,eak, and the nation too vlise 
to support them in entering on a war for the sake of Corsica.' 91 
89. SP 78/275, f.148, Rochford to Shelburne, 14 July 176[,. 
90. Anderson, pp.25~-252. 
91. Autobiop;raphical and Political Corres1Jondence of ._~ the Third Duke 
of Grafton, edited by W.R. Anson (London,1898), p.204. Grafton cites 
for this ; private latter from Rochford, which does not however 
appear to have survived amongst the Grafton now at the Bury 
at Edmunds and West Suffolk Record Office. Grafton adds in these 
memoirs (written c.1804-1806) that Rochford "conducted himself \'lith 
dignified firmness and discretion throughout the business"(i.e. over 
Corsica). Mansfield's remark is also noted in Fitzmaurice's Life of 
Shelburn.e_, II, 139-140 ; ,Political Lei:lOr::mc~a of •• tlle fifth Duke 
of Leeds, edited by Oscar Bro1:ming (London, 1881~), p.25 and note ; 
and in Stanhope's f}i8t;oryof J:y~ (1836-54), V, 301-302. See also 
Horn, .1?:t".itish piI?1-..9.!latic Serv2:..S£, p.196. 
92. 
93. 
94. 
95. 
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By the following ',,,eek it was obvious even to Rochford 
that tithe Storm \"hich seemed to threaten •• is blown over. II 
Choiseul was visibly more cheerful and at ease, declaring openly 
that the Corsican adventu~e would have no fScheuse Ruite. Chatelet 
was likewise assiduous in assuring everyone he met that there \-/as 
now no risk of \'lar. These denials in fact gave 1 ise to a rumour 
that Rochford had retracted and denied the strong language he had 
held to Choiseul ; moreove~ it had reached Choiseul's ears that 
Rochford had declared he had been tricked by the French Minister, 
and would therefore personally put no further confidence in him. 
This Rochford vehemeLtly denied to Choiseul himself, and also in his 
report to Shelburll'~ ; "had I even thought so, it vlould have been 
the Height of Imprudence to have sUBgested it to any Perr,on breathing.' 
Bu.t he felt obliGed to mention "such a gor . .sipping Detail" because of 
the large number of English visitors then in ?aris, and the strange 
tales which might be relayed back to London. 92 
Whatever crisis there had been Was now definitely over, 
and at this point the British Government pass~cl from "vThat may be 
93 
called the period of ineffective protest to that of sulky acquiescence. 
Shelburne's next letter to Rochford, of 22 July, vias <"I.stonishingly 
94 brief, and merely referred Rochford to his nreviouF;; instructions. 
Rochford responded with a distinctly bare and impersonal note of 
acknowledgement. 95 
SP '18/275, f.160, Rochford to Shelburne, 21 July 1768, Secret. 
This is B.S. Anderson's delightful description ; p.2.52e 
SP 78/275, f .152, Shelburne to Rochford, 22 July 1768, Separate. 
SP 78/275, f.175, Rochford to Shelburne, 28 July 1768. 
As soon as he perceived that he had lost the game to 
Choiseul, Rochford had in fact applied for home leave, which was 
96 immediately granted. The ostensible reason 1tlaS of course the 
state of his health, still much reduced by hio seri0us illness in 
°7 . May. 7 But the sense of defeat and failure must also have been 
a strong inducement for Rochford to quit the sa10ns of Paris for 
a time at least. Thi~ sense of defeat was s~rely not improved by 
Shelburne t S report of ~2 Al'_bust that ChateJ.et had rema!'t;:ed upon 
Rochford's having ueed a~?arently stronger terms than he was 
authorized to use ; Shelburne had den this to Chatelet, but added 
a warning for Rochford tantamount to a rebuke, that he should avoid 
letting drop in co!:versation anything vthich might be construed as 
;!a personal Resentm'3nt'l against Choiseul. 98 
It is surely significant that in ~he latter par~ of July, 
Rochford t s trusty friend and colleague Staniel' Parten, still in 
England on leave, suddenl~r resigned his Secretaryship of the Paris 
Embassy. 99 Rochford therefore had to remain in Paris for several 
more weeks until the arrival of Porten's succpssor, the llon. Robert 
100 Walpole. In the course of these last few weeks at Paris, 
Rochford continued to report regularly on the French campaign to 
subdue Paoli's insurgents on Corsica, and tpe reverses met by the 
French troops at first. Though the French claimed a victory in their 
96. SP 78/275, f.154, Shelburne to Rochford, 22 July 1768. 
~7. Early in Ju...'le, Lucy had told E,'11e du Deffand that Hochford very 
nuch wished to return to London as soon as he was well enough to 
travel; Valnole GorresDondence, edited by V.S. Lewia (Yale,1 ), 
IV, 85 ; Deffand to Ualpole, 11 June 1768. 
98. SF 78/275, f.180, Shelburne to Rochford, 12 August 1768, Secret~ 
99. SP 78/275, f.200, Shelburne to Rochford, 19 August 1768. 
100. SP 78/275, f.156, Shelburne to \Jalpole, July 1763 ; he ';IaS the 
son of Baron Va190le of Volterton, and cousin to Horace Walpole. 
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first pitched battle with the Corsicans in July, one Batallion ,vas 
so badly maul·eel it had tG be ''Ii thdrawn, four more 'VleI'e ordered to 
lea.ve for Corsica, Chauvelin >vas sent to the island in haste to 
take command of the campaign, and fears revived at Paris over the 
expense and the danger of a war. '1.'here \·rere the usual rumours of 
an impending bankruptcy being declared, and Rochford shrewdly 
observed 
"a particular Attention at this Homf:ut to their p1.'1blick 
Credit may more Light into their Politicks than any 
other Observation." 101 
Though Choiseul's supporters made much of the supposecl success 01' 
J'''rench arms, Rochford \vas " .. ell-informed that most of the other 
Fl~ench Hinisters .Jere "both sorry and ashamed 0f the Affair, 11 and 
Hme du Deffand remarked that Ghoiseul appea:."."ed to have counted his 
102 
chicken8 before they had hatched. 
These few indications suggest Rochford's slender 
chance lI'as not ,·/holly unr~alistic, and that a determined protest 
by Britain on 'cop of the first bloody encounters in what Choiseul 
had promised ",ould be a peaceful occupation m:~ght have stimulated 
Choiseul's opponents at Court to intervene against hi;., with the King. 
But Corsica had rapidly disappeared from Vie"l>l in British Government 
circles, displaced by the more urgent probl~ms of America and the 
continued domestic unrest set in notion b;y theproceedinc;s against 
the notorious John 'dilkes. September, Corsica was no longer even 
103 
a topic of conversation 'dans Ie monde' in Lond?n, and in October 
101. SP 78/275, f.207, Rochford to ;)helburne, 25 August 1768, Secret 
quoted in Fitzmaurice, II, 1 , but wrongly cited as 25 July. 
102. SP 78/275, f.202, Rochford. to Shelburne, 18 AUGust 1768, Secret ; 
Walpole Correspondence, edited W.S. Lewis ,1937-), IV, 157 
~~ " . 7rl---'~ 0 "" b 17(() DeI.:..ano. 'to ';,a ~)O~e,.?l evo er 00. 
103. Anderson, 
2 and 9 S 
, citing AEGP Angleterre, 480, Franc?'s to Ghoiseul, 
1768. 
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the Speech from the :l'hrone at the opening of ParliRment made no 
mention illhatever of the French acquisition of Corsica. As the 
session got under t,lay, the \oJ'eakness of the opposition soon became 
apparen t, and despite :lOisy critic isms from Burke and Beckford, 
t · f t' C' ff . ·1.e -'efeated. 104 a mo 1.on or papers on ne orS1.can a a1.r Has eas:L.y '" 
The ne\'T Secretary for the Paris Enbassy ;'trri veo. at 
Compi~gne on 23 August, 1:1here Rochford at once introduced him to 
Choiseul and the other French Hinisters. . Rochfol'a then took his 
audiences of leave vii th the l-:oyal Family, and returned to Paris 
to hand over the ciphers a:i.!.d to acquaint ivalp::>le i'ith the routine 
of the Er.1bassy. \'Jalpole reported to Shelburne that Rochford had, 
IIwi th the greatest Openness Cl.nd Confidence tl given him vf::ry full 
information and ample instructions for his cor-duct, "an::l on the 
~iethod of doing Business" ; here was yet another of Rochford IS 
Secretaries who ~dopted the diplomatic se=vice for his career. 105 
Rochford presumably left Paris as planned, on 1 September, 
106 
and i'Jould have arrived in London a few days later. It is not 
possible to state \-,1. th any certainty '>lhether he returned merely 
for a short break, expectLlg to return to Paris, or whether he had 
any expec ions of a Cabinet post ; direct evidence is lacking. 
'l.'hough Lady Rochford remained. in France \-1i th her friend Nnle de 
}i'orc8.lquier, '''hich suggests Rochford meant to return, 107 he must 
104. Anderson, pp.257-8 ; Ramsey, p.190, c1.'1:1.ng AECP An[!;2eterre, 481, f.72, 
Chatelet to Choiseul, 11 October 1768. 
105. SP 78/275, fos.211 and 217, Rochford to Shelburne, and 31 August 
1768 ; ibid., f.219, Walpole to Shelburne, 31 August 1768. 
106. SP 78/275, f.217, Rochford to Shelburne, 31 August 1768. 
107. Walpole Correspondence, edited by V.S. Lewis (Yale,1937-), IV, 1 
Daffand to Halpole, 27 DeceDber 1768. 
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have been a1;lare that Shelburne I s days as Secretary of State \vere 
numbered, ,.1i th Grafton and the Bedford faction intent on ousting 
him, and very likely \ian ted to be on hand in case his name "laS 
suggested as a r'9placemen t. This "las, it seems, the general vie\ .. 
of Rochford's return to England at this juncture ; Hansfield "Irate 
to Newcastle on 6 September ; 
"Lord Rochford is come over, I guess to be Secretary 
of State. Those here, to whom it vias offered, it seems 
'108 declined." 
Newcastle approved of this possibility, but Was not BO sure of 
Rochford's 1tJillingness to join the Hinistry \lhich had .l:'ai1ed to 
support him as Ambassador at Paris, as he point3d out to Albemarle 
"I 'Vfan;; particularly to speak to you about your friend 
Rochford. I hear it is reported that he is to be 
Secreta:;.~y of State .. He the fi tter.,t for. it of any man 
in England ; but I would have him come in with oar 
friends, and ilOt with the present Hinisters, ,·,ho lIJill 109 
endeavour to get him ; but that your Lordshil' must prevent." 
But the Ninisters 'lJ/ere not -the only. ones thinking of Rochford as 
a replacement foY' Shelburne ; on 1.5 September, George III ,,,rote to 
Grafton reporting; a C0:r1versation he had held the day before 1ttith 
Camden on this very subjeot. After canvassing various names, the 
King had let drop Rochfo~d's name ; 
!fas he could neither be called of the Bedford connection 
nor adverse to the Earl of Chatham," 
h d 1 b t " '1 hl' 110 and CaDden had agreed that e seene t 8 es cn01ce ava1 a e. 
108. BM Add ESS 32991a, f.69, Ma~sfield to Newcastle, 6 September 1768. 
109. BN Add H:3S 32991a, f.107, rJe\.Jcast1e to Albemarle ,16 September 1768 
extract printed in '.Iinstanley, Lord Chatham and the H:h2 r; 0-;:m08i tiOl! 
(1912), p. n.1. 
110. 9.orre(FJOndep,ce of ~,e IIJ~60-1783, edited by J. Fortescue 
(1927-28), II, Ho.651, George IJ.Ito Grafton, 15 Se~)tetJber 1 ; 
the original of this letter io in the Grafton Papers at the Bury 
St Edmunds an& West Suffolk Record Office, II, A, .519. 
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Soon after this conversation took place, Grafton 
decided that Shelburne must be compelled to resign, either not 
guessing or not wishing to guess that this would very likely 
entail Cha'tham 1 s reSiS'llation also. The first three \veeks of 
October vii tnessed Grafton I s agonized dilemma, \'lhen 8ha tham made 
clear his intention 0f reGigning for the sake of his hea~th. 
At last, Shelbu::"ne resigned \vithout telling the other Hir.iaters, 
and a day latert on 20 October, ChatharJ al;::;o res:~sned. Announcing 
this nNtS to Newcastle ~ Albemarle added ; "Rochford is enlisted, 
& will certainly get one of the Cabinet places •• iI 108 
In fact, Rochford was appointed Secretary of State that 
very same day, 21 October 1768. Yet contrary to most expectations, 
that he should be appointed to the Southern Department in which his 
diplomatic expf'!'ience lay, he \'laS appointed to the Northern, and 
vJeymouth transf<:irred to the Southern, indeed, ::"nsLsted on it, as 
in his view "the most material busines8 to this Country must go 
109 thro I the hands of him \'iho has the Southern CorresponderJ.ce. II 
Unfortuna"t " no direct evidence has yet come to light 
for Rochford's ow~ at this critical juncture of his Career. 
Burke later explained th.is matter, or so he claimed, "exactly in the 
light in \vhich it has been universally receivedu j that Rochford had 
remonstrated vigorously against the French acquisitiou of Corsica, 
108. BH Add HSS 32991, fos.295 and 305, Albemarle to :'levlcastle, 
109. 
21 and 22 October 1~'68. See also Brooke,The Chatham Administration, 
pp.376-383. 
Grafton Papers, Bury st Fd!nunds and Hest Suffolk Record Office, 
A, II, 799 ; Weymouth to Grafton, 6 Septe!nber 1768 ; also quoted 
in Brooke, p.375. EM Add MSS 32991, f. 3, Rochford to ~ewcastle, 
October 1768 (from Berkley Square), gives thanks -for what must 
have been Newcastle's congr~tulation3 on Rochford's appointment. 
See also Collins I)eerar:e of Enp;land (1779), IV, 1Lf4; and the 
Lond0l1 Ila.saz:!:p.e. (1768), 9.706, for the date of appointment. 
but found that the instructions upon which he did so were not 
supported by the rest of the Cabinet 
flLord Rochford, a man of spirit, could not endure 
this situation. " He returns from Paris, and comes home 
full of anger. Lord Shelburne, who gave the orders, 
is obliged to give up the Seals. Lord Rochf0rd, who 
obeyed these 0rders, receives them. He gOes, however, 
into another Department of the same Office, that he 
might not be obliged officially to acquiesce, in one 
situation, under what he had officially r~~onstrated 
against, in another. At Paris, the Duke of Choiseul 
considored this office arrangement as a compliment to 
him ; herp it was s20ken of as an attention to the 
delicacy of Lord Rochford.1I 110 
Choiseul t s opinion of Rochford \-,as indGed contemptuous in the 
extreme. He wrcte to Ossun at Nadrid :a!:e in September chat 
the rumours of Rochford's appointment as Secretary of state 
must cause Grimaldi mirth and astonishr:;ent 
fl. • en connoissan t parfai temen t Ie me-"ris que l' en 
do it avoir pour les talents et Ie caractere de M. de 
Rochford, je crains toujours dtavoir a faire a un 
fol imbecile.1! 111 
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110. Edmund Burke, Thot:r;hts on the Cause of the Present D:1.scontents (1770), 
edi ted by I:I. 1-1uTiso11 (CambridGe, 1913), pp. LI-6- l I-7. A similar vie~1 
was expressed in a letter to the Public Advertiser of 26 October 1768, 
signed !lV/hy?!! but generally attributed to Junius, l"hich questioned 
the manifest absurdity of ing Rochford to a Departnent in 
which he had no experience when he was so emin~n qualified for 
other. Amo:>:l.g other , this letter pays tribute to Rochford's 
"great abilities", -lis "constant attention to bus 11 at foreign 
Courts, and his IIneutrality and non-attachment to particular 
men or measures, II and est;" blishes the general joy and "uni vers?,l 
approbation ll of the 1_C to see a career diploinat at last given 
0: foreign 3ee also JOlln Almon's AnecGotes of the 
.... Earl of Chathan (London,1793), II, 141-142. 
111. AECP Espagne 575, Choiseul to Ossun, 27 Septeraber 1768 ; quoted in 
Abarca, "Bourbon 1 I against England" (unpublished ?h.:;). 
thesis, University of Notre Dai:lc, 19(5), p.200, note 129. 
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Earlier, on 4 AUGust, Choiseul had vlritVm to Durand, 
the Secretary of the French Embassy in London, that Rochford's 
rumoured appointment as Secretary of state 
"ne m'eri te'lti.cune sort de consideratio!1, C8.r c I est la plus 
pauvre esp~ce en teus genres que j1aye jamais vG. Cependant 
vous chercherez l'oGcasion de le flagorner ••• Son point 
de folie est de vouloir jouer un rBle et qUE' lion croye un 
grand po15tique, et surtout il imagine imiter Robel't Ualpole. 
Voil~ u~ eanevas assez vaste pour lui dire des riens et vous 
attirer sa confianee il vous la donnera a5sement, si vous 
le flattez, car coi, qui ne le flatte ~as, il me dit tout 
ce qulil pense et, quoique ce soit bien peu de choses, il 
n' est pas ~, negliger de sa voir ce qu' il fe1'2. a Londres. 1I 
5ut perhaps the most damning comment Choiseul had to make about 
Rochford '''as that expressed 1;0 Ch&telet late in Novembel' ; 
"Le Cornte de Rochford est si inconsidere, s1 indh,;:;ret, et 
si borne qu'il nlest guere possibl~ 0~ prendre quelque 
confiance en lui ; cep~ndant cornea il n'est pas moins 
. ;t A t J.mcompe ent, il se conduira peut-~etre plus convenablemen 
a notre egard da~a la place qu'il oeeupe qu'il nla fait 
pendant qu'il a resid~ en France." 113 
Why had Chois~ul formed such a bitter dislike of 
112 
Rochford? Were his rema~ks merely the product of porsonal spite, 
or do they hold some element of truth? Again, apart from the 
scanty fragments quoted above, the evidence remain::- inconclusive, 
but fortunately there survive two useful clues iL sources which 
cannot be described as partial to Rochford himself. 1'he first is 
112. AECP Angleterre LI-74 , f.248, Choiseul to Durand, 4 AuguGt 1768 ; 
printed in Recueil des Instructions donn6cs nux Ambassadeurs et 
lIinistres de I;'rance •• -~G3J-2, A:~gleterre, iii (1698-179'1), edited 
by P. Vaucher (Par~s,1965), p. ,note 13. 
113. AECP Angleterre 481, f. 
also quoted in Vaucher, 
to Ch£telet, 29 November 1768 
a statement by Horace Walpole, that Rochford had told him on his 
return to London that the cause of Choiseul's hatred for him was 
the spirit with which he h~d behaved at Paris, especially over 
the Corsican aff~ir ; 
"against i.fhich he .had remonstrated vIi th more \'Jarmth 
than he had been encollraged to do from home ; and 
had he, as he told me himself, been authorised to 
hold a firm language, France "Iould not have ventured 
to proceed in that conquest.!1 
It is at this point in his Hemoirs that Ualpole makes r1.is m-rn 
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considered and, as it proved, influential; estimation of Rochford 
"Lord Rochford \ITas a man of no abilities, and of as little 
knovdedge, except in the routine of office ; but he meant 
honestly, behaved plausibly, \'/aS pliant eno'.1.gh to take 
whatever Was offered to him, and too inoffensive to give 
alarm or je:::tlousy to any party." 114 
'TIle;) other ~lue comes from Rochford's Had!'id Embassy, 
in a remark made 1y the Abbe Belia:di to Choiseul ab0ut Rochford 
"oet homme ment '!:>eaucoup, qulil chance aSsez souvent de 
propos et qufil ~erait difficile de juger oe qu'il pense 
115 par ce qu;il dit." 
Lies and deception were inescapable ingredients of the art of 
diplomacy, and as Rochford himself once observed, trusting too far 
was a dangerous luxury. It does not seem too improbable that 
Choiseul disliked R~chford chiefly because he could never quite 
pin him dOltm, or kn01l1 that his own deceptions had been swallm'1ed at 
11!+. Horace Ualpole I Her.1oirs of the HeiCn of Kinr; George the Thir,d, 
revised edition by G.}'.. RusGell13arker (London,1894) , III, 168. 
115. AECP EspaGne 544, f. ,Beliardi to Choiseul, 9 September 1765 ; 
quoted in J .E. Hartin-Allanic, Boup;ainv:ille, nav,iga-ceyr, at les 
-'" 'J 1"r j ,) r· 2<-n I ·~O decouvertes ae Gon cernDS , ~b~, ., 7U, no~e ) • 
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face value .• In short, unlike most of the diplomatic corps at 
Paris, Rochford was never one of Choiseul's Itcreatures." 
Bu t this bring.s u.s close to making a judgment upon 
Rochford's abilit.ies and weaknesses as a diplomat, which properly 
belongs to the conclusion. He had at last achieved the elusive 
goal of a Ministerial post, without the aid of party connections, 
and he joined Grafton's Administration very much as an independent, 
as a King I s Hdn j on the merits of his diplomatic axpe:cience and 
his known pliability. i'lha tever Choiseul' s opinion 1.'3garding 
Rochford's appointm~nt, there went up a general sigh of relief 
amongst the British diplomats in the field, to see one of 'cheir 
own number given charee of foreign policy_ Fe,,:haps the most heart-
\-/arming of the congratulativns Rochford x·eceiv0G. '.fas that of his 
for.mer Chaplain, de Visme, ~10W at St Petersturg, ","ith i.vh:i.ch it 
seems appropriate to c.onclude ; 
"As I cannot but admire the \,lisdom of His Hajestyfs choice, 
so I am under no uneasiness on the particula:~ difficulties 
of the Task, after he,ving, during so long a time, been 
witness to an ap'plication equal to very uncommon abilities. 
Though at so great a distance from home, yet I cannot but 
esteem myself extremely happy in being em:910yed in this 
D t t il 116 epar men • 
116. SP Hussla 91/79, f .. 359, l)eVlsme to Rochford, 22 I\ovember 1768. 
ASSESSHENT 
Rochford once wrote that the assessment of personalities 
or "characters ll v"as c. very delicate business indeed. }'ortl.lnately 
it is no part of my task to form a character judgment on a person 
who has been dead for nearly two hundred years, but merely to 
assess the quality of his performance as a diplomat and his 
6uitability to take c~arge of British foreign policy as a Secretary 
of State. Nevertheless, it may be observed in pa8si~g that 
ROGhford was far from possessing an unattractive personality, 
insofar as can be judged from his letters. His warmth and affability, 
his quick sympathy, his sincerity, and his c )!:cern for the feelings 
of others, together with an almost total absence of sourness or 
vi~dictiveness, make them a joy to read. Yet these admirable 
quali ties, while they might make a good friend, do not iiecessarily 
make a good diplomat. Just \·,hat sort of a diplomat was Rochford? 
The overwhelming impression which arises from a detailed 
examination of Rochford's routine work is that of exceptional 
diligence and application to duty. This was, of course, exactly 
the impression which every diplomat sought to convey in his reports 
home, but in Rochford's c~se there are tangible results to support 
this view. His attitude to his work might almost be described as 
professional in an !3.g~ \vhere the British diploma tic service 'vas 
manned largely by proudly self-confessed amateurs. 
From the very start of his diplomatic apprenticeship at 
Turin, he did not shirk the drudgery involved in studying the 
background to the cases entrusted to his attention, as in the 
case of the English Hiners in Savoy, which in-;'olved quite 
complicated legal aspects. Where the defence of those who 
claim~d Britain's protection was involved, he took the trouble 
to vis the people concerned, though at some distance from 
i1urin, to obtain a first-hand understanding of their problems. 
Thanks to the thoroughness with ".:hich he prepared 
himself in such cases, Rochford was rarely, if ever, caught 
out on a point of detail, and \-ras more often aola to uce his 
command of the detail to good advantage. ris interest in the 
X'0utine part of his: work aiso meant that :he scarcely ever had 
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to be prodded by instructions at every turn. Quite the contrary 
seems to be true ; Rochford's initiative was such that he often 
anticipated the next step to be suggested by the Secretary of 
State t either in an unsigned note or more commonly in u.:lOfficial 
IIsound":'ngs, II usually with such accuracy and restre.in t as to earn 
praise and commendation, at times from the g himself. This 
surely suggests a nice sense of judgment and an 8.bility to grasp 
the realities of a given situation, both vit&l qu~lities in a 
diplomat. 
In over ten years' service abroad, Rochford only twice 
received serious rebukes for exceeding or failing to comply with 
his Instructions. The first rebuke, in the course of the negotiation 
at Turin relating to the '.2reaty of Aranjuez, was wholly undeserved, 
and proved in fact to be an oversight on the part vl Holdernesse. 
Much more serious was the misunderstanding which bedevilled the 
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British side of the first Falkland Islands Crisis in 1766. Yet 
here again, the error stemmed largely from unclear instructions, 
for which Shelburne later apologized. Rochford's assuMption 
regarding tl~e Hanila Ransom, based upon his Hadrid experience in 
that negotiation, \vas probably more realisitic th.:ln that entertained 
in London. 
Rochford's success in minor negotiations and the routine 
Cases which inGvitably arise in the course of a.Ti embassy constitutes 
perhaps his most significant achievement as a (1iplomat. These 
were often mat~er~ in which his own initiative had suggested 
workable solutions, as in the case of the Villafranca duty, or 
the rulings he obtained in Spain clarifying the position of Vice-
Consuls and Agents. Indeed, it is in Rochford's deali~ge with 
nearby Bri tisr Gonsuls \vhile at Turin and ;"iadrid that he is seen 
at his most dilig~nt and resourceful best. T~is may not seem 
particularly novel, yet in the conteXT, of the eighteenth centuJy, 
and in view of the social gulf which usually divided the Consular 
from the Diplomatic Service, it ,,,as exceptional, especially for 
one of the nobility. In Rochford's period, the only other British 
diplomat to my kno\vledge ',,,ho had such close deal \;,i th Consuls 
was Benjamin Keene, \'iho was not hampered by considerations of rank. 
Not all negotiations ... /ere capable of reso:ui~ion by the 
man on the spot, depending on circumstances far beyond his control, 
and Rochford had his share of frustration and disappointment from 
this source in the Aranjuez negotiation, the Manila Ransom claim, 
and the intractable problem of Dunkirk. It is arguable, though 
also perhaps debatable, that his efforts gained more for Britain 
than the bare minimum with which some diplomats m~.ght have been 
content. His failure in the crisis over t~e French acquisition 
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of Corsica was through no lack of vigilance or firmness on his 
part, but ratherche !"efusal of a weak and 0.i vided Hinistry to 
support the stern line which he personally advoca.ted !1nd pressed 
as far as he dared at Paris. Whether or not the policy of a 
stiffer Britist protest would have worked in practice is of course 
quite another question. 
Rochford was generally well-received at the Courts to 
which he was appointed, and took care to preserVE; good relations 
with Ministers and Courtiers alike. This ie very clearly seen at 
Turin, during the pOl-rer-struggle between Cssorio and Bogino~ lllith 
the monarchs themselves, Rochford was never at anytime Eersona 
non grata, an, there was no hint of a scandal to compare witt 
that of Hacartney at StPetersburg. Rochford seems to have been 
respected rather than disliked for his outsp0ken defence of B~itish 
. interests, and both Charles Emmanuel III of Savoy-Sardinia and 
Charles III of Sp~in are known to have complimented him on his 
tact and discreticn. 
In his dealings with fellow foreign ministers in the 
three capitals ~t which he resided, Rochford seems to have made 
a good impression, though this one aspect where my evidence is 
admittedly deficient ; with more time to comb various European 
archives, this optimistic view might be modified considerably. 
He seems at least to ha~e been recognized at Madrid as the leader 
of ;'Iha t might be termed the members of the IlCommon Cause, II and 
demonstrated his leadership decisively in his actions at the 
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Royal espousal early in 1764. Other ministers came to him for 
advice, and weTS prepared to follow his lead in ceremonial matters 
the Portuguese Ambassador' even had Rochford draft a difficult Note 
for him. Such Fmall episodes suggest that Rochford's abilities 
were recognized by his colleagues. 
Yet Rochford failed to make a good impression on the 
most powerful and well-knovm statesman he had to deal "lith, namely 
Choiseul, whose animadversions were noted in the previous chapter. 
It is impossible to speak with any certainty here, from the lack 
of supporting evidence, but I would suggest that Choiseul's 
dislike of Rochford stemmed equally from Rochford's strengths and 
weaknesses as a diplomat. Choiseul was acc~ctomed to the adulation 
of the diplomatic corps at Paris, but Rochford refused to be 
counted one of his IIcreatures,lI atld gave Choiseul a dii':i"icult 
time in so=ne of i:heir debates. But the failure of Choiseul' s 
scheme to combine the Hanila Rans('m and Falkland Isiands issues 
at the end of 1766 was profoundly humiliating, and it seems likely 
that he blamed Rochford' for the confusions and misunderstandings 
on the British side. In addition, Choiseul complained that 
Rochford's word could not be relied upon, and this brings me to 
consider what must be counted as Rochford's most serious weakness 
as a negotiator ; his loquacity. 
There are nany more testimonies available from Rochford's 
Secretaryship than from his diplomatic career regarding his 
celebrated verbal vivacity, yet curiously such a trait is perhaps 
less reprehensible in a diplomat than in a Secretary of state. 
A skilled talker can often wear down and confuse his opponents 
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more effectively than the taciturn negotiator '''ho must ,,,eigh 
carefully his every utterance. There are numerous instances of 
Rochford's having canvassed an issue unofficially, merely as a 
pri vate person, without committing himself in any wa.y. lvas this 
in fact his favourite technique of debate? To weave such a net 
that his interlocutor might ~egin to doubt his own argument ? 
To disclaim having stateu a view ministerially, and convert the 
charge into an oppor+-unity for yet more involved debate? 
Such an approach Can sometimes be most eff~ctive, and 
also extremely fructrating for one's opponent, but it has the 
disadvantage that ene tends not to be taken 8er~ously at times 
when the initiative is reversed. In a Secr·~tary of state, this 
is surely a serious fault. 
Nevertheless, whatever R(\chford I s skills or "waknesses 
in negotia~ien, these form only part of the total estimation, 
and he can claim Jolid merits in ether areas. Perhaps the primary 
function of a diplomat in the eighteenth century was the steady 
collection, assembling, and reportage of information which would 
be of use in framing foreign policy at home~ ~ochford's diligence 
and judgment here have had ample testimony. He spared no expense 
in the securing of relia~le sources of secret intelligence, yet 
treated all the informat thus gained with suitable caution and 
critical reserve. His reports were consistently measured and 
restrained, and at no time was their tone alarmist. He is known 
to have investigated rumours before reporting them, and there are 
several instances where he chose not to report a rum our \vhich he 
was satisfied had no foundation. 
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Where it has possible to test the accuracy of Rochford's 
reports, as in the case of the state of the Spanish armed forces, 
they have come out favourably. Rochford's estimates were much 
closer to those accepted by Choiseul than the hopeful exaggerations 
of the French Ambassador, Ossun. Yet this might easily be explained 
from a similarity of intelligence sources, were it not for Rochford!s 
sending his own Secretary to Cartagena to aee for himself, and his 
~close dealings through Porten with British Consuls in the Spanish 
ports. 
Probably of equal value, yet much more difficult to 
obtain, were the details Rochford was able to supply of French 
and Spanish trace and finances. fIis atten-don to matters commercial 
may also suggest the origin of his most profound insight into 
European affair~, which was to inform hiE direction of B~itish 
foreign policy as Southern Secretary after 1(70. 
The work of Protessor Hichael Roberts has cstablished 
that as Southern Secretary Rochford was one of the very few 
statesmen on either side of the Channel \.,.ho '.'lere beginning to 
think in terms other than the traditional Anglo-~~enrh enmity 
which had characterized the earlier part of the eighteenth century. 
This is much too large a question to be eX9lored here 'j but I 
would suggest that Rochfordts awareness of the relative decline in 
European importance of both England and France in consequence of 
the emergence of Russia and Prussia aB great pO\l/ers, r!:iay have had 
some initial glimmeringa before his term as Ilorthern Secretary, 
which seems the most obvious opportunity for this realization to 
daVin. Rochford's advocacy of a new Commercial Treaty .... lith France 
in 1767, when the obvious remedy to the prevailing difficulties 
(and that which t'las in fact adopted) Vlas simply to induce France 
to recognize the provisions of Utrecht, strongly suggests that he 
was beginning to think in terms of a rapprochement such as that 
mooted by George III a few years later in 1772. (On this, see 
P.oberts' Splendid Isolation, 1763-1780, p.38). This is, of course, 
merely speculation, but the fact of Rochford's secret talks with 
Hartang.e in 1773 testifies to the breadth of vision he displayed 
as Secretary of State! as also to the risks he was willing to take 
in its furtherance. 
How Buitable, then, was Rochford by 1768 as a candidate 
for the Secretaryship to which he was appointed in October of that 
year? Newcastle, aa noted in the previous chapter, declared him 
1:the fittest for it of any man in England e ,I In terms of his 
abilities and experience as a diplomat, I wOuld be inclined to 
agree. Talent lay thin on the ground in these years, and while 
'not by any means a perfect choice, Rochford does seem to have been 
the best available. Certainly, none could bp.ttar his experience 
as a diplomat in the premier Courts of weste:Cll EuropE' the leading 
British diplomats of later years were at this time much younger 
men just starting out, such as Stormont, R0bert Hurray Keith, and 
James Harris (later Lord lIalmesbury). The range yet unity of 
Rochford's diplomatic experience was quite exceptional in the 
service at this time. 
Rochford cannot be described as an ideal choice, not only 
from the weaknesses mentioned above, but also because of his lack 
of political connexions at home ,which made him a lighttveieht in 
domestic politics and severely limited his effectiveness as a 
Government spokesman in Parliament. This also led him to foster 
a direct relationship with George III, which earned him the 
suspicion of his Cahinet colleagues and the reputation of being 
a liKing's Han." Further, Rochford's slender personal fortune 
made him more depen'ent than most upon the profits of otfice, 
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and he has beer. charged with the manipulation of t.he J!""alklands 
negotiation of 1770 in order to reap a fortune (m the stock-market 
(in fact, however, his agent misjudged and lost heavily). 
Such considerations as these tend to re~ress the very 
favourable balance established by his diplo~atic career. They 
cannot, of course, erase the strong impreosion (even Horace Walpole 
concedes this) that Rochford would be an excellent administrator 
once in offic,,', which indeed 118 proved to be. But the::.~e l'rie 
last consideration which may seem curiously trivial yet is not 
without significance ; Rochford did not enjo~' good health. In this 
sense, he \'las far from being the IIfittest man" in England for the 
rigoursof high office. 112 the 1770s, his illnesses combined with 
Suffolk's gout to deprive Britain of any energetic direction in 
foreign affairs for vleeks on end, much to the disgust of foreign 
Ambassadors in .London. Rochford's resignation in 1775 owed as much 
to his poor state of health as to the impending \'Jar in America and 
the humiliations of the Sayre affair. 
It .is indeed tempting to speculate what use Rochford 
might have made of his ~;ide diplomatic experience and his 
broadening vision of Britain's role with France and Spain in a 
changing Europe, had he enjoyed better health, had he been 
spared the distractions of his domestic responsibilities as 
Southern Secretary, and had the American vlar not intervened. 
But thu.t belongs to his Secretaryship, which is 
quite another story. 
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